

prose of *The Real War*. Indeed, this may well be one of the burdens which high office imposes. But there is more than a little in the book which is surely disingenuous, despite all the day-to-day problems a chief executive must overcome.

Consider, for example, one of the main dangers Nixon cites—our vulnerability to upheavals in the Persian Gulf, our dependence on foreign energy, the power of OPEC. Nixon portrays his administration's response to the 1973 Middle East war as in keeping with his general view. Yet the successes of OPEC since that time are surely attributable to the pathetic reaction of the Nixon administration to the first assertion of OPEC power. The supine rhetoric and even weaker diplomacy of the Nixon administration in the spring of 1974 must be reckoned a failure of historic proportions. In this, it is not so very different from that of the Eisenhower administration (which Nixon admires)—the administration that in its abandonment of Britain, France, and Israel in 1956 began the process which culminated in the Western world's surrender to OPEC in 1974.

There is, to choose another example, Nixon's characterization of certain American businessmen as soft-headed in expecting commercial benefit from the Russians while ignoring Soviet strategic goals in East-West trade. But again, it was the Nixon administration that was prepared to lend billions of dollars in subsidized credit to the Soviets and transfer very sophisticated technology in the bargain. In those days, it was not soft-headed businessmen who were the objects of Nixon's wrath, but Senator Henry M. Jackson, the indefatigable foe of this short-sighted policy.

Again, Nixon now shows strong support for the ideological struggle as a feature of the "real war" between East and West. In his time in office, however, strong Western support for human rights inside the Soviet Union was seen as a noisome impediment to America's "quiet diplomacy."

That the Nixon administration's approach to SALT was directed by a seriously flawed strategic doctrine has been acknowledged even by

Henry Kissinger. He now has discovered that there is such a thing as strategic superiority, a concept scorned by the negotiators who signed the SALT I pact. Even so, Nixon defends his SALT I agreement, attributing subsequent difficulties to Congress, Carter, and others. The fact, however, is that Nixon's management of the enterprise was defective from the beginning. As early as 1970 Nixon had more realistic assessments in hand, but he ignored them.

The former President speaks approvingly of the "Nixon Doctrine," presenting it in this volume as if it were nothing but an argument for military sales to friendly governments. It was no such thing, but rather a doctrine which accepted the retreat of American power as an irreversible fact and which attempted to build up surrogates as a replacement for it. In its effort to preserve American power on the cheap, it is again reminiscent of Eisenhower's time, when the comparatively low cost of nuclear weapons allowed them to become a substitute for a real army. The vacuum in the Persian Gulf, which Nixon rightly calls to our attention, is not unrelated to this approach to strategic problems.

Finally, it is useful to recall the general problem of American rhetoric and American foreign policy. Nixon makes the case that the détente policy of the administration was misunderstood. Surely this too is disingenuous. It was, after all, President Nixon who approved a joint statement of principles at the 1972 Moscow summit which, among other things, incorporated phrases from the Leninist lexicon.

It is, in many respects, the policies of the Carter administration which have given to the Nixon era a remembered gloss of firmness and resolution. And, in truth, the coherence and consistency of the Nixon foreign policy, compared with that of today, can well be celebrated as a golden age. But there is more to vindication than the palpable incompetence of one's successors.

Indeed, the publishing successes of both the former President and his Secretary of State obscure important points. These authentic

"inside accounts," for all their presumed revelations, merely serve to rewrite the past and to make the current debate even murkier. Nixon and Kissinger now sound like some of their critics of a decade ago, but neither acknowledges the full force of the arguments that were made then. They write as if no alternatives were possible, even though there were many who maintained at the time that the seeds of our current predicament were being planted. Inevitably, those who displayed the real foresight have been neither lionized nor enriched for getting it straight.

### Muslims & Reform

MILITANT ISLAM. By GODFREY H. JANSEN. Harper & Row. 224 pp. \$8.95.

Reviewed by DANIEL PIPES

ISLAM, like Judaism, is both a faith and a way of life, and as with Judaism, the way of life has in recent times been severely reduced by the pressures and allure of modernity. In both religions, an orthodox minority clings to the traditional way of life, making as few changes as possible; others give it up altogether; and in between, still others attempt to reform it and reconcile it with the requirements of modern living.

For no apparent reason, Godfrey H. Jansen refers to the efforts of the last-named group, the Muslim reformers, as "militant Islam"; most of this book analyzes the consequences of their "willingness to re-think Islam in modern terms." Accordingly, its title notwithstanding, *Militant Islam* ignores Muslim military efforts (such as those under way in Afghanistan and the Philippines); the fundamentalist Islamic movement led by the Ayatollah Khomeini; extremist groups (strongest in Egypt, Turkey, and Indonesia); and the recent attempt by Muslim leaders to mold the Muslim world into a bloc. Jansen dwells instead on the

sincere attempt by leaders, some of them men of religion, some of

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them religious laymen for whom religion is a living, vital faith, to remodel their public and private life—politics, economics, law, social mores—according to the precepts of their faith.

