SLAVE SOLDIERS AND ISLAM
To My Grandmothers
One obedient slave is better
than three hundred sons;
for the latter desire their father's death,
the former his master's glory.

—A poet quoted in Niẓām al-Mulk,
Siyāsatnāmeh

He who glorifies slaves is debased by God.

—An Ḥadīth, Aḥmad al-
Iṣfahānī, Ḥilyat al-Awliyā’

More stupid than a slave or his mate
is he who makes the slave his master.

I never thought I should witness the days
When slaves would lord it and receive such praise.

—al-Mutanabbi

At three things the earth shakes,
four things it cannot bear:
a slave turned king . . .

—Proverbs 30:21–22
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Acknowledgments

This study is based on a doctoral dissertation submitted in May 1978 to Harvard University for a Ph.D. in History and Middle Eastern studies. My affiliation with Harvard formally began in 1967, but it really extends back much further, for I very much grew up in its milieu. I am therefore happy to record my many debts to its students and faculty.

Research for this work took me to various places. I spent a profitable six months at the Orientalische Seminar at Freiburg University, West Germany, in 1976. The American Research Center in Egypt funded a nine-month stay in Cairo during the academic year 1976–77, providing me with an opportunity to read Arabic sources on early Muslim history. I am grateful to the Department of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University for making me a Visiting Fellow during 1977–78. As a William Rainey Harper Fellow at the University of Chicago since 1978, I have profited from the university's unmatched resources for comparative history. Interesting courses to teach, widely knowledgeable colleagues, and excellent facilities have all helped me prepare this book for publication.

The research and ideas of David Ayalon form the intellectual basis for this study; his detailed inquiries into the Mamluk Kingdom of Egypt have both established military slavery as an autonomous institution and made it possible to analyze it elsewhere. I am also indebted to him for helpful ideas on how to proceed with this kind of research.

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D.P.

*Chicago*

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Introduction

Islamdom as a Unit

Muslim peoples in premodern times shared many customs and attitudes which had no apparent connection to Islam. Islam began as a religion, developed a legal system, and eventually included elements affecting all aspects of human existence. For example, minimal relations between the sexes, severe problems of political succession, and a cultural emphasis on memorization characterized premodern Islamicate life in nearly all places and times. These Islamicate patterns by no means eliminated local variations, but they did exert a constant and nearly uniform pull on nations converted to Islam or ruled over by Muslims. Islamic precepts and ideals influenced diverse cultures in a similar direction. This study analyzes in what ways Islam affected Muslims and to what extent they constituted a unit of civilization.

As a religious group, Muslims clearly made up a useful and sensible unit; however wide the variation in their beliefs and practices, in their tone, style and temperament, they shared basic common elements (especially belief in Muḥammad as the last prophet) which distinguished them from the adherents of other religions. Similarly, in the legal domain, the Shari‘a (Islamic sacred law) extended beyond regional and temporal differences; no matter how great the scope of customary or government regula-

1. Neologisms, special usages, and commonly used Arabic words are all explained in the Glossary.

2. The past tense used here and throughout the book indicates that these considerations do not necessarily apply to modern times.
tions, regardless of how imperfect the application of Shari'ah was, Muslim legal systems always had an Islamic basis in premodern times. Local variations existed within the context of a single religion and law of Islam; can one find similar Islamic contexts for other aspects of life? Can one speak of Islamicate literature, philosophy, sexuality, economics, statecraft, or warfare?

Beyond the ritual and legal spheres, the significance of being a Muslim is unclear; no consensus exists on the degree to which Muslims shared traits which distinguished them from non-Muslims. This is the problem I wish to address here. Put another way, this study considers how Islam helps us to understand the history of Muslims. I approach the question by combining (1) research in the primary sources for the core area (part II of this book) with (2) research in secondary works for the peripheries (part I). The core Islamic area is the “Middle East,” the region with the longest exposure to Islam and an overwhelming Muslim majority. All Islamicate patterns originated in this region; through research in the sources I am studying their nature and development, an interest that many scholars share.

The second level of research is less common; indeed, I believe no one has studied Muslims in history in this way. By reading extensively about all parts of Islamdom, including the most peripheral areas (for instance, Albania, Niger, China, Malaya), I hope to build up a broad comparative knowledge with which to assess the impact of Islam. Studying Islamicate patterns in the

3. On the uses of the term Middle East, see my “Middle East, Arabs, Semites, and Islam Explained,” in Middle East Notebook (forthcoming).

4. Several studies have discussed the validity of Islamicate patterns. On the arts, see O. Grabar, The Formation of Islamic Art (New Haven, 1973); on economics, M. Rodinson, Islam et le capitalisme (Paris, 1966); on geography, X. de Planhol, Le Monde islamique: essai de géographie religieuse (Paris, 1957) and Les Fondements géographiques de l’histoire de l’Islam (Paris, 1968); on psychology, M. Halpern, “Four Contrasting Repertoires of Human Relations in Islam”; in general, M. G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. Note also the research of A. Bouhdiba and C. Geertz. Planhol’s works stand out as the only attempts to generalize about an Islamicate pattern on the basis of information from all parts of Islamdom. Most works dealing with Islamdom as a whole (The Legacy of Islam, Cambridge History of Islam, The Social Structure of Islam, Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization, etc.) do not attempt to find common elements.
core area alone is not enough for this; to understand Islam in history, they must be traced to the far corners. For this purpose, the Middle East is only one region of many, albeit the most important. For example, Islamicate cities in the core area were usually divided into ethnic quarters; was this an Islamicate feature or a Middle Eastern one? The answer lies in Islamicate cities outside the Middle East. If most Muslims from northwest Africa to Southeast Asia in premodern times shared a pattern, it was presumably Islamicate; but before deciding this, one must venture still farther afield to examine patterns. Muslims everywhere emphasized cavalry over infantry; did this reflect an Islamicate bias or a universal tendency? The answer to this lies outside Islamdom.

In order to discuss these questions most precisely, I shall concentrate on an Islamicate pattern that existed throughout most of Islamdom and nowhere else yet had no evident connection to Islam. This is military slavery, the systematic acquisition, organized training, and professional employment of slaves in military service. It existed among Muslims from Spain to Bengal (and possibly farther); it was absent outside Islamdom (slaves did fight for non-Muslims, but not in the same systematic manner nor with the same degree of importance); yet it had no religious, legal, or institutional tie to Islam. To non-Muslims, slave soldiers were anomalous and rare; to Muslims they were familiar and widespread. Can Islam account for this difference, even though it has nothing to say about using slaves as soldiers? This study argues that Islam did have a relation to military slavery—furthermore, that this relation represents only one discernible point on a wide spectrum of political and military Islamicate institutions. Chapter 3 ties slave soldiers specifically to Islam; the following pages discuss generally how Islam extended its influence to all facets of life.

5. Besides these primary reasons for studying military slavery, there are others: (3) The topic has considerable intrinsic interest, raising such questions as: are slave soldiers real slaves, why do masters purposefully arm slaves, and what relations do they bear to their masters? (4) Although military slavery played an important role in most premodern Islamicate dynasties, it has not been treated as a single institution.
Islamicate Influences

Islam affected Muslims primarily in three interrelated ways: through the implementation of Islamic precepts and ideals, their nonimplementation, and the extension of Middle Eastern high culture. The influence of Islam that resulted from implementation of its goals is self-evident. The Islamic religion brings with it a wide variety of precepts and ideals which influence the believer, ranging from his urinary habits to his views on the just society. The Sharī'a incorporates several sources (the Qur'ān, hadīth, reasoning by analogy, and consensus) to elaborate a code which has something to say about almost every activity. To the degree that Muslims carried out its injunctions, they shared an Islamic way of life. Laws in the private domain, dealing with religious ritual and personal status, were largely implemented; conversion to Islam brought some conformity in these areas to vastly diverse practices on several continents. For example, Islam everywhere affected family relations by its inheritance laws, which created bonds and tensions of their own. Laws involving public affairs were less consistently implemented; exceptionally, those concerning the status of dhimmīs (adherents of scriptuary religions who lived under Muslim rule) were often effected.

The extent of Islamic influence varied in different parts of Islamdom. It was greatest in the Middle East, somewhat less strong in North Africa, Central Asia, and northern India, and much less so in sub-Saharan Africa, southeastern Europe, southern India, Yunan, and Southeast Asia. Whatever the depth of Islamic practices, the carrying out of their precepts and ideals represented a direct channel of Islamic influence.

Those precepts and ideals also had an indirect impact; Islam established some goals which could not be attained, and the common failure to live up to them provoked similar responses.

7. R. Brunschvig, “Perspectives,” pp. 49-50. This accounts for the many works with “Islam” in their title and no mention of Muslims outside the Middle East in their text; other areas are seen either as not fully Muslim or as derivative, and hence less interesting.
among Muslims. In fact, the responses to failure influenced Muslims in common ways as much as the goals they attained. In public affairs, Muslims did not live up to most Islamic precepts and ideals: the rates of taxation prescribed by Islam for zakāh were unworkable in an agrarian-based economy and were displaced already in the 2d/8th century; the juridical procedures were too inflexible for use in a system of justice; commercial restrictions (such as the prohibition on interest) were absolutely untenable for traders; and the political-military requirements were beyond the reach of any mundane government. No people has ever lived long by these laws of Islam—over a millennium of history makes this point clear beyond dispute—but each people that took its faith seriously had to deal with the gap between ideals and reality. It is my assumption that Muslims in premodern times did take these ideals to heart and therefore the failure to enforce them had major consequences. Muslims shared a disappointment in the conduct of public affairs: illegal taxes, non-Islamic judicial tribunes, usury, and failed political-military institutions (on which more in chapter 3) bound them together, for believers reacted in similar ways to these facts of life. Not the ideals themselves but Muslim responses to their nonimplementation accounted for the Islamicate element in the economic, social, political, and military life of premodern Islamdom. Many attempts to understand the history of Muslims as well as current developments miss this point entirely by looking only at ideals; in the abstract, these have little value for understanding the role of Islam in history.

The adaptation by Islam of traits particular to the Middle East constitutes a final pattern of Islamicate influence. Although not sanctioned by Islam, some Middle Eastern patterns became identified with the religion and its way of life; as a result, they spread across Islamdom. M. G. S. Hodgson identifies a Middle East high cultural tradition (he calls it the Irano-Semitic tradition of the Nile-to-Oxus region) which was modified and "refonted" by Islam. In his view, when Islam spread beyond

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the Middle East, only high culture traveled with it, not the "everyday cultural patterns of its underlying village and town life." The Middle East had Persian techniques of government, its own traditions of urban culture, and distinct attitudes toward religion; these were adapted by other Muslim peoples and deeply affected their ways of life. In Hodgson's words:

What was carried throughout Islamdom, then, was not the whole Irano-Semitic social complex but the Islamicized Irano-Semitic high cultural traditions; what may be called the "Perso-Arabic" traditions, after the two chief languages in which they were carried, at least one of which every man of serious Islamicate culture was expected to use freely. The cosmopolitan unity into which peoples entered in so many regions was maintained independently of the everyday culture, and on the level of the Perso-Arabic high culture; its standards affected and even increasingly modified the culture of everyday life, but that culture remained essentially Indic or European or southern or northern, according to the region.

As Islam expanded to new regions farther from its Middle Eastern heartland, "the everyday culture of the newer Muslim areas had less and less in common with that in the original Irano-Semitic lands." Still, "especially in the central lands but also wherever Islam was received, the 'high culture' had a steady influence in moulding the everyday culture." Thus, non-Islamic Middle Eastern patterns affected many aspects of Muslim life.

These three paths of Islamicate influence account for almost all elements common to Muslims, including military slavery. The systematic enslavement of soldiers was neither an Islamic precept nor a Middle Eastern trait; rather, it resulted from the nonimplementation of Islamic precepts and ideals in public life. Indeed, it symbolizes the impossibility of attaining Islamic political and military goals. When Muslim peoples perceived that

10. Ibid., 2:10.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 2:63.
14. I plan to follow this book with a companion study that deals with implementation in selected aspects of private life.
their public order could not correspond to those goals, they withdrew from their own armies, compelling the rulers to look for soldiers elsewhere, which in turn led to the development of military slavery as a solution.

The Military Slave System

A new dynasty rarely depends on slave soldiers at the time when it comes to power; they usually turn up two or three generations later, as a ruler casts about to replace unreliable soldiers with ones from new sources that he can better control. Typically, military slaves serve the ruler first as royal bodyguards, then move to other parts of his entourage, and from there to the army, government, and even into the provincial administration. As the ruler increasingly relies on military slaves, they acquire independent power bases and sometimes take matters into their own hands, either controlling the ruler or even usurping his position. Not always, however: in many cases, when judiciously used, military slaves render competent and faithful service to their masters for long periods of time.

The career of a military slave follows a tight pattern. Born a non-Muslim in some region not under Muslim control, he is acquired by the Muslims as a youth old enough to undergo training but still young enough to be molded by it. Brought to Islamdom as a slave, he converts to Islam and enters a military training program, emerging some five to eight years later as an adult soldier. If he has special abilities, he can rise to any heights in the army or (sometimes) in the government; while most military slaves spend their adults lives in the ruler's army, they are not just soldiers but a key element of the ruling elite in most Muslim dynasties.

15. Exceptions usually come from dynasties founded by military slaves, since they rely heavily on their own corps.
16. The special and fascinating phenomenon of soldiers of slave origins becoming rulers will not be considered in this study. This means that much of the evidence from the Mamluk Kingdom will not be analyzed.
17. Exceptions exist, notably in the Ottoman and Filali dynasties.
We know many facts about military slaves but almost nothing about military slavery. Although military slaves appeared in nearly every premodern Muslim dynasty between Spain and Bengal, the system that prepared and employed them is known to exist in only a few cases. This curious state of knowledge reflects information in the contemporary sources; though highly aware of the military slaves as individuals, the writers seem not to notice that a system made military slavery operate. In the substantial and varied corpus of premodern Islamicate literature, only a handful of writers—most notably Niẓām al-Mulk and Ibn Khaldūn—recognized this system and described it. The blindness of contemporaries to the military slave system constitutes the foremost difficulty confronting a modern historian who wishes to study it; but although nothing can remedy gaps in the sources, extensive reading and careful hypothesis can bring this elusive institution back to life.

Despite the unawareness of contemporaries, a system to acquire, train, and employ military slaves did exist; painstaking reconstructions from scattered evidence have established this system in several dynasties, most notably for several in the 7th/13th or later centuries. The Mamluk and Ottoman organizations are by far the best known, but we also have some idea of the systems in other areas of Islamdom. However different in detail one is from the other, a comparative reading shows that they all shared these crucial features: systematic acquisition, organized training, and employment of slaves as professional soldiers.

Information on military slavery before the 7th/13th century is meager; David Ayalon, the foremost scholar of military slavery,

19. On the significance of this blindness, see p. 69.
20. On the Mamluks, see the works by D. Ayalon, spread over many years and in many journals. Several articles have been recently reprinted in *Studies in the Mamluks of Egypt (1250–1517)* (London, 1977). On the Ottomans, see: I. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilâtından Kapukulu Ocakları* [The slave corps in the organization of the Ottoman state]; B. Miller, *The Palace School of Muhammad the Conqueror* (Cambridge, Mass., 1941); and B. Papoulia, *Ursprung und Wesen der “Knabenlese” in osmanischen Reich.*
Introduction

gave up on those times in 1951: “Our information is severely limited in what concerns the mamlûk system from its origins to 1250. It is doubtful that the sources we must know can be used to throw much light on that long period.” He has not changed his opinion in the intervening years. This study deals not only with the period before 1250 C.E., but with the earliest part of it. My research into the first two Islamic centuries confirms Ayalon’s conclusion: the sources do not provide enough evidence even to posit the existence of a system, much less to re-create it. In order to study the system, therefore, I have had to postulate its existence; the following two assumptions serve as the basis of this study:

1. Whenever soldiers of slave origins become a dominant military force, a system must exist to acquire, train, and employ them. Slaves can take on support, auxiliary, or emergency roles for an army in an unorganized way, but to become a major independent power they must be used systematically. This is not a theory but an assumption; slaves attained predominant power in many Islamicate dynasties for which we have hardly a trace of a system. Yet this assumption finds some confirmation in a comparative reading of slave systems. In particular, two facts support it: when a training program is known to exist, slaves often acquire overwhelming importance (for example, the Abbasids under al-Mu'taṣid, the Seljuks, Mamluks, Ottomans, Tunisia under the Beys, and Dar Fur); outside Islamdom, where no system is known to have existed, slaves never acquired such predominance. Although these facts do not logically necessitate the first assumption, they reinforce my belief in its correctness.

2. A system of military slavery must exist at least thirty years before military slaves assert power. Thirty years marks the ap-

22. Private communication, 23 August 1975.
23. For example, the following are some dynasties founded by soldiers of slave origins in the period 900–1100 C.E.: Simjurids, Ghaznavids, Kalbids, Najahids, Tujibids, 7 Amîrîds, Mujahîdîds, Jahwarîds, Burîds, and the Shahs of Armenia. In addition, Kâfir took control of the Ikhshidîd dynasty and Lu’lu’ eliminated the Hamdanîds. In all of these cases we know almost nothing about the existence of a military slave system.
proximate length of time between the training of slaves in a corps (at about age fifteen) and their rise to prominence (at about age forty-five). It might also take slaves much longer to acquire power, or they may never do so, but their advancing to an important military and political role in less than thirty years appears highly unlikely.

These two assumptions combined permit me to postulate the existence of a military slave system at least thirty years before slaves come to dominate a dynasty. For example, the Ayyubids lost power to their military slaves in 648/1250; this implies that a system existed by at least 617/1220. These assumptions are vital for the study of the first case of military slavery. The first known case of slaves dominating an Islamicate dynasty occurred in 247/861 when the Turkish slaves took control of the Abbasid dynasty. On the basis of the above assumptions, a system to train these slaves must have existed by the time al-Mu'tasim rose to power in 218/833. It may have emerged at an earlier time, however—even during the Prophet's lifetime. Accordingly, this study begins with the very first years of Islam and concludes in the year 218/833, with few references to later events, for I am assuming the existence of military slavery by about that date.

This study contains two parts, of three chapters each: part I places military slavery in its general Islamicate context; part II searches out the first instance of military slavery and explains its occurrence. The specific inquiry in part II requires the analytical tools shaped in the general discussion and so must follow it.

Chapter 1 defines the military slave and shows how distinct he is from other types of slaves; as the term is used here, he is a slave who has been acquired in a systematic manner, trained in an organized fashion, and then employed as a professional soldier. He only occasionally fits the standard English meaning of "slave," depending on the degree of control his master exerts over him.

The second chapter surveys the general record of slaves in warfare and concludes that while they fought all over the world, military slavery existed only in Islamdom. This is significant; establishing military slavery as an exclusively Islamicate phenomenon means that its rationale (proposed in chapter 3) must distin-
guish a function unique to Muslims. For reasons related to the nature of the Islamicate political order, Muslims depended heavily on a foreign soldiery from remote areas; as a result of this dependence, Muslims alone needed to institutionalize its use; military slavery served as a mechanism to acquire and control such soldiers.

Part II fills a much smaller canvas, investigating the date and circumstances of the first military slave system. Chapter 4 documents the Muslim use of unfree persons in war from Muhammad's time until 205/820, establishing that they fought frequently. Using the distinguishing traits of military slaves as previously defined, chapter 5 argues that their first appearance came not before 198–205/814–20 and analyzes the available information on them in this period. The final chapter explains how this initial development of military slavery occurred; an unusual method of using slaves and free non-Arabian converts to Islam in the period 64–132/684–750 provided a prototype for the systematic use of slaves later on.

The wide-ranging discussion in part I is indispensable for the detailed inquiry into the origins of military slavery: definition of the institution in chapter 1 makes possible the dating and identification of its first appearance in chapter 5; and interpretation of its first occurrence in chapter 6 requires the understanding of its rationale proposed in chapter 3.

**Historiography**

Along with most historians, I am skeptical of the veracity or accuracy of the information dealing with the first sixty years of Islamicate life. It appears that a major reediting of the Islamic past took place during 'Abd al-Malik's reign (an idea put forward by Goldziher for the hadīth, Lammens for the sīra literature, Noth for historical writing, and Crone and Cook for the entire Islamic tradition).24 Almost all historical information on

the first two centuries of Islam dates from later times and is open to doubt; how credible is the information on slaves in warfare?

