Politique Internationale: Do you believe in the two-state solution?
Daniel Pipes: No and yes. A Palestinian state is completely unacceptable – indeed, an absurdity – so long as Palestinians seek to destroy Israel, as both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas self-evidently aspire to do. But when the happy day arrives that the leadership and a majority of the population accept Israel, then yes, a Palestine alongside Israel is acceptable. No one seems to share my view; other analysts assume Palestinians will always reject Israel but I see them likely to undergo defeat and accept Israel. My Israel Victory project shows how to achieve that acceptance.
P.I.: What does this project consist of?
D.P.: As a historian, I note that international wars almost only end when one side gives up, otherwise they go on and on. In the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Israel needs to inflict a sense of defeat on the Palestinians. This is made much harder by international support for them, especially from Islamists and the Left, but it can be done. I advocate a path that maximizes messaging and minimizes violence – or the opposite of what the Government of Israel has engaged in since Oct. 7.
P.I.: Isn't what Hamas has done to Gaza a counterexample to be held up to those who favor two states?
D.P.: Yes, it is. Hamas seeks to destroy the Jewish state of Israel, not live alongside it in a two-state solution. While that is important, neither Hamas nor the PA has deep roots, nor do they enjoy wide support. They can be eliminated and a decent Palestinian leadership brought to power, but the Israelis need to work toward this outcome.
P.I.: If a Palestinian state came into existence, should it be located only on the West Bank or both there and in Gaza?
D.P.: It could be either. Despite a century of propaganda about a single, unitary Palestine, the West Bank and Gaza differ in many ways. Culturally, the West Bank fits into Greater Syria and Gaza into Egypt. Their populations have dissimilar accents in Arabic, they eat diverse foods, and have unlike historical experiences. Therefore, a Palestinian state could consist of one or both areas.
P.I.: Should the capital of this state be in East Jerusalem or elsewhere (e.g., Ramallah)?
D.P.: By definition, because Palestine must be premised on accepting Israel with its capital in Jerusalem, a Palestinian capital must be elsewhere.
P.I.: Should this Palestinian state be permanently demilitarized?
D.P.: No. Were the Palestinians truly committed to living next to Israel, and if they consistently proved their good intentions over a protracted period of time, it would not have to be permanently demilitarized. But that, admittedly, is asking a lot.
P.I.: Is there another solution besides the two-state one? For example, what about a single state with an autonomous West Bank (like Catalonia in Spain)?
D.P.: Yes, a return to the 1950s with Egypt in charge of Gaza and Jordan running the West Bank would be an acceptable solution. Unfortunately, neither Egypt nor Jordan shows the slightest intention to take up this burden. During a trip to Jordan some years ago, I had the distinct feeling that my Jordanian interlocuters felt as though they had played a trick on Israel in 1967, getting the Jewish state to take over the unmanageable West Bank.
P.I.: Does Donald Trump favor a two-state solution? Would he support another plan?
D.P.: Who knows with Trump? He mixes ignorance with inconstancy and egomania. He appears to disdain the Palestinians while caring inordinately about Israelis and Gulf Arabs. But that could change in an instant.
P.I.: What are the minimum concessions that Israelis and Palestinians must make to start a genuine peace process?
D.P.: The Government of Israel made two shockingly generous offers to the Palestinians in 2000 and 2008, only to be refused both times. But those are ancient history. Israelis will need many years of Palestinian good behavior, including truth, moderation, propriety, and non-violence, again to view them as positively as back then. Accordingly, the "Palestine" that once seemed imminent now looks like a mirage. Anger now reigns. To move ahead, Palestinians must first accept the Jewish state of Israel, then Israelis need to accept Palestinian autonomy and perhaps sovereignty. The diplomatic focus tends to be on Israelis but, in fact, Palestinians must start the process of change.
P.I.: In retrospect, was Israel's Prime Minister Ariel Sharon right to hand Gaza over to Gazans, whom Hamas quickly then took hostage?
D.P.: No, what Sharon did was insane. It was also very strange. He won the prime ministry in early 2003 in large part on the basis of ridiculing his opponent's readiness to leave Gaza. By the end of that year, however, Sharon reversed himself 180 degrees and adopted his opponent's policy, which he pushed through in 2005, just before entering a coma. Subsequent decades have repeatedly confirmed that it was a catastrophic decision.
P.I.: What is the best status for Gaza? Who should administer this territory and who should handle its security?
D.P.: I have proposed the concept of a "decent Gaza" in which Gazans who accept Israel work under the direct supervision of Israelis to administer and police their territory. The Government of Israel adopted this position in 2024 but since then appears largely to have abandoned it.
P.I.: How do you explain that the Israelis (and their American allies) ignored a vast underground city to be built in Gaza?
D.P.: The Hebrew word konceptzia (concept) goes far to explain the Israeli error. The Israeli security establishment thought it understood Hamas, that Hamas really just wanted to rule a quiet and rich Gaza, and so it ignored everything that contradicted this interpretation, from tunnels to rockets to preparations for Oct. 7, all of which it knew about. As for Americans, they largely saw Gaza through Israeli eyes.
P.I.: Does recognition by France and other countries of "Palestine" serve the cause of peace?
D.P.: No, rewarding Palestinians for Oct. 7 encourages rejectionism and continued efforts to destroy Israel. It is precisely the wrong move.
P.I.: Who are the Palestinians who embody the future – and is Mohamed Dahlan one of them?