Before dealing with reform Islam today, Jansen takes up two preliminary subjects, the religion of Islam and the challenge to it by Europe and modernity. To begin with, he outlines the basic precepts of Islam and describes some of its most powerful features, such as the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, "the largest multinational gathering of human beings on the face of the earth today"; the "simplicity and practicality and adaptability" of Islam; and the Sufi (mystical) brotherhoods which, according to him, have performed three crucial tasks in recent centuries:

They prevented Islam from becoming a cold and formal doctrine, keeping it alive as an intimate, compassionate faith; they were mainly responsible for spreading the faith in east Asia and sub-Saharan Africa; and they were among the foremost leaders in Islam's military and political battles against the encroaching power of the Christian West.

The challenge of the Christian West and Muslim responses to it make up the second preliminary topic. Activities by Christian missionaries and direct European political control over Muslim lands have long been recognized as threats to Muslim culture. But more than these, Jansen argues, it was the colonialist elimination of Islam from the classroom that imperiled the faith. This policy was most consistently pursued in Algeria, where the French had some success in eradicating the Arabic language and emasculating Islam.

European challenges forced Muslims to reconsider some aspects of their religion, but, Jansen holds, "Islam does not as yet seem to have found an answer to the overall challenge of Western civilization and modernization." This failure follows from the fact that until recently most Muslim leaders were either secular nationalists, interested in Islam only to exploit it for political purposes (Bhutto and Sadat come to mind), or *ulema*

(Muslim men of religion) who had too little experience of the modern world to come to terms with it.

Of late, however, efforts to re-think Islam have increased; the last part of the book explores these. The reformist groups who are the heroes of *Militant Islam* include the Muslim Brethren in Egypt, al-Maududi's *Jama'at-i Islami* in Pakistan, and "with reservations, the Libya of Colonel Qaddafi," as well as others in Morocco, Jordan, Iran, and Indonesia:

These men and groups, though Westernized are not Westernizers but modernizers; though Islamic believers, they are not fundamentalists but reformers. . . . What unifies them is an attempt to make Islam, which is indubitably alive today, relevant to the special needs of today.

Jansen sympathetically reviews the activities and doctrines of these groups and takes it upon himself to convince Western readers that their efforts are "laudable or at least understandable."

JANSEN packs a great deal of information into two hundred pages; indeed, the wealth of detail, ranging across the full extent of the Muslim world, is the most valuable aspect of the book. Yet the abundance of information cannot be relied upon; serious mistakes and dubious assertions occur every few pages. Two examples: "inter-Muslim wars have been surprisingly few," a bizarre statement coming from anyone who has so much as leafed through a book on the history of Muslims. Or, listing Muslim military reverses before 1500, Jansen ignores the Mongol catastrophe of the 13th century, when a majority of Muslims came under alien rule, with incalculable consequences for Islam.

Modern history receives equally cavalier treatment. How can "every single Muslim state" except Egypt be the sworn enemy of Israel when Turkey maintains diplomatic relations with Israel and numerous black African Muslim states did so too until pressured by the Arabs to break them off? How can Palestine be an exception to the general pattern of Muslim leaders' spearheading the struggle against Europeans

when Hajj Amin al-Husaini, Mufti of Jerusalem and head of the Supreme Muslim Council from 1922 to 1937, was for long the preeminent Arab leader against Jews and the British? The *ulema*, we are told, "are a respected body of men in every Muslim country except Turkey and possibly Afghanistan and South Yemen"; what, then, of Albania and Guinea, both two-thirds Muslim, in one of which the *ulema* have been utterly eliminated and in the other repressed far more severely than in Turkey?

On a lesser level but also distressing, the author persistently mistranslates Arabic words; perhaps the most amusing is "the Society of the Muslim Brothers," which comes out in his Arabic as "the Magazine of the Muslim Brothers." Dozens of minor factual and typographical errors dot the book's pages, further eroding confidence in Jansen's reliability.

WHILE the preceding are merely errors of fact, Jansen's more general pronouncements on Islam are even more untrustworthy. The statement that "all Muslim monarchies, whatever their pretensions to religiosity, have been totally un-Islamic" implies that Islam requires a republic and forbids the passing on of political power within a family. Not only is this nonsense for Sunni Islam (which has no rules for choosing a leader), but it ignores the fact that some Shi'is believe in divine kingship (as in Yemen until 1962) and their religious doctrines require monarchism.

A final preposterous statement: in order to modernize Islam, Jansen says that Muslims must cast out the dogma that "every single word of the Qur'an is of divine inspiration." Yet the several attempts to do just this (mostly notably by Taha Hussein in Egypt, an incident of which Jansen apparently has not heard) have met with thundering rejection, and for good reason. The truth of the Qur'an cannot be called into question by Muslims in the way that Jews and Christians question the Bible. The Qur'an is more than the Bible; it is the ultimate fact of Islam, comparable to the Covenant in Judaism or Jesus in Christianity—the element without which there simply is no religion.

