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## WARNING

The intelligence in this Review will not be reproduced, or made available in any manner to any foreign agency or person, without special authority from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.
FOREWORD

This is the initial issue of a new intelligence publication, world-wide in scope, which supersedes Review of Europe, Russia, and Middle East, Review of Far East, and Review of Western Hemisphere. It will be published on Thursday and distributed on Friday of each week.

The Intelligence Review will maintain the policies of its predecessors in that it will present current intelligence reflecting the outstanding developments of military interest in the fields of politics, economics, sociology, the technical sciences, and, of course, military affairs.

It is anticipated that the integration of the three Reviews into a single intelligence report will result in a more comprehensive approach and a fuller treatment of selected subjects.

All agencies that received the three discontinued Reviews have been included in the distribution list of the Intelligence Review (see page 79). Requests for changes in this distribution should be addressed to the Deputy Director of Intelligence for Dissemination, Military Intelligence Service, Washington 25, D. C.
TRENDS

Publication by the United States of a “Blue Book” charging Argentina’s military regime with collaboration with the Axis Powers is unlikely to affect the 24 February election in Argentina, but the document may secure support of other American Republics to a diplomatic quarantine of a Peron-dominated Government.

The Irish Government is launching a propaganda campaign, aimed particularly at the United States, to marshal support for ending the partitioning of Eire and Northern Ireland. This campaign may enlist sympathy here for Ireland’s entrance into UNO for resolution of such problems.

In Great Britain during the last five months there has been a curious reversal in Commons debates in the traditional Labor and Conservative viewpoints toward conscription and demobilization. Churchill and Eden have argued for reduction of Britain’s armed strength; Laborites, on the other hand, have argued stoutly in the Tory tradition that the Empire must be held together and that large military establishments will be required for this purpose.

Soviet efforts to obtain economic domination over southeastern Europe continue. Early in February, a Soviet delegation attempted unilaterally, against Austrian and Western Allied pressure, to seize funds of the Danube Navigation Company in Vienna. If this attempt succeeds, similar ones against other economically important organizations may be expected.

In Germany, the Communists are pressing to dominate the German trade unions. As a result of early February elections, the Communists now apparently control all trade unions in the Soviet zone, and will likely seek to control all labor organizations throughout Germany for the political advantages incident thereto.
The U. S. S. R. is launching a program to insure its position as the strongest military power in the world. Pre-election speeches, particularly that of Generalissimo Stalin, emphasized the tremendous step-up of production in heavy industry and maintenance of a very powerful armed establishment.

A move for establishment of Kurdistan autonomy may be expected in the next few months. The Soviets are encouraging independence of the Kurds, and Iranian officials believe a Kurd outbreak is imminent. Should the Kurds declare their independence, the position of Turkey and the British in Iraq will be materially weakened.

The Socialist and Liberal Parties in Japan will markedly improve their position if a proposed plan of the Shidehara Cabinet is fulfilled to ban from the forthcoming elections all persons sponsored by the Tojo regime in the 1942 elections. The conservative Progressive Party might be reduced by this ban to a minority role.

Progress continues in southern Korea toward political cooperation of all major political parties except the Soviet-sponsored Communists.

Improvement in the railway communications in North China and further cessation of fighting may be expected following an agreement between the National Government and the Communists on control, operation, and repair of the railroads. Improvement of the economic status in China is expected as a result of the agreement.

Further wooing of minority groups by the Soviets may be seen in the reported establishment of an autonomous republic in Inner Mongolia. The report is unsubstantiated and the degree of Soviet instigation undetermined. However, such a move would be in consonance with Soviet policy of territorial aggrandizement.

A Chinese bid for world opinion to forestall Russian demands for further economic concessions in Manchuria may be seen in the present reports emanating from Chungking regarding Sino-Soviet difficulties. Continued Soviet pressure for war booty and participation in industries in Manchuria may be expected.
establishment of French control over French Indo-China made some
ness when France signed a treaty with Cambodia giving that country
sure of autonomy. This treaty will probably serve as a model for
agreements with Cochin China, Annam, Laos, and Tonkin.

Approach to a peaceful solution of Indonesian problems was made when
: Governor General Van Mook announced the Dutch policy in regard
to Netherlands East Indies. The policy, which promises dominion
for the Indies, will serve as a basis for further negotiations between
esian leaders and Van Mook.
TRANSITION OF MAJOR POWERS TO PEACETIME MILITARY SYSTEMS

(This is the first of two articles surveying the current military status of the major and minor Powers of the world. These two articles will be followed by a series of more detailed examinations of the particular military systems of individual countries and by a parallel series of articles on special military topics and problems affecting all nations.)

Six months after the end of hostilities in a war which shook the foundations of modern civilization, the leading military Powers of the world are still groping for solutions to their respective national defense problems. Each of the great nations appears uncertain as to its exact postwar strategic and political position, its future domestic and foreign economic development, and the degree of success of efforts at international cooperation. These countries are now adapting their military establishments to postwar conditions, but even the general lines of military organization which they will adopt are scarcely discernible at present, and in any case the plans of each may be completely redrawn when the political horizons become less obscure.

Common to all or most of the leading nations are the problems of demobilization; determining the ultimate size of the armed forces; reshaping the top command structure; fixing the relative importance and manner of integration of the ground, air, and naval forces; the conscription question; and numerous problems connected with armament, tactical organization, and other applications of the military lessons learned in the war just ended. Furthermore, each great Power—Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and China—faces a number of special and individual problems in deciding what part of its human and material resources can and should be devoted to military purposes and how the forces are to be organized, equipped, and utilized.

Although half a year has passed since the atom-bombing of Hiroshima, none of the great Powers appears to have undertaken any substantial change
in its military system or its tactical organization because of the emergence of atomic fission as a factor in war.

British Problems Are Greater Than Those Before War

The military problems involved in maintaining the integrity of the British Empire and the world economic and political influence of Great Britain itself appear to be more, rather than less, complex than they were before World War II. Not only must internal order be preserved in the colonies and India in the face of ever-increasing agitation for self-government or independence, but vital lines of Empire communications are exposed
to possible interruption more than ever before. While the British naturally regret their displacement by the United States as the leading economic and naval power of the world, they have watched with growing alarm the extension of Russian hegemony in western and northern Europe, across the Mediterranean “lifeline,” and in the Middle East. They are also harassed by the resurgence of anti-European movements in large sections of Asia and Africa. (See “Islam: A Threat to World Stability.”)

Confronted with these developments, Great Britain lacks the manpower, and to some extent even the industrial power, to maintain a large army at home and adequate garrisons in the numerous outposts of the empire. The British people realize that they cannot expect any great amount of help from the Dominions, each of which is concerned with its own problems. Nor is it yet clear how effectively the Royal Navy will be able to meet its increased postwar commitments. Consequently the British, more than any other leading nation, place their main hope for the future in the United Nations Organization as a barrier to aggression and a preserver of peace.

In the meantime, the question of how large a military force Britain will require and be able to support remains unsolved. In 1937 the British Regular Army strength was 164,000, including 5 divisions, in addition to the Territorials (corresponding to the National Guard in the United States). During World War II the peak strength of all United Kingdom forces was 4,900,000. The British Army alone numbered 2,900,000 at the end of hostilities in Europe and included 29 divisions (24 infantry, 4 armored, and 1 airborne). Approximately 1,000,000 men had been demobilized up to 1 January 1946, and discharges have since proceeded at the rate of some 85,000 per week.

According to present indications the Army will remain substantially larger than it was before the war, possibly having between 250,000 and 300,000 men on active service. There will be at least 6 divisions. The tactical organization and armament developed by the British during the war are generally considered satisfactory and will probably not be radically altered in the immediate future. Similarly, they will presumably adhere to the principle of separate Ministries for the Royal Navy, the Army, and the Royal Air Force, although the command structure of the Army itself may be altered by Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, newly appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
TRANSITION

Conscription, introduced in Great Britain shortly before the war as an emergency measure, is a subject of wide public discussion. It will probably be continued in some form. The plan which at present appears most likely to be adopted provides that 18-year-old males will be called up for one year's service and upon completion of training will be transferred to the Organized Reserves for six years. During the latter period they will undergo short terms of active service in camps. The number of men annually available under this plan will be approximately 300,000, but only about one-half of these will be assigned to the ground forces.

France's Power—and Need for Power—are Both Reduced

The elimination of Germany and Italy as military powers has removed the most pressing prewar reason for the maintenance of a standing French Army out of proportion to the population of the country. A separate consideration, however, is that unrest has increased throughout the French overseas empire as a result of the war, while the means of preserving security have declined. France is also disturbed about the political future of Europe and considers its own mission to be that of occupying a middle position (though somewhat less than the balance of power) between the Soviet Union on the one hand and Great Britain and the United States on the other.

The French Army is at present in a state of flux. Since May 1945, demobilization has reduced its strength by approximately 400,000. The current estimated figure for the French Metropolitan Army is 470,000, comprising 15 divisions (10 infantry, 4 armored, and 1 airborne), of which 7 are located in Germany, 1 in Austria, 1 in Indo-China, and 6 in France.

The French fiscal situation is poor, and will require an over-all retrenchment in governmental expenses. Accordingly, the French Government plans to make further reductions, at least for the present, in the size of the armed forces. In December the Ministry of Information announced the Government’s intention to maintain a “streamlined” army of 500,000 men. The new plan announced on 11 February 1946 provides for an army totalling 400,000 men, the lowest figure since before World War I. The Air Force is allowed 50,000 men, and the Navy, 45,000.

To compensate for this reduction in strength, the French propose to emphasize greater efficiency. This will probably involve a decentralization of command from the General Staff in Paris to the military regions, corps,
and divisions; a revision of the conscription regulations; and concentration on field training for all personnel. There will probably be 13 divisions.

Most French divisions are now equipped with a combination of American, French, British, and captured matériel. Almost all of them are inadequately equipped, suffering particularly from a shortage of replacement parts as a consequence of the cessation of Lend-Lease. Purchases from the United States will have to be made only on a limited scale, because of foreign exchange difficulties, and French armament production will have to be considerably expanded if the deficiency is to be remedied.

The French High Command was reorganized in December 1945, when a single Ministry of Armed Forces was established to replace the three separate Ministries for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Command control is exercised by the President of the Republic through the General Staff for National Defense, headed by General Juin, and the commanders of the three services. The Ministry of Armaments is responsible for the production and delivery of equipment for the armed forces.

Soviet Union To Maintain Large Peacetime Force

In maintaining the armed forces which it considers necessary, the Soviet Union does not have to contend with actual or threatening shortages of either manpower or equipment to the same extent as do Britain and France. The Soviet Union's immediate military problems lie rather in the fields of demobilization and redeployment of personnel and of reconversion and reorganization of the armament industry—plus the furtherance of national interests in the new territories which have been added to the Soviet sphere of influence.

While the peacetime Red Army is expected to be kept at a high numerical strength, extensive demobilization already has been effected in accordance with the decrees of June and September 1945. This process has placed a heavy burden on transportation facilities and has led to difficulties in procuring proper employment for the returning veterans. More than 8,000,000 men, it is estimated, had been returned to their homes by the end of 1945. Most of them belonged to the older age groups, while the estimated intake of some 3,500,000 men during 1945 consisted almost entirely of the 1926 and 1927 classes.

Premier Stalin has indicated publicly that Soviet military strength will
eventually be reduced to one-third of its wartime level. This may be interpreted to mean stabilization at approximately 4,400,000 men, of whom 3,400,000 will be in the Red Army ground and air forces and the remainder in the Red Navy and the security police. The total is approximately 2.4 percent of the Soviet population of some 184,000,000, compared with 1.3 percent of the population in the case of France and 1.8 percent in the case of Great Britain. The annual class reaching military age in the Soviet Union numbers well over 2,000,000 men, although a considerable proportion of them are not called into service.

During the war with Germany, tactical units of the Red Army were evolved and reached a high degree of efficiency in combat. Hence, while the higher organization of combat forces has been changed to meet the needs of occupation forces and home garrisons, it is expected that the basic organization of infantry and cavalry divisions and of tank and mechanized corps will be retained.

It is evident that attempts are being made to develop new weapons and to improve existing models. The revamping of the armament industry is typified by the creation of a new Commissariat for the Construction of Military and Naval Industrial Enterprises out of the former Main Administration of Military Industrial Construction. On the other hand, the partial shift in emphasis back to civilian production is symbolized by the redesignation of the Commissariat of the Tank Industry as the Commissariat of Transport Machine Building, although it is believed that the production of new tank designs has continued and that a large stockpile had been accumulated before the reconversion.

China’s Armed Forces Will Be Reorganized

The defeat of Japan and the steps made toward conciliation between the Chinese Nationalist Government and the Chinese Communists have not eliminated the need for an adequate Chinese military force to preserve internal security. Only with an assurance of domestic peace can China hope to achieve political and economic recovery and to effect the far-reaching reforms necessary to progress. To this end, in the military as well as other fields, China looks almost entirely to the United States for aid.