D.P.: In any authoritarian system, it is very difficult to identify reformers versus enforcers. Nikita Khrushchev appeared to be a mini-Stalin while Nicolás Maduro looked like someone who would break with Chávez. Accordingly, I hesitate to try to predict how a successor to Mahmoud Abbas might act.
P.I.: Is there a scenario that poses a threat to the Abraham Accords?
D.P.: Yes, if Israel annexes part or all of the West Bank, the Emiratis made it clear they will pull out of the Abraham Accords. Short of that, however, the accords appear strong. Its Arab signatories need Israel as an ally versus the Islamic Republic of Iran and do not wish Palestinian rejectionism to interfere with that priority.
P.I.: How do you explain the contrast between Israel's brilliant military performance against Hezbollah and Iran and its incompetence in Gaza?
D.P.: It can seem like the Israel Defense Forces has two entirely separate components – the innovative, far-sighted, astonishingly successful part that fights non-Palestinians and the dreary, self-deluding, astonishingly failed part that fights Palestinians. While many factors explain the latter's failure, perhaps the most crucial one concerns the historic Zionist illusion going back nearly 150 years that Palestinians can be assuaged through conciliation, thinking that enrichment and placation will end their rejection of Zionism. This has never worked, yet the hope lives on and leads to constant damage.
P.I.: Will President Trump succeed in convincing Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords? And is the creation of a Palestinian state a prerequisite for such a move?
D.P.: Trump enjoys considerable influence over Mohammad bin Salman and the Saudi elite, but I doubt they will join the Abraham Accords before the death of King Salman, currently 89 years old and sickly. Even after his passing, the Saudis will drive a hard bargain, so it may take a while for them to sign on.
P.I.: Is U.S. support for Israel unconditional?
D.P.: Hardly. While the two governments may seem in full agreement from the outside, the alliance suffers the inevitable tensions one would expect between a great and a regional power. In particular, polling shows Democrats increasingly disaffected from Israel as well as a growing criticism among what is called "Woke MAGA" among Republicans. Israel faces a more difficult future in the United States.
P.I.: Israel, with U.S. help, had a nearly complete victory in the Twelve-Day War. What's next?
D.P.: The mollarchy publicly shows almost no signs of reconsideration; indeed, the president has met criticism for a willingness to engage in talks with Washington. Is that braggadocio or policy? It is hard to tell at this early date, but I tend to think it tough is to hide panic. That raises another question: Does a regime in panic mode give up or become even more recklessly aggressive? That depends ultimately on Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i. I worry that his martyrdom complex will lead him to double down and become yet more aggressive.
P.I.: Is Iran's mollarchy fragile?
D.P.: Yes, very fragile. The American novelist Ernest Hemingway once explained how one goes bankrupt: "Gradually, then suddenly." The same applies to the fall of dictatorships; for a recent example, look at the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, an unsuccessful effort which lasted fourteen years triumphed in less than two weeks. In Iran, I expect that a bakery running out of bread, a gas station running out of petrol, or a faucet running out of water will prompt a rebellion against the Islamic Republic, one that will spread quickly and inexorably, ending with the Islamist regime's collapse.
P.I.: Does Reza Pahlavi embody, at least in part, Iran's future?
D.P.: Reza Pahlavi has emerged as an ever-more impressive opponent of the Islamic Republic and as a contender to replace Khamene'i. If he continues to rise in stature as of late, that could happen.
P.I.: What are economic, political, and military steps can help build stability in Lebanon? What should be done about Hezbollah?
D.P.: Fixing Lebanon requires knowing two main things about the country. First, its government differs from every other in the world, being based on a communal system that recognizes an astonishing eighteen sects in a country of just a few million. Accordingly the central government is weak by design. Second, militias have predominated for a half-century, with Hezbollah emerging as the most powerful. Looking to the future, Israel's severe weakening of Hezbollah opens the possibility of the central government asserting itself but the communal structure limits its potential power. External actors like France should help, while being extremely careful not to aid Hezbollah and other hostile forces.
P.I.: Does the new Syrian regime inspire your optimism?
D.P.: Not at all, and its actions since December 2024 make me the more pessimistic. In effect, the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime swapped Iranian for Turkish influence. While Ankara is less virulent than Tehran, it is smarter and probably a more effective antagonist to the West. I see Syria as a satrapy of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Türkiye, a place where his full autocratic nature and jihadist vision can be expressed.
P.I.: How can Türkiye, a NATO member, be an adversary of the West?
D.P.: In theory, you are right, it cannot. In practice, however, Türkiye has quasi-joined the Chinese-and-Russian-sponsored counterpart to NATO, purchased and sold major weapons systems to enemies of NATO, forwarded an Islamist agenda hostile to the West, and engaged in many lesser hostile acts. Seeing Türkiye as an ally is over twenty years out of date and becoming more inaccurate with time.
P.I.: Is Türkiye 's presence and influence in Syria good or bad for stability of the region?
D.P.: The term neo-Ottoman well describes Erdoğan's outlook: he hopes to resume Turkish influence, if not sovereignty, where the Ottoman Empire once ruled, including the Balkans, Cyprus, Syria, Iraq, Israel, Egypt, and Libya. This greatly destabilizes the Middle East and so harms stability.
P.I.: What diplomatic success does Donald Trump need to achieve to deserve the Nobel Peace Prize?
D.P.: Get Vladimir Putin to remove all Russian troops from every meter of Ukraine and sign a treaty recognizing Ukrainian sovereignty.