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Islamists Penetrate Western Security

by Daniel Pipes
January 24, 2005

updated Mar 9, 2008

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It was hard for me to write this, but I argued exactly two years ago that "There is no escaping the unfortunate fact that Muslim government employees in law enforcement, the military and the diplomatic corps need to be watched for connections to terrorism, as do Muslim chaplains in prisons and the armed forces."

Those words came to mind this evening, at the very end of the sixth episode in Fox Broadcasting's 24 drama, when one of the key American counterterrorist figures turned out to be working for an Islamist terrorist gang. It may sound unlikely, but there are already at least four documented cases of Islamist infiltration of law enforcement and the intelligence services in Western countries:

 

Ghazi Kassim

   

For examples of penetration of the U.S. military, see my writings at "Pentagon Jihadis" and "More Pentagon Jihadis." Plus, I discuss the murky case of FBI Special Agent Gamal Abdel-Hafiz at "The FBI Fumbles [on Gamal Abdel-Hafiz]" and a follow-up weblog entry, "The Saga of FBI Special Agent Gamal Abdel-Hafiz."

Assuming that these are not the last such instances, I will record others here, as they come to my attention. (January 24, 2005)

March 8, 2005 update: The Los Angeles Times has a major article today on this problem by Bob Drogin, "Spy Agencies Fear Some Applicants Are Terrorists." Barry Royden, a counterintelligence instructor at the Central Intelligence Agency flat-out states that "We think terrorist organizations have tried to insinuate people into our hiring pools." Three senior counterintelligence officials added their worry that terrorist groups are trying to place an "insider" in U.S. counterterrorist planning and operational networks. They point to two difficulties in keeping out infiltrators:

those most qualified for such sensitive jobs — naturalized Americans who grew up in the Middle East or South Asia, for example, and who are native speakers of Arabic, Farsi, Dari, Urdu and other crucial languages — have proved the most difficult to vet during background checks. In addition, because of restrictions imposed by U.S. privacy laws, authorities at one spy service may not know that someone they had rejected later found a job at another agency or at a defense contractor working on classified systems.

March 25, 2005 update: Another specific case, this one nipped before it could happen:

May 31, 2005 update: There's quite a story coming out of Sydney:

It could be argued that racial if not ideological profiling is now an accepted part of risk assessment. Investigations revealed that some security guards ... have been in Australia for relatively short periods of time yet have already been issued with security and firearms licences despite their grasp of English being minimal.

Then there is the problem of porters. Among them, the report goes on,

there is a predominance of Middle Eastern male employees in their early 20s. It was felt some of the men were under the influence of a particular supervisor who used his 'lieutenants' in the distribution of narcotics and the systematic stealing from carpark and baggage. Some of these persons have affiliations with radical ... groups and are seen as a possible security liability. Some have associations with gangs predominantly in Sydney's southwest renowned for gang rapes, ram raids, theft, drive-bys and car-rebirthing. The vulnerability of Sydney airport ... should not be under-evaluated in terms of counter-terrorism or other criminal activity.

June 10, 2005 update: The report from Sydney just above focuses on airport security screeners and porters, but what about baggage handlers?

Crown Prosecutor Geoffrey Bellew told the court during the committal hearing that Khazal had compiled a terrorist manual by collecting articles he found on the internet. … [Central Local Court Magistrate Michael] Price today committed the 35-year-old to stand trial, saying there was a reasonable prospect of conviction. "I find there is a reasonable prospect that a reasonable jury properly instructed will convict you of this indictable offence and you are committed to stand your trial in the Supreme Court."

The Sydney Morning Herald provides details on Khazal's manual for terrrorists, titled Provisions on the Rules of Jihad and written under a pseudonym (Abu Mohamed Attawheedy). Khazal is modest about his effort, found on his computer in suburban Lakemba and dedicated to the "martyrs of Islam." He writes that it has "short and wise" rules for jihad but apologizes for the text's deficiencies, noting it was done in a few days. Almost a third of the text provides guidance for assassins, including attributes needed ("wit and a quick mind," "a terrorist psychology," and "high physical fitness"). The manual explains how to set up hit squads and tells how jihad fighters can protect themselves from the CIA and Mossad. A checklist for jihadist assassins covers such subject as finances, transportation, and constructing time-bombs. The book praises Al-Qaeda's "impressive success of the conquest of New York," a reference to September 11, 2001.

Khazal also faces a committal hearing on a second terrorism-related charge, that of inciting another person to commit a terrorist act.

Oh, and Bilal Khazal has already been convicted, along with his brother Maher, of helping and financing a terror group that bombed a McDonald's restaurant in Beirut in April 2003.