The Chinese Deputy War Minister has announced that demobilization will begin immediately as a result of the agreement ending the civil war in
China. He reports that the Nationalist Army will be reduced from 4,830,000 to 1,800,000 men during the first six months of 1946. These figures must be regarded as excessive, since personnel records are almost nonexistent in most units, and local field commanders tend to “pad” their rolls in order to receive more food and equipment. It is estimated that the effective strength of the Nationalist Army will be reduced from about 2,850,000 men in 262 divisions to approximately 1,500,000 men organized into 90 divisions, plus 10 cavalry brigades and certain special units.

Numerous Army reforms are contemplated, including the exclusion of political influences from the military forces, introduction of sound personnel and finance systems, improvement of the method of conscription, and measures for the rehabilitation and employment of discharged personnel. If these are carried out and if the reduced Army is at least reasonably well equipped and well led, it will be incomparably more effective than it has been.

The Communists have announced that they will reorganize their Army and limit its size to 20 divisions of 300,000 to 400,000 men. The present strength is estimated at 960,000. No plan has yet been announced for integrating or merging the Communist and Nationalist Armies, but a joint military committee is working on the problem.

The Chinese Air Force, which has been noted for its inefficiency, is in process of being streamlined by an American military mission. Present plans include the training of staff officers in proper administrative procedures, establishment of a staff school with United States standards, coordination of communications, and creation of an Air Training Command and an Air Service Command. No immediate expansion is contemplated except an increase in the existing two transport squadrons to eight, which will facilitate the rapid movement of troops to meet emergency situations in remote parts of the country.

(A second article, dealing with the military transition of minor Powers to peacetime systems, will appear in next week’s issue.)
MANCHURIA—SOVIET OR CHINESE SPHERE?

After Japan's surrender, the Chinese National Government was faced with the problem of reoccupying Manchuria. Reoccupation, difficult enough because of logistical considerations, was made an even graver problem by the fact that Soviet troops occupied the area and were rumored to be supporting Chinese Communist forces in the latter's attempt to obtain a dominant position in Manchuria. However, it now appears that Soviet policy was directed toward gaining economic concessions from the National Government, in return for which the Soviets would cooperate in re-establishing National Government authority over the area.

The National Government has yielded to the Soviet Union no rights in Manchuria beyond those granted in the Sino-Soviet treaty of August 1945, an “authoritative source” in China recently informed the press. However, a “high Chinese official” has disclosed that discussions concerning Manchurian war booty are progressing. He described the Soviet policy as “completely opportunist,” and maintained that China could not agree with the Soviet viewpoint that Manchurian industries should be regarded as the U. S. S. R.'s war gains. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had been quoted earlier by the press as saying that “informal” negotiations were pending with the Soviet Union regarding economic concessions “beyond the published terms of the Sino-Soviet treaty.”

Even aside from this problem, the National Government is still confronted with serious difficulties in the reoccupation of Manchuria. The main problems are as follows:

1. Military Control: Such control appears unlikely for an indefinite time, because of difficulties in the movement of troops and supplies. Establishment of effective military control, moreover, must precede establishment of administrative authority over public affairs.

2. Civil Administration: Even when in administrative control, the Chinese Government's lack of competent civil administrators will occasion
difficulties. Dissatisfaction and a lack of confidence in the National Government may arise among the local populations.

3. Trade and Industry: Managers and technicians qualified to solve immediate practical difficulties will be lacking. Resumption of mining and manufacturing at a sufficiently high level to provide for Manchuria’s industrial needs and to aid China’s own rehabilitation will be delayed until successful military control and an efficient civil administration have been established.

As the solution of these problems will require considerable time, it is probable that the National Government will not be able to gain complete control over Manchuria for many months.

Manchurian Economy Well-Developed

At present the plans of the National Government to take over the Manchurian economy have not progressed beyond arrangements for a survey of the area, authorization of special currency notes, and the training of technicians. The Chinese, however, will take possession of a well-developed, though unbalanced, economy. In addition to the basic agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining, there is an industrial establishment with substantial capacity for production of iron and steel, light metals, chemicals, railway and automotive equipment, synthetic oil, machines and tools, and many other products. Moreover, there is available a well-integrated system of railroads for necessary transportation.

Nevertheless, several problems must be solved before any economic benefits may be realized by the Chinese:

They must replace experienced Japanese administrators, managers, technicians, and skilled laborers.

They must convert an industry designed for war to a peacetime basis and restore production to a level adequate for current needs.

They must redirect the economy from its position as part of the Japanese economic bloc, building up normal trade channels to dispose of surplus merchandise, and providing the goods now lacking.

They must meet situations, arising from the Soviet Union’s special privileges, to be certain that the area’s economy is not oriented away from themselves and toward the U. S. S. R.

Chief surplus minerals in the territory are coal, iron, aluminum, mag-
MANCHURIA

nesium, lead, zinc, oil (derived from shale), and salt (largely from the sea). Other surplus materials are food and lumber. China itself particularly needs the metallic minerals and lumber. These resources are estimated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>Millions of metric tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>20 - 25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron Ore</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminum Shale</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnesite</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead, Zinc, Copper and Silver Ore</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Shale</td>
<td>7,628</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(See map on page 15.)

Heavy Industry in South

Manufacturing is largely concentrated in southern Manchuria, where abundant natural resources, good transportation facilities, and a large labor supply are available. Although numerous small centers carry on manufacturing, large-scale industrial activity is concentrated in Mukden (munitions, aircraft, rolling stock, and diversified products); Anshan and Penhsihu (iron and steel); Fushun (coal, oil, and aluminum); Talien (Darien) (railway equipment, metal goods, and chemicals); Harbin (food products); Antung (aluminum and automotive equipment); Kirin (synthetic oil and chemicals). Most of these plants suffered little damage from bombing, and unless much equipment has been removed to Siberia by the Soviets, as many unconfirmed reports state—there should be no great problem in physical restoration. However, because of the lack of trained supervisors, technicians, and skilled labor, some difficulties are anticipated in conversion.

No information has yet indicated the present level of industrial production. It is probable, however, that it is much below operating capacities, and that improvement will be delayed until the Chinese have occupied the territory for some time. Capacities of production of principal mineral products are estimated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Estimated annual capacities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>25,000,000 M. T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coke</td>
<td>2,800,000 M. T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron Ore</td>
<td>5,100,000 M. T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig Iron</td>
<td>2,500,000 M. T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel Ingots</td>
<td>1,500,000 M. T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminum</td>
<td>18,000 M. T.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MANCHURIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Estimated annual capacities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magnesium</td>
<td>4,000 M. T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>19,000 M. T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metallic Zinc</td>
<td>12,600 M. T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Gasoline</td>
<td>400,000 Bbls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary Gasoline</td>
<td>2,300,000 Bbls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel and Diesel Oil</td>
<td>3,900,000 Bbls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubricating Oil</td>
<td>19,000 Bbls.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

About 30 percent of Manchuria is arable, and most of this area lies in the Central Lowland which extends northward from the Liaotung Gulf to within 100 miles of the Amur River. About half of the arable land has been cultivated. The principal crop is soy beans, usually exceeding 4,000,000 tons a year. The nation should be able to export approximately 2,000,000 tons of soy beans and soy bean cake and oil. About 15,000,000 tons of grains, principally kaoliang, millet, and maize, are produced. About 1,000,000 tons each of wheat and rice are grown. Most grains are consumed locally, although 1,000,000 tons are normally available for export to North China, Korea, and Japan. Production can be substantially increased through cultivation of additional land.

Railroads Are Integrated, Roads Poor

There are approximately 7,000 miles of standard-gauge, single-track railroads in Manchuria. It is believed most lines are operable, but efficiency has probably been reduced by damage and removals of rolling stock, lack of maintenance, insufficient stocks of coal, inadequate personnel, and otherwise unsettled conditions. Except at Manchouli and Suifenho, there are no connections with Siberian railroads. The network joins the Korean lines at three points, and the Chinese lines at two. (See map on page 17.)

The highway system largely supplements the railroads. Outside of cities there are few paved roads, and only a few of the others are surfaced or reasonably well maintained. Most roads are unfit for travel during the rainy season in July and August and during the spring thaws.

There are about 5,000 miles of navigable waterways in the state, most of them in the north. They are used for transportation of both passengers and agricultural products. River transport is hampered by floods and freezes.
MANCHURIA

By far the most important port in the territory is Dairen, which is expected to resume its place among the leading ports of the Far East. Other ports include Hulutao, Yingkou, and Antung. It seems likely that the north Korean ports of Rashin, Seishin, and Yuki will be used to some extent by northeastern Manchuria.

The present electric-power capacity, unless impaired by damage or removals of equipment, should be approximately 2,000,000 kilowatts, of which approximately 30 percent is hydroelectric. It has been reported without confirmation that the Soviets dismantled about two-thirds of the Yalu River installations, which were shared equally by Manchuria and Korea. Japanese-installed hydroelectric plants are located at Suibo, on the Yalu River, and Tafengman, on the Sungari River. It is possible that another plant on the Hun River may be completed. It is probable that none of these plants is fully equipped now, but it is believed that Manchuria is capable of quickly developing sufficient electric power to meet any industrial requirements for the next several years.

Population Largely Chinese

Manchurian ethnic groups, their numbers, and their probable political loyalties, are:

Chinese: 39,000,000. Expected to be generally loyal to the Nationalist Government, although groups loyal to local leaders may hinder National Government control in some specific regions.

Mongols: 950,000. Expected to remain aloof from politics although they may cause trouble later in the sparsely settled areas bordering Outer Mongolia, especially if the Chinese do not offer them considerable cultural and political autonomy.

Japanese: 1,000,000. Probably will accept National Government authority without question and may contribute considerably to economic stability through business and industrial skills. They are thinly disguised Japanese "commercial ambassadors," however, and if they are permitted to dominate the commercial scene, Japanese imperialistic aims probably will be reasserted.
Koreans: 1,500,000. Will accept authority of the National Government without question, but may become troublesome if Korean independence gives them a greater sense of national status.

Russians: 50,000. Although this element performed no intrigues for the Soviets prior to the Japanese surrender, the present prestige of the U. S. S. R., plus Soviet political and economic pressure in Manchuria, may draw the younger generation into the Soviet orbit.

Soviet Rights Restored by Treaty

The August 1945 treaty restored to the Soviet Union virtually all rights which czarist Russia held in Manchuria before the Revolution directed the Soviet Union's interest toward internal affairs and gave the Japanese an opportunity for expansion, culminating in the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo. The 1945 agreement:

(1) Established Dairen as a free port with the Soviet Union holding one-half of the port installations and obtaining duty-free transit of goods shipped to or from Soviet territories;

(2) Declared Port Arthur a joint naval base;

(3) Granted the U. S. S. R. joint ownership of the Chinese Changchun Railway, which includes the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway;

(4) Called for Chinese recognition of the independence of Outer Mongolia, should a plebiscite so decide (in October an election favored independence);

(5) Recognized Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria;

(6) Provided for moral support and material aid by the Soviet Union to the Chinese Nationalist Government; and

(7) Promised noninterference by each signatory in internal affairs of the other.

Since 1858, Russia, China, and Japan have sought to conquer Manchuria for imperialistic purposes and each has fought the others for control. After Japan established the puppet state of Manchukuo, Soviet-Japanese border clashes were continual until the U. S. S. R. entered the war against Japan in 1945.
MANCHURIA

Yalta Foreshadowed Soviet Policy

Since the Japanese surrender, Soviet policy has developed along lines foreshadowed at Yalta and in the August treaty with China, including recognition of National Government sovereignty and Soviet acquisition of sufficient economic and military concessions to assure its preferential position.

Although local Soviet commanders in Manchuria apparently have aided some Chinese Communist leaders, it is clear that the immediate Soviet policy envisages restoration of the area to the National Government. Rumors of Soviet support of the Chinese Communists have been unfounded, and Soviet officials still deny such aid, although Chinese National Government sources continue to report Communist receipt of captured Japanese equipment.

News reports from Communist-held North China state that the Soviet forces and the Chinese Communists are "cooperative but not intimate," and point out that Soviet policy in Manchuria has confused even the Chinese Communists, who have received local cooperation while still being officially ignored.

Despite widespread condemnation of the Soviet failure to withdraw from Manchuria as early as had been originally announced, it is apparent that the change in plans was made with at least tacit consent of the National Government. For a time it appeared that the Soviets would aid, or at least not try to prevent, occupation of key areas of Manchuria by the National Government. However, relations deteriorated when Soviet forces denied permission for United States vessels to land Nationalist troops at Dairen and Port Arthur and when Soviet troops withdrew from strong points in Communist-held areas prior to the arrival of Nationalist troops. Recurrent reports that the Soviets were removing both personal and industrial property from Manchuria also contributed to the ill feeling which then prevailed.
The National Government now has approximately 52,000 troops in Manchuria, deployed principally in the Mukden and Liaotung Gulf areas. An increase to approximately 70,000 is anticipated prior to 1 March, but this number is not judged sufficient to garrison the area and relieve the estimated 300,000 Soviet troops now stationed there. In addition, the National Government has 50,000 troops in Jehol. Chinese Communist forces are estimated at 100,000, but they are poorly organized and equipped, and are believed capable only of harassing action against lines of communication should active Nationalist-Communist warfare resume, unless reinforcements are brought from North China.

