

whether of the terrain, the rudimentary structures, or the wizened men. If not beautiful or alluring, the pictures do help give this hitherto nearly faceless people a distinct identity of its own. And that, after all, is the point.

The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-51. By Ilan Pappé. New York: I. B. Tauris, 1992. 324 pp. \$69.50.

Pappé, one of Israel's revisionist historians, synthesizes the work of his clique. Despite a consistent and pronounced anti-Israel bias (which isn't all that surprising: Israeli academics are about as alienated from their government as American academics from theirs), the results hold great interest.

Pappé repudiates the Zionist portrayal of a tiny, nascent Israeli state surrounded by enemies, winning its war of independence through pluck and courage. For him, the war was over "before even one shot had been fired." How so? Because the Yishuv had built a solid and effective state-like infrastructure over two decades. It had governing bodies, diplomats, military units, intelligence assets, and economic infrastructure. From a customs agency to a medical system, everything was in place and functioning. As a result, "When the hour struck on 15 May 1948, the Jewish community was ready." In contrast, the Palestinian leadership failed to use the mandatory period to prepare. Pappé points to two main failings. First, members of the elite, persistently looked out for number one, prompted much internecine fighting. Second, they invited the Arab rulers into Palestine, hoping these would carry their water. Of course, the kings and presidents had—then as now—their own interests which they pursued at the Palestinians' expense.

Rather than a tightly integrated history, *Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* consists of ten essays only loosely tied together. In combination, they constitute the new standard interpretation of Israel's emergence as a state.

Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XIV, 1990. Edited by Ami Ayalon. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992. 758 pp. \$89.95.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait so dominated Middle Eastern politics in 1990 that the annual *Middle East Contemporary Survey* for that year really contains two separate books: before August 2, and after. In over three-quarters of the chapters, the invasion gets mentioned in the opening paragraph; in the others it follows soon after. The Saudi chapter (by Jacob Goldberg) starts with arresting pairs of quotes, one pre-invasion, the other post-. The earlier ones refer to Saddam Husayn's "wisdom" and "farsightedness," while claiming that the kingdom will rely entirely on its own soldiers. The latter, of course, state just the opposite. Similar reversals characterize the policies of many other states in the Persian Gulf region.

Perhaps the most interesting chapters deal with the states which prevaricated in response to the invasion, especially Iran (by David Menashri) and Libya (Yehudit Ronen); the full extent of their incoherence only becomes evident in retrospect.

The *Middle East Contemporary Survey* also covers the significant events which never quite got the attention they deserve. In 1990, these included the unification of the Yemens, the fundamentalist Muslims' consolidation of power