Any historiographical analysis of the sources for the first two centuries of Islam must begin with recognition of a fundamental fact: we are dealing here with oral tradition. With few exceptions, all the information on this period was first compiled in the 3d/9th or subsequent centuries, often two hundred years after the events had occurred. Obviously, the use of such materials is fraught with pitfalls. A methodology for the historical use of oral traditions has been recently developed and can serve as a guide. Although it does not deal with Islamicate sources from a thousand years ago, but with oral traditions collected in contemporary nonliterate societies, especially in Africa, this methodology has perfect validity for our purposes; the major difference is that Islamicate traditions were not written down by alien researchers but by Muslims themselves, a distinct advantage for our material.

Given the nature of oral traditions, it is possible to accept information about slaves in warfare at face value. This is so because (1) chroniclers had no interest in distorting this particular information and so (2) the inaccuracies of their accounts do not seriously flaw the general picture which this study attempts to draw.

Oral traditions are particularly susceptible to distortion, so how does one take this into account?

It is absolutely essential to find out what purpose a tradition is used for, so as to be able to judge the kind of falsification it may have undergone . . . sometimes it is possible to provide proof that a given tradition is unlikely to have been falsified. A case in point is where a

A. Noth, “Zum Verhältnis von kalifaler Zentralgewalt und Provinzen in umayyadischer Zeit,” writes: “The larger part of the traditions dealing with the first caliphs was originally not—or almost not—dated. The arrangement of facts in the hijra chronology was a later systematization” (p. 41). P. Crone and M. Cook, Hagarism: The Making of the Islamic World (London, 1977), part 1.

25. For a different view, see U. Sezgin, Abü Mihnafü ein Beitrag zur Historiographie der umayyadischen Zeit (Leiden, 1971).

tradition contains features which are not in accord with the purpose for which it is used.\textsuperscript{27}

In the history of early Islam, the oral traditions had great religious and political significance; the events of that period remained the focus of controversy for centuries to come. Information about slaves in warfare is mentioned in the course of matters more important to the chroniclers, who were unconcerned with slaves fighting, paid them little attention, and most probably did not manipulate facts about them because they did not raise any fundamental issues. No intentional distortion colors this information; and reediting probably did nothing to alter the reporting about slaves in war.

Because the chroniclers had no reason purposely to distort the role of slaves in warfare, factual errors in their accounts reflect unintentional mistakes and probably cancel each other out. This study rarely uses isolated facts but instead tries to build up a broad statistical picture; some clear patterns emerge, and they appear valid even if specific details are inaccurate. By relying on many facts I hope to reduce the importance of each particular one. Only great quantities of soldiers (4,000, 8,000, 100,000 and even more) come under doubt; I understand these figures to mean merely "large multitudes."

Although I have made efforts to collect all pertinent information for this study, it must be pointed out that the facts for military slavery in early Islam do not add up to a watertight explanation for its origins. My conclusions are highly speculative; lacking hard evidence, I have come to explain the events as they make most sense to me. In our present state of knowledge, the very assertion that a military slave system existed before 235/850 is audacious; to attempt to trace its development might seem absolutely foolhardy. The attempt seems worthwhile, nonetheless, for the important role military slavery played in Islamicate history justifies a guess, no matter how wild.

While part I is based mostly on secondary works, part II relies heavily on primary sources with historical content: chronicles, specialized histories (such as that of the vizierate), biographies,

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., pp. 81, 83.
Terminology

A glossary at the end of the book defines all frequently used Arabic words as well as neologisms and special usages. Although no friend to jargon, I have sacrificed some familiar terms in favor of accuracy; I hope my terms are benign.

Slave and military slave present the greatest problems in terminology and will be dealt with at length in chapter 1. Slave throughout this study means “a person of slave origins” regardless of his subsequent status. One cannot tell if he is later free in law, in fact, or both. This special usage corresponds to the use of slave in Muslim vernaculars. A “military slave” is a person of slave origins who undergoes acquisition in a systematic manner, followed by training and employment as a soldier. This term does not apply to all slaves who fight in wars, but only to those whose lives revolve around military service. The military slave keeps this appellation even after he attains legal or real freedom. “Military slavery” is the system which acquires, prepares, and employs military slaves.

'Abd and raqīq are translated into English as “slave” while other comparable Arabic terms (ghulām, khādim, mamlūk, mawlā, wasīf, and so on) usually remain untranslated. Appendix 1 shows that all these terms had the same meaning in early Islam. Because mawlā occurs so very often, it is not italicized.

M. C. G. Hodgson, in the introduction to his monumental work The Venture of Islam, suggests a number of neologisms which have the virtue of precision though they sometimes lack elegance. I use some of them in this study. “Islamic” refers to the religion of Islam and “Islamicate” to its civilization. “Islamdom” is the “society in which the Muslims and their faith are recognized as prevalent and socially dominant”;28 but since military slavery and other patterns of statecraft probably did not extend

28. Hodgson, 1:58; also 1:95.
to East Asia, the term “Islamdom” here does not include Islamicate territories east of Bengal.

Since “Arabs” presently live in most of the areas conquered by the Muslims in the 1st/7th century, “Arabian” points out that the ruling Muslims in the first two centuries of Islam came predominantly from Arabia or traced their origins to there. “Early Islam” refers to those first two centuries from Muḥammad to al-Maʾmūn, the germinative period of Islamicate history when so many customs and attitudes were set.

Unless an event is exactly dated, the Christian year which contains the bulk of a Muslim year follows as its equivalent. A.H. 61 began on 1 October 680, so most of it fell in 681 c.e. (= A.D.): hence 61/681.

Transliteration follows the Library of Congress system but modifies some of its applications (for example, as-Ṣahāba rather than al-Ṣahāba). Vernacular plurals are formed with an “s”: ghulāms rather than ghilmān. Names of places and dynasties are written without diacritical marks.
### Abbreviations

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<td>AR</td>
<td>Quarles, <em>The Negro in the American Revolution</em></td>
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<td>Asl</td>
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<td>CW</td>
<td>Quarles, <em>The Negro in the Civil War</em></td>
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<td>Din</td>
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<td>EI1</td>
<td><em>Encyclopaedia of Islam</em>, 1st ed.</td>
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<td>FB</td>
<td>al-Balādhūrī, Futūḥ al-Buldān</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ Miṣr wa Akhbārha</td>
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<td>ʿIbar</td>
<td>Ibn Khaldūn, Kitāb al-ʿIbar</td>
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<td>al-Jahshīyārī, Kitāb al-Wuzaraʾ waʾl-Kuttāb</td>
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<td>al-Yaʾqūbī, Kitāb al-Buldān</td>
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<td>KM</td>
<td>Ibn Qutayba, Kitāb al-Maʾārif</td>
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<td>MDh</td>
<td>al-Masʿūdī, Murūj adh-Dhahab</td>
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<td>Muq</td>
<td>Ibn Khaldūn, al-Muqaddima</td>
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<td>NT</td>
<td>al-Maqqarī, Naḥḥ at-Ṭīb</td>
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Abbreviations

T  at-Tabarî, Ta’rikh ar-Rusul wa’l-Mulûk
Tanbih al-Mas‘ûdî, at-Tanbih wa’l-Ashraf
TAS adh-Dhahabî, Tajrîd Asmâ’ as-Šahâba
TMaw al-Azdî, Ta’rikh al-Mawṣil
TYaic al-Ya’qûbî, at-Ta’rikh
UA Ibn Qutayba, ʿUyûn al-Akhbâr
UG Ibn al-Athîr, Usd al-Ghâba fî Maʿrifat as-Šahâba
UH al-ʿUyûn wa’l-Hadâʾiq, ed. M. J. de Goeje
Umm ash-Shafii, Kitâb al-Umm
UV Grunebaum, ed., Unity and Variety
WTS Parry and Yapp, eds., War, Technology and Society in the Middle East
Part I may appear to be anachronistic; like old-style histories, it ignores time and place—appearing to imply that nothing really changed among Muslims—and it finds in Islam the key to a military institution—suggesting that Islam explains everything about Muslims. Despite their archaic ring, however, my ideas about the history of Muslims differ fundamentally from the old assumptions. To make this clear, I wish to indicate some general views before taking up military slavery.

First, this is not an "essentialist" study. Western scholars used to view the history of non-Western peoples as static: cultural traits were fixed millennia back and have remained similar henceforth. Since then, motion has occurred but without changing the essence of that culture. (In contrast, we see ourselves as always developing; each century, even decade, has a distinct spirit and role.)

For the history of Muslims, this view led to the notion of a classical civilization that developed in the first centuries of Islam, followed by steady decline. An increasing appreciation in this century for the adaptive and creative forces which characterized Islamicate institutions has modified this static approach.* Now we know that Islamicate life was continuously changing, both over time and space; most recent efforts in the field of Muslim history endeavor to understand those changes. In the case of military slavery, this means that it had different functions in ninth-century Iran, eleventh-century Egypt, thirteenth-century India, fifteenth-century Bengal, seventeenth-century Morocco, and nineteenth-century West Africa. At various times and in various places, slave soldiers served their masters as bodyguards and elite troops, infantry and cavalry, political agents and provincial governors, as a force to centralize or to extend political power. Later rulers had different needs from those who first developed the institution and adapted it to achieve their purposes. Changes occurring in the military slave system are as yet unknown in detail, but it evolved considerably over a millennium.

I pass over change and diversity here, not because they are less important than similarities, but in order to study the institution

of military slavery as a whole. To explore its myriad variations and developments would obstruct a vision of the core institution; thus part I removes slave soldiers from all temporal and spatial contexts. The result, an ideal type, highlights central traits that variations would otherwise obscure.

Second, not everything goes back to Islam. Earlier European scholars tended to attribute anything inexplicable to Islam. The exotic, regrettable, or merely puzzling (harem, eunuch, "fatalism") all were explained in this way; religion provided the key to an unchanging typology. Again, time and space dropped out; the enormous diversity of Muslim life across many eras and lands mattered less than the belief in Allah. Of course, such explanations usually proved illusory, for most occurrences in Muslim history were the results of specific temporal or spatial features (a mountain range, an advance in military technology, a new trade route, or an evil king), not of Islam.

I happily recognize this fact. My interest lies not in tying everything to Islam, but in establishing that it does explain some aspects of life among Muslims. Certain features of the political and military order—military slavery in particular—can be understood only in the light of Islam; the attempt to explain it as, say, a fourteenth-century or an Iranian phenomenon would lead to profoundly wrong conclusions.
Chapter One
What Is a Military Slave?

The purpose of their purchase is not to enslave them but to intensify their zeal and solidarity and strengthen their prowess.

—Ibn Khaldūn

I have defined a military slave as a person of slave origins who is acquired in a systematic way, trained for military service, and spends most of his life as a professional soldier. The two most common questions concerning him are: what distinguishes him from other slaves, and is he a “true” slave (in the standard English sense of the word)?

I use the English term “military slave” because it is more universal, precise, and flexible than the equivalents in Islamicate vernaculars. Although some words have come to mean military slave (notably fatā, ghulām, kul, and mamlūk), each of them has only limited usage and none universally acquired the meaning of “military slave.” In other words, besides limitations in time and place, each of these words also has other meanings; not one of them refers exclusively to military slaves. This lack of specificity might result from the fact that Muslims have never recognized slave soldiers as a distinct type of slave (see p. 13).

Of these several terms, mamlūk has gained the widest usage in orientalist literature, thanks to its propagation by David Ayalon in his many works on this subject and to the relative fame of the Mamluk dynasty in Egypt. Yet this is the most ambiguous of all the vernacular words. Mamlūk means not only military slave, but (1) any slave, (2) any white slave, (3) the rulers of Egypt from 648/1250 to 922/1517, and (4) the ruling elite in Egypt between

1. ‘Ibar, 5:371. For full quote in translation, see Appendix 2.
648/1250 and the mid-13th/19th century. Even knowledgeable scholars confuse these related but distinct meanings.²

Besides lacking universal and specific terminology, the vernaculars also have no abstraction comparable to “military slavery.” (This is also why I prefer “military slave” to the more precise and euphonic “slave soldier”.) Rather than coin a neologism in one of the Islamicate languages, it seems wisest to discuss this unusual institution in English terminology. Such practice is facilitated by the fact that, unlike the majority of European terms applied to non-Western institutions (for instance, feudalism, clergy, bourgeoisie), “military slavery” has no meaning in Western civilization, so it carries with it no Western connotations to confuse or mislead the reader.

Differences from Other Slaves

In contrast to all other slaves, the military slave devotes his life to military service. His characteristic features derive from the fact that he works as a soldier. From the time he is acquired until his retirement, he lives differently from other slaves, for he participates in a lifelong system with its own rules and rationale. Specifically, he differs from two other kinds of slaves: ordinary slaves who happen to fight and government slaves.

Ordinary Slaves in Warfare

Ordinary slaves are all those not in the army or government. They come to mind when one thinks of slavery in its usual form: domestic service or labor at some economically productive task. Such slaves do happen to fight occasionally, but they are entirely different from military slaves. For the sake of comparison with ordinary slaves, the life of a military slave may be divided into three parts: acquisition, transition, and employment; at each stage his life-pattern differs dramatically from that of the ordinary slave.

The differences begin with ownership, for the possession of a

² For example, E. Be’eri, Arab Officers in Arab Politics and Society (Jerusalem, 1969), pp. 296–99.
military slave is much more limited than that of ordinary slaves. While even a poor person can own an ordinary slave, only leading political figures—the ruler, his officials, provincial leaders—can own military slaves, for they represent military power. Most military slaves, in fact, belong to the ruler and the central government (and this chapter concentrates on them alone). This exclusive ownership means that military slaves always breathe rarefied air and keep company with the powerful.

While the decision to purchase an ordinary slave comes down primarily to a question of economics (can the master afford his domestic services or does he gain from a slave’s economic activities?), acquisition of a military slave depends on military considerations. As a result, the trade in military slaves has a drive and rhythm of its own.

From the moment a ruler or notable person decides to acquire military slaves, he lavishes exceptional care on selecting recruits. Specifically, the prospective owner seeks two qualities: military potential and malleability. As regards the first, he insists on greater capabilities than those required of ordinary slaves; while any misfit can carry water or dig for salt, a future soldier has to bear graver responsibilities. A preference for youths of noble origins and the high prices paid for outstanding recruits reflect the master’s interest in finding the most highly qualified prospects as military slaves. In one well-known case, al-Manṣūr Qālaʿūn al-Alfī, a Mamluk sultan (r. 678–89/1280–90), is said to have received the last part of his name (alfa, Arabic for “thousand”) from his purchase price, 1,000 dinars. Selection criteria also determine geographical sources of military slaves, for some regions are known to produce better soldiers than others. So, while Indian slaves do not often fight, Central Asian male slaves almost invariably do.

3. The military slaves belonging to other persons exist less often, their patterns imitate the rulers’, and they are less well documented.
5. al-Maqrīzī, Kitāb as-Sulūk, 1:663. For many more examples of this type, see Ayalon, L’Esclavage, pp. 6–7.
Besides high quality, a master seeks potential loyalty in his military slaves. Ordinary slaves can be coerced into doing their jobs (even including some military assignments), but military slaves have to be convinced. Since these men nearly always assume great responsibilities and acquire considerable freedom of action, personal bonds between the master and his slave matter greatly. A master ensures strong relations by acquiring slaves both young and foreign. Children being far more impressionable than adults, the master spares no effort in acquiring youthful recruits. He accepts boys as old as seventeen but prefers them about twelve; at that age they are still highly amenable to training but are already skilled in the martial arts of their own peoples. The transferal of these skills to the master’s army constitutes one of the main benefits of military slavery. In contrast, a master seeks ordinary slaves among young adults, when they are at the peak of their economic productivity.

A slave owner recruits aliens because their foreign origin also increases their susceptibility to being molded; the owner can isolate a foreigner by eliminating any ties outside his immediate household and by forcing him to depend entirely on the small world of the master and his fellow slaves. To complete this isolation, most military slaves arrive on the scene ignorant of the language of the country in which they will serve.

Of these numerous qualities desired in a military slave, youth is unquestionably the most important. Noble origins, high potential, and being foreign all help, but youth matters most, because this quality alone suffices to ensure the success of the next stage, the training program.

8. When a dynasty and its subjects speak different languages, military slaves may know the language of the dynasty, but they ought not to know that of the populace (e.g. the Mamluks of Egypt). Oddly, the language and religion of a military slave are quite the opposite of those of an ordinary slave. Military slaves are often allowed to retain their foreign tongue but are practically compelled to convert to Islam. Ordinary slaves in Islamdom, on the contrary, must learn their master's language but are free to remain non-Muslims, especially if they believe in a scriptuary religion.
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The military slave's special status becomes even more pronounced during his first years in bondage. On arrival in his new country, he faces a number of experiences intended to prepare him for a military career. Clearly, for the slave to be used most effectively, he cannot be enrolled directly in the army but has to learn its ways and form new loyalties. The transition period serves to change him from a self-willed, alien boy into a skilled and loyal soldier. His capabilities, youth, and isolation combined with the thoroughness of the training program work to assure this change. At the time when ordinary slaves are being exploited for their labor, military slaves are being trained and educated. These long years of schooling and reorientation sharpen still further the contrast between them.

The training program is the core of military slavery. To understand the achievements of these soldiers, we must study their training, for this experience shapes their entire adult life. Whereas untrained slaves provide dubious skills and loyalty, only suitable for limited military functions, trained slaves fill every position of skill and responsibility. The program lasts about five to eight years and has a twofold purpose: to develop skills and to imbue loyalty. Skills are imparted through an intensive program of physical and spiritual instruction, with rather more emphasis placed on the former. Through games, contests, hunts, and the like, recruits exercise continuously in the martial arts.9 The product is a superbly trained and highly disciplined soldier. Or, if assessed as intellectually promising, a slave may be further educated and prepared for governmental work.

Training has another purpose too: to transform the identity of the recruit. He begins as a pagan foreigner with loyalty only to his own people; by the end of the transition period he is a Muslim, conversant in the manners of his new country and intensely loyal to his master and fellow slaves. As a result, military slaves habitually prove themselves to be their master’s most solid and loyal troops.

9. Details may be found in H. Rabie, “The Training of the Mamlûk Fâris.”
Upon completing training, military slaves join the army. No support, auxiliary, or emergency roles here: they enroll as full-time professional soldiers. Their master gives them direct financial support, so they have no competing interests to distract them from military service. Military slaves perform key military duties and carry heavy burdens; they serve all year round, form elite corps, supply many officers, and rise quickly in the military hierarchy. No listing of their activities can be given here; in differing circumstances, they undertake every conceivable military duty. Unlike ordinary slaves, they habitually become the mainstay of the armies they serve. And whereas ordinary slaves belong to private individuals, military slaves belong to leaders; so the former tend to fight alongside their masters, while the latter form large corps and fight in separate slave units.

By virtue of their military strength, the lives of these men differ remarkably from those of ordinary slaves. Far from being lowly domestics or servile laborers, they enjoy the respect and the power of soldiers. Although slaves, they are part of the ruling elite; they bear arms, have access to the ruler, fill important positions, and enjoy the amenities of wealth and power. Indeed, they enjoy many advantages which most free men cannot attain and, as a result, their slave status carries with it no stigma. On the contrary, it becomes a badge of distinction; slavery, in an extraordinary reversal, gives access to power and social superiority which free birth might deny. Far from considering it a humiliation, free men covet this status and slaves jealously guard it. None of this, of course, holds true for ordinary slaves.

The power held by military slaves enables them to gain control over their own destinies. Ordinary slaves become free only when their master decides to manumit them. They can flee or revolt, but these efforts usually fail; slave revolts can cause great upheavals and bring governments down, but they do not place slaves in power for long. How different the situation with military slaves! They commonly free themselves through a gradual shift in relations with their master. With time, they evolve from being his subordinates into being an independent military force. This opportunity of acquiring power from within is completely closed to ordinary slaves.
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Government Slaves

A ruler may use his household slaves as political agents; they then share the high standing of military slaves but are not soldiers. Government slaves acquire political power if a ruler needs trusted agents, for as his domestic slaves they are totally under his control and serve him with great loyalty. Lacking any power base other than his favor, such men are ideal tools for their master; and should he wish to retire to pleasanter pursuits, they can take over the responsibilities of state without threatening his position as ruler.

Government slaves are found all over the world. In Europe, the servi Caesaris in the Roman Empire are the most renowned and the best studied; but they are far from unique. One finds government slaves, for example, in the East Gothic, Vandal, and Burgundian kingdoms; they were called ministeriales in medieval Germany; and in Muscovy, they dominated both the central and provincial governments for several centuries until about 1550.