In administering Manchuria the National Government apparently intends to absorb the territory into the Chinese state, largely disregarding the dominant political regionalism of the area. Appeals have been made to the "national spirit" of the population, a spirit never strongly manifested. Chiang Kai-shek has stated that his Government's political plans for Manchuria are to "make the people realize our bright political prospects" and "strengthen and facilitate the administration of the provinces." With this objective the Provisional Headquarters of the Chairman of the National Military Council was created at Changchun to negotiate with the Soviets during the interim period of their occupation. To facilitate the second step, the original three provinces are to be divided into nine provinces, to enable the Government to administer the area more efficiently as well as to break down the power of local leaders.

Soviet Gains Probable

Soviet interest in Manchuria stems from the historical drive for warm-water ports and from a desire to forestall Japanese influence in the area. Eastern Siberia lacks year-round port facilities and the food and basic industrial products which Manchuria possesses. In Dairen and Port Arthur the Soviets have gained warm-water bases for commercial and naval operations, and they have likewise obtained railroad connections with these ports. There is a strong possibility that before the Soviets withdraw completely they will
MANCHURIA

have gained further privileges from the Chinese, including partial control of certain industries and special commercial rights.

In calculating future trends, it appears likely the Soviets will continue to develop their economic position in Manchuria along lines of joint exploitation and at the same time assume the role of chief economic adviser to China in the area. It is believed the Soviet policy will be aimed at attainment of the following goals:

1. Joint operation of important coal and iron mines and rights to survey and develop new mineral resources.
2. Joint operation of heavy industries.
3. Extension of railway rights to embrace other lines than the present Chinese Changchun Railway.
4. Acquisition of through telephone and telegraph lines from Dairen and Port Arthur to Soviet territory.
5. Special navigation rights on Manchurian rivers.
6. Commercial agreements for improvement of transportation and industry in Manchuria.
7. Appointment of Soviet economic advisers and technicians.

The Soviets may use seizure of Japanese property as a basis for claiming ownership in Manchurian industrial property, and even partial achievement of these objectives would enable them to build up their territory to the north by directing development of the Northeast provinces along favorable lines. At the same time they would be in a position to prevent participation of other nations in Manchurian industry and trade.

If the Soviets attempt to draw on Manchuria for substantial amounts of processed and semi-processed goods, they will be in direct conflict with China's pressing need for such goods to aid in economic rehabilitation and development. There would be no such conflict, however, in export of agricultural products.

Conclusions

The problem of Manchuria appears to be entering a new phase rather than approaching an early peaceful solution. Manchuria has emerged from the war as a most inviting economic entity. While Chinese political sovereignty is recognized, it is clear that Soviet economic and strategic
aspirations have not been relinquished and that China is not now capable of integrating and administering the area.

The needs and desires of the Manchurian population, meanwhile, are being given residual attention only, and the National Government apparently is ignoring their desire for participation in local political affairs. Since the majority of the population is Chinese and so considers itself, popular dissatisfaction is unlikely to result in a movement to separate from China. Failure of the National Government to respect minimum local demands, however, almost certainly would bring widespread unrest and crystallize strong anti-National Government alignments.

For the immediate future, the following are regarded as certainties:

(1) Soviet troops will not have withdrawn fully by 1 March 1946.

(2) The Chinese National Government will not have sufficient military strength in Manchuria to provide for effective military control of the area for many weeks; establishment of firm political control will be correspondingly delayed.

(3) Prospects for friction between the Nationalists and the Chinese Communists hinge upon developments in China proper; if the truce holds, the Chinese National Government will be able to continue its occupation progress without organized opposition.
ISLAM: A THREAT TO WORLD STABILITY

The Moslem world sprawls around half the earth, from the Pacific across Asia and Africa to the Atlantic, along one of the greatest of trade routes; in its center is an area extremely rich in oil; over it will run some of the most strategically important air routes.

With few exceptions, the states which it includes are marked by poverty, ignorance, and stagnation. It is full of discontent and frustration, yet alive with consciousness of its inferiority and with determination to achieve some kind of general betterment.

Two basic urges meet head-on in this area, and conflict is inherent in this collision of interests. These urges reveal themselves in daily news accounts of killings and terrorism, of pressure groups in opposition, and of raw nationalism and naked expansionism masquerading as diplomatic maneuvers. The urges tie together the tangled threads of power politics which—snarled in the lap of the United Nations Assembly—lead back to the centers of Islamic pressure and to the capitals of the world’s biggest nations.

The first of these urges originates within the Moslems’ own sphere. The Moslems remember the power with which once they not only ruled their own domains but also overpowered half of Europe, yet they are painfully aware of their present economic, cultural, and military impoverishment. Thus a terrific internal pressure is building up in their collective thinking. The Moslems intend, by any means possible, to regain political independence and to reap the profits of their own resources, which in recent times and up to the present have been surrendered to the exploitation of foreigners who could provide capital investments. The area, in short, has an inferiority complex, and its activities are thus as unpredictable as those of any individual so motivated.

The other fundamental urge originates externally. The world’s great and near-great Powers cover the economic riches of the Moslem area and are also mindful of the strategic locations of some of the domains. Their actions are also difficult to predict, because each of these Powers sees itself
in the position of the customer who wants to do his shopping in a hurry because he happens to know the store is going to be robbed.

In an atmosphere so sated with the inflammable gases of distrust and ambition, the slightest spark could lead to an explosion which might implicate every country committed to the maintenance of world peace through the United Nations Organization. An understanding of the Moslem world and of the stresses and forces operative within it is thus an essential part of the basic intelligence framework.

**History of the Moslems**

The influence which integrates the Moslems is their religion, Islam. This religion began officially in the year 622 A.D., when Mahomet was driven from Mecca because of his preaching of a synthesis of Jewish and Christian heresy, and took flight to Yathrib (Al Medinah). Taking advantage of the age-old feud between the two towns, he soon rallied an army to his side, made extensive compromises with Medinah paganism, and attacked Mecca. At his death in 632 A.D. he was the master of all Arabia.

His successors, the Caliphs (or Khalifs) quickly overran much of the known world; they reached India and penetrated Trans Caspiana and Musa ibn Tariq, and crossed the straits at the western end of the Mediterranean, giving to the mountainous rock at their entrance the name of Jebel Al Tariq (the mountain of Tariq), which the Spaniards later corrupted to “Gibraltar.” In 732 A.D.—just one century after the death of the Prophet—the Moslem advance in western Europe was finally turned back at Tours, France, by Charles Martel. To the north of Arabia, the Byzantine Kingdom held back the Moslem tide until the 15th century, when Constantinople fell and central Europe became a Turkish province. From that high point, Moslem expansion gradually receded. Although for centuries the Moslem world had been contributing to western arts, science, and trade, a period of increasing sterility set in, and during the next 400 years the Moslems advanced very little in any phase of human endeavor.

At the present time there are no strong Moslem states. The leadership
Number and percentage of Moslem population by areas.
of the Moslem world remains in the Middle East, particularly in Arabia. This area lies near the geographical center of Eurasia’s population, with industrial Europe to the west and the agricultural countries of India, Indonesia, and China to the east. Through it passes the Suez Canal; and north of it lie fabulously rich oil fields around the Persian Gulf.

Present Forces Tending to Weaken Moslem Unity

The many forces tending to tear the Moslem world apart have been so strong that there has been no central Moslem authority since the 8th century; the factors which generate disunity are discussed briefly below.

1. Lack of a common language.—Moslems east and south of the Tigris River (except those in Malaya and Indonesia) usually speak Urdu, Persian, or Turkish. West of the Tigris River, the dominant language is Arabic, but its far western dialects are unintelligible to the eastern Arab.

2. Religious schisms.—The oldest of these schisms is the Sunni-Shiah controversy, which arose in the 8th century. The eastern Caliphate, with its capital at Baghdad, gave impetus to the Shiah sect, but it was not until the 17th century that the Shiah creed was officially adopted in Iran. The majority of Moslems, however, belong to the Sunni (unorthodox) sect, although islands of Shiah believers exist in Sunni regions. Neither sect has a recognized leader. In theory the Sunni should have a Caliph, a successor to the Prophet; but the historic Caliphate came to an end in Baghdad about 1350, and there have since been only “captive” Caliphs—puppets set up by secular powers and not generally recognized. The Emir Husayn of Mecca desired the British to recognize him as Caliph in 1916, and in recent years King Faruq (Farouk) of Egypt has made gestures indicating he would be willing to play the part. Nationalism keeps the Moslems apart, however, and no serious bid for the traditional role of a leader of Islam now exists.

Islam is also beset with modern movements which try to make it conform to new historical evidence and to modern psychology and science. These have included a reform movement known as Babism, which appeared a century ago in Iran, followed by Bahaism, which adopted many features of the former.

Along with “the acids of modernity,” there have been atavistic movements designed to preserve the original “purity of Islam.” In 1703 an
Arab chieftain, Abdul Wahab, revived a fanatically purist faith, which soon swept over all Arabia. Thousands of "pagan Moslems" were massacred at Mecca by desert adherents of the new faith. Around 1850 the movement suffered eclipse but again appeared in 1903, led by Abdul Aziz of the Saud family. Again it overran the Arabian Peninsula, and it is now the recognized faith of Saudi Arabia. These Wahabis believe that the Koran is the only source of faith and that it contains the only precepts for war, commerce, and politics; they regard any innovation as heresy.

Paralleling this reactionary tendency, there have appeared in Egypt and elsewhere several societies that stress Islamic culture; these are openly anti-European and secretly anti-Christian and anti-Jewish. The best-known is the Ikhwan el Muslimin (Brotherhood of Moslems), which encourages youth movements and maintains commando units and secret caches of arms (it is reported to have 60,000 to 70,000 rifles). The militant societies, such as the Shabab Muhammad (Youth of Mahomet) and the Misr Al Fattat (Young Egypt), are led by demagogues and political opportunists. They issue clandestine pamphlets, attack the government, stir up hatred of the British, and sow the seeds of violence. In recent months, Premier Ahmad Maher of Egypt was assassinated, and former Premier Nahas Pasha was wounded by people associated with these groups. Christian minorities in the Middle East fear these fanatical and nationalistic Moslem societies which exploit the ignorance and poverty of the masses, and even the more enlightened Moslem leaders must cater to their fanaticism in order to retain their positions.

3. Geographical isolation.—The Indian Moslem knows little or nothing of his fellow believers in Mongolia and Morocco. To a Sudanese, Turkey and Iran are meaningless terms. High mountains, broad deserts, and great distances separate one group from another, and provincialism has inevitably resulted.

4. Economic disparities.—Throughout the Moslem world, social conditions closely approximate medieval feudalism. In Egypt, a few thousand people own the land on which 15 million labor as sharecroppers. In Saudi Arabia, where the purest desert "democracy" exists, the contrast between the living conditions of the peasant and the feudal land-holding classes is very great. That contrast is common throughout the whole Moslem world, where the lack of industrial development has made it easier than elsewhere
to retain the feudal system of exploiting the land and the peasants. Social reform has been given only lip service, and the Moslem peasants have a growing conviction, stimulated by Soviet propaganda, that the landowners are their worst enemy. In northern Iran, the peasants have openly revolted under the instigation and protection of the Red Army, and such a revolt can happen anywhere in the Moslem world.

5. Political rivalries and nationalism.—The Iranian has always looked upon the Arab as a wild man and upon the Turk as a “son of a dog”; the Turk in turn considers the Iranian a degenerate but agrees with his views of the Arab; and so goes the cycle of animosity. These mutual dislikes have existed for centuries, but they have a deeper meaning in the present era of nationalism. For example, after exiling the puppet “Caliph” in 1923, the Turks completely nationalized the idea of Islam. Pilgrimages ceased almost entirely, the Koran was translated into Turkish, and all prayers were put into that language. Oaths no longer needed to be made on the Koran, but on one’s honor. Thus, the roots of Islam were cut, making religion a purely passive phase of nationalism.

Likewise in Iran, during the period from 1920 to 1940, religious holidays were displaced by national fiestas, national heroes were substituted for those of Arab origin, and the old customs of Islam were replaced by new.

Even within the Arab-speaking world, nationalism transcends religion. Egypt is concerned with local issues. Saudi Arabia is absorbed in the age-old feud between its royal family and that of west Arabia. Nationalists in Syria, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Morocco are concentrating on means to throw off the French yoke.

Only when a cause in another region would be of value in their own do the Moslems cooperate. For example, their widespread sympathy for the Palestinian Arab in his struggle against Zionism is translated into action only by the Arab states bordering on Palestine. The largest single group of Moslem believers lives in India, but its principal fear is of being swallowed up in a sea of Hindu millions; to these Moslems the establishment of a colony of Jews three thousand miles to the west is by comparison a matter of little concern.

