

federally financed compensation to the former masters for lost property would have facilitated such magnanimity. A revived paternalism might also have accepted the duty of schooling blacks in the ways of freedom and responsible citizenship, recognizing that if the two races were to live in harmony, whites were obliged to aid blacks in elevating themselves.

John Dennett and the AMA agents found surprisingly little anger or resentment among Southern blacks. The urge to avenge themselves upon their former owners did not loom large among the freedmen. They insisted on maintaining their free status and sought an economic stake in society, but beyond that, most blacks exercised an admirable restraint and moderation. They would probably have responded

LIBERAL ARTS

The director of the New WORLD Theater bares her soul in the Massachusetts Council on the Arts and Humanities Bulletin (December '87/January '88):

This past year it was my privilege to serve on the Massachusetts state art council's theater panel. There I was distressed to discover the real extent to which Massachusetts' theaters had failed to achieve even minimum compliance with Affirmative Action guidelines. Despite the fact that this is the law as well as one of three criteria for Council consideration (the other two being artistic excellence and a commitment to Massachusetts artists), the vast number of applicants were characterized by racial homogeneity.

We still have the necessity and responsibility to ensure that we do not continue to impoverish our art by forcing the Gordon Heaths, Dexter Gordons, Paul Robesons, et al to higher ground beyond our borders in search of artistic opportunity and integrity.

For Paul Robeson, of course, the "higher ground beyond our borders," the land of "artistic opportunity," was Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union.

favorably to overtures of aid and friendship from whites. Thirty years later, Booker T. Washington still asked for no more than a chance for the blacks to prove themselves in the economic arena. Because blacks were so remarkably patient in the years after the Civil War, it is not outlandish to suggest that, offered the opportunity to farm their own land, they would have foregone voting rights and civil equality until times were more propitious. As it was, they got nothing from the white South and only a paper freedom from the North. Ironically, as independent landowners, they would have formed the bedrock of the yeomanry whose passing the Nashville Agrarians lamented in the 1930's.

The Prankster From Tripoli

by Antony T. Sullivan

Qaddafi and the Libyan Revolution by David Blundy and Andrew Lycett, Boston: Little, Brown; \$17.95.

One of the more curious features of our time is the inordinate attention given by the Reagan administration and the American media to Libya and its mercurial dictator, Muammar Qaddafi. Sporadic outbursts in Washington, echoed in the press, have served to elevate the unstable ruler of a weak, Third World police state to almost superhuman proportions. In the process, American policymakers have contributed to whatever influence Qaddafi has gained among extremists in the Middle East and deflected attention from the more effective practitioners of terror in that region. In recent years, Qaddafi has come to symbolize much that Americans think they know and dislike about the Arab and Muslim worlds, and he has provided Washington a scapegoat on which to vent frustration for failed policies toward Lebanon, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Understanding all this, British journalists David Blundy and Andrew Lycett, longtime Middle East correspondents for the London *Sunday Times*, try to demythologize Qaddafi in this balanced and objective book.

Qaddafi rules a land that deserves better. His is not the first regime in 20th-century Libya to achieve military domination through terror. In the 1920's, Mussolini's troops under General Rudolfo Graziani, in an effort to crush Libyan resistance led by Omar Mukhtar, raped and disemboweled women, threw men from airplanes, and established concentration camps in which tens of thousands of Libyans died. The movie *Lion of the Desert* provides a reasonably accurate picture of these events. It is ironic indeed that Qaddafi, a third-rate terrorist by Italian standards, sees himself as the heir of Omar Mukhtar within Libya and of Gamal Abdul Nasser in the wider Arab world.

Concerning Qaddafi, strange stories are told. For example, some reports have it that Qaddafi's mother was really a Libyan Jewess who married a Saharan tribesman during the 1940's. If true, Jewish law would of course claim Qaddafi as a Jew. Another tale is that Qaddafi is the son of a Jewish woman raped by an Italian soldier. If the latter is correct, it may explain Qaddafi's attempts to eliminate all "foreign" influences and his pathological hatred of Israel and the West. Whatever the facts of his birth, Qaddafi's bizarre personal behavior as head of state is not in doubt. To relax, Qaddafi occasionally lies on the floor of his office and covers his body with a sheet. CIA reports indicate that he suffers from attacks of depression and takes sleeping pills and stimulants to get from one day to the next. Although a married man with children, Qaddafi has three foreign female sexual partners (two Yugoslavs, one East German), and regularly propositions visiting female journalists. Yet no Western intelligence service considers Qaddafi insane or a buffoon whose actions do not merit the closest monitoring.

For their part, Blundy and Lycett provide a sound account of Qaddafi's formative years, his (inchoate) political philosophy and his attitudes toward Islam, the Libyan oil industry and the country's economic development. They present data collected by Israeli and American sources demonstrating that the principal targets of Qaddafi's terrorism abroad have not been America, Israel, or the West, but his own

Libyan opponents and political moderates from Arab and African countries. The authors discuss CIA warnings to the White House that a military attack on Libya would neither overthrow Qaddafi nor significantly reduce terrorism. And, familiar with the relevant scholarship on Libya, Blundy and Lycett assist the reader with an excellent index.