Some scholars, drunk on the excesses of Roman slaves (and ignorant of Islamicate history), have made preposterous claims on their behalf: "imperial freedmen gained an ascendancy in the [Roman] Empire the like of which has never in another nation fallen to a series of low-born upstarts. . . . The Roman Empire enjoys an unenviable distinction. She possesses the longest list of menials who rose to guide the destinies of a state" (Duff, Freedmen in the Early Roman Empire, p. 174). T. P. Ion makes an even more astonishing comparison with Islamdom: "The slaves in the Islamic countries never played a prominent part, either in social or state affairs, being exclusively used for domestic service. On the contrary, the slaves in Rome . . . were not only servants, but teachers, educators, and above all, soldiers." Roman Law and Mohammedan Jurisprudence (n.p., n.d.), pp. 26–27.

11. For the East Gothic, Vandal, and Burgundian kingdoms, see D. Rothenhöfer, Untersuchungen zur Sklaverei in den ostgermanischen Nachfolgestaaten
Outside Europe, the early Ch'ing use of servile administrators is perhaps the best-known example; their presence in Ethiopia may have been due to imitation of Islamicate models.\textsuperscript{12}

Despite the high standing and power which government slaves share with military slaves, the two groups are fundamentally different. Whereas government slaves are chosen from among the ruler's servants, military slaves are soldiers. Government slaves cannot build up a power base of their own and almost never threaten their master; military slaves, however, can develop such a base from within their own corps and use it to stand up to the ruler. The difference here is explained by origins, not functions, for government slaves can take on military duties and military slaves often receive administrative appointments. Yet, even when they have military command, government slaves remain merely the agents of their master; military slaves in administrative or political positions, however, retain their military base and can build up independent political power from it. Their military connections, group solidarity, and close ties to the ruler propel them into a wide variety of positions—-as personal counselors, top administrators, provincial governors, special agents, confidential agents, and so on. In case after case they enter the ruler's entourage, go on to dominate the court, then the central government, and sometimes even take over the realm itself. These many opportunities are uniquely open to military slaves.

\textit{Is He a True Slave?}

The differences between military and other slaves are so great that one wonders if the former should even be considered slaves.

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at all. Can slaves who enjoy such power, who even rule, remain slaves? Before attempting to answer this question, a general discussion about the nature of slavery may help to clarify the issues.

Muslim and Orientalist Views

Let us begin with a review of what others have written in this regard. No one, Muslim or orientalist, has paid much attention to the position of military slaves, so material on the topic is scanty. Premodern Muslims never recognized them as a distinct type of slaves and modern scholars have barely considered the question.

The Shari'a shapes the Muslims' view. It discusses at length the many statuses of slaves but ignores their functions. Whether the slave works in a saltpeter mine or directs an empire, the law looks only at his legal status, and it contains an immense body of regulations specifying the exact duties and rights of each type of slave (e.g., ma'dhûn, makâtib, umm walad). It did not consider the possibility that the function of a slave might overshadow his legal status.

Military slaves do not have a separate legal status, so they were practically absent from the Muslims' consciousness in pre-modern times. Muslims did not recognize their extraordinary functions and roles. Premodern writings—legal works, belles lettres, historical writings, mirrors for princes—all ignore them; indeed, the subject of this inquiry went largely unnoticed in Islamicate civilization. This has resulted in a paucity of both primary source materials and scholarly interest.

The few modern scholars who have concerned themselves with this question usually hedge their answers. Several Ottoman

13. There is no detailed exposition of the Muslim slave's legal position in a European language. R. Brunschvig, ""Abd" in EI² gives an excellent overview. Also, the following topics have been covered: (a) Qur'anic injunctions: R. Roberts, The Social Laws of the Qurān (London, 1925), pp. 53–60; (b) Mālikī law: D. Santillana, Istituzioni di diritto musulmano malichita, 2 vols. (Rome, 1926–38), 1:111–26; (c) Shāfi'i law: T. W. Juynboll, Handbuch des islāmischen Gesetzes (Leiden, 1910), pp. 202–08, and E. Sachau, Muhammedanisches Recht nach Schafitisher Lehre, pp. 125–79, cover manumission; (d) Ottoman law: K. E. Weckwarth, Der Sklave im Muhammedanischen Recht (Berlin, 1909). Despite its title, this dissertation deals exclusively with the Ottoman legal system.
historians view military slaves as slaves, though with reservations, being discomfited by the way they so blatantly contradict the lowly image of a slave. Lybyer writes of the 10th/16th century that the title kul (Turkish, “slave”) was not “mere form: with few exceptions, all members entered the system as actual slaves, and there was nowhere along the line of promotion any formal or real process of emancipation.” Gibb and Bowen imply that military slaves were slaves, but they find it “unfortunate that we should be obliged to use the word ‘slave’ for persons of this status. For it is appropriate only in some ways [given that] their servitude carried with it scarcely any social inferiority [or] obloquy.” Papoulia, too, finds them real slaves, but she qualifies this view in two insightful footnotes. In the first she says, “they remained slaves only so long as they directly served the ruler”; in the other, she points out that many of the ruler’s powers over military slaves were those of an absolute ruler over his subordinates and had nothing to do with the slave status of military slaves (this point is further discussed below, p. 19).

In contrast to these views of military slaves as slaves, some scholars refer to them as mercenaries, though without justifying this terminology.

Only one scholar, M. A. Shaban, argues that military slaves are not slaves in any sense, especially in the early period of Islam.

17. Ibid., p. 21 n. 54.
18. Ibid., p. 8 n. 24.
19. For example: (a) J. Karabacek, “Erstes urkundliches Auftreten von Türken,” Mitteilungen aus der Sammlung der Papyrus Erzherzog Rainer (Vienna, 1887), p. 93; (b) Lévi-Provençal, L’Espagne musulmane au 10ème siècle, p. 130; (c) Here and there in C. E. Bosworth’s writings on Islamic military organizations; (d) Káldy-Nagy, “The First Centuries of the Ottoman Military Organization,” p. 153 and passim. The differences between military slaves and mercenaries will be discussed briefly in the last part of this chapter and at greater length in chapter 3. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, pp. 1015–18, understands the differences clearly.
Unfortunately, his argument is based on very free use of facts, so his conclusions must be treated with utmost caution. Shaban takes issue with the "astonishing" mistake of earlier historians in thinking that the soldiers called slaves were in any way servile. He thinks "it is high time [this idea] was utterly refuted." As he sees it, the notion that slaves defended and ruled Islamicate dynasties "is not only a gross misunderstanding of human nature, but it also goes against the overwhelming evidence to the contrary in our sources." ¹⁰

According to Shaban, the terms ʿabd, ghulām, khādīm, mawlā, and wāṣīf had all been abstracted from their original meanings; although slaves in name, they were no more slaves in actuality than an American secretary of state is a secretary who takes dictation and serves coffee. Far from relying on overwhelming evidence to prove this point, Shaban does not offer a shred of support from the sources. Contrary evidence he dismisses out of hand; an account which indicates in passing that some officials were later manumitted he labels "almost certainly fictitious . . . probably put forward by their opponents." ²¹ This feeble explanation misses the point entirely. A slave background need not have pejorative connotations. Human nature has often committed stranger follies than placing slaves in high positions; and the entire system of military slavery makes more sense when one accepts words and statements at face value rather than overinterpreting them.

The Islamicate Meaning of "Slave"

Much of the confusion surrounding the nature of military slavery derives from the Muslim practice of calling these men slaves regardless of their actual circumstances. The slave may be under his master's control (and thus a slave in the standard English sense), he may have been manumitted, or he may have seized power with his own hands; in all these cases, Muslim contem-

¹⁰ Shaban, Islamic History, 2:63-64.
²¹ Ibid., 2:66.
poraries referred to him simply as a slave, usually without dis-
tinguishing between the important differences.

In its Islamicate meaning, slave is shorthand for “a person of
slave origins”; similarly, military slave means “a soldier of slave
origins.” The slave appellation refers only to a person’s origins
and not to his subsequent position or function. In this sense, it
resembles the title “doctor of philosophy” in our culture. This
kind of doctor receives his title on completing a doctoral educa-
tion and keeps it regardless of his subsequent career. Doctor in
this sense does not define a status or activity but indicates an
educational background; he is “a person of graduate school ori-
gins.” The Islamicate usage of slave similarly describes nothing
in later life, only an early experience.

Slave in this study has its Islamicate meaning: a person of slave
origins. Free refers to a person who has never experienced slav-
ery, someone not of slave origins. Admittedly, these usages do
not correspond to their standard English meanings, but an Is-
lamicate institution must be described in its own terms. As ever,
one must be cautious in applying the vocabulary from one civili-
zation to another. True slave refers to the slave as he is commonly
understood in English: a person in a state of legal and actual ser-
vility. It is in this sense that we ask whether the military slave is a
true slave; does he fit the standard English meaning of the word
slave? Or does he fit only the more general Islamicate meaning, a
person of slave origins?

The Diverse Positions of True Slaves

The argument against military slaves being true slaves focuses
on their highly favorable position as soldiers and members of the
ruling elite. It is an apparent contradiction for a true slave to
share more with the mighty than with the weak.

This view presupposes that a slave must live a servile and
wretched life in order to qualify as a true slave, yet this too is
plainly wrong. Occidentals, particularly Americans, have a nar-
row idea of slavery, perhaps in part because they associate it with
Simon Legree and the sometimes exaggerated(?) horrors of

22. Even the U.S. situation can be seen in a different light. See R. W. Fogel
What Is a Military Slave? 17

chattel slavery in North America. As the harshest slave system in history, the American experience provides a poor basis from which to understand the more subtle phenomenon of military slavery; the reader will do best to free his mind of it before considering the following discussion.

Although often oppressed and debased, slaves need not live badly; some pursue responsible careers in business, government, or the court. Far from being despised in these positions, they wield power and accrue wealth. Islamic law, for example, has a special term for the slave who engages in business, ma'dhin. Despite the fact that governmental slaves have filled such important positions all over the world, including Europe, these facts commonly arouse surprise and protest: “Such men are not true slaves” is the usual reaction. But, as we shall see, they often are. True slavery has a wider range of possibilities than one might imagine; indeed, a slave can live in any circumstances as long as he meets two conditions. He must normally be salable and he must be subject to his master in all important matters. True slavery implies treatment as a commodity; the slave can be bought and sold like any other object. The true slave does not have power over the most important aspects of his own life; his whereabouts, occupation, marital status, or discipline. The master decides where the slave lives, what work he does, whether he may marry, and whether he should be punished. The key here is control; though everyone is subject to innumerable restrictions and limitations, the slave (and possibly the citizen of a modern totalitarian state though he cannot be sold) consistently lacks the power to make his own most important decisions.

As this definition of true slavery considers only the relations between slave and master, it allows us to ignore the slave’s occupation, wealth, social standing, and power. He may do anything; as long as his master controls him, he is still a slave. He may acquire great wealth and power or shape the destinies of millions of people while remaining a true slave. For centuries the Otto-

and S. L. Engerman, Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery (Boston, 1974), for the latest major statement of this point of view.

23. For an explanation of this, see S. M. Elkins, Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life (Chicago, 1959).
man grand viziers were slaves, subject to the merest whim of their masters, the pādīshāhs (sultans). When a pādīshāh so wished, he could reduce the grand vizier to a kitchen aide or have him executed; yet, at the same time, the grand vizier directed the government of a world power. As long as he personally remained under his master’s control, nothing else affected his status as a true slave.

In sum, the fact that a person is a true slave tells us nothing about his power, wealth, or social standing. To be sure, most slaves were debased and poor; but they did not have to be, and not all were. As long as a slave had a master who controlled him, he could gain any position—short, of course, of sovereign, since the ruler had no mortal master. This potential of the true slave was nowhere so fully exploited as in Islamdom.

Leaving Slavery

True slavery ends when a person acquires control over his own vital decisions. This change can occur either with or without the master’s consent. Manumission, a legal and social event announcing that a master voluntarily relinquishes control over his slave, is the normal way of becoming free. Among all but military slaves, this is the only way of shedding the master’s control (short of rebelling or running away); they need his consent.

Military slaves have another way of gaining control over their own major decisions without permission. As professional soldiers and powerful officials, they have their own power base and opportunities far beyond those of other slaves. Their military role gives them a means of escaping slavery—and they regularly exploit it. Military slaves manumit themselves as a matter of course.

No term in English describes this process of self-manumission, since it does not occur in Western civilization. Yet, because it is a basic feature of military slavery, we need a name for it. By extension from “manumission,” I shall call it “ipsimission.” And in contrast to the true slave (under his master’s control) and the freedman (legally manumitted), I shall assume that the “former slave” freed himself through ipsimission. In other words, the former slave need not be manumitted.
What Is a Military Slave?

Depending on their specific circumstances, then, military slaves may either be true slaves or not. An analysis of their position must take into account the changes they undergo. In general, military slaves begin their service to a dynasty as true slaves and gain partial or full independence over time. Again, the extent of the master's control is the key factor; they are true slaves as long as a master can sell them and makes the vital decisions in their lives. If they have no such master they are no longer true slaves. It is only their relations with the master that determine their status as slaves; other considerations have no effect on this status. Sebūktigin, a military slave who later founded the Ghaznavid dynasty, explained what being a true slave meant: "The Master had not commanded us to fight; if we had fought without the Master's orders, then each one of us would have been a master not a slave, for the mark of a slave is that he does only what his master tells him." 24

Some writers contest the servility of these men. Papoulia doubts that their relationship to their master was a true slave-master bond. She points to a wider pattern of relations between an absolute ruler and his subordinates:

Other factors also played a role here besides the status of the [slave] nobles. This is a phenomenon which is always possible under absolute rule. Blind submission resulted from their education, from the time when they did serve as true slaves, and it was more of a religious than a political principle. 25

In truth, regardless of other circumstances, these men are true slaves because they can be disposed of by their master and they must obey him. They remain true slaves regardless of who else shares this submission. Our concern here is with military slaves; if it turns out that others in the court share their servility, this does not alter their own status. If the master's powers as absolute ruler complement those as slavemaster, then they only increase his control over the slaves and make them servile in more, not fewer, ways.

Alternatively, one can see military slaves as a type of mercenary; but as long as they are true slaves, this view does not help

25. Papoulia, p. 8 n. 24. The final assertion is highly dubious.
us understand their position. Typically, a purely cash nexus connects the mercenary to his employer, not compulsion or loyalty. The military slave who is still a true slave, in contrast, is tied by bonds of both control and loyalty to his master; indeed, his interests and his master's are nearly inseparable. Mercenaries come and go according to circumstance, but military slaves require long-term planning. Any ruler who decides to create a military slave corps must be prepared to wait a decade before it becomes an effective fighting force. When they are true slaves, military slaves resemble mercenaries very little.

The superiority of military slaves over other types of soldiers may induce the ruler to increase their numbers and influence too rapidly for the good of his dynasty. As they replace other troops and infiltrate the upper levels of the army, the ruler may lose control over them. Once the balance between slave and free forces is upset, the ruler no longer has other forces to restrain the slaves.

When military slaves acquire power, they inevitably use it for their own ends. As the ruler comes to rely on them too heavily, they imitate themselves and take charge in very un-slavelike ways. Imitation occurs when military slaves realize that they no longer have to obey their master. Note, however, that not all military slaves imitate themselves; Islamicate history offers numerous examples of balance, of dynasties in which the slave forces did not acquire too much power but remained true slaves throughout.

The timing of military slaves' self-assertion follows a clear pattern. A given ruler acquires them in too great quantities and relies too heavily upon them, but still they remain subject to him. Awe of him and personal loyalty combine to keep them in his power. His successor, even his son, often finds them no longer willing to obey. Unable to rally other forces against them, he can do nothing to prevent their imitation and eventually falls under their control. In this manner, the Turks obeyed al-

Muʿtaṣīm but not his son al-Wāṭḥīq; the future Mamluks of Egypt obeyed aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb but not Tūrānshāh; and the ʿAbīd al-Bukhārī revolted after the death of ʾĪṣmāʿīl as-Samīn. Once the balance is upset, the takeover can be deferred only as long as highly competent rulers consecutively succeed one another; this largely accounts for how the Ottomans postponed military slave domination for a full century, from the late 9th/15th to the late 10th/16th century.

Of all slaves, only those who are soldiers can ipsimit themselves, for only they have a political relationship with their master. Whereas other slaves perform domestic, economic, or even administrative services, military slaves provide military power. Behind the trust and loyalty between the ruler and these slaves lies a complex adversary relationship: the more he trusts them, the more power they gain; the more power they gain, the less loyal they become. As a result, a master can forego the services of other slaves but he cannot afford to release his military slaves. Their military support affects his own power too much for him ever to relax his grip on them voluntarily. If he does reduce his control, he surrenders some of his power base. Yet, though their military and political importance makes manumission unthinkable, it makes ipsimission possible; military slaves can seize for themselves the freedom their master never gives them.

Manumission and ipsimission are closely related yet very different; some clarification is in order here. For a military slave, ipsimission is by far the more important process; manumission, if it occurs, is barely more than a formality. When the master manumits military slaves, he has no intention of giving up any real control over them, nor do they leave him; yet, if the slaves ipsimit themselves, their legal status remains unchanged. The master’s military dependence on his military slaves thus has two contrary implications; he never voluntarily relaxes control over them, but they have the means to escape his control against his will. The double-edged sword of politics cuts both ways.

The event of manumission marks a major change in the status of other slaves, but it matters little for military slaves (unless the master uses it as a rite of passage, as did the Mamluks of Egypt). Consequently, no significant difference distinguishes those mil-
itary slaves who are legally free from those who remain legally enslaved. Two cases illustrate how little attention was paid to the manumission of military slaves: one of the Fatimid caliphs "realized one day that all the great men in his state were legally slaves, that they were married contrary to Islamic law, that their children were illegitimate, and so forth. He then proceeded to legitimize this state of affairs."\(^{27}\) That the situation could have reached such a point betrays the fundamental insignificance of manumission. In the other example, no one knew whether or not Iltutmish, the Mu'izzī sultan of Delhi (r. 607–33/1211–36) was still legally a slave when he became ruler. Only when his opponents challenged his legitimacy on the grounds that he was a slave did he make public his manumission certificate.\(^{28}\) Both of these cases show how manumission was in the natural course of events often forgotten. A comparative reading in military slave systems suggests that manumission occurred in about half the cases.

Former slaves act as independent professional soldiers for whom financial considerations have paramount importance. As long as their former master pays them regularly, they obey him; but when not, they tend to take matters into their own hands.

Appearances to the contrary, military slaves do still differ fundamentally from mercenaries. They resemble mercenaries in their readiness to turn against the ruler who falls behind in his payments, but they differ in that mercenaries always remain outsiders and military slaves become insiders. While dissatisfied mercenaries may express their grievances by rampaging and setting up their own rule, military slaves are part of the govern-

27. J. Schacht, in UV, p. 163.
What Is a Military Slave?

ment and are too deeply involved in its politics and society to rebel against it or to establish their own government. And whereas mercenaries might desert their employer to return home, military slaves have nowhere to go. They cannot leave, for they have become indigenous; they are part of the ruling elite, nor just its paid employees. Unlike mercenaries, they can neither plunder nor leave.

Instead, they usurp the government from within. Sometimes they control the ruler from behind the scenes without proclaiming their power; at other times they take over in name too. Men of slave origins directed Islamicate governments more than fifty times and women of slave origins, twice. Although the "slave-king" phenomenon puzzles the rest of the world, it represents the logical culmination of military slavery (if not its intended result) and marks the final step in the transformation of the military slave from true slave to master.

The military slave thus differs from other slaves in numerous ways: he alone is carefully selected, purposely acquired as a youth, trained and indoctrinated, then employed as a professional soldier. He joins the ruling elite and belongs to a corps of soldiers which can seize power under the right circumstances. Yet, despite these many differences between him and other kinds of slaves, he remains a true slave as long as his master controls him. One must not dismiss his slavery as a formality or as legal fiction. His distinct qualities delineated and his slavery established, we can move on to the question: when and where did the military slave exist?

29. The two female rulers of slave origins were the Mamluk Shajar ad-Durr and the Nahid 'Alam.
Many differences between ordinary and military slaves assured them dissimilar experiences in battle. Not selected or prepared for warfare, nor cultivated for their loyalty, ordinary slaves did not play a central military role in any army or war, and they hardly ever gained independent political power. Although they did occasionally provide significant help to their masters in battle, ordinary slaves in warfare never amounted to more than an irregular or peripheral phenomenon. On the other hand, military slaves were acquired, trained, and employed for the purpose of warfare; consequently, they had far greater military and political significance.