In addition to the dissension and selfish interests that tend to split the Moslem world from within, various foreign countries have parcelled
it into spheres of influence or areas of outright domination. From 1930 to 1940 only three Moslem states, with a total population of less than 40 million people, had any real degree of independence. They were Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, and each of these was jealous of the others and on the defensive to protect its national existence against the great Powers.

6. Prostitution of leadership.—At the end of the 18th century, Moslem power had fallen so low that a series of self-appointed Protectors of Islam appeared. One of the earliest was Napoleon, who as Governor of Egypt from 1799 to 1802 outdid the old Moslem rulers in celebrating Islamic festivals and reviving decadent customs.

Later, Great Britain assumed the role, but her efforts had small success because her Zionist policy antagonized the Arabs.

Then Mussolini and Hitler represented themselves as guardians of the Moslems. Axis money and intrigue proved effective in many instances, so that with the approach of war the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and Rashid Ali Al Gailani of Iraq, among others, were in the Axis camp. In Iran, a group of important persons was formed into a loose political party which favored the Axis, and in Egypt the British could trust neither the King nor the Premier.

The most recent claimant as Protector of Islam is the Soviet Union, which before the war showed little interest in championing religion but now realizes the value of such a role as an instrument of policy. Thus, while the London BBC and the Delhi radio have recently broadcast recitations in Arabic from the Koran and admonished the faithful to continue their devotions, Radio Moscow has told of the facilities which the Soviet Union had made available to pilgrims for traveling by air to Mecca.

Recent Soviet broadcasts have quoted the Imam of the Moscow Mosque, Sheikh Nasr ad-Din, on freedom of religion in the Soviet Union. The Imam stated that “every Moslem in the U. S. S. R. is well aware of the fact that the Stalin Constitution is a guarantee for the freedom of expression and belief,” and (citing the oppression of Moslems under Christian regimes) that “Moslems in the U. S. S. R. always beseech Allah to protect the Soviet authorities and our great father and friend of all nations, the great and wise Stalin.” The Imam was also quoted as saying that “as a result of the consideration shown by the Government toward Soviet Moslems, tombs of distinguished Moslem religious leaders are being maintained” and recon-
structed. Another Moscow broadcast, directed at Arabic-speaking peoples, declared that rumors circulating in Arab circles regarding the Soviet Union's attitude toward religion, particularly the Islamic, were "nothing but political maneuvers of the imperialists, who are afraid of the Arab march on the road of democracy and true liberty."

The election in Moscow of the Grand Mufti of the Central Moslem Administration is reported to have been scheduled for January. Arab circles are reported to have taken more interest in this assembly of Moslems than in any other Soviet propaganda effort. It is to be anticipated that the election of the Grand Mufti of the Central Moslem Administration may prove as useful propaganda as was the election of Alexius to the Patriarchate of All Russia. The Soviets have also solicited the favor of the Coptic Church in Egypt and that of other religious groups in the Middle East.

The net result of all these intrigues has been that the Moslems are properly suspicious of their leaders. The moment a new leader appears he is tempted by various European Powers to accept their "assistance," and almost inevitably his loyalty and discretion are eventually sold to one of them.

Present Forces Tending to Strengthen Moslem Unity

1. The Pilgrimage to Mecca.—This ancient duty formerly brought many hundreds of thousands of pilgrims from all sections of the Moslem world to Mecca, where ideas were actively exchanged, along with goods. Although the pilgrimage is still made (the last was in November and December 1945), the number participating has dwindled greatly. The scarcity of shipping during the war reduced the usual horde to about 20,000—30,000 per year. While the numbers will probably increase now, they are not likely to reach their former proportions. Turkey discourages pilgrimages; Iran (where the dissident Shiah sect is the official religion) has prohibited them altogether since 1944. Yet they will continue to be a unifying force when Moslems from the East and West meet and repeat prayers in a common language.

2. Classical Arabic.—All written Arabic, as well as that spoken in public assemblies, is based on the classical forms. Accordingly, a newspaper printed in Casablanca can be read in Baghdad, or by members of the Lebanese colony in New Jersey. The Arab press is reviving. Al Ahram, a daily paper in Cairo, has almost as large a circulation outside the country
ISLAM

as within. Many new books have been published on the lives of the early Moslem heroes, and a "Book of the Month Club" distributes biographies of famous characters, almost all Moslems. The American Readers' Digest, in its Arabic translation, sells around 100,000 copies a month, indicating the increasing demand for reading material. It is still too early to know whether this literary revival will tend to break up Moslem solidarity by introducing new ideas, or will lead Islam out of its slough of intellectual inaction.

3. Modern communications.—The development of fast, comfortable, and relatively cheap travel is affording a more cosmopolitan outlook to a small group in each country. Radio programs in all the languages of the East flood the air. Thus, for a few, the isolation of the past has ended, and these few will act as a leaven for the rest. Any growth in understanding among the poverty-crushed masses, however, will be very slow.

4. The Arab League.—After a spasmodic upheaval, such as that led by Lawrence in 1916-20, the pan-Arab movement broke up under the pressure of British and French policies and because of rivalries between the Hashemite family of west Arabia and the Saud family of east Arabia. Nevertheless, two other forces were driving the Arabs of the Middle East toward greater cohesion: (1) hatred of European exploitation and (2) fear of a Jewish state on Arab soil. By 1942, leaders of the Arab world were advancing plans for the formation of an Arab Federation, and in February 1943, British Foreign Secretary Eden declared that Great Britain favored any move toward Arab unity. (See map on next page.)

Soon there was a stirring of political activity, culminating in October 1944 with the announcement of the Alexandria Protocol of the Arab League Conference. A constitution was drafted in March 1945, and seven states (or mandated territories) have become members. The League aims to include all Arabs in North Africa and then to take in Turkey and Iran. It represents the sympathetic and broader vision that is being expressed by the Arabs of both East and West for the first time in centuries. At the very least, the League serves as a rallying point for Moslems, and many of them hope will restore Islam to some degree of political power.

The Present Estimate

If the Moslem states were strong and stable, their behavior would be more predictable. They are, however, weak and torn by internal stresses;
furthermore, their peoples are insufficiently educated to appraise propaganda or to understand the motives of those who promise a new Heaven and a new Earth.

Because of the strategic position of the Moslem world and the restlessness of its peoples, the Moslem states constitute a potential threat to world peace. There cannot be permanent world stability, when one-seventh of the earth's population exists under the economic and political conditions that are imposed upon the Moslems.
RESULTS OF SOVIET-AMERICAN ECONOMIC CONFERENCE IN KOREA

The Soviet-American Conference, which had been assembled at Seoul to discuss urgent inter-zone economic problems, adjourned on 5 February after three weeks' discussions in which only limited progress was achieved. Soviet insistence upon restricting the scope of agreements to specific barter arrangements precluded the possibility of reaching any fundamental coordination between the two commands at this time.

Specific agreement on the questions of the distribution of electric power and the exchange of commodities was made impossible by disagreement on the values of the items concerned and by the inability of the American authorities to provide the surplus rice which the Soviets considered a prerequisite to any exchange agreement. No decision was reached on the questions of repatriation of Japanese from north Korea to Japan nor of Koreans from Japan to north Korea. The Soviets insisted that repatriate Koreans be laid down in north Korean ports with sufficient food to enable them to return to their homes without drawing on northern Korean food stocks. At the same time, however, they desired that food for Japanese returning to Japan be furnished by the United States from Korean ports.

The questions of opening inter-zone telecommunications and of establishing a uniform national financial system are to be discussed further by letter. Small liaison groups are to be exchanged.

Specific agreements, however, were reached on the following points:

1. *Inter-zone transportation.*—Carefully regulated inter-zone rail, truck, and coastwise transportation is to be established, with tariffs on a uniform basis. Rolling stock is to be accounted for at designated exchange points, and the deficiency in Soviet transportation caused by the movement of greater tonnage southward is to be made up by the American command. Locomotive repair shops are to resume the standards prevailing on 1 August 1945, and repair schedules in effect at that time are to be re-established not later than 1 April. Both commands are to work toward the manufacture
CONFERENCE IN KOREA

of spare parts required by locomotives in both zones, and the distribution of parts is to be according to the 1 August ratio.

2. Inter-zone movement of Koreans and mail.—Upon formal application, Korean civilians will be allowed to travel between zones if they are: (a) returning to their former place of residence; (b) engaging in authorized commercial activity; (c) attending to urgent personal business; or (d) attending school near the boundary line. The agreement on the movement of mail provides that letters, postcards, and registered mail will be exchanged at one point near the border, on the basis of mutual exchange of records and mutual settlement of accounts. Exchanges of mail are to take place whenever desired by postal authorities.

3. Border control.—Soviet and American border control posts are to be established not more than two kilometers apart in areas of no military responsibility, and are to be in regular contact with each other through telephone or messenger service. Such details as exact locations will be worked out after the boundary adjustment question is settled.

4. Radio regulation.—Frequencies of radio stations may not be changed except by mutual agreement.

5. Future coordination.—Special meetings on administrative and economic problems may be called in the future by either command, and the recommendations made at these special meetings are to be effective when approved by both commands. Small liaison groups of two or three persons are to be exchanged between the two commands. Both commands have agreed to keep the present Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line open and in good repair.

The limited accomplishments of this preliminary conference are disappointing to the Koreans, whose economy has been virtually paralyzed by the rigidity of the 38th parallel barrier. This disappointment is probably intensified by the secrecy surrounding the Soviet-American discussions.

The conference accomplished little in the nature of concrete improvement in Soviet-American relations, but the fact that representatives of the two commands were able to meet and reach even limited agreement represents some progress. The attitude of the Soviet delegates convinced the American authorities in Korea that the Soviets approach current Korean problems as matters concerning a Russian Korea and an American Korea rather than a unified Korean nation.
Both the Soviet and American authorities realize the limited results of the economic conference and are anxious to proceed as rapidly as possible with political discussions leading to the formation of a representative Korean interim government. The joint Soviet-American commission provided for at the Moscow Conference to discuss Korean political problems is scheduled to hold its initial meeting early in March.
ANGLO-AMERICAN CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT CONCLUDED

Great Britain and the United States have concluded a bilateral air transport agreement after four weeks of negotiations at Bermuda. Efforts to get American carriers into the air had been negated by fundamental disagreement between the two nations since the Chicago Civil Aviation Conference of 1944. At that time, Great Britain maintained that international commercial aviation should be controlled by an international civil aeronautics authority, which would allocate routes and control flight frequencies, capacities, and rates. The United States fostered a policy of unregulated competition. This opposition of views stemmed to a great extent from the fact that the United States manufactured a predominance of transport aircraft during the war, while Great Britain concentrated on the production of tactical types.

Great Britain feared that the field would be preempted before she could produce enough commercial transports to compete with United States airlines. In addition to military and intelligence considerations, Great Britain's shortage of dollars induced her to favor enough control of air traffic to ensure British carriers a fair share of this export market.

The "Freedoms of the Air"

For purposes of definition, the various degrees of traffic freedom were crystallized into the so-called Five Freedoms at the Chicago Conference:

1. Privilege of innocent passage.
2. Privilege of making non-traffic stops.
3. Privilege of discharging in foreign countries traffic taken on in the carrier's homeland.
4. Privilege of discharging in the carrier's homeland traffic taken on in foreign countries.
5. Privilege of carrying intermediate traffic on international routes.

Great Britain refused to sign the so-called Five Freedoms Agreement.
at the Chicago Conference and thereafter refused to come to terms with the United States on any civil aviation treaty. However, the British have become anxious about Congressional approval of the proposed $4,400,000,000 American loan and accordingly dared not postpone the conclusion of a bilateral agreement any longer. At Bermuda the two delegations reached an agreement on Fifth Freedom traffic, rate-setting, and commercial use of the 99-year-lease bases.

**Great Britain Grants Fifth Freedom**

The accompanying map shows Fifth Freedom stops which United States and British carriers may make under the terms of the agreement reached at Bermuda. Routes shown on the map should not be construed as being the actual routes which will be flown, since the carriers conceivably may establish a different network pattern, using the stops authorized by the convention. That the British have conceded these Fifth Freedom privileges amounts to a drastic revision of the British policy adopted at Chicago. No control of frequencies or capacities is stipulated, although it is agreed that flights must be "economical." (This means that neither country's airlines will be permitted to fly empty or nearly empty planes in an attempt to corner the market.) The British delegates at first wanted to outline a "ribbon pattern" of routes by pin-pointing the stops on each run. However, they finally acceded to the United States' demands, and alternate points are named in most instances.

The agreement provides that if one contracting party desires to change the points served in the territory of the other contracting party, such a change will be made only after consultation between the aeronautical authorities of the two countries. Should either country wish to change its stops elsewhere, it may do so without prior notice. In this case, the second party may have recourse to consultation and to the machinery of the PICAO (Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization) if the route amendment prejudices the interests of the second party's carriers.

