As negotiations between the Arabs and Israel grind on, it becomes increasingly difficult to figure out just what the Arab leaders have in mind. They seem to say one thing in public and another in private.
This dual pattern has a long history and it's actually quite easy to figure out which carries more weight.
As far back as 1933, an exasperated British ambassador to Iraq dressed down King Faisal on this matter, using some strong language: "Was I to report to my government," he rhetorically asked, "that Iraq's public men, men who had held the highest positions in the state, made speeches on solemn occasions in which they voiced opinions which they knew to be false and meaningless? Was I to say that the Iraqi Parliament was just a sham, a place where. time and money was wasted by a handful of men, who, while masquerading as statesmen, neither ' meant what they said, nor said what they believed?"
In recent times, the Arab-Israeli conflict has prompted the greatest inconsistency between public and private utterances. Fiery anti-Zionism characterizes public statements far more than it does private ones, as American officials have frequently noted. A US ambassador to Saudi Arabia in the 1970s noted that King Faisal would carry on for hours about the Zionist conspiracy. Then he would dismiss the notetaker and get down to the real business at hand. Similarly, Henry Kissinger noted in 1973: "Every leader I have talked to so far has made it clear that it is far easier for them to ease pressures [on Israel] de facto than as public Arab policy."
What about Arab insistence on an independent Palestinian state? Jimmy Carter raised eyebrows when he revealed in 1979 (at a moment when Arab politicians were pushing especially hard for this), "I have never met an Arab leader that in private professed the desire for an independent Palestinian state." Three years later, Carter explained in his memoir that "almost all the Arabs could see that an independent [Palestinian] nation in the heart of the Middle East might be a serious point of friction and a focus for radicalizing influence. ... However, because of the powerful political influence of the PLO in international councils and the threat of terrorist attacks from some of its forces, few Arabs had the temerity to depart from their original position in a public statement."
Israelis have also noted this contradiction: According to Moshe Dayan, Anwar Sadat "frequently stated" in private his opposition to a Palestinian state.
Even Palestinians point out the inconsistency. George Habash, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, observed in 1991 that while the Algerian and Yemeni governments really wanted a Palestinian state, "Jordan doesn't. Syria is not decided." He concluded that "You could say that perhaps the effective Arab states do not want one."
American officials have come to anticipate that private conversations with Arabs will soften public attacks on Israel. Here's Richard Nixon on Syria's President Hafez Assad: "I was convinced that Assad would continue to play the hardest of hard lines in public, but in private he would follow the Arab proverb that he told me during one of our meetings – "When a blind man can see with one eye it is better than not being able to see at all."
Predictably, Gamal Abdel Nasser exemplified this contradictory pattern, adopting stands as the occasion suited him. Privately he said to a number of Western mediators that he was willing to negotiate with Israel, but publicly he led the fight against the Jewish state. Nasser even acknowledged his own inconsistency. Three days after accepting UN Security Council Resolution 242, he instructed the army brass not to "pay any attention to anything I may say in public about a peaceful solution."
This pattern of inconsistency raises important questions: What should an outsider believe, whispers or shouts? Which of the two levels of discussion, private or public, provides a better guide to policy?
A review of the historical record leaves no doubt as to the answer: Public pronouncements count more than confidential revelations. Neither provides an infallible guide, for politicians lie in public and private, but rhetoric has proven to be more operational than private communications.
Insiders attach great value to exclusive and confidential one-to-one conversations with leaders. To understand Middle East politics; however, you're probably better off reading newspapers and listening to radio broadcasts than talking to politicians in private. What the masses hear counts; privileged information tends to mislead. This rule of thumb helps explain why distant observers get the point more often than do on the spot diplomats and journalists.
The writer is director of the Middle East Council, a division of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia.
Dec. 14, 2010 update: I draw on the above analysis for a column today, "Pouring Cold Water on WikiLeaks," where I argue that, when it comes to Middle East politics, "one does better reading press releases and listening to speeches than relying on diplomatic cables."
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