Please note two points: (1) since slaves who fought against their masters contrast diametrically with the controlled use of slaves in warfare, slave revolts fall entirely outside this discussion. (2) Military slavery did not exist in early Islam (see chap. 5), so I shall draw on examples of ordinary slaves in warfare not

1. Rulers of slave origins outside Islamdom are very rare. Two examples, Toussaint L’Ouverture and Henri Christophe, come from Haiti in the Napoleonic period. The slave rebellion in Haiti was one of the very few in history to have lasting success.

Some rulers of slave origins in Islamdom had nothing to do with military slavery. For an example, see the Tuareg case described by F. Rodd, *People of the Veil* (London, 1926), pp. 96–97, 103–05, 108.

2. Rouland, pp. 25–26, makes the same distinction.
just from outside Islamdom but from the first two centuries of Muslim history. This chapter outlines the ways in which ordinary and military slaves were used. It is the first comparative analysis of ordinary slaves in warfare.

Ordinary Slaves

Conditions of Use

In peacetime ordinary slaves worked at nonmilitary occupations as personal retainers, domestic servants, plantation workers—and engaged in warfare only by chance when every able body was needed. Just as household slaves might sometimes help to harvest a crop, so ordinary slaves occasionally fought; yet many limitations always hampered their effectiveness. The slaveowner rarely thought of his ordinary slaves as potential soldiers. They provided him with various services, personal and economic, which normally had nothing to do with warfare. Normally, that is, until war broke out; then military needs compelled a slaveowner to assess his slaves' possible usefulness as soldiers.3

When war broke out, slaveowners usually felt reluctant to use their slaves in battle.4 Besides an ideological aversion to honoring slaves with arms which could take the form of a legal prohibition,5 this reluctance stemmed both from their low estima-

4. For example, in Greece: Westermann, p. 37; Sargent, p. 201. If the government owned its own slaves, it was likely to use them first before enrolling privately owned slaves (Jacob, p. 63).
5. Rome: Halkin, p. 44; Barrow, p. 146; Rouland, pp. 48, 91–97. British West Indies: "A Negro is never of any use in the plantation after they [sic] have carried arms" (Buckley, p. 38); Goveia, p. 253.

The following statements come out of the Confederate debate over arming slaves at the end of the Civil War in the United States: "When we arm them, we abandon slavery" (Hay, p. 63). "If the negro was fit to be a soldier, he was not fit to be a slave" (ibid.). "If they are to fight for our freedom they are entitled to their own" (The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, ed. F. C. Ainsworth et al., 70 vols. in 128 [Washington, D.C., 1880–1901], ser. 4, 3:959).
tion of the military abilities of slaves and their fear of mutiny. Indeed, ordinary slaves suddenly thrust into battle without any preparation generally did make indifferent soldiers. Lacking military skills, they could provide only limited help. Exceptions to this pattern occurred on the rare occasions when a slave's innate talents outweighed the handicap of being untrained. Antar, the legendary hero of Jahili Arabia, began his career as a slave shepherd and became a great warrior through his own perseverance and abilities. A slave joined a rebellion against the Umayyads in Syria about 70/689, and when it failed he returned to his master. The caliph heard of this slave's exploits in the rebellion and, after procuring his manumission, assigned him to command a regiment of troops. On occasion, even mass levies of slaves fought well. This is what happened when al-Junayd, the Umayyad governor of Khurasan, fought the Turks in 112/730:

Al-Junayd proclaimed: "The slave who fights is free," so the slaves fought hard and the people were astonished by them. . . . Seeing their hardiness, the people were delighted. The enemy retreated and the people persevered until victory. Upon concluding, Musā b. an-Naghr said to the people: "Rejoice in what you have seen the slaves do."8

The master's fear of a slave mutiny was the most important deterrent to using his slaves in battle. The slaveowner rarely

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6. "The proposition to make soldiers of our slaves is the most pernicious idea that has been suggested since the war began. . . . You cannot make soldiers of slaves, nor slaves of soldiers. . . . You can't keep white and black troops together and you can't trust negroes by themselves. . . . The day you make soldiers of them is the beginning of the end of the revolution. If slaves will make good soldiers our whole theory of slavery is wrong—but they won't make soldiers" (ibid., p. 1009).
7. "Some say that [arming slaves] will be giving up the question. What, giving up the question to grip it the tighter? Giving up slavery to have slaves defend it? To have them shoot down the enemies of slavery? Strange notion, indeed!" (ibid., p. 1010).
8. Legal prohibition: Justinian Corpus juris civilis ix. 12. 10, dating from 468 C.E.
10. FB, pp. 160–61. For a translation and discussion, see p. 189.
treated his slaves so well that he could expect their loyalty in combat; he anticipated halfhearted efforts from them or, even worse, desertion to the enemy. Yet the record shows that when slaves did fight, they did so with vigor and neither mutinied nor deserted to the enemy, as the many examples in the following pages should make clear. Slaves did mutiny and desert their masters, but not during battle. A slave who intended to turn against his master did so either before the fighting began or after it had ended; once engaged in battle, he had cast his lot with his master willy-nilly and could no longer change sides. Slaves did scheme for their freedom and considered joining the enemy, but they rarely made a rash move during battle. Desertion entailed great risks; if the slave deserted to the enemy and then the enemy lost, he could expect the harshest punishment. Also, he usually had no assurance that the enemy would grant him freedom or would even accept his services. Finally, since ordinary slaves rarely formed autonomous units (exceptions are found in Athens and Rome), they usually did not have the opportunity to plot mass desertions or mutinies. With little organization and their masters always watching their movements, slaves could not rally—and single individuals were unlikely to attempt such moves on their own.

Rather than make trouble, slaves generally helped their masters in war to the best of their abilities; exceptions were infrequent and usually involved civil disturbances or recently acquired captives, as will be discussed later. Cooperation of slaves in battle was both widespread and spontaneous. Several factors may explain this: ordinary loyalty to home and country, espe-

10. Greece: Garlan, pp. 29–35, discusses this point at length.
11. Exceptions: Thucydides The Peloponnesian War 7:13, 15; Garlan, pp. 31–32.
15. Greece: Garlan, p. 35. Rome: Rouland, pp. 41–42. Barbados: Handler, p. 113. See also the remarkable statement by Xenophon Ways and Means iv. 41–42. He understood and articulated this fact before anyone else did.
cially among slaves with families (on this theory, the Roman Republic in 217 B.C. enrolled in the army only freedmen who had children); a strong personal relationship with the master; the expectation of reward for faithful service mingled with fear of punishment for poor service; religious conviction, if appropriate; and fear of defeat. This last factor probably had the greatest importance; no matter how low the position of a slave, no matter how miserable his lot, he had nothing to gain from the victory of his master's foreign enemies. A slave could rarely expect to improve his circumstances by being taken prisoner of war; when captured, he was at best uprooted and enslaved again in some foreign place; at worst, he was executed right on the field of battle. The victors rightly assumed that the slaves of their enemies were also enemies. The slaves' social inferiority did not help them at such times; on the contrary, nobles had a far better chance of surviving defeat than their slaves did.

On occasion, slaves not only provided faithful service but even excelled over free soldiers. Because they had usually lived through greater privations before enlistment, perhaps they could adjust more easily to the difficulties of military life, maintain higher morale, better exploit poor materials, serve free of competing civilian interests, resign themselves to long periods of compulsory service, and accustom themselves more readily to unquestioning obedience. "They understood discipline, fought with courage and honor to be free, adjusted to varying climates, and endured hard work." Slaves also fought well because military service provided them with an opportunity to show their worth. In Barbados it "constituted an important and positive aspect of their self-image." On occasion, it could save a runaway from being returned into slavery.

Manumission sometimes played a major role in either en-

16. Treggiari, p. 68; Rouland, p. 55.
17. Haas, p. 29; Goveia, p. 297.
18. Rouland, p. 43 n. 106.
20. AR, pp. 78–79; Hay, p. 44; quotation from Lombardi, p. 44.
abling or inducing slaves to fight. Many societies specifically excluded slaves from military service but (reluctantly) allowed freedmen this privilege. In such places, manumission had to precede enrollment in the army. If slaves could enroll in the army or if they were not formally enrolled, manumission could either precede warfare or follow it as a reward for loyal service. In general, manumission gave military commanders greater flexibility in employing slaves as soldiers. Consequently, the difference between being a slave or a freedman sometimes had significance and at other times did not. Note, however, that only slaves with freedom of action had much chance for manumission; a galley slave hardly required freedom to row hard—the lash probably worked more efficiently.

The United States Civil War presented some outstanding examples of the loyalty of slaves. Although slavery itself lay at the heart of the issue between North and South, both slave and free Negroes in the South aided the Confederate cause, however contrary this ran to the general interests of Negroes. Quarles suggests three reasons for the help that free Negroes provided: local patriotism and a “sense of community responsibility,” good wages, and the hope of an improved status through loyal service. Of course, many slave and free Negroes also fought for the Union, and some Negroes in the Confederate army deserted.

28. CW, pp. 38–39. One Negro laborer is reported to have said, “We would rather fight for our own white folks than for strangers” (Hay, p. 64).
There were two situations in which a master could not count on his slaves' loyalty at all: in civil disturbances and when using just-captured prisoners of war. Civil disturbances eroded the bonds between master and slave, as domestic enemies were less of a threat to a slave and could appeal to his self-interest. Internal wars often gave slaves the opportunity to bargain with either side, auctioning off their services for freedom and promises of booty. The Corinthian Pact of 338 B.C. specifically stipulated that neither signatory could manumit the other's slaves in return for their military services. In small-scale civil wars, slaves resembled mercenaries in so far as they acted as disinterested profit seekers; large-scale civil wars might have the same effect as foreign invasions, however, since the enemy came from afar and could not deal directly with the slaves. The huge scale of the United States Civil War partly explains why some slaves remained loyal to their masters in the Confederacy though this meant disregarding their own long-term interests.

War prisoners who had just been enslaved showed no loyalty to their new masters whatsoever. They had to be forced to fight, especially when the enemy was their own people. Unlikely as this use of slaves sounds, it did happen. In hazardous situations these slaves could be used as shock troops in order to save the lives of more valuable soldiers. The Mongols systematically deployed captives from a city just conquered to storm the defenses of the next one; they pushed these miserable unarmed slaves up to the front line and ordered them to attack just to use up enemy ammunition. The Mongol warriors stood behind them, prepared to shoot down slaves who turned back; ahead the slaves faced nearly certain death against the city walls. This offensive tactic was so important that "the ruthless employment of captives" stood out as one of the main features of Mongol siegecraft.

Similarly, in Venezuela the "Royalists had the unpleasant reputation of putting all the blacks in the front line, presumably to save their white troops." The fate of captives depended largely on their own fighting skills. If they had none, they served as cannon fodder; but if they had some, then they performed less gruesome functions. Skilled captives sometimes joined the victorious army as free men, subordinates, or slaves. Although strong fighters, such captives were always unreliable and could not be counted upon to show any allegiance, so they had to be strictly controlled. They tended to be better treated and more reliable when they constituted a class of soldiers; then they changed sides lightly, being more concerned to remain in the military ranks than to fight for any factional allegiance.

Military Functions

Since most masters thought that slaves had no military skills and feared their mutiny or desertion, few ordinary slaves were enlisted into the army itself. Most slaves filled noncombatant positions; sometimes they served as auxiliary soldiers, but it usually required an emergency to induce rulers to enroll slaves within the army itself. Nearly all slaves in war fitted into one of these three categories: support, auxiliary, or emergency.

When slaves stayed out of the direct line of fire, they were better controlled and could use some of the civilian skills they already possessed. Like women in some modern armies, slaves took on the noncombatant duties, which released soldiers for fighting. The variety of their work behind the lines was endless: they staffed the notorious galley crews in both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic; they maintained stables in ancient

p. 67. The Mongols did not have military slaves at first, but made use of them by the end of the 7th/13th century (John Masson Smith, Jr., The History of the Sarbadar Dynasty 1336-1381 A.D. and Its Sources (The Hague, 1970), p. 110.
34. AR, pp. 94-103, 134-56 (British use) gives complete accounts.
35. Rouland, pp. 41-42.
India, mobilized the West Gothic army, paid the Roman soldiers their wages, beat drums in both early Islamic times and the American Civil War, dug trenches and hauled supplies in Peru, cared for horses in Muscovy, or generally supplied "corvée labors in and about the camps." In ancient Athens, "slaves help prepare the food, act as guides, rescue wounded men, serve as attendants to generals, carry important messages, but it is as carriers of baggage, shield-bearers, and caretakers in general of the armor of hoplites that they are most frequently mentioned." In the American War of Independence, "the typical Negro served with the infantry. Often he was a non-arms-bearing infantryman, detailed for duty as an orderly or assigned to functions in support of combat operations." Slaves tended to be assigned the less pleasant duties: "American soldiers generally disliked assignment to the wagon, commissary or forage services, hence it was not unusual for Negroes to find themselves enrolled in these departments." Although slaves in support positions usually stayed behind the lines and did not enter the battle, sometimes the battle came to them. When their side lost, they had to defend themselves; if it won, they might "scour the battlefield for enemy soldiers to execute," as in Peru.

Even when slaves participated in the fighting itself, they tended not to join the regular army but filled a wide variety of ancillary functions. They frequently spied and piloted; they

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38. Sargent, p. 203.
39. AR, p. 75.
40. AR, p. 77; also Hay, p. 36; Goveia, p. 219.
41. Greece: Garlan, pp. 45-48; Sargent, p. 207.
42. Bowser, p. 9.
burned bridges and carried flags in early Islam, fought initial skirmishes before the full-scale battle in ancient India, protected the Byzantine and Muscovite baggage trains, patrolled the borders of the Roman Empire, and formed the ruler's bodyguard in Rome, in some of its successor states, and in seventeenth-century Ethiopia. If they joined the regular army, slaves still commonly found themselves not in the main host but in auxiliary corps. And when they did join the main army, they still were likely to do battle in the less important contests.

Ordinary slaves entered battle most often as personal retainers, accompanying their master and joining him in their common defense. Although very widespread, this role excited little attention; the common sight of a slave fighting by his master's side rarely drew an observer's notice. Only when we possess exact information on the combatants can we estimate their role. The lists of warriors at the main battles between Muhammad and Quraysh indicate that slaves and freedmen formed a sizable proportion of the fighting forces of each side, and most of them fought with their masters. If these lists are accurate, a Muslim slave retainer killed a Qurashī counterpart at the Battle of Uhud. The following anecdote from ancient Greece reveals something about both the extent of trust placed in slave retainers and the generally low opinion of their military abilities:

Iphicrates, as he was campaigning against the allies of Lacedaemon, changed the dress of his men during the night, putting the soldiers in retainer's clothing and the retainers in soldier's


47. IH, 1:677–706.

48. IH, 1:710.
clothing. The retainers dressed as soldiers strolled far from
the arms depots, relaxed in the manner of free men; the soldiers
dressed as retainers stayed near the arms, going about their usual
tasks.

Seeing this, the enemy imitated its opponents; the soldiers re-
laxed and strolled nonchalantly outside the camp while the retain-
ers set to work at the corvée. At this point the signal went up; Iphic-
rates' soldiers rapidly took to arms, ran to the enemy camp, and, as
the retainers there ran away and the soldiers sought their weapons,
they killed some and captured others.49

In emergencies, the government often looked to the last pool
of manpower: slaves. Although ignored through the calmer
stages of warfare, slaves could find themselves enrolled in the
army overnight when a crisis struck. In mass-slaveholding
societies, this measure could immediately produce thousands of
new soldiers—for example, in ancient Greece and Rome, in
Brazil, Peru, the British West Indies, and even in the American
Confederacy.50 These emergency troops cost both government
and slaveowners heavily, and their allegiances were probably less
firm than those of slaves who fought alongside their masters, so
this measure was usually reserved for extreme situations. Even
then, these slaves usually fought diligently for the same reasons
of self-interest as others did.51

Finally, lest I give the impression that slaves were always belli-
cose, let me mention a slave who may have averted a battle. The
story has it that the Arabians peacefully conquered the castle of
Shuhriyāf around the year 19/640 thanks to the efforts of one
of their slaves. A participant recounts:

We had besieged Shuhriyāf for at least a month and thought we
were near victory. One day, after an attack, we returned to our

49. Polyaeus, Strategematum libri octo, iii. 9. 52.
189, 193, 204; Westermann, p. 61; Rouland, pp. 46–47; Treggiari, p. 68. Brazil:
A. G. B. and H. J. Fisher, Slavery and Muslim Society in Africa (Garden City, N.Y.,
Indies: Buckley, pp. 43–53, explains how this possibility was successfully op-
51. Westermann, p. 61.
camp and a slave stayed behind—he was thought to be a deserter. He wrote a decree of protection (amān) and sent it to the city by arrow.

When we returned to fight, the enemy left its castle and said, "This is your decree of protection." We wrote about this to [Caliph] Umar and he wrote to us: "A Muslim slave is a Muslim, so his protection is as any other's. His decree is valid." Thus, we carried out its terms.52

In conclusion, any slave could help in warfare (though the literature mentions no such use of female slaves.53 Even when unskilled and of dubious royalty, slaves provided support behind the lines, reinforcements on the sidelines, and emergency help on the front lines; if not trusted, they could be coerced. Yet, however helpful ordinary slaves could be in battle, they had limited functions; they never constituted the mainstay of an army. For that they had to be trained professional soldiers—in other words, military slaves.

Military Slaves

While ordinary slaves fought here and there around the globe, without any particular pattern, military slaves rarely appeared outside Islamdom and very frequently within it. Let us look at some non-Muslim instances of slave soldiers and then sketch their wide role among Muslims.

52. FB, p. 391; Khalīfa, p. 183, and T, 1:2568 have almost identical accounts. This incident became celebrated in Islamic law as the basis for a general ruling on the validity of a slave's amnesty: Umm, 7:319; Abū ʿUbayd, pp. 242–43; as-Sarakhsi, pp. 255–56. C. Huart, "Gondēshāpur," in EI2, dismisses this anecdote as a "romantic fiction."

53. Only minor exceptions can be found; in Ethiopia, for instance, slave-women might help carry a soldier's equipment (M. Perham, The Government of Ethiopia [London, 1948], p. 162), and in ancient India, prostitute slaves served their masters as spies (R. R. Sharma, "Slavery in the Mauryan Period, c. 300 B.C.-c. 200 B.C.," Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 21 (1978): 191). Muslim slave Amazons were hardly more common. One example comes from the Mughal imperial household, where "armed women guards" kept watch over the inside of the harem and "the most trustworthy of them were placed near the emperor's sleeping apartments" (Qureshi, p. 56).
Outside ISLAMDOM

Slaves occasionally fought in an organized way for non-Muslim masters;\(^{54}\) in rough chronological order, this occurred in Muscovy, China, West Africa, the West Indies, the United States South, and Cameroon.

**Muscovy.** In Muscovy, slaves recruited by individual soldiers, not by the central government, fought in large numbers.\(^{55}\) Nobles were obliged to bring retainers to war; sometimes these included slaves. One historian estimates that slaves made up three-quarters of the cavalry in the Muscovite army in the 1550s.\(^{56}\) Slaves also served in the army as substitutes for their masters.\(^{57}\) They bore firearms unless they were expert archers.\(^{58}\) In general, "the slaves who were equipped for combat were better armed, on the average, than the pomeshchiki [nobles] themselves. . . . This was largely because only the wealthier lords could afford to bring slaves, and they equipped their vassals better than the average cavalrymen could outfit himself."\(^{59}\)

Some Ottoman influence can be discerned here, but it seems to have influenced the government away from military slavery. In the mid-sixteenth century, just as the Ottoman slave army reached its height, a Russian military expert who had years of experience with the Turks recommended against the reliance on slaves.

He claimed that an army of slaves . . . was unfit because slaves were not brave. . . . Throughout the sixteenth century, however, slaves

\(^{54}\) How does one classify the Sardaukars of science fiction? They live on a planet with Arabesque names and resemble military slaves. F. Herbert writes about them in *Dune* (New York, 1965); my thanks to William Fuller for this reference.

\(^{55}\) Hellie, "Muscovite Slavery," p. 171. Richard Hellie has kindly shared with me the information he is collecting for his forthcoming *Slavery in Muscovy*.