**Rates To Be Regulated**

The United States has acceded to control of international civil aviation to the extent of having fares established by the IATA (International Air Transport Association). Although this amounts to a revision of the United
AVIATION AGREEMENT

States' position at Chicago, some form of rate control had been made inevitable by the unilateral rate tactics recently adopted by Pan American Airways. IATA, an international organization of commercial aviation companies, is committed to the setting of equitable and economic fares in order to avoid rate wars. Adherence to this phase of the agreement necessitates Congressional action, however, authorizing the CAB (Civil Aeronautics Board) to establish rates. At the present time, the CAB can control fares only indirectly through mail contracts.

Agreement in Principle on Leased Bases

In March 1941, Great Britain leased to the United States certain naval and air bases in the Western Hemisphere for a period of 99 years in exchange for some 50 over-age destroyers. The terms of the agreement governing the transfer provided that commercial aircraft would not be authorized to operate from the bases except in emergencies, or for strictly military purposes under the supervision of the War and Navy Departments.

While an actual agreement has not yet been concluded, delegates at the Bermuda Conference agreed in principle to opening the following bases to commercial aircraft: Kindley (Bermuda); Coolidge (Antigua); Beane (St. Lucia); and Atkinson (British Guiana).

The following bases are situated in territories where adequate civil airports now exist and are to be used by civil aircraft only as bad weather alternates: Carlson (Trinidad); Waller (Trinidad); and Vernam (Jamaica).

Further, the British delegation gave oral assurances that the Government of Great Britain would use its good offices with Newfoundland and Canada in efforts to obtain the use of the Argentia, Gander, Goose, and Harmon fields for civil aircraft.

The conferees reached an early agreement on this issue, only to have a near-rupture in negotiations occur upon the late arrival of representatives of the British Colonial Office. These officials insisted that facilities, services, and supplies should be furnished solely by the colonies. This would have involved a rather heavy local tribute, and the United States delegation balked at the demand. The British reversed their stand 24 hours later, and a compromise was reached whereby the colonies might compete with United States enterprisers in providing facilities, services, and supplies. Under this arrangement, United States carriers would not be obligated to
AVIATION AGREEMENT

buy from the colonies, although local taxes would apply on all sales. However, during the last week of negotiations, the British again objected to this stipulation for the provision of facilities, services, and supplies, and at the close of the conference, the delegates failed to reach an agreement on this issue. As the matter now stands, the leased-base agreement will not be put into effect until this question has been settled, either through diplomatic channels or at another conference.
WHEAT: KEY TO THE WORLD'S FOOD SUPPLY

The world is facing an acute food shortage in 1946. Supplies are currently short in every important item, including grains, meats, sugar, and fats and oils. Unless foods are carefully allocated and equitably distributed, the people of many areas will be forced to subsist on supplies inadequate to insure against disease and unrest.

Wheat products are the most important items of consumption in every European country. In the Far East, although wheat is subordinate to rice, the acute shortage of rice has greatly increased wheat requirements. Thus, the wheat supply will have an important bearing on the extent of hunger, disease, and unrest throughout the world in 1946.

The 1945 wheat crops failed to meet the expectations of most of the European governments. The disappointing harvest was caused, in part, by inadequate plantings, insufficient fertilizer, and unfavorable weather. Some agricultural areas had been battlefields. Farmer hoarding, inadequate transport, and black market operations, accompanied by a breakdown in collection and distribution procedures and other governmental weaknesses in a number of countries, further contributed to low grain collections.

The Demand

Estimates of important requirements of the liberated and occupied countries began to increase rapidly in November 1945. France, for example, in January estimated her import requirements for the first six months of 1946 at 2.8 million long tons in contrast with a November estimate of 1.4 million long tons. Importing countries now list their current requirements for the first half of 1946 as 18.1 million long tons. These requirements are tabulated below:
The Supply

The United States, Canada, Argentina, and Australia are the only countries of the world with exportable supplies of wheat. The maximum amount which each of these countries will be able to export during the first half of 1946 is currently estimated at 11.1 million long tons, as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Exportable Supplies (Millions of Long Tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These estimates represent the maximum export level which each of the countries will be likely to achieve. The difficulties faced by the United States in meeting the export commitments which it has made to the Combined Food Board and has further acknowledged in official and public announcements were emphasized on 6 February by President Truman's order directing wheat conservation and imposing stricter controls on inventories and shipments. United States exports are threatened with delays resulting from the severe loads imposed on elevator, flour milling, and transport capacities.

So far, Canada has succeeded in meeting her commitments, but she has consistently opposed outlining a definite program for more than the first three months of 1946. The Canadian Government has excellent control
WHEAT

of the country's wheat stocks, yet it is likely that by the second quarter of 1946 greater difficulty will be experienced in maintaining the currently estimated export level. The amount which Argentina will export during the first half of 1946 is subject to considerable question, and the Government has refused to make positive commitments to the Combined Food Board. Prospects of a smaller 1946 crop have recently developed. Furthermore, Argentina apparently has been trying to exploit the price advantages resulting from the world-wide shortage. Australia has also avoided making definite export commitments.

The Deficit

Total exportable wheat supplies for the first half of 1946 thus fail to meet stated requirements of the importing countries by 7 million long tons—a deficit of almost 40 percent of requirements.

The amount of wheat which each of the importing countries will receive from currently available supplies has not been agreed upon by the four exporting countries. Tentative allocations have been suggested by the Department of Agriculture, and estimates of the effect of such allocations on the diet of the average urban consumer have been prepared. Those estimates, shown graphically in the accompanying chart, provide the best available measure of the probable effect which the wheat shortage will have on the normal urban consumer in the various countries.

Only averages are shown on the chart. Since inequities in distribution within the countries concerned are inevitable, particularly of nonrationed and black-marketed foods, most individual consumers will receive either more or less than the amounts indicated. The calculations also assume that supplies of other foods will remain at levels prevailing in the latter part of 1945. It is quite possible, however, that supplies of other foods will be less, thereby reducing the caloric-intake levels below those shown on the chart.

In five of the importing countries—Denmark, Great Britain, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway—it is estimated that the wheat shortage will have no effect on the total caloric diet of the normal consumer. Reductions probably will occur in Belgium, Switzerland, France, and Czechoslovakia, though the daily caloric consumption in those countries is not expected to fall below 2,000.
EFFECT OF WHEAT SHORTAGE ON FOOD SUPPLIES
NON-FARM POPULATION

CALORIES PER DAY

U.S. DENMARK GREAT BRITAIN SWEDEN NETHERLANDS NORWAY BELGIUM SWITZERLAND FRANCE CZECHOSLOVAKIA GREECE POLAND GERMANY SPAIN JAPAN ITALY

ESTIMATED FOOD AVAILABLE FROM ALL SOURCES (CALORIES) SECOND QUARTER 1946
APPROXIMATE PRE-WAR CALORIC LEVEL
NORMAL RATION NOT COMPARABLE TO OTHER COUNTRIES
NORMAL CONSUMER RATION, LATTER PART 1945
THIRD AND BLACKMARKET SOURCES, LATTER PART 1945
WHEAT

The daily caloric consumption will probably average between 1,500 and 1,700 in Greece, Poland, Germany, and Austria. The daily caloric intake is expected to drop below 1,500 in Spain, Italy, and Japan, where the wheat shortage will be felt acutely.

Comparable information on caloric intake is not available for India or China. Recent reports indicate, however, that India is faced with famine. In both India and China it is probable that the average urban consumer will be forced to subsist on substantially less than 2,000 calories per day.

Before the war, Poland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, now under Soviet domination, produced grain surpluses. A large quantity of the best seed used for grains and potatoes in Germany came from Poland and East Prussia. It is unlikely, however, that in 1946 or 1947 the nations of eastern Europe will make appreciable quantities of seed and food available to the western European countries, unless those nations orient themselves politically and economically to the Russian sphere. The only alternative is for western Europe to import from the Western Hemisphere and Australia.

Conclusions

The present food shortage will remain acute until new grain harvests become available in the fall of 1946. Unless this year’s crops are exceptional (and there are already indications that the United States crop will fall below that of 1945), there will be serious shortages of food in much of the world next winter and spring.

The United States, as the world’s principal source of exportable wheat, is the center toward which the food demands of much of the world are directed. Failure to maintain current wheat supplies in areas occupied by United States forces is likely to result in decreased food rations, causing disease and unrest and threatening American personnel in these areas. To permit, over an extended period, a lower diet than prevailed during the Nazi occupation would constitute a serious setback to the prestige of all the western democracies. “Skillful diplomacy,” it has been said, “is an empty phrase when you are dealing with people who face starvation . . . If people are hungry and disillusioned, democracy will suffer.”
TENSION IN UNO SECURITY COUNCIL DIMINISHES

The volatile atmosphere which had surrounded the UNO Security Council meetings suddenly cleared last week when Andrei Vyshinsky, Soviet Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs, and Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary, agreed to a settlement of the Soviet charge that British troops in Greece constituted a threat to international peace and security. The bitter dispute was resolved by a brief statement of Chairman Norman Makin of Australia that the Council had taken note of the declarations of the representatives and considered the matter "closed." (Eight members had expressed the opinion that British troops in Greece were not a menace to peace.) Although Bevin gained no formal exoneration of his Government, as originally demanded, the decision was generally regarded as a resounding British victory.

Certain aspects of the procedure in the case—the Soviet threat to invoke the veto power, the closed meetings of the Big Five, and the extreme acrimony of the Bevin-Vyshinsky debates—seemed to provoke an adverse reaction among the small nations of the UNO toward Big Power methods. Some members privately expressed wonder whether the Council had become a mere stage for dramatizations of the Soviet-British clash of interests in the Near East and Balkans.

Indonesian and Syrian-Lebanese Questions Pending Settlement

The Soviets indirectly acknowledged their defeat in the Greek dispute by the mild and unprovocative manner in which Dmitri Manuilsky, Ukrainian Commissar of Foreign Affairs, presented the case against the British position in Indonesia. He accused Great Britain of interfering in the internal affairs of the East Indies and requested that the Council send a commission, composed of representatives of the U. S. S. R., Great Britain, the United States, China, and the Netherlands, to investigate the problem. However, there was no mention of a threat to international peace and no
demand for evacuation of British troops, and these deletions constituted a radical modification in the charge since its introduction.

The nature of the discussion, which seemed both anomalous and perfunctory, was suddenly reversed on 10 February when Vyshinsky took charge of the Soviet presentation and flatly charged the British and Dutch with a long series of UNO charter violations, including the "threat to international peace." The Soviets probably hoped that this move would create an impression of sincerity and avert further loss of face. Meanwhile, one additional item had been listed on the agenda which might delay adjournment. This was the Syrian-Lebanese complaint calling for immediate evacuation of Anglo-French forces from the Levant. Believed to be aimed primarily at the French, the question, nevertheless, contained the potential elements for another Soviet-British clash of interest.

Organizational Problems Prevail in Assembly

Although its work was obscured by the sensational political issues debated in the Security Council, the General Assembly attempted, without noticeable success, to solve the remaining organizational problems prior to adjournment.

Both the Assembly and the Council, in separate elections, agreed on the choice of 15 judges (representing 15 nations) to fill the bench of the International Court of Justice.

The site problem, argued throughout the meetings of the Executive Committee and Preparatory Commission, again became entangled in com-
Organization chart of the UNO. Key positions generally are occupied by men who are moderately left. See Significant Personalities for biographies of selected leaders.
UNO SECURITY COUNCIL

plex procedural difficulties. The Site Committee rejected an attempt of the French delegate to delay the decision on the specific location of the UNO headquarters until the second session, now scheduled for 3 September. Now pending final vote is a Dutch recommendation for acceptance of the North Stamford-Greenwich area, with New York City chosen for the interim capital and any other related details deferred for future consideration. Presumably, adjournment will be based on positive action in choosing a temporary capital.

A resolution on the European refugee problem was finally adopted in subcommittee, after protracted dispute. It not only recognized the international scope of the issue, but established the policy that no refugees were to be forcefully repatriated, with the exception of war criminals. The resolution was categorically opposed by the nations of eastern Europe— the U. S. S. R., Yugoslavia, and Poland—and these three countries will undoubtedly unite in an attempt to block or delay further measures which might hamper their efforts to regain control over political enemies now outside their jurisdiction.

Toward the close of the weekly sessions the Assembly delegates proved that agreement was possible when they adopted, by a vote of 45-to-0, a Panamanian resolution forbidding membership in the UNO to Franco Spain.
REPATRIATION PROGRAM VIRTUALLY STALLED

Repatriation of displaced persons from the Western Zones of Germany, which had proceeded at a rapid, but decelerating, rate from V-E Day until late in 1945, came to a virtual standstill in December and early January. During this period only 600 persons were repatriated from the American zone, and slightly more from the British zone. Cold weather, lack of heated transportation facilities, and a paucity of DP's desiring to return to their native countries contributed to the slowdown. Although some of the remaining displaced persons will eventually desire repatriation, it is probable that all of them wish to spend the current winter where they can be assured of adequate food and housing.