Interestingly, Qaddafi's view of society is a holistic one. His "Green Book" occasionally sounds like a poor imitation of Fichte or Herder. The nation is a "natural," organic entity, compacted of family and tribe. The primary societal values, Qaddafi maintains, are solidarity, cohesiveness, and unity. The integrity of the family has unique importance: "Societies in which the existence and unity of the family are threatened," he writes, "are similar to those whose plants are in danger of being swept away by drought or fire." None of this has prevented him from encouraging women out of the home and into the army or from attacking Libya's religious establishment. On both counts, Qaddafi has sought to create new, "radicalized" constituencies loyal to him alone.

Despite Qaddafi's military rule and his use of terror both at home and abroad, there is little doubt that he has long enjoyed widespread popular support within Libya. Recently, there have been signs that this support may be eroding, as sharply lower oil prices impose constraints to which Libyans have not been accustomed since the late 1960's. Nevertheless, as Blundy and Lycett point out, Libyans still earn more per capita than do Englishmen and enjoy free education and medical care as well. Most own a house and few are unemployed. Clearly, Libyans remain among the economic elite of the Third World. Barring a total collapse of oil prices, rampant popular disaffection with Qaddafi or his policies is unlikely.

Especially puzzling, then, is Qaddafi's frantic campaign to eliminate his Libyan critics abroad. Ironically, Qaddafi's efforts to assassinate Libya's "stray dogs" overseas recall the Reagan administration's attempt in April 1986 to assassinate the "mad dog" who rules Libya. As Qaddafi's operations only undermined Europe's toleration of his regime, so American bombing discour-

aged whatever opposition to Qaddafi may have existed within the Libyan officer corps. Silent contempt would have been a more intelligent approach for both Libya and the United States and would probably have served their national interests more effectively.

If the publisher had understood the contents of this book, the dust jacket might have avoided the spectacularly erroneous suggestion that the authors have presented new evidence concerning the enormous terrorist threat that Qaddafi poses to the West. Moreover, better editing might have eliminated some of the tedious detail accorded Qaddafi's foreign adventures and economic relationships. These flaws aside, this book can be recommended to anyone seeking a judicious assessment of Qaddafi and Libya during the last two decades.

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Better War Than Troubles

by Thomas McGonigle

The Gun in Politics: An Analysis of Irish Political Conflict, 1916-1986 by J. Boyer Bell, New Brunswick: Transaction Books; \$24.95.

The Irish have a word—as they are supposed to—for this sort of book: blather. The author could be described as one of those fellows who "does go on," to the point of being, eventually, barred from the pub for boring everyone to tears.

The Gun in Politics bears the subtitle "An Analysis of Irish Political Conflict, 1916-1986." If we are to judge a book by its cover, given the reality of much that is published in the United States, we might conclude that this was an interesting book. The gun has been a central force in modern Irish history, even if it is not immediately visible or heard, and it would be good to have such a study. However, Bell's book is not that but rather a collection of previously published essays on diverse themes. As the author writes in his own introduction, "... a mingled

manuscript—some old, some new, much discarded, all edited, a medley rather than separate essays or a brand new book." He adds in way of defense that the book has "little wisdom to offer after a generation in and out of the island."

Mr. Bell's medley is composed of an interminable essay about his own living in Ireland, a bibliographical critical overview of everything that has been written on the Irish problem in the last 15 years or so, a buff's history of the Thompson submachine gun (originally published in *The Irish Sword, Journal of the Military History Society of Ireland*), a history of the Irish contribution to the Spanish Civil War which reads like a proposal for an interesting book. And that is Bell's main problem: much of his book reads like a proposal, a pitch for this or that grant, a hustle to get some of the loose cash that floats around and about in university and government circles, engaged in the study of terrorism and other assorted problems. A world populated with people such as Mr. Bell, who is president of something called International Analysis Center Inc. (a consulting firm focusing on the problems of unconventional war, terrorism, deception, risk analysis, and crisis management), is indeed in trouble, for anyone who has the time and money to consult such an organization might as well kiss his ass good-bye: it is already too late. The facts of the Irish case are laid out and plain when it comes to the situation in Ireland today. It was all probably a matter of failure of nerve in 1921. If Michael Collins had held out, if he had been better informed and had waited while negotiating with Lloyd George an end to the war between England and Ireland, partition would not have occurred. True, the war would have gone on, but it would have ended in real resolution rather than postponing it to some dim future. The Algerians, for example, knew this while fighting the French in the 1950's. Today there is no part of Algeria that is "forever" France. It is done with. There is France, and there is Algeria. But today there is Ireland, there is England, and there is something called Northern Ireland. And there is war acknowledged as such only by the IRA. The English treat it as a civil disturbance and brand their opponents