The Qur'an is Islam. Calling it into question strikes at the roots of the faith, something no believer can tolerate.

Jansen persistently asks Westerners to understand Islam, yet he approves of Muslim intolerance toward the West. While he derides as an "atavistic stereotype" the 19th-century European image of "licentious Turks lolling in the harem with their odalisques," he condones the equally shallow Muslim view of the West "as a source of decadence and muddled values."

PERHAPS most indicative of the disturbing and unsatisfactory nature of this book is the passage in which Jansen urges that writers on Islam declare their interest. He calls for this because he suspects that scholars who favor Israel (he specifically mentions Bernard Lewis) are not objective when it comes to Islam. Their alleged mischief is all the greater because nothing external gives them away:

The Arab authors, of course, stand out because of their names, and their works tend to be taken automatically as being partisan and propagandist. Such is not the case with the Israeli or pro-Israeli writer: their [*sic*] works are accepted as the product of objective scholarship, which in very many cases, they are not.

Aside from the obnoxious assumption that pro-Israel sentiment implies a bias against Islam, this argument reads most strangely in the light of the following facts: Godfrey H. Jansen is a citizen of India and a Muslim. He is undoubtedly aware that his name makes him appear British and Christian, and surely he knows that his book would be taken differently if his identity were revealed, yet he does nothing to advise the reader of it. In view of the passage quoted above, Jansen's silence borders on duplicity.

Absorbed with efforts to reconcile Islam with modernity, Jansen ignores the really significant new trends in Islam: Muslim militancy against non-Muslims (as in Chad, Lebanon, Eritrea, the Ogaden, Cyprus, Afghanistan, Thailand, the Philippines, as well as against Israel and India) and Muslim militancy against Western cultural influences

in order wholly to reestablish the Muslim way of life (a movement exemplified by the Ayatollah Khomeini). A book on the recent changes in the Muslim world would indeed merit the title *Militant Islam*, but this is regrettably not the book Jansen has written.

### The Faith of a Modernist

SELECTED PAPERS. By MEYER SCHAPIRO. *Braziller*. I. ROMANESQUE ART. 368 pp. \$30.00. II. MODERN ART: 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES. 277 pp. \$20.00. III. LATE ANTIQUE, EARLY CHRISTIAN, AND MEDIEVAL ART. 414 pp. \$25.00.

Reviewed by DAN HOFSTADTER

OVER the past few years three volumes of historical and critical writings by Meyer Schapiro have been published under the daunting title, *Selected Papers*; a fourth and final installment, on the theory and philosophy of art, is due in about a year. One of the acknowledged masters of academic art history, a man who can be mentioned in the same breath as E.H. Gombrich or Erwin Panofsky, Schapiro, during his over fifty years in the art-history department at Columbia University, has acquired a considerable reputation for eloquence and wisdom, though never before has he made his writings available to the general public.

The designation "papers" is a bit misleading, for though many of Schapiro's writings collected here are highly erudite and hard for the layman to follow, others are full-blooded essays, with all the richness, rigor, and sense of expectancy that the essay shares with the sonata. And if they have been conceived in two different manners of expression, the papers also deal with two widely separated periods, the medieval and the modern. This may at first seem odd, until we observe what Schapiro has chosen *not* to study, namely, the vast epoch falling roughly between Mantegna and Ingres, the age in which the naturalism of a perpetually rediscovered antiquity reigned supreme.

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The exclusion of that age suggests that Schapiro is chiefly interested in those styles of Western art that have largely escaped the influence of classicism—not such an unusual choice for a modernist intelligence.

What is unusual about Schapiro is his position at the confluence of several streams of creativity. A man long celebrated in university circles, he has also been the friend of young artists still at the margin of society. (Willem de Kooning, the painter who confessed that his pictures were "never finished, only saved from disaster," was once persuaded by Schapiro that a certain canvas had already been worked to salvation and might soon be worked to death; to this vigilant sympathy we perhaps owe the preservation of a masterpiece.) And in addition to these activities, Schapiro has also made himself known as a critic. John Pope-Hennessy, chairman of the committee that awarded him the Mitchell Prize in Art History for *Modern Art*, was sounding a familiar theme when he declared that "of all living critics who have exercised a formative influence on our attitude to the art of the immediate past, it would be generally conceded that the most influential was Professor Meyer Schapiro."

Indeed, it is by now common to hear Schapiro described as our "most influential" art critic. Yet the description gives one pause. For in what sense can an art historian who has never to my knowledge written any reviews, who has never had to stand empty-handed before brand-new art and explain it to a bewildered public, be called a critic? And how great is his influence in the area where it would generally be thought to count most—in the galleries and salesrooms of the art trade?

We may legitimately call Meyer Schapiro a critic if by criticism we mean, in his case, not the day-to-day exercise of judgment on recent work but rather the broader function of examining and explicating a visual culture. He is a critic as Pater and Fromentin were critics, and in this sense even his studies of medieval art constitute a sort of criticism. The question of how influential his ideas have been in the working art world is another mat-