July 10, 2005 update: Michael Sulick, former CIA chief of counterintelligence, today quotes Barry Royden that as many as 40 terrorists may have attempted to infiltrate U.S. intelligence agencies in recent months and adds on his own authority that "post-Sept. 11 pressures to quickly boost staffing make it increasingly likely that a terrorist could sneak into the intelligence community's ranks." He also argues that

Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups operate like traditional intelligence services. Terrorists spy before they terrorize. They case and observe their targets. They collect intelligence about their enemy's vulnerabilities from publicly available information and by eliciting secrets from unwitting sources. Like intelligence officers, terrorists also practice tradecraft — the art of blending seamlessly into a society's fabric for months or years before striking.

And Sulick makes this observation about the potential damage such a spy could do:

In the war on terrorism, intelligence has replaced the Cold War's tanks and fighter planes as the primary weapon against an unseen enemy. A single mole in the CIA, the National Security Agency or the FBI could inflict far more damage to national security than Soviet spies did during the Cold War. Because the U.S. and Soviet Union never went head-to-head in war, the Soviets never fully exploited the advantages from its spies. Now, however, our nation is at war. Imagine the damage Al Qaeda could do with the help of an infiltrator such as FBI spy Robert Hanssen or CIA traitor Aldrich Ames, each of whom passed a wealth of classified material to the Russians.

July 15, 2005 update: This case does not exactly fit the list, given the person's Christian religion and non-attempt to hide his views, but I include it because of its similarities with the other examples.

Sep. 11, 2005 update: In a related matter, an Independent on Sunday investigation by Shiv Malik has established "How militant Islamists are infiltrating Britain's top companies." Specifically, it looks at the ways Hizb ut-Tahrir has placed its members in such leading institutions as the National Health Service, IBM, the Guardian, and Reuters.

Dec. 1, 2005 update:

Dec. 9, 2005 update:

May 14, 2006 update:

June 10, 2006 update:

June 18, 2006 update:

July 3, 2006 update:

July 30, 2006 update: Two items in the same paper, the Sunday Times (London), on the same day, one concerning law enforcement and one a policymaker.

Abid Javaid.

Nov. 15, 2006 update: More rot in Londonistan.

Jan. 21, 2007 update: Omar Bakri Mohammed, the British extremist now resident in Lebanon, met with Mike Hirst and Adam Lusher of London's Sunday Telegraph in Beirut, where he "sipped freshly-squeezed strawberry juice in an upmarket restaurant overlooking the Mediterranean." Bakri told them that Muslims in police, Armed Forces and Civil Service will one day revolt against the system to "crush it from within." Britain is "digging a deep hole" for itself by allowing Muslims into the Services and Whitehall.

When you start to ask Muslims to join your Army and your police you are making a grave mistake. That British Muslim who joins the police today will one day read the Koran and will have an awakening. Those moderates are one day going to be practising Muslims. Now what happens if they are British police or in the Army and they have weapons? How much information do they have about you that they will use to serve the global struggle? They will revolt against the system if they have been failed by your foreign policy which is oppressive against Islam, or have been contacted by people who believe Britain is a domain of war.

Hirst and Lusher report that Bakri, consistent with this outlook, "took pleasure" in hearing about Abid Javaid, a civil servant in the Immigration and Nationality Directorate, who was exposed late last year as a leading member of Hizb ut-Tahrir.

The Muslim Council of Britain, not surprisingly, took exception to Bakri's analysis. According to Ibrahim Mogra, chairman of its Interfaith Relations Committee, "On the contrary, the more a Muslim police officer becomes a practising Muslim, the more loyal he will become, the more he will realise his duty to his country and the need to contribute to its well-being."

Feb. 3, 2007 update: Intimations of a mole in the military:

Apr. 21, 2007 update: What could be a mole in a nuclear power plant:

Omar Altimimi, convicted terrorist, tried to get a job with the Manchester, U.K. police department.

May 8, 2007 update: A novel twist from Chicago:

July 6, 2007 update: A rare instance of a convicted terrorist trying to get access to a police building from the inside:

July 7, 2007 update: Large-scale fears of UK police being penetrated by Islamists; and worse than that, almost no recourse to dismiss them.

Mustapha Boutarfa

July 8, 2007 update: An only-in-Britain tale of incompetence.

Nov. 11, 2007 update: "Thousands of illegal immigrants have been given official licences to work as security guards, the Home Office has admitted."

Nov. 13, 2007 update: The FBI released information today on perhaps the worst U.S. case of infiltration so far:

Nov. 20, 2007 update: In a major analysis, "Is U.S. gov't infested with terrorist moles?" WorldNetDaily.com surveys this general problem. It also focuses on one case:

Dec. 14, 2007 update: The UK sets a new scale for this problem, dwarfing all others:

Feb. 12, 2008 update: Stephen Wright of the Daily Mail offers a survey of this problem at "Revealed: Islamist extremists have penetrated the heart of Britain," based on government intelligence reports.