\(^{56}\) A. A. Zimin, referred to on p. 38 of Hellie, *Enserfment*. In idem, "Muscovite Slavery," p. 142, comes the estimate that one-sixth of "Moscow's population able to bear arms in 1638 were slaves."

\(^{57}\) Hellie, *Enserfment*, pp. 48, 217, 361 n. 149.

\(^{58}\) Ibid., p. 211.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., p. 220.
continued to fight on horseback alongside their owners, and this system was not discarded until the seventeenth century, when most slaves were ultimately relegated to guarding the baggage train. \(^{60}\)

Finally, in the eighteenth century, “the slaves were displaced by peasant recruits.” \(^{61}\)

“One of the minor issues in Russian historiography” revolves around the question of the slaves’ military role in Muscovy. Some think they fought alongside their masters, others say that “they had largely noncombat, secondary roles, such as accompanying and guarding the baggage train, keeping the horses, getting food and fodder, and so on.” \(^{62}\) Whatever their exact role was, and however numerous the slaves were, it is clear they did not have the important functions of military slaves.

The Manchus. The Chinese themselves made almost no use of slaves as soldiers (though given their low estimation of the military as a career, it might seem likely). The one approach to an organized use of slaves in war took place when the Manchus were in the process of conquering China.

The Manchus, a semibarbarian people whose habitat extended from the forests of Manchuria to the north of China, united under Nurhaci in 1613 and began a vigorous attack on the Ming government of China in 1618; by 1621 they had captured several Chinese cities. Many Chinese fell captive to the Manchus and were made their slaves. At first, these slaves (Manchu: booi, Chinese: pao-i, usually translated into English “bondservant”) did mostly menial household chores and “were rarely used in actual fighting.” \(^{63}\) With time, however, the Manchu leaders found this “loose system of privately owned slaves” deficient for two reasons: it did not allow them to centralize power nor to control their manpower directly. Also, “as the Manchus conquered increasing amounts of territory settled by the Chinese it became a practical necessity to organize the captured men in some way that was more formal than allotting them to

\(^{60}\) Ibid., p. 165; idem, “Muscovite Slavery,” p. 177.
\(^{61}\) Hellie, Enserfment, p. 221.
\(^{62}\) Ibid., pp. 368 n. 167, 290 n. 119.
\(^{63}\) Spence, p. 7.
leading Manchus in private bondage. Accordingly, sometime between 1615 and 1620, the bondservants were formed into companies and battalions on the [Manchu] model." Thus, enslaved Chinese captives of the Manchus were systematically employed as soldiers and "assumed a key role... as aides-de-camp to high military commanders." Two major differences distinguish this phenomenon from military slavery. In the first place, the Chinese were captives of war, not acquired slaves, and there was nothing planned or systematic in their use as soldiers; they joined the fighting only when the Manchus considered it propitious. Second, this arrangement lasted only a very short time. Already in the early 1630s, full-fledged Chinese battalions were formed; as increasing numbers of Chinese came under Manchu authority, many joined the army voluntarily and were treated as free men. The bondservant companies fell into decay by the time of the Manchu conquest of Peking in 1644.

West Africa. Several elusive cases come from non-Islamic West Africa. The slave-kings of the eighteenth-century Bambara dynasty, the Ton-Dyon, were at least partially Muslim, so they fall under the Islamicate rubric. Other hints of military slavery come from the Yoruba kingdom in the nineteenth century.

There was no standing Yoruba army... many chiefs, especially at Ibadan... brought with their contingents household slaves trained for war, these constituting the nearest approach to regular troops among the Yoruba.

64. Ibid., p. 8.
Recruitment seems to have been arbitrary, but the slaves remained in the ruler’s entourage. In Oyo, these slaves made up a large part of the cavalry, and they seem to have undergone training. They formed the only cavalry in the region and stood on year-round duty. These slave soldiers were perhaps comparable to Muslim military slaves, but the information about them is too scanty to judge. Also, their use may well have been adapted from the numerous Islamicate military slave systems of the area.

**The British West Indies.** By far the most dramatic and best-studied case of slave soldiers outside Islamdom comes from the Caribbean Islands in the time of the Napoleonic Wars, 1795–1815. Analysis of this slave corps clarifies many of the differences between military slavery and other slaves and warfare.

The British government created the West India Regiments in 1795 by purchasing a miscellany of slaves and outfitting them as a military unit. The local settlers of British descent refused to sell the army their own slaves, forcing the imperial government to bring slaves from Africa for the Regiments. It brought about a thousand slaves each year until the abolition of the slave trade in 1808. When, for legal reasons, it was advantageous to free these slaves, some 10,000 of them were manumitted in one fell swoop in 1807. As units of the imperial British army, these troops proved themselves an unqualified success. When the wars ended, they were disbanded and the West India Regiments disappeared.

These soldiers shared some noteworthy characteristics in common with military slaves in Islamdom, among them the following:


1. Systematic acquisition. It was official British policy to acquire slaves in substantial numbers from Africa and transport them to the Caribbean. The slaves were sought from the most warlike nations and had to meet certain standards (such as being a certain height). The Regiments included a mixture of many ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{72}

2. Professional employment. The black soldier "wore the same uniform and enjoyed the same pay, allowances, and privileges as his white comrade-in-arms."\textsuperscript{73}

3. Isolation. The slaves rarely deserted, having nowhere to go. To minimize contact with others, the soldiers were expected to be celibate; when this requirement failed, prostitutes and wives were allowed. The authorities made particular efforts to keep slave soldiers and ordinary slaves apart.\textsuperscript{74}

4. Competence and loyalty. Time and again, the British West India Regiments undertook difficult tasks and executed them with distinction. They were "reliable and efficient corps" which, with one major exception (a revolt on Dominica in 1802), proved loyal and devoted. They had a major role in maintaining the plantocracy and slave system of the West Indies, fighting even against African slaves and runaways.\textsuperscript{75}

Despite these important similarities with military slaves, the West India Regiment soldiers were not part of a military slave system comparable to the Islamicate ones, as the following differences show.

1. Emergency nature. The West India Regiments existed only because tropical diseases killed off British soldiers in the Caribbean and the army had to find some troops who could replace them. They were a "desperate measure," not a preferred system.\textsuperscript{76} If Europeans could have survived there, slaves would never have fought in such an organized fashion; even under

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., pp. 53, 117, 117–18.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., p. 65.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., pp. 109, 124–27.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., pp. 89–91, 107 (quote), 76–77, 141.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., pp. 2–4, 7, 11, 17, 95, 97–105, 108; 18, 20.
emergency circumstances, a deep opposition to slaves fighting prevailed, especially among the settlers. 77

2. Provincial troops. Unlike the Muslims, who made slaves the elite corps, the mainstay of armies, and the protection of the court, the British used slave soldiers in a remote region. The slaves had only minor importance for the British Empire as a whole, comparable perhaps to the Ottomans employing Janissaries only in the Sudan. Had the British brought these slaves to England, employed them in the Coldstream Guard, and placed them in the House of Lords, they would have had an importance comparable to their role in Islamdom.

3. Specific task. Until 1797, the West India Regiments were not considered permanent troops; and even though they were classified as permanent after that year, they were disbanded as soon as the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815. 78 The Regiments came into being and dissolved in accordance with specific needs; they were not part of an on-going military system.

4. Ideological racism. The fact that only black Africans became slaves gave a different tenor to the use of slaves in war. They were despised and feared in a way that slaves of the Muslims were not. The sight of black troops guarding white deserters struck white observers as a "revolting sight." Whites officered the black soldiers because "to commission blacks in the regular British regiments that were to garrison British islands would be bestowing on them a dignity and social elevation that was the guarded preserve of upper-class whites." 79 White officers who were attached to the Blacks "loathed service" with them and had an appalling rate of absenteeism (for example, forty-seven out of fifty-nine). 80

The West India Regiments present the most elaborate use of slaves as soldiers outside Islamdom. 81 While the British did em-

77. Slaves were recruited only when free Negroes did not suffice, ibid., p. 25.
78. Ibid., pp. 28, 94, 134–36.
79. Ibid., p. 22.
80. Ibid., pp. 32–33.
81. They may have inspired the Portuguese authorities in Ceylon to purchase
ploy military slaves, a system of military slavery as the Muslims knew it did not exist.82

The Barbados militia was close in time and space to the West India Regiments yet entirely different in spirit. In the early nineteenth century, freed Barbados slaves "were expected to serve in the island's militia."83 They usually formed separate black corps but provided few or none of the commissioned officers.84 In all, they provided loyal and useful service and constituted a considerable portion of the entire militia.85 Although proportionately more important to Barbados than the West India Regiments were to the British Empire, these freedmen served in a militia, so they were not professional soldiers and hence not military slaves.

The American Confederacy. It comes as no surprise to learn that many soldiers of slave origins fought for the United States army against the Confederacy,86 for in so doing they were fighting

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82. Referring to an earlier version of this study (my dissertation) on ibid., p. ix, Mr. Buckley states that "it is reasonable to assume that [Islamicate military slavery] served as a model" for the West India Regiments. While this may be so, I am skeptical because of the profound dissimilarities between the two institutions and the absence of any apparent connection between them.
83. Handler, p. 110.
84. Ibid., pp. 111–12.
85. Ibid., pp. 114–15.
86. The abundance of books dealing with this single minor topic testifies to the extraordinary fullness of U.S. historical studies. Besides the sources used here, note these:
5. C. H. Wesley, Ohio Negroes in the Civil War (Columbus, Ohio, 1962).
against slavery; much less explicable is the fact that they also fought for the other side—in effect, helping to perpetuate slavery.\textsuperscript{87} While free Negroes were already fighting in 1861,\textsuperscript{88} the question of using slaves as soldiers arose seriously only in 1863, as the South increasingly faced manpower problems. Public debate grew after a secret memo written by a general in the Army of Tennessee in January 1864 proposed that slaves be recruited for military service and subsequently receive their freedom as a reward for faithful service.\textsuperscript{89} The Confederate Congress began debate on this question in November 1864; public hostility to the idea of arming slaves lessened over the following months, but a motion to this effect was defeated by the Confederate Senate on 7 February 1865.\textsuperscript{90} General Robert E. Lee strongly endorsed the idea in a letter written on 12 February, and this turned the tide; Congress approved the measure and it took effect on 13 March,\textsuperscript{91} less than one month before Lee’s capitulation at the Appomattox Court House on 9 April. Commonly known as the “Negro Soldier Law,” it legislated “that, in order to provide additional forces to repel invasion, . . . the President be . . . authorized to ask for and accept from the owners of slaves, the services of such number of able-bodied negro men as he may deem expedient . . . to perform military service in whatever capacity he may direct.”\textsuperscript{92} These troops were to receive the same treatment as free soldiers; each state had a quota of 300,000 slaves (with certain provisos); the law explicitly did not free the slaves or offer them freedom for loyal service.

\textsuperscript{87} CW, pp. 356–57, lists twelve full-length reminiscences written by white officers of black troops, describing the federal techniques for recruiting Negro soldiers—and this is a very partial listing!

\textsuperscript{88} Negroes also contributed their labor to the Confederate cause; although this had more importance than their fighting, it will be ignored here. See J. H. Brewer, The Confederate Negro: Virginia’s Craftsmen and Military Laborers, 1861–1865 (Durham, N.C., 1969).

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., p. 150; The War of the Rebellion, ser. 4, 3:1008.

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., p. 157.

\textsuperscript{91} Lee’s letter: The War of the Rebellion, ser. 4, 3:1012. Congressional debate: Stephenson, passim.

\textsuperscript{92} The War of the Rebellion, ser. 4, 3:1161.
The Islamicate Context

The secretary of war authorized the enlistment of slaves two days after this measure was passed. The capital itself, Richmond, was the only place at which any appreciable number was enlisted. Here two companies of mixed free Negroes and slaves were recruited. As a means of inducing other Negroes to sign up, these companies were put on exhibition in the city. Uniformed in Rebel grey, they held parades in Capitol Square before thousands of curious onlookers. White Richmonders were fascinated by the spectacle of blacks marching in perfect step and going through the manual of arms with clocklike precision. But within a week after the drillings and parading had begun, Richmond was abandoned; it had become too late.

Historians agree on the ineffectiveness of this belated attempt to arm the slaves: “The results of the Negro soldier bill were nil.” “There seems to be no evidence that the Negro soldiers authorized by the Confederate Government ever went into battle.” The desperation behind enactment of this bill and its contrast with Islamicate military slavery hardly require elaboration.

German Cameroon. An intriguing final example comes from the German colonial administration in Cameroon. Germany annexed the country in 1884, and in 1891 an agent purchased 199 male and 171 female slaves from the king of Dahomey to serve for five years as “carriers, soldiers, farm workers.” Known as the Dahomeys, fifty-five of the men were two years later employed as “Polizeisoldaten,” or gendarmes—simultaneously police and soldiers. The Germans used them to help subject the whole Cameroon region; as veteran soldiers, they were well

94. CW, pp. 280–81.
95. CW, p. 280; Wiley, p. 160.
96. Ralph Austen brought this event and its description by Rüger to my attention.
prepared for this duty and proved themselves admirably in warfare.\textsuperscript{98}

The interest of this particular use of slaves as soldiers lies in the fact that the German authorities treated them as though they were ordinary slaves, depriving them of food, not paying them, and punishing them brutally. When the Dahomeys wrote a supplicating protest in March 1893, the governor who was responsible for their mistreatment reduced their food allotment.\textsuperscript{99} Eventually, provoked by a beating of their women, the Dahomeys revolted on 15 December 1893; they lasted seven days before meeting defeat.\textsuperscript{100} The ineptitude of the German administration here was quite astonishing; \textsuperscript{101} it also accentuates the differences between a military slave system and other, more haphazard, uses of slaves as soldiers. While certain parallels with military slavery can be found throughout the world, nowhere outside Islamdom did slaves perform the duties and have the significance which Muslims habitually gave them.

	extbf{Inside Islamdom}

For a full millennium, from the early 3\textsuperscript{rd}/9\textsuperscript{th} century until the early 13\textsuperscript{th}/19\textsuperscript{th}, Muslims regularly and deliberately employed slaves as soldiers. This occurred through nearly the whole of Islamdom, from Central Africa to Central Asia, from Spain to Bengal, and perhaps beyond. Few dynasties within this long time-span and broad area had no military slaves.\textsuperscript{102} Even a cursory glance at the history of Muslim peoples reveals the extraordinary role played by men of slave origins in the armed forces. They served both as soldiers and as officers, then often acquired

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., pp. 105, 112.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., pp. 116–21, 121–29.
\textsuperscript{101} The mutiny by the Eighth West India Regiments, 9–12 April 1802, was similarly caused by “the fear of being sold into [ordinary] slavery” as a result of the slave soldiers having been compelled to do menial work (Buckley, p. 77; see also p. 128).

\textsuperscript{102} Negative indications are hard to find, but it does appear that the Idrisids made no use of military slaves. Cf. G. Marçais, \textit{La Berberie musulmane et l’Orient du moyen âge} (Paris, 1946), pp. 119–20.
preeminent roles in administration, politics, and all aspects of public affairs. The systematic use of slaves as soldiers constituted the single most distinctive feature of Islamicate public life in premodern times.\

Precisely because of its prominence and wide extent, military slavery in Islamdom defies brief description; slaves filled too many positions, served too many functions. Thus, comprehensive documentation of their incidence and activities cannot be given here, only some indication of their distribution. Selected examples demonstrate the importance, widespread occurrence, and frequency of military slavery.

The premier dynasties of Islamdom nearly all depended on military slaves. These are the governments which governed the greatest areas, lasted the longest, and most influenced the development of Islamicate institutions. I have selected seventeen preeminent dynasties; of them, it appears that all but one relied on military slaves. The exception, the Umayyad dynasty, preceded the existence of a military slave system; yet even it employed the unfree in a manner which foreshadowed military slavery. A brief characterization of slave soldiers in these seventeen dynasties follows, with some references to the secondary literature.

1. Umayyads (41–132/661–750). Part II of this study shows the manner in which the Umayyad government relied on mawlas who resembled military slaves; the institution of military slavery did not exist before the 3d/9th century, but the Umayyads


Perhaps because the systematic and extensive employment of slaves as soldiers had no parallel in other civilizations, historians lack a reference point for military slavery, and this accounts in part for the subject's attracting so little attention relative to its importance.
went as far as they could in the direction of using the same kind of soldiers.

2. Abbasids (132–656/749–1258). Slave soldiers dominated the Abbasid army and government by the mid-3d/9th century. Then, much later, when the Abbasids revived in the 7th/13th century, slaves again acquired a major military role.

3. Spanish Umayyads (138–422/756–1031). They also developed a slave system in the early 3d/9th century; slaves played a consistently great role throughout the life of the dynasty. At its dissolution in 422/1031, several dynasties with rulers of slave origins emerged.

4. Buyids (320–454/932–1062). Although tribal soldiers from the Daylami mountains brought them to power, the Buyids rapidly recruited Turkish slave soldiers. This change also signaled a shift from infantry to cavalry warfare.

5. Fatimids (297–567/909–1171). Like the Buyids, from an initial tribal army, they quickly depended on military slaves, though the Fatimids employed slaves of diverse origins, including Turks, Berbers, Blacks, and Slavs.

104. See Ahmad; Ayalon, “Military Reforms”; Forand, “Development”; Hamdi; Ismail, “Mu’ta’sim”; Saidi; Töllner.


6. Ghaznavids (366–582/977–1186). Founded by a military slave who broke away from the Samanids, the Ghaznavids drew on slaves for their armies primarily from Central Asia, secondly from India.110

7. Seljuks (429–590/1038–1194). The Seljuks established the dynasty that was most influential for Islamicate institutions. They came to power as the leaders of tribes of steppe warriors but soon made abundant use of military slaves.111 By the time of the Seljuk demise, slaves had almost taken control of the dynasty.112

8. Almoravids (448–541/1056–1147). The first major dynasty based in North Africa, the Almoravids began as a religious movement but gradually came to rely moderately on slaves in their armies.113

9. Almohads (524–667/1130–1269). They were similar to the Almoravids in locale, religious origins, and moderate use of military slaves.114

10. Ayyubids (564–648/1171–1250 in Egypt: until later elsewhere). Beginning with free Kurdish and Turkish troops, the Ayyubids came to depend largely on military slaves from Central Asia. Supplies from there were greatly increased by the turmoil resulting from the Mongol invasions. The Ayyubid dynasty came to an end when its military slaves usurped the throne.115

114. Ibid.
11. Delhi sultanate (602–962/1206–1555). The Delhi sultanate was in reality six distinct dynasties, all of which made use of military slaves. The first of them, the Mu'tizzis, were founded by a slave soldier who broke away from his Ghurid masters; several later Mu'tizzi and other rulers were also of slave origins, and slaves played a prominent military role throughout.116

12. Hafsids (625–982/1228–1574). The Hafsid rulers employed a black African bodyguard of slaves, but it is unclear whether the Turks they employed came as freemen or as slaves. In either case, slave soldiers had only a minor role.117

13. Mamluks (648–922/1250–1517). The military slave dynasty par excellence; not only did almost all the soldiers begin their careers as slaves, but they formed the government and passed the rule on to other slaves. The Mamluks maintained a self-perpetuating slave oligarchy for centuries, recruiting mostly in Central Asia and the Black Sea region.118

14. Ottomans (680–1342/1281–1924). Along with the Mamluks, theirs is the best-known system of military slavery. Slave soldiers were introduced sometime in the 8th/14th century and their last vestiges were only abolished in 1241/1826. Besides supplying the army with foot-soldiers (the Janissaries), slaves took on many burdens of the central administration.119

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119. A. Djevad Bey, Etat militaire ottoman, vol. 1: Le Corps de Janissaires, trans. G. Macridès (Constantinople, 1882); Káldy-Nagy; B. Miller, The Palace School of Muhammad the Conquerer (Cambridge, Mass., 1941); Papoulia; Uzunçarşılı; S.
15. Safavids (907–1145/1501–1732). Slaves counterbalanced the tribal troops which had brought the Safavids to power. The slaves came mostly from the Caucasus region and lasted to the end of the dynasty.¹²⁰

16. Sharifs of Morocco (Saʿdi and Filali, 917/1511–). The Saʿdi use of slaves in the army remained secondary, but the Filalis depended very heavily on them, especially in the 12th/18th century. The slaves were black Africans.¹²¹

17. Mughals (932–1274/1566–1858). While the central government used slaves as soldiers only erratically, the mansabdārs recruited them extensively.¹²² The central government found its soldiers in many places, usually free.¹²³

All the most influential Islamicate dynasties relied militarily on slaves; in many, these soldiers played important roles. The visible, prevalent role of slave soldiers in the major dynasties attests to their importance.