Concurrently with the repatriation slowdown there occurred a considerable movement of displaced persons, particularly Jews, from Poland. This, together with the discovery of displaced persons not previously registered, caused an increase to show in the total listings of displaced persons. (See chart on next page.)

In an effort to encourage movement of displaced persons, General McNarney has recommended that United States responsibility for displaced persons in the American zone be considered to have ended by 1 June. At the present time more than a million displaced persons are in the French, British, and American zones. It is estimated that more than half of them may be repatriated without the use of force, but the remainder constitute a more serious problem. Many of them will have to be repatriated forcibly, and the remainder will probably have to be absorbed in the German population.

The displaced person problem in Austria is more complex. Over four-fifths of the displaced persons in Austria are in the American zone, and the majority represent German minorities from southeastern Europe. Although some progress is being made toward moving these persons into Germany, a continued influx from southeastern Europe and the Soviet zone leaves the total number static. (See chart on next page.)
REPATRIATION PROGRAM

Of the approximately 60,000 Poles and royalist Yugoslavs in Austria, nearly all are inclined to resist repatriation. In addition, there are many Jews from southeastern Europe who are traveling through Austria to Italy in the hope that they will be able to reach Palestine. Upon completion of the expulsion of German minorities from eastern Europe it is likely that there will be a residue of about 50,000 who will refuse repatriation. Authorities feel that this small number will present no insuperable problem of resettling.

The change in the border between Poland and Germany has necessitated the transfer of approximately 16 million people into Germany. Over 10 million of these were to be moved from Poland. The problem was alleviated somewhat by the fact that many Germans had moved westward ahead of the advance of the Soviet armies. Although the movement of such persons has decreased since November, less than 6 million Germans remain to be moved. (See chart on preceding page.)

Most of the Germans displaced by the border change have been moved to the Soviet zone. Little is known of the provisions for feeding and housing those persons, but, according to a State Department estimate, over 1,100,000 deaths above normal have occurred among the moving German population. German charitable agencies have been made responsible for the care of refugees in the British and American zones, but extensive war damage has made it difficult to obtain adequate housing.
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U. S. "Blue Book" on Argentina Answers Peron's "Peace Bid"

As Argentina entered the final ten days of a presidential election campaign marked by mounting tension, shooting affrays, and attacks on special trains bearing campaigning candidates, the U. S. State Department issued a lengthy "Blue Book" accusing the Argentine Government of "positive aid" to the Axis during the war and of continued protection of Axis interests in the Western Hemisphere.

This came as a flat rejection of the "peace bid" which Col. Juan Peron, strong man of the military clique and one of the candidates, had made to the United States on 9 February. Peron had said in a statement (which was not released within Argentina) that the country must enter into close, sympathetic relations with the United States, and that United States investments and technical aid must be encouraged. It appeared that the Military Government might be trying again to follow divergent internal and foreign policies, with Peron attempting to create the impression that the estrangement in Argentine-United States relations was due to personal animosity of U. S. Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden rather than to any basic differences between the two nations.

After the "Blue Book" had specifically singled out Peron as a leading conspirator with the Axis, he charged that the United States was trying to set up a puppet government in Argentina, and it appeared that the final days of his campaign would utilize a "Peron or Braden" slogan.

The "Blue Book" was distributed to all American Republics except Argentina, with a request for comment, indicating that the United States might be seeking support for exclusion of Argentina from the coming Rio Conference on Hemisphere Defense, or for refusal of diplomatic recognition to Peron should he remain in power after the elections on 24 February, either through electoral processes or a coup d'etat.

Reports from Argentina indicated a "good possibility" that relations between that country and the United States would be ruptured almost immediately as a result of the publication of the charges of Axis collaboration.
WORLD IN REVIEW

Pro-Peron Police Placed Under Military During Argentine Election

The Argentine Government’s most recent attempt to demonstrate sincerity in guaranteeing free and honest elections is contained in a decree issued on 10 February which places all federal, national, provincial, and local police under military “electoral commands” for a week before and during the 24 February elections. In another recent decree, high Army, Navy, and Air Force officers were designated to head “electoral commands.” These officers are to supervise both the police forces and the troops guarding polling booths.

The police, both in Buenos Aires and the provinces, are pro-Peron and have frequently used tear gas, sabers, and even firearms against anti-Peron crowds. Through police intimidation of voters, Peron could gain a decisive advantage. However, it is doubtful that the measure will actually nullify his advantage. It is probable that the Government either thinks Peron can win a reasonably fair election or that the decree is merely lip service to the opposition’s claim that a free election cannot be held unless activities of the pro-Peron police are curtailed. While the Army has repeatedly guaranteed impartial elections, the Military Government, with at least the acquiescence of the Army, has shown marked partiality for Peron.

Tension Mounting in Bolivia

Political tension appears to be mounting in Bolivia, and a new political alignment within President Gualberto Villarroel’s military-dominated Government within the next two weeks is quite possible. Recent events have intensified the three-way political struggle among (1) the dominant military clique, (2) the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) Party (which has participated in the Government), and (3) the opposition Democratic Anti-Fascist Front. The threat of large-scale Indian uprisings against the landowners and mine operators as a result of MNR agitation has increased. Violence was narrowly averted when a scheduled strike by the mineworkers was cancelled on 5 February.

The Democratic Anti-Fascist Front was organized in December as a result of the return to Bolivia of many exiled leaders of the liberal opposition. It is composed of the five main opposition political parties. Members of the Front have attacked both the military Government for its repressive measures and the Fascist-minded MNR which, so far, the mili-
WORLD IN REVIEW

tary clique has protected and used as its tool in the National Congress. Realizing that the Front's continued publicizing of charges against the MNR's ruthless methods (including political murders) would eventually result in completely discrediting the Party, MNR leaders recently called for the complete and final crushing of the Front. However, on 8 February, President Villarroel refused to back up the MNR and repudiated the Party's call for open political war. If the military clique follows up this repudiation by forcing the MNR from the Government and attempting to reorient the Government by inviting members of the Front to join the Cabinet, as now appears possible, MNR agitation among the Indians could lead to bloody uprisings. Under any circumstances, however, President Villarroel's military clique appears able to control the Government.

Mexican Laborers Strike Against Sinarquistas

The Mexican Labor Federation (CTM), demanding dissolution of the rightist Sinarquista Union, staged a nation-wide strike on 5 February. Some 1,250,000 members of the CTM, the largest labor group in Mexico, were idle for one hour in Mexico City and four hours elsewhere in the Republic. While the laborers described their demonstration as against "subversive and reactionary elements," their real opposition to the Sinarquistas is because they constitute a strong and very active group opposing Miguel Aleman, the labor candidate for the Presidency. The strike was timed to coincide with the nominating convention of the National Action Party, the political group through which the Sinarquistas plan to participate in the July presidential election. Its effectiveness can be partially judged by the fact that Luis Cabrera, a former Secretary of the Treasury and prominent attorney who had been offered the nomination as presidential candidate of the National Action Party, refused to accept. If the Sinarquistas cannot find a satisfactory candidate, they may swing their support to Ezequiel Padilla, the strongest opposition candidate, since they, as a Catholic group, prefer him to Communist-backed Aleman. The Government has not responded to the demand for dissolution of the Sinarquista Union and the suppression of allegedly fascist publications. Since the Government had previously announced that it would remain impartial in the forthcoming election, it is not expected to take any drastic action against the Sinarquistas.
Defiant Franco Repudiates UNO Exclusion of Spain

While the UNO Assembly in London was formally adopting a resolution, introduced by Panama's delegation, that the Assembly endorse the San Francisco\(^1\) and Potsdam\(^2\) declarations, General Franco, speaking at Segovia, stated that foreign powers did not wish the Spanish "experiment" to succeed because it is strictly Catholic and Spanish. He threatened to effect Spain's complete isolation if the world continued its antagonistic attitude. Until he can bring about the "evolution" of his regime, Franco is drawing heavily on Spanish historic Catholicism and nationalism.

The threat of an early diplomatic break by France and the growing list of exiled Spanish-Republican leaders in France undoubtedly add to Franco's uneasiness. However, there appears to be no speed-up of negotiations with the Spanish Pretender, Don Juan (whose presence in Lisbon had stimulated activity among the Monarchists) because Franco retains support of the Army, business, and financial interests, and because the Spanish people continue to live in fear of communism and civil war. There is, therefore, no indication that Franco will relinquish his dictatorial powers immediately.

Polish Guard Units in U. S. Zone in Germany

The long-standing problem of establishing a satisfactory procedure for handling displaced Poles in Europe was further complicated last week when the Polish press roundly criticized USFET for employing and arming Polish refugees in the American zone of Germany, since these Poles are openly opposed to the recognized Polish Government in Warsaw. The American plan, the press complained, undermines efforts to induce displaced persons to return to their home countries.

USFET is employing 37,500 Poles in "Polish Guard Units," composed of 5 officers and 250 men each, as guards for German prisoners of war because of U. S. Army personnel shortages. The Poles wear dyed American uniforms and are equipped with arms and ammunition, for which they are strictly accountable. USFET has reported that they are treated as other displaced persons.

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\(^1\) The San Francisco Conference resolution banned from the United Nations "states whose regimes has been installed with the help of armed forces of countries which have fought against the United Nations, so long as these regimes are in power."

\(^2\) The Declaration of the Potsdam Conference stated that Franco's Spain "does not possess the necessary qualifications to justify its admission" to the United Nations Organization.
WORLD IN REVIEW

_Republic_, the leading Government newspaper in Poland, stated that “if Britain and America [were] really concerned about security in Poland,” they would prohibit organizations of Poles from bearing arms in their territories. Heretofore, the Polish press has been uniformly cautious in its criticism of American policy, although it has bitterly attacked British support of expatriate Polish forces under British command. The presence of armed forces of Poles under United States control, however, has afforded an opportunity for anti-American propaganda which doubtless will continue until a satisfactory disposition is made of displaced persons who refuse repatriation.

Realignement of Rightist Opposition in France

In the recent vote of the French Constituent Assembly, giving the Government power to reduce the budget by decree, minor rightist parties were joined by four members of the centrist Mouvement Republicain Populaire in voting against the measure. This break in party discipline may portend a split in the MRP. Should De Gaulle fail to return as a political leader—as developments indicate—the MRP would lack unifying leadership, and might lose its supporters to the parties of the Right and Left. In this event, the Communist and Socialist Parties would be dominant and the MRP a poor third after the June elections. As a close fourth there might be a rightist party, such as the newly organized Republican Party of Liberty (PRL), which supported Clemenceau in the recent presidential election. Although the PRL commands only 30 votes in the Assembly, it might, as the major rightist party, approach 100 votes (out of 618) following the coming elections.

New Labor Party Changes Dutch Elections Outlook

Emergence of the newly organized Labor Party introduces a fundamental change in Dutch politics by cutting across denominational lines and combining the political philosophies of the 50-year-old Social Democratic Workers’ Party and the Catholic and Protestant resistance movements. Prime Minister Schermerhorn, a leader of the new Party, has been charged by leaders of conservative parties with trying to credit his party with the undeniable accomplishments of his Government. However, there is a widespread belief that the Netherlands must adopt a progressive labor program.
The new Party will be put to a test in elections for Parliament and provincial, state, and city councils to be held from 17 to 24 May. If the Indonesian Nationalists accept the Government's offer of parity status, the Labor Party will win greater popular prestige.

**Effect of Coal Shortage on Italian Employment**

Italy is confronted with the threat of an increase in the number of unemployed persons from a present total of 2,000,000 to an estimated 2,500,000 next month because of the irregularity of coal deliveries from other nations. Italian industry, which has been operating at about 20 percent of capacity, has already reduced its production program tremendously because of fuel and raw material shortages and has exhausted its working capital, principally by paying workers frozen on payrolls even when not working. A new labor agreement, in effect since 19 January, permits the dismissal of between 20 and 30 percent of these workers and is the first provision since hostilities ended to permit dismissals on a considerable scale. “Bread and work” demonstrations have been increasing in number and scope throughout Italy in recent weeks.

**Swedish Purchase of British Jet Aircraft**

The Swedish Air Force has concluded negotiations for the purchase of jet-propelled “Vampire” fighter aircraft from the British De Haviland Aircraft Company. The contract provides for the delivery of up to 60 aircraft. It is estimated that the first delivery of these planes will be made in April.

These arrangements are indicative of the progressive efforts of the Swedish air arm to build up a modern, efficient defensive force. Although considerable interest has been evidenced in jet development and manufacture, no jet aircraft have yet been produced in Sweden.

**Commission to Study Italo-Yugoslav Boundary Problem**

The Foreign Ministers' Deputies Commission will arrive shortly in Trieste in an attempt to fix an Italo-Yugoslav boundary which will satisfy the mixed Italian-Slovene population of Venezia Giulia ethnically, economically, and politically. It has not yet become clear to what extent the Soviet Union will back Yugoslav claims to Venezia Giulia. Italo-Slav
an animosity over the issue has already created a tense atmosphere and caused some bloodshed.

