* How do you evaluate Turkey's Nov. 1 general election results, was Washington expecting such a comeback from the AKP after the June elections?
Given the consistency of polling results, U.S. government officials expected a similar outcome to the June election.
* Were you expecting this comeback?
I did write about the possibility of election fraud but I did not expect it to happen because (1) it would be too blatant and (2) there were other ways for President Erdoğan to reach his goals. Specifically, he could push aside the parliament in the same way as he did the prime minister.
* What is the cause of AKP's comeback?
I believe that widespread fraud explains the otherwise inexplicable increase in voters and the move of MHP and HDP supporters to the AKP.
* How is Washington evaluating these results?
The Obama administration accepts the results as valid and is encouraging Erdoğan to use them to move forward and ease the frictions of recent months.
* Some American experts wrote that the strategic partnership between Turkey and United States have come to an end. Do you think this is the case?
I do. The 60-year alliance is over. I urge the U.S. government to approach the Republic of Turkey very differently from the past, with suspicion and self-defense.
* What are Washington's expectations about the future of the American-Turkish relations under a single-party AKP government?
The consensus in D.C. is that the resolution of the political situation in Turkey can provide a basis for a new start.
* And how do you, personally foresee the future of the relations?
I predict that the Turkish government will turn to Washington when needed, for example, concerning Syria, arms, and financial matters, but will otherwise pursue independent policies that often conflict with American interests.
* What effect would AKP's single-party government have on US policies in the Middle East, particularly in Syria?
Not much; the AKP's vision has dominated Turkish foreign policy for 13 years and would continue to do so regardless of the election results.
* Looking at the fact that the US is continuing its operations in Syria together with the PYD, on what common ground would Turkey and the US meet? If there is any common ground, how would they meet on it, and what efforts would the US make for this?
I doubt the two sides will find common ground. But if they do, it would take the form of a compromise whereby Washington supports Turkish goals in Syria and Ankara helps with American goals there.
* Did Washington foresee the intervention of Russia in Syria?
From what I know, it was a complete surprise.
* Both the US and Erdoğan's AKP government are against Russia's initiative in Syria. Which moves is Washington planning after Moscow's initiatives?
So far, the U.S. response to the Russian intervention in Syria has been tentative and confused. Should Washington confront Moscow or work with it? Can the Russians be influenced to direct more attacks against ISIS or it that hopeless? Can they be split from Tehran or is that bond too tight? None of these issues have been resolved.
* How could the US cooperate with Turkey against the Russian initiatives?
I do not see much opportunity here.
* After these election results, how does Washington foresee the future of the Kurdish opening in Turkey?
The Obama administration is open more to working with the Kurds of Turkey as its relations with the government decline.
* Do you think that the decrease in HDP's votes is a drawback in this peace process?
I do not see this as an important factor.
* And what effect will AKP's single party government have on the peace process?
Erdoğan now faces a major decision: Whether to continue to make war on the PKK or whether to return to diplomacy with it. He will move in the direction that he understands best helps him reach his twin goals of more personal power and more Shari'a.
US-TURKISH ARMY RELATIONS:
* President Erdoğan said, the "parallel structure" of state officials sympathetic to US-based Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen "misled and deceived" Turkey through the Ergenekon and "Balyoz" (Sledgehammer) coup-plot cases, claiming that he had personally objected to the arrest of top commanders and officers. Erdoğan also said that these military officers were arrested with false documents. And now it is known that the military officers put on trial during these cases are also blaming the US. Why is that?
The Turkish military leadership rightly resents the fact that its American allies did so little to stand up for it but instead meekly accepted the truth of those absurd and false conspiracy theories.
* Looking at all these facts, and also looking at the fact that the US is determined to use YPG militants as a ground force in Syria against ISIS, while Turkey is making operations against the PKK, how are the current Washington-Turkish Army relations?
The Turkish military is again finding its voice, in part due to the collapse of the phony Ergenekon and Balyoz cases, in part because it is again needed, especially for the Syrian crisis. But it is still very careful and not active with regard to Washington.
* How do you foresee the future of the relations?
I would be surprised if they ever return to the warmth and trust of the pre-AKP era. They will be business-like and correct without the enthusiastic spirit that began long ago in Korea.