Concentration on the use of military slaves in a single region or time period may convey the intensity of their usage. While nearly any area of Islamdom would do, Egypt has the double advantage of being clear to observe and well studied.


The first large-scale expedition of slave soldiers in history was probably that of al-Mu'taşim in 213/828, which consisted of 4,000 Turks sent to Egypt for two years. As military slaves came to form a large part of the Abbasid army in the following decades, they gained a greater role in Egypt as well, culminating in 254/868 when the son of a Turkish military slave, Aḥmad b. Țūlūn, became governor of the province and then independent ruler, relying in large part on an armed force made up of slaves. By the time the Abbasids won back control of the country in 292/905, slave soldiers had a major role in the military structure. Under the Ikhshidids, “many freed slaves carried arms and entered the military organization, some of them reaching high positions in it.” Kāfur, a black slave eunuch with military experience, took over the Ikhshidid government in 334/946 (becoming its official head in 355/966) and ruled until just before the Fatimid conquest of Egypt in 358/969.

With the advent of Fatimid rule, military slaves acquired new importance; perhaps most characteristically soldiers of diverse origins fought under the Shi‘ī leadership, which led to constant turmoil in the armed forces. From the time the Ayyubids took over in 564/1169, slaves of Central Asian origins predominated. In time their hold over the army and the government increased, until 648/1250 they took over the rule, too, keeping it for over two and half centuries. Even after the Ottoman conquest in 922/1517, military slaves and their descendants continued to dominate Egyptian politics. They lost to Napoleon in 1213/1798 and were massacred by Muḥammad ʿAlī in 1226/1811, which ended their hold over Egyptian public life. Some of their descendants, dubbed Turco-Egyptians, retained

124. Al-Kindī, pp. 188–89; ITB, 2:208–09.
128. On the Fatimid, Ayyubid, and Mamluk use of military slaves, see notes 109, 115, and 118 above.
important positions until the overthrow of King Fārūq in 1371/1952.\textsuperscript{130}

Slave soldiers fought across the width and breadth of Islamdom. Perhaps four-fifths of all Muslim dynasties made regular use of them. A few cases from the corners of Islamdom (particularly those areas not represented by the major dynasties listed above) may help to illustrate this.

Sub-Saharan African Muslim dynasties probably made the greatest use of slave soldiers, a fact which reflects the especially important place of slaves in their economies and social lives. Slaves had ubiquitous military and political roles in many dynasties;\textsuperscript{131} some of the better-studied include Dar Fur,\textsuperscript{132} the Sudanese Mahdiya,\textsuperscript{133} Bornu,\textsuperscript{134} the Fulani emirates,\textsuperscript{135} and the Ton-Dyon.\textsuperscript{136}

Military slavery existed in most parts of the Arabian peninsula, but particularly in the region with the most highly developed political institutions—the Yemen. For example, a 5th/11th-century dynasty there, the Najahids, emerged from a military slave corps.\textsuperscript{137} One of the very last incidents of slave soldierly was reported in Mecca at the beginning of this century.\textsuperscript{138}

In India, military slaves in the north came mostly from Central Asia, while those in the south and east derived from Africa. For example, Mālik Ambar, who ruled a sizable part of the

\textsuperscript{138} A. ar-Rayhānī, \textit{Mülûk al-ʿArab} (Beirut, 1924), p. 226.
Deccan in the years 1009–35/1601–26, was a slave of African origin.\textsuperscript{139} It is not clear whether military slavery existed east of Bengal; I have found only wisps of evidence, such as the fact that “throughout Malaysia, the number of troops which a [Muslim] rajah could command was both a symbol and an actual indication of his wealth and power.”\textsuperscript{140}

In contrast to the erratic employment of slaves as soldiers by non-Muslims, military slavery in Islamdom served as a nearly universal tool of statecraft. Elsewhere, slaves fought as emergency forces, personal retainers, auxiliaries, or cannon fodder; only Muslims used them in large numbers on a regular basis as professional soldiers. Also, the few systematic examples of non-Muslims using slaves in this way date only from the sixteenth century, long after the establishment and proliferation of the Islamicate system. Except for these unusual cases, Muslims alone chose to recruit soldiers through enslavement, a fact which has many implications.

\textsuperscript{139} R. Shyam, \textit{Life and Times of Malik Ambar} (Delhi, 1968). Several other full-length studies on him are noted in Joseph E. Harris, \textit{The African Presence in Asia} (Evanston, Ill., 1971), pp. 91–98.

Chapter Three
An Explanation of Military Slavery

This chapter seeks to account for the two basic facts of military slavery: that it existed at all and that it occurred only in Islam. Why would anyone choose to recruit soldiers as slaves? Why did Muslims alone in fact do so? These questions are intertwined; the raison d'être of military slavery is bound up with its purely Islamicate existence; its causes cannot be understood apart from Islam.

A Connection to Islam?

The distribution pattern of military slavery sketched in chapter 2 strongly suggests that Islam lay behind the existence of this institution. Yet before inquiring into the role of Islam, let us consider other possible factors for the existence of military slavery. Of the alternatives, three stand out: climate, Turks, and the stirrup. 1 Muslim lands from Spain to northeast India share a basic climatic feature—dry heat; perhaps this or some other environmental feature could explain military slavery. Without attempting to elaborate on this connection, we can reject it as a cause by noting that the lands from Spain to India enjoyed the same climate before 622 C.E. Were military slavery related to climate, we would expect it to have existed in those same regions

1. The notion that military slaves were merely mercenaries in Muslim clothing has been treated in chapter 1. The assumption here is that they were a distinct phenomenon. Some scholars grant that military slavery occurred only in Islam but resist the idea that it is connected to Islam. See M. A. Cook, introduction to V. J. Parry et al., A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730 (Cambridge, Eng., 1976), p. 7; Frederick Cooper, Plantation Slavery on the East Coast of Africa (New Haven, 1977), p. 194 n. 183.
before the appearance of Islam; but it did not. Furthermore, military slavery occurred also in wetter areas such as southern and eastern India.

Turks are often associated with military slavery, with good reason. The Abbasid use of slave soldiers coincided with their importation of Turks; Turks served in almost every military slave corps in the Middle East and northern India; and they dominated the best-known and most spectacular group, the Mamluks of Egypt. Their close connection to the institution of military slavery both as soldiers and as rulers makes it reasonable to consider the Turks its originators and propagators.

Two considerations show that this was not so, however. The first resembles the argument against a climatic explanation; if Turks were the cause, why did military slavery not exist among Turks outside of Islamdom? Turks in the pre-Islamic Middle East and in non-Muslim areas did not institute military slavery. Most notably, for centuries they faced Byzantium and numerous empires in China and pre-Islamic Iran; they also fought for the Muslims for 150 years before becoming military slaves. Non-Muslims made efforts to incorporate Turks into their service, yet none devised the system of military slavery. Nor did the system exist in the Turks’ Inner Asian homelands.

A second argument against the Turkic explanation comes from the Umayyad dynasty in Spain. It appears that simultaneously with the development of military slavery in Iraq under the Abbasids, this Spanish dynasty was independently making systematic use of slaves as soldiers. No Turks were present in early 3d/9th-century Spain. Later, too, sub-Saharan dynasties made extensive use of slave soldiers, and almost none of them were Turks. Thus, Turks correlate much less clearly with military slavery than does Islam.

The stirrup offers a much better reason for military slavery. To understand how, I shall summarize Lynn White, Jr.’s ideas

2. Pp. 161–66 discusses some of these possibilities.
4. On the Turks and Crusaders, see note 95 below.
on the stirrup in Europe and then explore its possible effects on Islamdom. Placing stirrups on a horse vastly enhances the power of its rider. When he sits in the saddle without any grip for his feet, a soldier wields a lance with the strength only of his arms and legs. The stirrup welds horse and rider into a single unit; now the soldier can attack with his lance carrying the entire force of his and the horse's combined weight. Heavy cavalry outfitted with stirrups enjoys a great preponderance over infantry (it does not affect light cavalry in most cases). But it was exceedingly expensive; equipment for one horseman in medieval Europe cost about the same as plough-teams for ten families—not even counting the price of remounts and retainers.

White approaches the stirrup's role in medieval Europe by accepting Heinrich Brunner's classic statement of 1887 on the origins of feudalism. Brunner connects two events which occurred closely in time: the increased role of cavalry in the Franks' armies between 732 and 775 C.E. and the confiscation of church lands by Charles Martel (r. 714–41). He suggests that the Franks had to augment their cavalry and that the church lands helped to pay for the vast new expenses of horses, equipment, and training; but nowhere does Brunner explain what it was that compelled the Franks to increase their cavalry at that time. Here, where prior theories were lacking, White introduced the stirrup as an explanation.

The metal stirrup originated in fifth-century China, whence it passed to Central Asia and the Middle East. The Muslims had it by 74/694 and surely used it after 92/711 in their conquest of Spain and invasions of Gaul. Although the Muslims lost to the Franks at Poitiers in 115/733, the latter presumably noted the stirrup's effectiveness and took steps to adopt it, enlarging the cavalry and designating church lands to pay for it. According to White's thesis, the stirrup brought about a military transformation which contributed to a far-reaching social upheaval, the feudal order. The soldiers on horses who benefited from

the new military order acquired political and economic power too and evolved into an aristocracy. Thus, the stirrup led to a series of adjustments which created a social division in western Europe: it produced a military aristocracy and charged the peasantry with the expense.

Did the stirrup have a comparable effect in Islamdom? Perhaps it caused a shift along geographic rather than social lines. In most of the heavily populated parts of the Eastern Hemisphere (notably those in North Africa, the Middle East, India, and China), war-horses could not be raised. The introduction of the stirrup enhanced the power of the peoples living where horses could be raised—primarily in steppe lands and in deserts—and reduced the strength of peoples living in densely inhabited areas, especially cities. By making horses more important to warfare, the stirrup redistributed power from civilized to barbarian peoples. The non-horse-breeding areas in Islamdom, like the peasantry in western Europe, became a nearly passive source of funds for the horse aristocracy, in this case from the steppes and deserts. The centers of civilization came under assault from horse-breeding barbarians during the roughly seven centuries when cavalry reigned supreme (700–1400 C.E.).

If one accepts this reasoning—and I propose it here without being convinced of it myself—then military slavery appears to be an answer by the civilized centers to the predations of the horse barbarians. The centers adopted various strategies to deal with the horsemen: all made efforts to acquire horses of their own; and the Muslims also made the imaginative and successful effort to bring in the riders too. Thus, military slavery can be understood as a response to the shift in military balance caused by the stirrup. To explain military slavery in this way also neatly accounts for its appearance not long after the stirrup appeared on the scene, without any reference to Islam. Unlike the climatic or Turkic reasons, this one answers why military slavery did not

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8. Here, as so often, Japan resembles Western Europe.
exist before Islam. It also explains why so many of the slave soldiers came from steppe and desert regions.

Yet even the stirrup theory correlates far less well than Islam does. If it was the decisive factor, why, then, did the other non-horse-breeding areas (Hindu India and China in 700–1400 C.E.) not also develop military slavery? Furthermore, many military slaves were foot soldiers, like the black troops in Egypt and the Janissaries, the renowned elite corps of the Ottoman Empire. Something besides the stirrup must have been involved in the role of slave soldiers in Islamdom.

The striking correlation between Islam and military slavery shown in chapter 2 raises the possibility of a causal connection between this religion and this pattern of military recruitment. However, correlation alone, as statisticians and logicians never tire of pointing out, does not imply causation. Some correlations are merely unrelated; no one claims significance for the “near-perfect correlations ... between the death rate in Hyderabad, India from 1911 to 1919, and variations in the membership of the International Association of Machinists during the same period.”

Others are counterlogical: statistics indicate that the presence of fire engines at fires correlates with more destructive fires; can one infer that fires would be less destructive if no fire engines were dispatched? High correlation between Islam and military slavery “can serve only as the starting point for further investigation and analysis.” In general, “to establish the regularistic causal proposition that X caused Y, three things must be demonstrated. First, there must be a correlation between X and Y. Second, there must be a proper temporal relationship in their occurrence, X must occur before Y. Third, there must be at least a presumptive agency which connects them.” In the case of Islam and military slavery, correlation does exist and the temporal sequence is proper (Islam preceded military slavery); to

11. Ibid., p. 93.
prove a causal link, "a presumptive agency which connects them" must be established.

Islamic or Islamicate?

Military slavery may have been connected either to the religion or the civilization of Islam. If it is considered a part of the religion or its legal system, we call it "Islamic"; if an aspect of the more diffuse civilization which accompanies it, then "Islamicate." Islamic elements are myriad and indisputable: the five "pillars of the religion"; the lesser ritual prescriptions; the entire body of the Shari'a, which deals with almost every aspect of human existence; and numerous features not required by Islam but characteristic of Muslim life, such as turban wearing, use of the Arabic script, and Sufi orders. All these elements come with the religion as part of an Islamic package; they are nonfunctional and can only be explained in the light of Islamic ideals and traditions. Clearly, military slavery is not Islamic; it has no religious sanction and it is not even unambiguously legal. Nothing whatever argues for its being part of the Islamic religion or its legal system.

If not Islamic, is it Islamicate? Islamicate elements are not an outgrowth of Islamic religion and law, yet are integral to Muslim life. Such an element need not be by nature Islamic:

The specifically Islamic quality of a cultural element might well . . . owe nothing to its origin, but simply express the fact that Islam, by taking it up, put its mark on it or tended to appropriate it.

13. See pp. 94–95.

Islam . . . tended to call forth a total social pattern in the name of religion itself. . . . In many spheres, not only public worship but such spheres as civil law, historical teaching, or social etiquette, Muslims succeeded quite early in establishing distinctive patterns identifiable with Islam as religion.\textsuperscript{15}

Even something so utterly unrelated to Islam as the lateen sail can be characteristic of Muslims.\textsuperscript{16} Regardless of origin, such an Islamicate pattern must fit somehow into the structures established by Islam:

[It is] legitimate to consider Muslim doctrine as a factor, not only when it happens to introduce a new solution from its own resources or brings about a new solution directly or indirectly, but also each time that, having integrated an interior or foreign solution into its system, and colored it its own way, it contributed to getting it adopted or maintained. How many practices, which have nothing Islamic about them in principle, have been naturalized as Muslim to the point of becoming characteristic of Islām . . . ?\textsuperscript{17}

By nature, Islamicate patterns are less distinct than Islamic ones, for they lack the clear impress of Islam. Some have been observed,\textsuperscript{18} but very few have been systematically tied to Islam.

\textsuperscript{15} Brunschvig, p. 54; Hodgson, 1:89.
\textsuperscript{17} Brunschvig, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{18} For some studies, see note 3 to chapter 1. The following list presents my casual compilation of some features which appear to be Islamicate (omitting those which are discussed in this chapter): \textit{Political}: no legislation (only ad hoc decisions); severe problems of succession; huge palace complexes; very few women in political life; absence of municipal organizations; nonterritorial loyalties; discomfort living under non-Muslim rule. \textit{Military}: heavy use of cavalry. \textit{Social}: fluid class structures and social mobility; clothing differentiates social and ethnic statuses; sharp distinction between in (Muslim) and out (non-Muslim) groups; kinship ties paramount. \textit{Economic}: commerce prestigious, agriculture scorned; silver and gold coinage both present; wealth an attribute of power, rarely the reverse; little scope for risk money; slaves abundant. \textit{Intellectual}: religious authorities control education; memorization emphasized; religious orientation of nearly all cultural life. \textit{Artistic}: representations discouraged; calligraphy emphasized; geometric and vegetal forms prevalent. \textit{Geographic}: uncohesive structure of cities; concentric arrangement and hierarchical division of quarters;
Military slavery lends itself particularly well to this relation because it correlates to Islam so visibly and has no comparable existence outside Islamdom. How does one make a connection between slave soldiers and Islam?

A number of writers, both social thinkers and historians of Islam,19 have linked military slavery with the patrimonial nature of Islamicate governments. (A patrimonial government is one based ultimately on relationships of paternal authority and filial dependence in contrast to a feudal one, which is marked by contractually fixed fealty based on knightly militarism.)20 Patrimonial rulers always needed trusted agents to execute their will; outsiders (aliens and unprivileged subjects) have the fewest conflicting interests, so they provide the most reliable agents. From this vantage point, military slavery could be said to be a means of acquiring such agents. Muslims alone developed a system to bring in agents, because their governments were the most patrimonial.

This simple explanation is unfortunately neither adequate nor accurate. It is not enough to explain military slavery as a consequence of patrimonialism; the basic question still remains: why were Islamicate governments patrimonial? Furthermore, it is not true that Islamicate dynasties were predominantly patrimonial; many of the most important ones (for instance, the Seljuks, Ayyubids, Mamluks, Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals) had important feudal elements. Moreover, it is a mistake to view military slaves as political agents; over and over, they were recruited primarily as soldiers. They were warriors brought in to staff ar-


mies; although they also served their masters as agents, military duties came first.

The reason why only Muslims established military slavery lies deeper, in the nature of Islamic political ideals and their effect on the actual conducting of politics.

**Why Muslim Subjects Relinquished Power**

We have established that military slavery must have been connected to the civilization of Islam. Now we face the central question: *what Islamicate reasons caused Muslims alone regularly to recruit their soldiers as slaves?* What uniquely Islamicate pattern caused military slavery to come into existence?

This section identifies a fundamental pattern of public life in Islamdom: withdrawal by Muslim subjects from the governments and armies which ruled them; the subsequent sections show who took their place, connect this pattern to military slavery, and demonstrate how military slaves served Muslim rulers better than their alternates. Military slavery recedes temporarily into the background in the following pages; the discussion here concerns a fundamental characteristic with numerous and profound consequences for Islamicate public life; military slavery was but one of those, though an especially visible one. The argument concerning Islamicate public life is presented as a hypothesis, and a springboard for discussion, not as a firm conviction about the "presumptive agency" connecting slave soldiers and Islam.

**Islamic Public Ideals**

While all religions postulate ideals that human beings cannot consistently maintain, Islam alone of the universalist religions makes *detailed political* ideals part of its basic code, the Shari'a.  

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21. I am not considering Confucianism a religion. The following argument connecting military slavery to Islam was inspired by a reading of C. S. Kessler, "Islam, Society and Political Behaviour: Some Comparative Implications of the Malay Case." This insightful article testifies to the original and unorthodox ideas which those who study Islam in the peripheries can provide.
To understand the nature of the statecraft in Islamdom, one must appreciate the special place of political and military ideals in the Islamic tradition. It is most vividly seen in contrast to the Jewish and Christian traditions.

In their formative periods, both Judaism and Christianity evolved outside a state structure and without government support; in contrast, Islam from the first and almost always thereafter developed in conjunction with political authority. After the Jewish kingdom was destroyed in 586 B.C.E., Jews had to adopt their religion to exile, dispersal, and political disenfranchisement; as a result, Judaism grew independent of constituted authority and had no need for it. Christianity from its very inception drew a clear line between the realms of religion and politics, disassociating itself from government. Intermittent Roman persecution during its first three centuries accentuated this division, although it diminished when Christianity became the Roman state religion. The relationship of Christianity to the state then became a burning issue for the next millennium and a half in the Catholic church (less so for other churches), but was not clearly resolved. After 1500 C.E., Protestant reaffirmation of the early ideal of separation found increasing acceptance, so that by now Christianity has again turned away from politics. Even when the Catholic church was most powerful West European political institution in the High Middle Ages, a pious Christian could fulfill his religious duties without reference to the government. Jews and Christians are inclined to view as government a necessary evil.

In contrast, Islam from its first years had close relations with the state. Muhammad, as is well known, founded not only a religion but the community of its believers, a political unit: he served both as prophet and statesman for the infant community. From that time, each Muslim ruler has not only a mundane role but also an Islamic one; his foremost duty is to carry out the Shari‘a. Good Islamic government means enforcing its regulations and creating an environment where Muslims can live a correct life; the sources of Islamic inspiration have thus a great deal to say about proper political conduct. A bad government only partially enforces the Shari‘a; anarchy means no enforcement at
all. Islam requires a government run by Muslims because the fulfillment of a proper religious life depends on this enforcement; no other agency can maintain the Shari'a, represent the umma, or wage jihād.