Italy obtained control of the entire Istrian peninsula and the Dalmatian coast by treaty after World War I. Thereafter, the age-old friction between Italians and Yugoslavs was aggravated by Italian atrocities in the conquest of Yugoslavia and by Yugoslav reprisals during the Tito campaign which preceded the German collapse. In May 1945, Yugoslav troops occupied Trieste (at the head of the Adriatic, on the west coast of Istria), and, as a result of subsequent Italo-Slav affairs and cross-charges, Venezia Giulia was divided into two zones, separated by the so-called Morgan Line. The Allied-administered western zone includes Pola and the important port city of Trieste, and has direct communications into Austria; the Yugoslav-controlled eastern zone contains Italy's major resources of mercury, bauxite, and coal.

Premier De Gasperi has announced Italy's willingness to accept a boundary suggested after World War I by Woodrow Wilson, which would leave Italy with about two-thirds of the Istrian Peninsula, including the principal coal and bauxite deposits, but which would give the Yugoslavs the large cities of Fiume and Zara and the entire Dalmatian coast. Tito claims not only the Dalmatian coast but all of the Venezia Giulia region as well. The Council of Foreign Ministers, unable to decide upon a boundary at its London conference some months ago, recommended that the port of Trieste be internationalized, with the city itself remaining Italian, and that a commission of their deputies be sent to investigate the boundary question. It is this commission which is now preparing to convene.

The normal population of Venezia Giulia is predominantly Italian in the large cities and Slovene in the hinterland. There are indications that, in preparation for the commission's visit, the Yugoslavs have been attempting to deport Italians. The Russian-trained Italian Communist leader, Palmiro Togliatti, first supported the Yugoslavs, but has now switched to a pro-Italian stand as a result of his party's loss of prestige last year; the Italian Communist Party of Venezia Giulia is also pro-Italian. This reversal by the Italian Communists, coupled with other reports, indicates that the U. S. S. R. may be withdrawing its original support of Tito's claims. It is possible that the U. S. S. R., which has been demanding a trusteeship of the Italian African colony of Tripolitania, has decided to
encourage Italian claims at the expense of Yugoslavia in order to regain Russian prestige in Italy and strengthen the Italian Communist Party.

**Voting By Troops in Soviet Elections**

The number of troops outside Russia who voted in the elections on 10 February was probably about 2,600,000, according to the following deductions. A Moscow press release of 12 February said 682 constituencies had been formed for elections to the Council of the Union. There are 656 districts inside Russia which choose candidates to that Council. Hence the remainder of 26 consists of the “special election areas” formed for military personnel outside Russia. Since each special area contains 100,000 voters, the total of such voters would be about 2,600,000.

The MIS estimate of U. S. S. R. armed forces on duty outside Russia as of 15 February is distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>730,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>130,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,786,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Soviet occupation forces in Europe and the Far East were greatly reduced in late 1945. (The MIS estimate for 1 December was 3,640,000.)

**Britons Critical of Further Food Rationing**

There is no indication that the serious food shortage in Great Britain will be alleviated soon. The recent “belt-tightening” order of Sir Ben Smith, Minister of Food, depressed war-weary Britons, who thereupon charged the Labor Government with having bungled the food situation. Both Labor and Conservative members of the House of Commons joined in the criticism following Sir Ben’s announcement that bacon, poultry, and cooking-fat rations would be reduced and dried eggs eliminated from Britons’ diet. The Government believes that it will be able to avoid bread rationing only if there is a nation-wide response to an appeal to save flour.

Prime Minister Attlee has directed that 8,000 farm workers, scheduled for induction into the Army this year, be left on the land to aid in food pro-
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duction. Basically the grain shortage is not caused by a lack of dollars or shipping but by an estimated deficit of about 7 million tons of wheat in the available world supply between now and June. Because of this general shortage, the British will have to put up with an allotment of some 220,000 tons less than their needs.

Mexican Oil Settlement With British and Dutch

The signing on 7 February of agreements providing a means of evaluating British and Dutch petroleum properties expropriated by the Mexican Government in 1938 is another indication of Britain's desire to settle her pending disputes in the Western Hemisphere. The British and Dutch had refused to negotiate during the war.

The agreement provides that appointed experts must report within a year on the assessed value of the properties. Then the governments concerned will decide the amounts, method, and time limits of payments. If the negotiations follow the same pattern as in the case of United States companies in 1942, the sum finally agreed upon will be only a fraction of that claimed. Estimates had placed the claimed value of the United States petroleum properties as high as 175 million dollars, but the claims were settled for less than 24 million dollars.

The agreements do not indicate any marked change in diplomatic relations between the countries concerned, since the controversy over the British and Dutch claims never became as heated as over the claims of United States companies. Some increase in trade between the countries is expected during the coming year, but it will be caused primarily by the resumption of normal peacetime trade rather than as a result of the new agreements.

Chinese Political Situation Precarious But Moving Toward Unity

Since the truce in the civil war and the agreement on governmental reorganization reached by the Political Consultative Council, China appears to be approaching internal peace and unity. Charges of truce violations have become less frequent. The first phase of the work of carrying out the cease-fire order is now nearly complete, and a general agreement has been reached on the basic principles for restoring disrupted communication lines in North China.
The Political Consultative Council resolutions providing for an interim coalition government, to be followed by a permanent constitutional government, are due to be approved by the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party early in March. Reorganization of the Government is to start immediately after this formal approval.

However, in view of the deep-rooted mutual distrust between the Kuomintang and the Communists and skepticism on both sides regarding the faithful carrying out of commitments, the political situation remains precarious. No matter how sincere may be the leaders who made the agreements, there is always the danger that extremist elements in their parties will not abide by the agreements. Recent disturbances at political rallies in Chungking are believed by American observers to have been caused by reactionary elements in the Kuomintang who resent the concessions already made by their party.

Formation of Autonomous Government in Inner Mongolia

According to unconfirmed reports from Chinese Nationalist sources, an autonomous government for eastern Inner Mongolia was established on 15 January under Soviet auspices. This regime is said to be headed by a council composed of 9 Soviet officers, 19 Mongols, and 12 Chinese Communists, with a Soviet-educated Mongol as chairman. The new regime is allegedly supported by an army of 25,000 men, largely equipped with captured Japanese matériel. The leader of the Chinese Communist group in the council is reported to be General Nieh Jung-chen, Communist commander in Manchuria and North China. General Nieh recently told correspondents in Kalgan that an “autonomous local government” would be established for the region, which includes Hopch, Chahar, Jehol, and Liaoning Provinces. It is not certain, however, that the Chinese Communists would be willing to support a purely Mongol autonomy movement, as distinguished from a Chinese Communist-dominated “coalition” regime.

Earlier reports have been received of cooperation between Outer Mongolia and the Chinese Communists and of moves to establish a Soviet-sponsored autonomous government in Inner Mongolia; but these reports have not been confirmed. It is known that strong dissatisfaction with Chinese Nationalist rule exists among the Mongols of Inner Mongolia. It is probable that many Inner Mongols look to Outer Mongolia, which is in the
WORLD IN REVIEW

Soviet sphere, for help in achieving autonomy. If the Soviets have decided to foster such aspirations, their dominant influence in Outer Mongolia places them in a favorable position to do so.

Japanese Conservatives Hurt by Cabinet Ban

The recent decision of the Shidehara Cabinet to ban from the forthcoming elections all persons recommended by the Tojo regime during the elections of 1942 is a severe blow to Japanese conservatives, who apparently had hoped for a mild interpretation of SCAP's purging directive of 4 January. The Japanese Government also warned that others elected in 1942, even though without official sponsorship, would be barred because of their war records, and added 119 nationalistic societies to the list proscribed by SCAP.

An estimated 90 percent of the lower house's members and about 95 percent of all the Diet members of the conservative Progressive Party, the majority element in the outgoing Diet, apparently are included in this ban. Thus, the Progressive Party—which had been considered capable of securing a plurality or even a majority in the new Diet—may now be reduced to the position of a minority party, faced with the necessity of either sponsoring a new slate of little-known candidates or dissolving. Nearly half its proposed list of 400 candidates are reportedly banned under the Cabinet's ruling, and about 100 of its more obviously disqualified leaders had already been replaced. Some observers predict that the new Diet will include many members who are puppets for purged political leaders.

The Liberal Party, about 10 percent of whose candidates are affected by the ban, may gain increasing support from conservative circles and emerge as the leading conservative party. The Japanese newspaper, *Asahi Shimbun*, has noted the increasing possibility of a conservative bloc composed of the Liberal and Progressive Parties. The Government's decision also increases the chances for a Socialist victory, since the Socialist Party held only about 25 seats in the old Diet and was comparatively free from connection with Japan's war program. The vocal Communist Party remains numerically small, claiming only 5,000 members on 25 January, and the *Asahi Shimbun* has estimated that it will win only 14 or 15 seats.
Uprisings Anticipated in India After Provincial Elections

Reports from reliable sources in India forecast serious native disturbances by late summer or early fall, following the provincial elections. After the elections, when the Congress Party will probably control or have formed coalition governments in 9 of India’s 11 provinces, it is expected to take advantage of the famine to demand that the British relinquish control. The Congress Party made such a demand in 1942, when a Japanese attack seemed imminent. Rioting then resulted in the destruction of Government property, strikes in textile and steel mills, and numerous casualties. About 90,000 persons were arrested before peace was restored. Disturbances this year could be more serious than in 1942 because the Congress Party could use the machinery of government to abet rather than crush the uprisings, and because the Indians are better armed. It is highly improbable, however, that a revolt would be successful.

Dutch Policy Statement Given to Indonesians

Official Dutch policy on the Indonesian situation has been outlined in a statement handed to Nationalist Premier Sjahrir by Acting Governor Van Mook in the presence of British Envoy Clark Kerr. The statement did not disclose the full nature of the 15-point program which is to form the basis for negotiations. The only Indonesian comment on the statement came from Hadji Salim, veteran Moslem leader and spokesman for the Indonesian foreign office, who termed it “a starting point for talks, and that’s all.”

The policy statement called for:

1. The creation of a Commonwealth of Indonesia with a constitution granting citizenship with full legal equality and without racial discrimination to all persons born in Indonesia, and guaranteeing freedom of education, expression, and worship.

2. The management of domestic affairs by a “democratic representative body containing a substantial Indonesian majority,” with a cabinet responsible to that body under a representative of the Dutch Crown as head of the Government.

3. Representation of Indonesia in a Netherlands Commonwealth Cabinet, and the sponsoring of its membership in the UNO as a partner in
the Netherlands Kingdom, the other partners in which would have varying degrees of autonomy.

4. Possession by the Crown representative of "certain special powers to guarantee fundamental rights, efficient administration, and sound financial management, to be exercised only when these rights and interests are affected."

By the terms of the statement, this governmental structure is to remain in force for a transitional period, after which the parties will independently decide on its continuance. Van Mook, in answer to questions, was unable to say how long the period would be.

Sjahrir's public utterances have echoed the Nationalist stand that nothing less than complete independence will be acceptable to the Indonesians. However, the whole course of his relations with the British and Dutch has been in the direction of negotiation and compromise. Both the British and the Dutch Governments are committed to carrying negotiations through to a conclusion. Clarification of provisions regarding the Indonesian governing body and the power of the Dutch Crown representative may render the proposals acceptable to Sjahrir. However, since his is a coalition government representing diverse Nationalist elements, its coherence is not to be relied upon. Dissension among the Dutch and the attitude of the Soviet Union toward the British occupation further endanger the outcome of the negotiations.
SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS

British Progress on Atomic Energy

A mineral "more important than uranium" as a source of atomic energy has been discovered in the Scottish Highlands in sufficient quantity to last Great Britain for generations, according to recent news dispatches from London.

The material was not identified, but it may be thorium, an element known to be more plentiful than uranium and a possible source of fissionable material necessary for atomic energy. No announcement has been made whether experimentation with the material has begun. However, Prime Minister Attlee has announced organization of a special department under RAF Air Marshal Lord Portal to gather materials for atom-splitting experiments. He also revealed that experimental work will be done at Harwell Airdrome (60 miles west of London and 12 miles south of Oxford) under control of the Ministry of Supply.

Another atomic research laboratory is in operation at Didcot (20 miles south of Oxford). This plant is directed by Dr. J. G. Cockroft who during the war was chief superintendent of Air Defense Research and Development for the Ministry of Supply. He reported achievements in nuclear research as early as 1932 and was a member of the Technical Committee on "Tube Alloys," which directed a large part of the British work on the atomic bomb.

Atomic energy has been debated several times in Parliament since organization last August of an Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy which was to report to Parliament on the subject. The Committee chairman is Sir John Anderson, former Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, although not a physicist, directed the general policy committee which guided the British efforts in development of the atomic bomb.