Islamist extremists have infiltrated Government and key public utilities to pass sensitive information to terrorists, the security services have warned. Counter-terrorism officials say "insiders" or their associates are almost certainly working "undetected" in sensitive posts and are actively supporting the activities of extremists. In some cases, lifelong relationships between friends or relatives are being exploited to obtain crucial information from those in sensitive posts. … Officials say the idea of "penetrating the enemy is pervasive" for Islamist extremists. … Some are even believed to have attended terror training camps in Pakistan or Afghanistan.

Wright then gets into operations:

Fanatics who infiltrate the Government or the "Critical National Infrastructure" - vital utilities such as water, electricity, transport and communications - have a number of objectives. These include trying to gain information on what the law enforcement agencies know about the activities of fellow Islamist extremists and how to evade the attention of police and the security services. They may also try to obtain information or intelligence to help them to carry out acts of terrorism. This involves getting access to premises or individuals "with the immediate purpose" of mounting an attack or obtaining sensitive information to facilitate a later atrocity. The extremists might also seek information which is of "indirect use" to the planning of a terrorist attack - such as getting access to banking information to raise money through fraud, gaining insider knowledge about airport security and surveillance measures on the London Underground. Security sources say there is evidence that UK-based terrorists have discussed the possibility of attacking national infrastructure targets with the help of a "sympathetic insider".

Mar. 9, 2008 update: More along these lines, but now more specific: "MI5 targets four Met police officers 'working as Al Qaeda Spies'," reports the Sunday Mail.

Four police officers in Britain's top force are reportedly under close secret service surveillance after being identified as Al Qaeda spies, it emerged today. MI5 are said to have homed in on the the "sleeper" agents passing secrets from Scotland Yard to the terror group only in recent weeks. … All four are understood to be Asians living in London and are feared to have links both with Islamic extremists in Britain and worldwide terror groups - including al-Qaeda training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan. MI5 chiefs reportedly believe the suspected moles have been planted as sleepers - agents under deep cover - to keep al-Qaeda informed of anti-terror raids planned by London's Metropolitan Police. They are said to fear the four could have already accessed sensitive information about secret operations to root out terror cells planning further attacks in the UK. …

Now agents, helped by anti-terror police, are understood to be watching the four suspects - who work at different police stations around London - around the clock while searching for the vital evidence needed to make arrests. The officers' every move at work is being monitored along with their phone calls, it was claimed. Homeland security agents are reportedly sifting through their bank account transactions. MI5 experts are also understood to be building a family tree for each one and trying to put together a picture of their links to their home countries. Their names are being cross-referred with lists of men who have been to terror training camps in Pakistan or Afghanistan.

Apr. 23, 2008 update: The authorities were disturbingly soft on what appears to be another infiltrator:

In June 2005, when federal agents had a Fairfax man under surveillance, the man apparently asked Rasool to check the license plates of three vehicles he thought were following him. Rasool's lawyer described the man as a member of Rasool's mosque. According to court records, Rasool checked the databases and left the following voice-mail message for the man: "Umm, as I told you, I can only tell you if it comes back to a person or not a person, and all three vehicles did not come back to an individual person. So, I just wanted to give you that much." The three vehicles were undercover FBI vehicles, according to a letter from the FBI filed in court yesterday, and Rasool's message "likely alerted the subject of the FBI investigation which had a disruptive effect on the pending counterterrorism case." …

The target was arrested in November 2005, then convicted and deported, according to court filings in Rasool's case. Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeanine Linehan said that the target and his family were already dressed and destroying evidence at 6 a.m. when agents arrived to make the arrest, indicating that they had been tipped off. The target's name and the charges against him have not been disclosed. In October 2007, the FBI confronted Rasool about his computer inquiries on the man's behalf. According to a brief written by Linehan, Rasool denied knowing the man. When presented with the recording of his message for the man, Rasool admitted checking the databases

May 9, 2008 update (1): The Investigative Project on Terrorism has made the prosecutors' sentencing memo to the court about Rasool available, and it explains the importance of Rasool's activities:

The defendant's actions damaged the integrity of the NCIC [National Crime Information Center] system and jeopardized at least one federal investigation. The defendant's actions could have placed federal agents in danger. The FBI has had to undo the harm caused by the defendant.

May 9, 2008 update (2): A new area of activity:

Aug.12, 2008 update: I summarized this blog in an article today, "The West's Islamist Infiltrators."

Related Topics:  Counter-terrorism, Muslims in the West, Radical Islam receive the latest by email: subscribe to daniel pipes' free mailing list This text may be reposted or forwarded so long as it is presented as an integral whole with complete information provided about its author, date, place of publication, and original URL.

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