Thus, while Jews and Christians in the practice of their religions can ignore the authorities above them, Muslims cannot. Jews formed closed minority communities for thousands of years without attaining sovereign control; on the contrary, the Church has been so powerful that it has on occasion threatened to take over the state. More dependent on government, Islam is vulnerable to its vicissitudes; a failure by Muslims to attain the public ideals required by their religion would have serious consequences for their attitudes toward government and involvement with it. The contrast between ideals and the actualities of public life has thus been especially significant for Muslims.

_Umma, Caliphate, Jihād: The Ideal_

The political and military ideals of Islam are well known: they are the subject of introductory courses in Islam and of full-length studies, so they need not detain us long. Three Arabic words may be used to sum up these ideals: *umma*, caliphate (= *khilāfa*), and jihād, referring to the community of Islam, its political leadership, and its warfare.

The *umma* of Islam emerged in Medina under Muḥammad. It developed in opposition to the communities of the other monotheistic religions and to the Arabian tribes. The Islamic *umma* aimed to make the Muslims into both a religious community like those of the Jews and Christians and into a supratribal unit in which Islam replaced kinship-based affiliations. The convert to Islam put prior affiliations aside when he joined the *umma*. As Islam became universalistic, when non-Arabians joined, the *umma* became universalistic too. From humble be-

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The following discussion ignores financial and judicial ideals, although the same argument applies equally to them (e.g. zakāh, Haarmann, pp. 10–14).
ginnings in Medina, it spread through Arabia and then (very sparsely, for there were few Muslims at first) to the lands between Spain and India. In subsequent centuries, the umma filled out as conversions to Islam increased, and it spread yet more widely into new areas.

Whatever its extent, the umma was a single unit, ideally under the leadership of a single man, the caliph. Loyalty to the caliph was the tangible expression of devotion to the unity of the umma. The position of caliph emerged in an unplanned way after the death of Muhammad in 11/632; the fledgling umma needed a leader, so a successor (khalifa) to Muḥammad emerged. He had no prophetic function but succeeded Muḥammad only as leader of the umma. The caliph symbolized the unity and power of the Muslim community.

The unity of the umma and the rule of the caliph both point to a third characteristic Islamic ideal, the jihād, military action intended either to defend or expand the boundaries of lands ruled by Muslims.23 This ideal has two important implications; first, it encourages, under proper circumstances, aggression against non-Muslims as fulfillment of a religious precept. Second, it prohibits warfare among Muslims, for violence must only be employed to spread the rule of Islam—and how can it be spread to regions that Muslims already control? The ideals represented by the umma, caliphate, and jihād complement each other; Islamic doctrines call for political unity and peace among Muslims. Differences between believers must not lead to political divisions, much less to war.

Umma, Caliphate, Jihād: The Reality

In contrast to the theoretical statements of Islamic ideals, their actual role in history has gone almost unnoticed. Premodern Muslim kingdoms, rulers, and warfare varied widely over 1,200 years and several continents. Kingdoms ranged from local

23. It is always important to remember that jihād spreads the rule of Islam, not the religion. Muslims may use violence to gain political control but not to coerce belief; and since non-Muslims pay higher taxes, there is usually no incentive to convert them anyway.
dynasties to far-flung empires, rulers from military conquerors to religious revivers, warfare from tribal skirmishes to sieges of many years. Within this large diversity, one fundamental pattern prevailed: political and military realities virtually never met the ideals established by Islam. The actual course of Islamicate history compares sadly with the ideal of a unified umma under a caliph waging jihad against non-Muslims only. Both of these ideals were transgressed against early and permanently. The unity of the umma did last, admittedly, for about thirty years (until the murder of ʿUthmān in 35/656), but major intra-Muslim warfare began in 37/657 with the civil war between ʿAlī and Muʿāwiyah; a century later, in 138/756, the umma was formally split when the Umayyad ruler of Spain refused to recognize the Abbasid caliph as sovereign; from that time on for about a century, a new region became independent every five years. The unity of the umma was never reestablished. Perceived common enemies (for example, the Crusaders, Mongols, Zionists) could produce local feelings of solidarity thereafter, but no positive bonds effectively united Muslims. Furthermore, the size of the umma and its diversity made unity impossible; the ever expanding area of Dār al-Islām was simply too large to remain politically unified.

The caliphate endured a slower decline. It withstood the vicissitudes of the first three centuries, remaining powerful and virtually unchallenged. Shiʿis, Khārijis, and rebellious governors had only limited impact, and even when the caliphs fell under the control of military slaves in the mid-3rd/9th century, their prestige survived. Then the first rival caliph emerged in 297/909, when the Shiʿī Fatimids took power in Tunisia; not long after, in 316/929, the ruler of Umayyad Spain also declared himself amīr al-muʾminīn ("Commander of the Faithful," another term for "Caliph"). More serious yet, the Shiʿī Buyids conquered Iraq in 334/945 and held the Abbasid caliphs near-captive for a century; from this date on the caliphs became mere figureheads. Seljuk substitution for Buyid overlordship in 447/1055 did not change this, though the Seljuks were Sunnīs. Aside from a purely local revival at the end of the 6th/12th century, the

24. A list of the breakaway dynasties may be found on pp. 178.
caliphate remained politically obscure until its demise at the hands of the Mongols in 656/1258. After that only a very attenuated version of the office continued to exist for several centuries before disappearing altogether. Its revival by the Ottoman rulers in the late 12th/18th century was a doomed undertaking. The caliphs did fill the important task of representing the political power of Islamdom until the Buyid conquest; from that time on, Islamdom has been politically fragmented.

The jiḥād was partially maintained; from the Arabian conquests onward, Muslims have eagerly defended or expanded the borders of Dār al-İslām. The Byzantine, Spanish, and Indian fronts saw sporadic fighting over eight centuries, the Balkan over six; Muslims responded actively to the Crusader and Mongol invasions; they took up arms sporadically against pagans in sub-Saharan Africa and on the Inner Asian steppe; and in modern times, they resisted encroachments by seaborne Western Europeans and land armies advancing from Russia and China. Yet, though Muslims carried out the injunction to fight non-Muslims, they ignored the prohibition against warfare among believers. Indeed, Muslims fought one another far more often than they did the infidels; true jiḥād constituted a pitifully small percentage of their total warfare, for in contrast to the distant boundaries of Dār al-İslām, those of neighboring Muslim governments were close by. Disputes with fellow-Muslims arose much more often than with infidels. To be sure, when Muslims fought Muslims, each side armed itself with doctrinal justifications; but the fact that both parties considered themselves Muslim could never be ignored or forgotten.

Umma, caliphate, and jiḥād represent only the summits of Islamic public ideals; the Sharī'a also concerns itself with the details of much else, generating equally deep gulfs between expectations and reality in such matters as taxation and legal justice. Islamic public ideals have remained permanently unattainable since shortly after the time of Muḥammad: the political order envisaged in the Qur'ān, Sunna, Sharī'a, in the legal handbooks and political treaties, has never existed. 25

But Islamic public ideals were none the less important for being unattainable. Though beyond reach, they constantly influenced attitudes toward politics and warfare, causing Muslim subjects to look askance at the governments that divided the umma and the armies that wasted Muslim lives. The presence of these ideals caused Muslim subjects to reject their rulers, and in this way, Muslim rulers failed. They failed not by external criteria (for example, capacity to dominate, duration of rule) but by falling short of Islamic standards. A government did not embody the aspirations of its subjects, its boundaries had little meaning for them, and its warfare had virtually none. Yet Muslim rulers were no worse than others; their subjects were dissatisfied not because of any inherent insufficiencies but because of heightened Islamic expectations. Muslim subjects looked for successors to Muḥammad but instead found business-as-usual politicians. The existence of Islamic public ideals served more to denigrate real governments than to guide them; those ideals undermined more than they sanctioned. This may be seen most clearly with regard to the umma.

The political importance of the umma lay not in its positive ability to mobilize Muslims but in its negative effect on real governments. The umma ideal made reality look transient and miserable; Muslims preferred the vision of their glorious community. The existence of an ideal of the umma thus worked to restrict the appeal of existing kingdoms. Even after the unified

26. I must reemphasize that this is not my judgment on the Muslim rulers but an understanding of how their subjects felt. The reader may note two modern parallels: (1) In the twenty years following World War II, Americans heard incessantly about the virtues of their country and the benevolent role it was playing in the world. This created a political ideal which the U.S. government could not in reality attain; as a result, each stumble seemed like a calamitous failure. The Vietnam War and the Watergate Affair (the latter a peccadillo by any other standard) led to severe disaffection because they contrasted darkly with the ideals. In the United States this was a passing theme, a result of the ideological excesses of the Cold War; the gap between ideal and real in premodern Islamicate civilization was a permanent part of the religiously-based culture, constantly generating disaffection. (2) By parading glamorous, unattainable images, movies and television (especially advertisements) often convince the viewer that his own life is deficient and leaves him dissatisfied with reality.
umma had become a pipe dream, it remained a vital emotional anchor. Regardless of the divisions into kingdoms and the warfare among them, the community of Islam did not lose its allure for Muslim peoples; they saw devotion to the umma as an expression of allegiance to Islam and its principles. Concern for the totality of Muslims, often a fuzzy notion, took the place of local patriotism. Muslim subjects felt more of a bond to the umma than to their governments; the transitory, arbitrary, local rule of some king paled in the face of the permanent, grand, universal umma.27

As the unity of the umma, rule by the caliph, and warfare against only unbelievers turned into pious fictions, Islamic ideals became ever more isolated from life.

The government of Allah and the government of the sultan grew apart. Social and political life was lived on two planes, on one of which happenings would be spiritually valid but actually unreal, while on the other no validity could ever be aspired to.28

But, unreal as they were, Islamic public ideals continued to dominate Muslim thinking. Any number of examples show this; military slavery itself makes the point well. The scholars argued fine points of Shari‘a but did not recognize—or at least acknowledge—this preeminent institution. With the single exception of Niżām al Mulk’s brief description (Appendix 2), no writer on politics deigned to discuss military slavery! And it never appears in the Shari‘a. Having no place in theory, slave soldiers had no place in the Muslim consciousness, which remained attuned to Islamic ideals and pulled away from discordant realities. But the world was filled with harsh facts; how did the Muslims deal with them?

The Withdrawal from Power

Muslim subjects responded to troublesome realities by withdrawing from politics and warfare. They avoided the blatant nonimplementation of Islamic goals in the public sphere by re-

treated into other domains, where Islam had much greater success. Not all Muslim subjects withdrew, of course, but insofar as an Islamicate pattern existed, Islam caused its believers not to participate in public affairs. As a result of the unattainable nature of Islamic public ideals, Muslim subjects in premodern times relinquished their political and military power.  

In practice this meant that Muslim subjects turned away from the dominant political and military institutions. "The prevailing attitude toward power is skepticism"; the populace stayed aloof from the decision makers. This "widespread disinclination to collaborate in government" was particularly true of those who took the Islamic message most seriously. The ʿulamāʾ did their best to avoid serving as qādis; some Sufis refused "to touch funds coming from an amīr, on the ground that they represented illicit gains"; and

in the 13th century courageous jurists in Egypt declared prayer in a cemetery chapel, which the Sultan had erected, as not permitted, on account of the inhumane methods used during its construction. A tacit, boycott-like opposition to the government existed in certain pious circles of the early Islamic Middle Ages, when any money coming from the government was considered religiously forbidden property. It is even reported that some pious people considered it forbidden to drink water from a canal dug by the... government, or to fasten their bootlaces at the light of a lamp belonging to the government.

The reputations of Muslim authorities who did serve the rulers suffered as a result; the trustworthiness of Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798), author of Kitāb al-Kharāj, came into doubt because he worked for the government. A number of prominent Muslim

31. Ibid., p. 132.
An Explanation of Military Slavery

ethical and religious writers, such as Abū'l-Layth as-Samarqandi (d. 373/983) and Abū'l-Ḥamīd al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) discussed the problems entailed in dealing with rulers. Islamicate writings widely reflected this attitude to government. Further, Muslim subjects and rulers alike internalized this attitude, making it a normative pattern of behavior; all agreed that Muslim subjects should not become involved in public affairs.

Muslim subjects avoided armies (less so navies) even more than governments and administrators. Hearing repeatedly about the unity of the umma and the sinfulness of fighting against other Muslims, they stayed out when, as was usually the case, the enemy was Muslim. (Exceptions here are those cases where Muslims fought to save their own lives.) As a result, al-

34. Goitein, pp. 205–06.
35. An intriguing alternative explanation for the alienation of Muslim subjects from their rulers can be traced back to an argument Hodgson makes about the ecology of the Middle East creating a culture which had few ties to the land:

The unusual access to interregional trade in the mid-Arid Zone, combined with its aridity and its openness to overland conquests and to imperial formations, all having increasing effect in the course of the millennia, could have resulted, over the whole region rather than just locally, in an unusual degree of legitimation of culture oriented to the market, and this is a form favouring cosmopolitan mobility rather than civic solidarity (2:73–74).

The aridity of its agricultural lands, its central location in the Oikoumen, and its accessibility to conquest by land combined to make Middle Eastern civilization little oriented to geographical loyalties. Hence, Middle Eastern Muslims naturally directed their loyalty more to the umma. This then became part of the high culture which spread with Islam.

Another explanation for the uninvolvement of Muslim subjects comes from a different Middle Eastern tradition. Autonomous cities had existed since the most ancient times, before bureaucratic empires functioned. Cities were accustomed to pay off imperial foreigners with quitrents in return for local freedom of action in the hands of the religious and commercial elites. Although this procedure was outdated by about 600 B.C.E., it remained in force through Parthian and even Sasanian times; perhaps its legacy extended into the Islamic period as well and expanded from the Middle Eastern base to all Islamdom.

36. In 389/999, for example, the populace of Transoxiana "followed the advice of its teachers and decided that 'when the struggle is for the goods of this world' Muslims are not obliged to 'lay themselves out to be murdered' " (quoted in W. Barthold, Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion, trans. V. Minorsky et al., 3d ed. (London, 1968), pp. 267–68). This implies that Muslim populaces should
most everywhere in Islamdom and throughout premodern times, Muslim subjects rarely fought for the armies that ruled over and protected them.

To be sure, Muslims did agitate against the government that ruled them: disloyal governors, oppressed peasants, unruly desert tribes, and angry city mobs sporadically rebelled, but except when non-Muslims threatened, indigenous subjects of a ruler almost never made a sustained attempt to control their own government. Notables with local roots, landlords or merchants, hardly ever led the subjects to overthrow a regime and put themselves in power. (Rare attempts to do this were, significantly, led by religious figures.) A common pattern found in other premodern civilizations almost never exists in Islamdom: indigenous peoples in charge of their own governments and staffing their own armies.

When non-Muslims threatened everything changed; danger to the Sharī'a or to Dār al-Islām meant that Islam had to be defended, and in these circumstances Muslim subjects often became more active. In early Islamic times, before many of the conquered peoples had converted, the Muslims felt endangered and participated more actively in war. So, too, an offensive jihād stirred Muslims to fight. The main marches of Islamdom (Spain, Anatolia and the Balkans, India) demonstrate this point vividly, as do areas such as West Africa and Central Asia.37 Faced with Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, or animist enemies, Muslim subjects responded favorably to their rulers' need for military manpower. Similarly, European, Chinese, and Japanese imperialism normally stay out of warfare. The Sharī'a reflects this view, too: "Abstain and desist from civil strife [between Muslims]" al-kaff wa'l qu'ād fit-fastna. Ibn Baṭṭa al-’Ukbarī (d. 387/997) ash-Sharī’ wa’l-Ibānā wa’l-Uṣūl as-Sunnah wa’d-Dīnā, ed. and trans. H. Laoust (Damascus, 1958), 67/126, with further references. (R. Stephen Humphreys provided me with this reference.)

37. A few examples are: the Samanid and Saffarids in early Islam (when Muslims were still a tiny minority in most places), Syrian cities 340–550/950–1150 (when the Byzantines threatened), and the Sarbadarids (in response to a Mongol threat). Haarmann, pp. 18–19, points out the unusual nature of the Muslim response to the Crusader challenge.
mobilized them in modern times; and most recently, the U.S. presence in Iran aroused an atavistic Muslim response. When Muslim subjects fought, they most probably perceived a threat from non-Muslims; but when a government reasonably maintained the Sharī'a and kept the infidels at bay, they stayed away from armies and tended to their private gardens.

So, instead of public life, Muslim subjects in normal times concentrated on personal matters. They were principally interested in leading the good life and much less in who administered it. Intense family, communal, and religious involvements, where Islamic precepts and ideals were often attained, took the place of power politics and warfare. Persons interested in righteous living did best to restrict their activities to private affairs.

Affiliations tended to be either small-scale or Islamic. (Small-scale groupings are face-to-face societies in which everyone virtually knows everyone else; they are typically based either on proximity or on kinship relations.) In rural areas of Islamdom, villages and tribes predominated; in urban areas, quarters and fraternal associations (such as youth clubs, trade guilds, even criminal gangs) had the most importance. Everywhere the family came first, though, as the supreme locus of Muslim life.

Larger affiliations (in which a person does not know everyone) derived from Islam. These were primarily two, the madhhab and the ṭariqa. The madhhabs were systems of jurisprudence (often translated as “law schools”) which developed into social institutions. Each madhhab undertook to translate the regulations of the Qurʾān and hadith into a complete legal structure. They evolved out of early study groups of scholars; by the early 5th/11th century, nearly all Sunni Muslims held allegiance to a madhhab (and Shiʿi and Kharijī groups each had their own madhhabs, too). Surprisingly, these informally organized legal affiliations became vehicles for popular expression in the period between al-Maʿmūn’s reign and the Buyid Conquest (ca. 200–330/820–

39. For discussions of these social questions, see the writings of Claude Cahen, Marshall G. S. Hodgson, and Ira M. Lapidus.
The Islamicate Context

950), largely as a result of the practice of one madhhab, the Ḥanbalī, of organizing common people “into cadres dedicated to defending the principles of the school.” The other madhhabs appear to have followed the Hanbalīs and to have similarly transformed their systems of jurisprudence into genuinely popular movements. At the same time, they spread geographically and each of them became predominant in some regions.  

The tariqas (Sufi orders or brotherhoods) developed from the 6th/12th century and paralleled the madhhab organization on a more emotional and mystical level. Although Sufi thought had existed long before, the orders were first organized in the 6th/12th century. The tariqas differed widely one from another and between regions; always, however, they supplied an emotionally and socially conducive context for intense religious feelings; strong bonds between members of the same lodge made an important contribution to the social order. They offered “a sense of spiritual unity” which the failed political institutions were unable to provide. For most Muslims, tariqas played a much larger social role than did any of the government agencies. 

Similarly, the religious elites, the Sufi masters (pirs) and the ulama usually replaced the ruler as the source of authority and prestige for the average urban Muslim. Because the political structure lay beyond the usual concerns of Muslim subjects, religious status had more bearing than political or military power. These elites provided daily guidance for the populace and also served as intermediaries between Muslim subjects and their rulers. They were indigenous.

These disparate affiliations, small-scale and Islamic, shared one key feature; none of them had coercive powers—they could not tax, raise armies, nor claim a monopoly on violence. Some of them might occasionally mobilize on a local scale, but none could challenge the rulers. They absorbed energies which otherwise would have gone into politics.

40. Lapidus, p. 36, relying largely on the work of Henri Laoust, George Makdisi, and Dominique Sourdel.
41. Ibid., p. 41.
42. Ibid., pp. 42–43.
43. Hodgson, 2:221.
The commonplace assertion that Islam does not distinguish between religion and politics is true; but, paradoxically, by embracing politics and warfare, by making them central to Islamic life, Islam removes them from the lives of most Muslims. "While Islam is in one sense the political community par excellence it has tended to make the pious Muslim more and more nonpolitical." The mixing of religion with politics and warfare leads to a sharp division between public and private domains; instead of government and warfare, Muslim subjects devoted themselves far more to religious, social, and family concerns. As a result, "the true central thread of Islamic history lies not in the political realm of the caliphs and sultans but in the social realm where the ulama served as the functioning heart of the historic Muslim community." Politics and warfare have played a smaller role in the lives of Muslims than in those of other peoples; only when non-Muslims threatened did they engage in those areas themselves. The ruling structure stood in striking isolation from the peoples' lives; in particular, it could not draw them in as soldiers.

Who, then, staffed Islamicate armies?