Prime Minister Attlee on 31 January told the House of Commons that "Britain hopes the use of atomic energy will be developed in cooperation, rather than in competition, with other nations." He contended this statement answered Laborite Capt. A. R. Blackburn's question whether "the main object of Britain's atomic research (was) peacetime development, or
SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS

research into the construction of atomic bombs.” Attlee also said he was not prepared to estimate the date when Britain would be able to manufacture plutonium (a synthetic element derived from the processing of uranium, and suitable for use in atomic bombs) at “the minimum significant rate of 100 grams (about 3½ ounces) a day.”

Col. Martin Lindsay (Conservative) demanded the reasons for continuation of secrecy and a statement as to when the Government hopes to place the full facts and its proposals before the House. Attlee replied that any statement would have to be “concerted with that of other governments” and pointed out that “we are working in close cooperation with the United States and Canada and also the whole matter has been referred to the UNO.”

Commons has been informed that millions of pounds will be needed to finance the research required to keep Britain abreast of world scientific discoveries. America and the Soviet Union were declared to be far ahead in atomic research, and no industrial concern in England was believed by the British to have sufficient resources to engage in large-scale production of plutonium or U-235 (a rare type of uranium which has been manufactured for use in atomic bombs).

It seems clear that the British are committed to broad and intensive atomic research, and that statements about the nation’s relative weakness in this field are intended to deter foreign competitive experimentation and to make large appropriations for this purpose palatable to the British public.

Soviet Academy of Sciences Meets

A scientific research program to extend for five years was approved at the annual meeting of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow. Sergei Ivanovich Vavilov, president of the Academy, did not disclose what the plan proposed, but indicated emphasis would be on “physics, chemistry, and mechanics.”

Vavilov at the opening of the conference reviewed the activities of Soviet scientists during the war years and discussed the postwar problems confronting the Academy. More than a thousand scientists attended the session.

1 See significant personalities.
SIGNIFICANT PERSONALITIES

Paul Henri Spaak, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs and President of the UNO Assembly in London, is brilliant and impetuous, with a reputation for wit and force in his public speeches. In his youth he was a fiery and radical Socialist, but once established in the Belgian Government he swerved to the right and abandoned radicalism for what he calls "authoritarian democracy." He has frequently held to his own views in opposition to regular Socialist policy, and has always been on friendly terms with members of rightist parties. With other Socialists, he is rigidly opposed to the retention of King Leopold. He urges a hard peace for Germany, and seems willing to make certain concessions to maintain the best possible relations with Russia. He has made no definite statements about the various suggested western European coalitions, but he has said that, while cooperation among nations is essential, "opposition blocs will not provide the answer."

Trygve Halvdan Lie, Secretary General of the UNO, resigned as Norwegian Foreign Minister on 2 February. A 50-year-old lawyer, Lie possesses enormous physical and mental energy and is noted for his ability to keep his equilibrium under very heavy pressure. As chairman of the Norwegian delegation at the San Francisco Conference, he manifested his belief in the principle of international cooperation, together with an insistent belief in the rights, privileges, and duties of small nations. He favors cooperation among the Scandinavian countries, but as separate states, rather than as a federation. A leader of the Norwegian Labor Party since 1919, he has always leaned to the left politically. Lie was backed for the Secretary Generalship of UNO by the Russians, probably because they felt that, by virtue of his nationality and his own personality, he was in a position to arbitrate on questions involving representatives of the eastern and western blocs.

Norman Makin, Australia's Minister of Navy and Munitions and Acting Minister for External Affairs, is chairman of the Security Council of the UNO. He is a leader in the Labor Party in Australia, and has a
reputation for efficiency, sincerity, and tolerance. He serves as a buffer in his country, being a Protestant in a strongly Roman Catholic Cabinet and the man relied upon by the government to keep the support of the large group of Australians who stand between the Conservative and Labor groups. As one of Australia's chief spokesmen in missions to foreign countries, Makin has expressed conviction that the United Nations must be made a working organization to ensure reconstruction and maintain world peace. He is confident of continued cooperation between the British Commonwealth and the United States and desires friendship between Australia and the Soviet Union.

Dimitri Z. Manuilski, 62-year old Foreign Commissar of the Ukrainian S. S. R., is chairman of the key Political and Security Committee of the UNO. Considered one of the top-ranking leaders of the Soviet Union, Manuilski has had a long revolutionary career since he joined the Communist Party in 1903. A member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party since 1924, Manuilski also served as secretary of the Presidium of the Comintern from 1924 until it was disbanded in 1943. His reputation as a tireless agitator for world revolution has been reflected in the numerous reports he has presented at Party Congresses and meetings of the Comintern, following the Leninist theory that the present period is one of simultaneous capitalist disintegration and world revolution.

Roberto MacEachen of Uruguay, chairman of the UNO Committee on Trusteeship, is a career diplomat with a distinguished record in educational fields. In 1926 he began his foreign service in the Uruguayan Legation in Washington and has since served as delegate to several economic and banking conferences. In 1943 he was appointed Minister to Great Britain and was raised to the rank of Ambassador the next year. Dr. MacEachen is considered thoroughly pro-democratic and pro-United Nations.

Sir Arcot Ramaswami Mudaliar, president of the Economic and Social Council of the UNO, has had a long and varied political career in India. The Government posts which he has held have been attained through British appointments, and his political position was established and has been maintained throughout his career by his endorsement and support of British aims and policies in India. That fact suggests that he is probably
opposed by Indian nationalists. A division of opinion exists as to his personality, but it is thought that he is intelligent, an able administrator, and esteemed in official circles. At the UNO Security Council conference in London, Mudaliar declared that differences between nations might be avoided if more attention were paid to economic and social aspects of world problems. He is apparently friendly to the United States.

**Peter Fraser**, self-made leader of New Zealand's Labor Government, heads the Humanitarian and Cultural Committee in the UNO. Born in 1884, the son of a cobbler in Scotland, he had been converted to the Labor cause before he moved to London in 1908 and then to New Zealand two years later. The next few years were highlighted by his close association with Socialist Harry Holland, leader of the Labor Party when he died in 1933. Since 1918, Fraser has been steadily re-elected to Parliament, and since 1935, when New Zealand's first Labor Government was voted into office, to Cabinet posts. His election in 1940 as leader of the Labor Party and Prime Minister was thoroughly approved by Whitehall. His activities in the UNO are likely to be influenced by his conviction that the wartime cooperation between the United States and the British Empire deserves preservation.

**Roberto Jiminez** of Panama, chairman of the Legal Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, is a lawyer with extensive experience in governmental and foreign affairs, including a period when he served as Panamanian Minister of Foreign Affairs. He attended the Council of Pan-American Foreign Ministers and served as Panama's delegate to the United Nations conference at San Francisco. Resigning as Foreign Minister upon his return to Panama, Dr. Jiminez was appointed Panamanian delegate, with the rank of Ambassador, to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Considered pro-United States, Dr. Jiminez has a reputation of cooperative understanding in Pan-American relations.

**Faris El Khury**, 66-year-old veteran Syrian politician and ex-Prime Minister; heads the Budgetary Committee of UNO. A graduate of American University in Beirut and one-time Damascus lawyer, Khury has had a long and varied political and diplomatic career. Twice president of the Syrian Parliament, he acted as chairman of the Syrian delegation to the
SIGNIFICANT PERSONALITIES

Arab League Congress in 1945 and was also a delegate to the San Francisco Conference. Observers consider Khury a moderate nationalist and one of the most influential Syrian political personalities. He commands respect not only from his own Christian group but also from the Moslem majority in Syria. Khury is very friendly both to the United States and Britain, but has always taken a firm stand against French domination of Syria. He is opposed to Jewish settlement in Syria and to the expansion of Jewish interests in Palestine.

Dr. Henryk Kolodziejski, chairman of the Economic and Financial Committee of the UNO, is a 60-year-old economist, member of the Polish Socialist Party, and leader in the Polish cooperative movement. As one of the leaders from within Poland, he participated in the June 1945 discussions in Moscow which resulted in the formation of the present Provisional Government of National Unity. Subsequently, he was appointed a member of the National Council of the Homeland (KRN) and in July 1945 was sent to London as one of the leaders of the “Commission to Secure the Property of the Polish State.”

Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, leader of the Soviet Union’s UNO delegation, first gained fame as chief prosecutor during the Moscow “purge” trials of the 1930’s, but has climbed to second place in the Soviet Union’s Foreign Office hierarchy in a diplomatic career of less than six years, during which he has been concerned chiefly with the Soviet Union’s activities in eastern Europe. Vyshinsky, an old revolutionary with a political past going back to the beginnings of the Russian labor movement, joined the Communist Party in 1920. He is an outstanding lawyer but is not regarded as an orator. More experienced and versatile in logical argument than many of his younger colleagues in the Soviet Union’s foreign service, Vyshinsky fits into no type and has made a distinctive contribution of his own to the style of his country’s foreign policy. The qualities in him which foreign observers have most commented upon are a merciless logic unassailed by doubt and a purposeful concentration of energy.

Sir Bernard L. Montgomery will succeed Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke as chief of the British Imperial General Staff on 26 June. Field Marshal Montgomery’s appointment is no surprise, but it is too early to
SIGNIFICANT PERSONALITIES

forecast the effectiveness of his relations with the War Office, where, as late as last September, he was reported to be unpopular. For some time high-ranking officers from Montgomery’s 8th Army Staff in Africa and from his 21st Army Group Staff in Europe have been transferring to the Imperial General Staff, laying the groundwork for his appointment to his new post.

Sir Sholto Douglas, 52-year-old Air Chief Marshal in RAF and head of the British Air Force of Occupation since May, has succeeded Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery as Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in Germany. When Sir Sholto was promoted to the highest rank of Marshal of the Royal Air Force on 1 January this year, he had completed over 25 years of continuous and meritorious service with the RAF, besides having distinguished himself as a flyer in World War I. While serving as the third RAF instructor at the Imperial Defense College (1932–1936) he won recognition as a “thinking strategist”. Subsequently, he became director of staff duties and was appointed the first assistant Chief of Air Staff. During 1940 he was advanced to Deputy Chief of Staff and, after being transferred to the Fighter Command, he became an Air Marshal. As a result of his leadership in that capacity he was knighted by King George. Because of his dynamic leadership and unassuming manner, he became one of the most popular officers in the Fighter Command. While heading the Middle East Command, Allied Air Forces, under the command of Sir Arthur Tedder, he was successful in carrying out his No. 1 task of interrupting the Axis supply line to Tunisia. For all those accomplishments he was decorated by General Eisenhower in November 1944 as one of four men who helped to curb the Luftwaffe.

W. A. B. Anderson, colonel of the Royal Canadian Artillery, has been appointed Director of Military Intelligence in the Canadian Army, succeeding W. W. Murray. This is the first military intelligence post held by Colonel Anderson. Still young (40), he has had wide and varied military experience in both staff and command positions. He served in the European Theater and has attended staff schools in Canada, Great Britain, and the United States. From the invasion of France until early in 1945 he was GSO-1 Operations (similar to G-3) of the First Canadian Army. He has since served as Chief Instructor of the Royal Military College at Kingston, Ontario. Colonel Anderson has a strong and outstanding personality, a keen
SIGNIFICANT PERSONALITIES

Sergei Ivanovich Vavilov, elected president of the Academy of Sciences of the U. S. S. R. last July, was graduated from the Physics Department of Moscow University in 1914. He published a number of papers on the photometry of varicolored light sources and heat-fading of colors before his work was interrupted by four years of military service during World War I. Captured by the Germans in 1918, he escaped after two days, returned to Moscow, and resumed his scientific investigations. Vavilov has achieved recognition in the field of optics and is highly regarded as an authority on photoluminescent phenomena. His recent work on electrons moving at higher-than-light speeds has attracted much attention. Elected to the Academy in 1932, he served as Administrator of the Physics Institute. During World War II, he was responsible for the design of complex military optical instruments. In recognition of his scientific achievements, he has been awarded two Orders of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, and a first Stalin Prize (1946) by the Soviet Government.
MID NEWS

New Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2


Key Officers in MID

Currently in important positions in MID are:
- Chief of Policy Staff, MID—Col. L. R. Forney
- Chief, MIS—Brig. Gen. P. E. Peabody
- Deputy Chief, MIS—Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke
- Director of Intelligence—Brig. Gen. Riley F. Ennis
- Director of Information—Col. Carlisle V. Allan
- Director of Administration—Col. F. E. Cookson

MIS Officers With National Intelligence Authority

The President has established, by executive directive, a National Intelligence Authority, consisting of his Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy; the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy; and Rear Admiral Souers, newly appointed head of the Central Intelligence Group of the Authority. Admiral Souers has formed an ad hoc Planning and Advisory Group to which Col. W. A. Perry and Col. C. P. Nicholas have been appointed temporarily as MID representatives.

Decorations

Officers in MID receiving decorations during the past week included the following:
MID NEWS

MIS Institutes Civilian Career Service

A carefully planned civilian career service has been set up in the Intelligence Group, MIS. The new plan, which includes provisions for professional ratings from P-1 to P-8, is considered to be a forward step in the procurement of talented and able civilians for work in specialized research fields in MIS.
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