Withdrawal by Muslim subjects created a power vacuum which opened Islamicate public life to domination by others. Armies became the playthings of nonsubjects; one succeeded another with hardly any reference to the subject populations. Marginal Area Soldiers

Two geographic terms, "marginal area" and "government area" sharpen the analysis of Islamicate military patterns; soldiers in Islamicate armies nearly all came from marginal areas, the steppes, deserts, mountains, and forests being thus defined.

47. Nonsubjects dominated politics almost as much, but the following discussion takes up only their military role.
Throughout premodern times, these hinterlands supported only simple forms of social and cultural life, for they contained few cities or large concentrations of population; their inhabitants usually lived far apart from each other or did not settle at all. They more often had contact with animals than with fellow humans outside the family. The economy was simple and nearly self-sufficient, though articles from the cities were highly prized and formed the basis of an important trade. Social life was rudimentary, with few divisions or distinctions between individuals. Culture remained at a popular level, for marginal areas could not support specialists; the minstrel or folk artist had to devote his days to providing for himself. Intellectual life beyond traditional wisdom hardly existed. Political organization in marginal areas followed predominantly tribal lines, though not always (the Balkan population lived in mountains without being tribal, while even city-dwellers in sub-Saharan Africa remained tribal). On the whole, institutions stayed simple, rarely involving more persons than knew each other. Ibn Khaldûn calls these peoples savage (wâhshî) and enumerates them: “The Arabians and the Zanâta are such peoples, as are similar groups, for instance the Kurds, Turkomans, and the Veiled Şanîâja.”

The “government areas” included what was not marginal, the permanently settled lands where city-dwellers and farmers lived more closely together. Unlike marginal areas, which permitted only simple economies and cultures, government areas supported more complex forms of human activity; in a word, they housed civilization. With regard to political organization, they developed large-scale structures—governments—in contrast to the tribes in marginal areas.

The distinction between outsiders and insiders parallels that of government and marginal areas. “Insiders” are the ethnically dominant, economically stable, socially accepted, religiously conforming population of a settled region. They populate both cities and countryside and have a stake in preserving the estab-

49. The blâd as-sîbâ and blâd al-makhzan in Morocco reflect this distinction most precisely.
lished order because they prosper in it. “Outsiders,” by con-
trast, are a diverse lot, either foreigners or outcast indigenous
groups such as minorities (persons differing in language, reli-
gion, color, or some other significant trait), the indigent, slaves,
and any other disadvantaged group.51

The outsiders who filled empty spaces in Muslim armies came
overwhelmingly from marginal areas. They enjoyed vital mili-
tary and political advantages over soldiers from government
areas, even though they were culturally less sophisticated. Ibn
Khaldfün52 expresses this contrast symbolically: “Sieves were al-
together non-existent among (the Arabs) and they ate wheat
(kernels) with the bran. Yet the [military] gains they made were
greater than any other ever made by human beings.”53 Several
elements contributed to the recurrent military superiority of
marginal area soldiers: the hardships of their way of life, their
healthiness, and their social organization; the fact that no gov-
ernment controlled them was of key importance.

Whether outsiders lived in the steppes, deserts, or mountains,
merely staying alive was a steady challenge. Agriculture was err-
atic and animals lived in a fragile climatic balance as the vaga-
ries of weather hit with particular severity. Life was hard: each

50. Ibn Khaldfün uses the term khārijīya to express “outsider” (Muq 1:279
n. 84, 376).

51. A person coming from a marginal area is automatically an outsider, for an
insider must participate in constituted society and therefore live in a government
area. On the other hand, an outsider may come from either a marginal or a gov-
ernment area so long as he is from outside a given society.

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<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Marginal</th>
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<td>Outsider</td>
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52. Ibn Khaldfün’s writings accord so well with the following argument that I
shall combine quotes from al-Muqaddima and al-‘Ibar with my views. In the pro-
cess, I shall admittedly be taking his statements out of context, for Ibn Khaldfün
stresses groups whereas I am looking at individuals. Still, he often comments on
the qualities of individuals, too, and it is these I shall quote.

53. Muq, 1:419.
person had to maintain excellent physical strength in order to carry out his daily functions of farming, herding, or hunting. The marginal areas could not afford soft jobs (for example, as domestic servants, aristocrats, or philosophers) or nonproductive institutions (such as opulent courts). Pleasures were simple and comforts primitive; their environment compelled these peoples to stay lean and hardy. Marginal area peoples were also healthier; spending most of their lives away from densely populated areas, far from insects and rodents and away from standing water, they escaped most of the endemic diseases found in settled government areas.

The inability to support a government implied an absence of public authority in marginal areas; this had important social consequences. It forced marginal area peoples to protect themselves by grouping together and reinforcing the bonds of mutual trust. A single individual could not protect himself; he had to be guaranteed by his groups, usually the family and tribe. Elaborate codes of honor and vigilante tactics developed to ensure order. The total effect was to sharpen each person's wits and military capacity. Raiding for booty and feuding for honor were endemic; for reasons of both defense and attack, every male practiced the martial arts from infancy, was trained as a soldier, and stayed in practice at all times. Belonging to a mutual assistance group with military capabilities gave the social structure of marginal area men an inherent potential for warfare. They belonged to ready-made military organizations—the tribes. Besides these, they had few groupings: the urban quarters, fraternal groupings, madhhabs, and tariqas found in government areas barely existed in the marginal lands. The tribe and village were usually the only forums.

Lack of government fostered an independent ethos; each person had to fend for himself against the elements and his fellow men. Ibn Khaldūn describes the spirit this engendered as follows:

The Bedouins . . . live separate from the community. They are alone in the country and remote from militias. They have no walls and gates. Therefore, they provide their own defense and do not entrust it to, or rely upon others for it. They always carry weapons.
They watch carefully all sides of the road. They take hurried naps only when they are together in company or when they are in the saddle. They pay attention to every faint barking and noise. They go alone into the desert, guided by their fortitude, putting their trust in themselves. Fortitude has become a character quality of theirs, and courage their nature. They use it whenever they are called upon or an alarm stirs them.54

In sum, their environment compelled these peoples to develop the physical and mental qualities ideal for military prowess. The weak perished and the survivors made powerful soldiers. Again Ibn Khaldūn:

Since . . . desert life no doubt is the reason for bravery, savage groups are braver than others. They are, therefore, better able to achieve superiority and to take away the things that are in the hands of other nations . . . The more firmly rooted in desert habits and the wilder a group is, the closer does it come to achieving [military] superiority over others.55

Besides these martial advantages which marginal area soldiers held over all government area peoples, they had an additional strength over Muslims from government areas; by definition, there was no government in marginal areas, so the peoples who lived there were not ruled by a constituted political authority which fell short of the Islamic ideals. They had nothing, therefore, from which to turn inward. Muslims who were not subjects did not relinquish power because no government existed to alienate them. Their small-scale and Islamic groupings involved them in the exercise of power: as a result, they consistently ruled and fought. The combination of not being alienated and innate military superiority gave marginal area soldiers an enormous advantage over Muslim peoples. It explains why they were the main Muslim political actors; they dominated Islamicate public life, founding the dynasties and staffing the armies.

The relinquishment of power by insiders and the strength of marginal area soldiers resulted in a general pattern; soldiers from

steppes, deserts, and mountains had an almost total hold over Islamicate armies. To a degree unmatched in any other civilization they dominated the armies that brought new governments to power and their subsequent replacements. Here we show the extent to which they brought the new dynasties in; the following pages explain why the troops continued to come mostly from marginal areas even after a government had been established.

It is easy to demonstrate the role of marginal area soldiers in founding new governments; a survey of armies similar to that done in chapter 2 (which looked at military slaves) makes this clear, for the major dynasties mentioned there, as well as most others, depended primarily on marginal area soldiers to bring them to power.

Such a pattern existed nowhere else to the same extent as it did in Islamdom, not even in the same lands before they became Muslim. In pre-Islamic Egypt, for example, while marginal area soldiers had some role from the time of the Hyksos onward, native Egyptians almost always fought in the armies of Egypt. They predominated when Egypt was independent and served as auxiliaries when foreigners (Libyans, Cushites, Persians, Greeks, and Romans) ruled. But with the coming of the Muslims, native Egyptians (except for the Bedouin, who were not insiders)

56. This role has received but scant attention. Some hints may be found in: Ashtor, p. 18; Bosworth, "Recruitment," p. 64; J. C. Hurewitz, "Military Politics in the Muslim Dynastic States 1400–1750," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 88 (1968): 97; J. Celerier, "Islam et geographie," *Hesperis* 39 (1952): 347; Gelner, p. 3, has noted this fact most clearly: "It seems to be a striking feature of the history of Muslim countries that they frequently, indeed generally, have... penumbra of marginal tribalism."

57. Hodgson makes this point, too, but with different terminology and a different explanation. He calls it "militarization" (2:64) and attributes it to a "stalemate between agrarian and mercantile power" (2:65).


largely disappeared from the armies of the government. It was not until modern times, 1238/1823, when Muḥammad ʿAlī conscripted Egyptian peasants, that they again reentered the army. Muḥammad ʿAlī undertook this novel measure partly because his Nubian recruits died off; but, more importantly, he had seen the success the French had with a national army.

Recruitment

While steppe, desert, and mountain soldiers provided a source of great power, they had their own particular drawbacks. However mightily they began, they rapidly became unreliable after conquering a government area, in either of two ways: some settled down and lost their martial strength; others retained that strength but became unruly. In either case, they became dependable and had to be replaced with fresh soldiers. Marginal area men could, of course, deteriorate and become unruly simultaneously, but for the sake of clarity, I shall analyze these processes separately.

The striking contrast between the warriors of one generation and their effete grandsons has provoked much speculation. Though the rapid degeneration of marginal area soldiers is a conspicuous pattern, its causes remain vague. Originally, courage and hardiness characterized the marginal area soldier; these were not innate qualities but were acquired by living in a harsh environment, which he left on entering a polity. The milieu which had forged those qualities was necessary to maintaining them too. Once they undertook the softer life as rulers, marginal area soldiers began to lose the very qualities which had brought them military success. "Whenever people settle in fertile plains and amass luxuries and become accustomed to a life of abundance and luxury, their bravery decreases to the degree that their wildness and desert habits decrease." ⁶⁰

As a new world of amusements, affluence, and culture opened

up, marginal area soldiers often willingly and joyfully reveled in it. This easy life so badly undermined their courage and hardiness that already their own offspring lacked their power; their sons fought no better than other men born in the polity and their grandsons might have fought even less well. The loss in martial virtues was both rapid and permanent. Eventually, “the warrior distinguishes himself from the artisan only by his inability to work; the men of marginal areas differ from civilized men only in their clothing.”

Ibn Khaldūn devotes much attention to the reasons for the decay of dynasties. He specifies three elements in this process: the love of glory (which destroys ʿasabīya, group-feeling), indulgence in luxuries (which destroys the economy), and tranquillity (which undermines the soldiers’ martial qualities). He makes the following points about the loss of martial qualities:

When people become accustomed to tranquillity and rest and adopt them as character traits, they become part of their nature. . . . The new generations grow up in comfort and the ease of luxury and tranquillity. The trait of savagery (which former generations had possessed) undergoes transformation. They forget the customs of desert life that enabled them to achieve royal authority, such as great energy, the habit of rapacity, and the ability to travel in the wilderness and find one’s way in waste regions. No difference remains between them and ordinary city dwellers, except for their (fighting) skill and emblems.

Besides lapsing into comfortable indolence, grandsons of warriors lost the other advantages of the marginal areas, their good health, strict codes, independent spirit, and lack of alienation from the government. As they became identical to government area men, the army suffered from a loss in soldierly qualities. This degeneration of marginal area soldiers forced the ruler and military leadership to seek out new sources of soldiers.

However, it was possible for marginal area soldiers to keep their martial skills and avoid deterioration by maintaining their

61. ʿIbar, 6:3.
old lifestyle. Cattle nomads who continued herding most often retained their old abilities; although their locale changed, their activities remained the same, so their descendents stayed hardy and fought well. The unreliability of these soldiers lay not in their military aptitude but in their political unruliness.

As victorious troops, the marginal area soldiers who brought a dynasty to power felt privileged; they and their descendents placed great demands on the ruler and considered themselves entitled to whatever he gave them. These soldiers considered the ruler in their debt and tolerated him only as an arbiter. They pressed him for concessions, squabbled among themselves, and obeyed him only when it suited them. In short, the ruler could not impose his will on them but had to tolerate them as an independent force. With time, however, the ruler would find their attitudes and power intolerable as he increasingly took on the responsibilities and challenges of a sovereign. Especially when the marginal area soldiers were the ruler’s kinsmen did they grow fat and clamor loudly for privileges, so he was forced to sever his dependence on them: “A ruler can achieve power only with the help of his own people. . . . [Eventually, however,] the ruler shows himself independent of his people, claims all the glory for himself, and pushes his people away from it with the palms (of his hands). As a result, his own people become, in fact, his enemies.”

Therefore, about three generations after the founding of a dynasty, some of the grandsons of warriors lapsed into comfortable indolence and others made unacceptable claims on the ruler. As the descendents of marginal area soldiers became unreliable, the army had to lessen its dependence on them and replace them with new troops.

In order to prevent them [his people] from seizing power, and in order to keep them away from participation (in power), the ruler needs other friends, not of his own skin, whom he can use against (his own people) and who will be his friends in their place. These (new friends) become closer to him than anyone else.

63. Muq, 1:372.
64. Ibid.
Who were these new friends, and where did they come from? Overwhelmingly, they were outsiders, fresh marginal area soldiers. This comes as no surprise; they had the same strengths as the marginal area soldiers who had originally conquered the government area and founded the dynasty: hardiness and good health, martial skills and inclination. As marginal area men, the recruits had not experienced government and so had not withdrawn from it; and their way of life required that they be hardy and martial. When they joined a government army (or administration) they had no interests of their own in the kingdom, little sympathy for the subject peoples, and they were readily convinced to associate themselves with the existing outsider ruling elite. In a key passage, Ibn Khaldūn notes that the ruler must seek out fresh marginal area soldiers when his own become unreliable:

In a dynasty affected by senility as the result of luxury and rest, it sometimes happens that the ruler chooses helpers and partisans from groups not related to (the ruling dynasty but) used to toughness. He uses (these people) as an army which will be better able to suffer the hardships of war, hunger, and privation. This could prove a cure for the senility of the dynasty. . . .

While marginal area soldiers dominated these recruited troops, insiders also participated (in contrast to the act of founding a dynasty, when insiders were usually entirely absent). Government area soldiers had drawbacks (they were inclined to be alienated and they lacked the best martial skills) but they also had two advantages, their abundance and low cost. The rulers made occasional use of them as auxiliary forces, as emergency reinforcements, as a counterbalance to the marginal area soldiers, or even as a source of revenue (for sometimes they paid to join the armed forces). In general, however, insiders played a

65. Muq, 1:342.
small role. All rulers, even those who lacked easy access, had to acquire marginal area soldiers, sometimes at great cost, for no army was complete without them. 68

The recruitment process did not end there, however; as fresh marginal area troops spent time in the government area, they too became unreliable. Once again, some lost their martial skills, others lost their loyalty. As fresh troops went stale, new ones had to be recruited in an unending cycle which lasted as long as the dynasty did. Ibn Khaldūn describes how the new friends become as demanding as the old relatives:

In taking [new friends] on as followers and [in] replacing his old clients and original followers by them, the ruler is motivated by the fact that (his old clients and followers) have become overbearing. They show little obedience to him. They look at him in the same way his own tribe and relatives do. 69

Thus, martial decay and political unruliness rendered a perpetual search for new sources of military manpower obligatory. Rulers relying on marginal area soldiers found themselves constantly seeking out new soldiers; they had to find these or else watch their armies grow debilitated and fractious. Each pre-modern Islamicate government which depended largely on marginal area soldiers—and this included nearly every one—had to seek out alternate sources of manpower within two (or so) generations of its establishment and then continue to do so until the time of its demise.

The recruitment of marginal area soldiers completed their hold over Islamicate armies. They both brought dynasties to power and staffed the armies thereafter. As the founding soldiers became unreliable, the government imported new marginal area soldiers to replace them. Thus, unreliability did not signal the exit of marginal area soldiers but only changed the cast. After the first spasm of conquest, importation might go on for generations. The influxes of marginal area soldiers marked the great shifts of power in politics: the first created the dynasty, the second maintained it, and the third destroyed it, begin-

69. Muq, 1:376.
ning the cycle over again. The first forced its way in, violently imposing its will from the outside, while the second was imported and acquired power peacefully from within. Marginal area soldiers entered once as conquering warriors, the second time as paid soldiers.

This explanation for outsider domination of Islamicate public life reverses the usual understanding. Other analyses, which assume that Muslim subjects sought power but failed to attain it because outsiders took over, focus attention on the wrong actors. I argue that the key lies in this fact: insiders relinquished power and allowed outsiders to take it up. Outsider soldiers and rulers were always in the wings in premodern times; the striking feature in Islamdom was not the presence of marginal area soldiers but the absence of insiders. The peculiarity lay with the insiders who did not rule more often. Had Muslim insiders wished to participate, no one could have prevented them; the fact that they did not points to their relinquishment of power, which then made rule by outsiders possible. Adherence to the ideals of Islam did not cause an abundance of outsiders in authority but a dearth of insiders who wished to assume it.

The Benefits of Military Slavery

When a ruler decided to recruit soldiers from marginal areas to replenish his armed forces, he had three means through which to acquire them: alliance, pay, or enslavement. Each of these methods had its advantages and drawbacks, yet I shall argue that in two crucial respects, rulers preferred slaves to either mercenaries or allies because they were acquired more easily and more thoroughly controlled. In these benefits lay the raison d'être of military slavery. Ibn Khaldûn refers to them in his eulogy of military slavery:

This status of slavery is indeed a blessing . . . [the slaves] embrace Islam with the determination of true believers, while retaining their nomadic virtues which are undefiled by vile nature, unmixed with

70. E.g. Goitein, p. 218; Grunebaum, Islam, p. 132.
the filth of lustful pleasures, unmarred by the habits of civilisation, with their youthful strength unshattered by excesses of luxury. 71

The advantages of enslavement will be illustrated by comparing slaves with the two alternate types of marginal area soldiers fighting for governments: mercenaries and allies.

Acquisition

A government could procure slaves more easily than it could either mercenaries or allies. It might purchase, capture, abduct, or steal a slave, but obviously not a free man. A slave could be compelled to join the army; mercenaries had to be enticed to serve, and allies had to find it expedient. The slave was subject to more active and flexible means of persuasion. By recruiting him through enslavement, the ruler did not have to wait until cooperative marginal area soldiers appeared on the scene, 72 a common predicament of governments that did not enslave soldiers (such as Byzantium and China). In contrast to the limited conditions under which mercenaries or allies agreed to fight, slaves came according to circumstance: some arrived as tribute; others as merchandise, booty, contraband, or stolen property.

Military slaves were usually procured as children and this, too, facilitated their acquisition. While mercenaries and allies could only be found among friendly peoples, children could be abducted or captured from enemies in wartime and, through training made into faithful soldiers. The pool of potential slaves could be many times larger than that of free recruits.

Enslavement gave access to a wide variety of nationalities and this provided the army with a beneficial diversity of troops, as they often brought with them the special skills of their own peoples: 73 This multiplicity of ethnic backgrounds and skills contributed directly to the flexibility and tactical power of Islamicate armies. Though mercenaries and allies, too, could have

71. *Ibar* 5:371 (adopted from Ayalon, “Yāsa” C1, 119; see Appendix 2).
72. Hrbek, p. 545.
73. Bosworth, Ghaznavids, p. 108.
varied origins, the ruler had much less control over where they came from.

Further, by enslaving his recruits, the Muslim ruler could choose his soldiers man for man. Mercenaries and allies arrived in corps or tribes and fought as a group; slaves came singly. The government could select its slaves carefully, which was not possible with free marginal area soldiers. This selectivity made possible a higher standard of quality for each soldier in slave armies.

Along with these benefits, the procurement of military slaves also involve some special problems. As a dynasty declined in strength, it could no longer acquire its slaves through force (raiding, warfare, and so forth) but had to purchase them. Yet, as the dynasty weakened its resources diminished, so this expense grew ever more burdensome. The Mamluks of Egypt could neither reduce their dependence on new recruits nor acquire them inexpensive; the need to buy slaves contributed significantly to the economic troubles of the government.74

The distance slaves usually had to travel from their homelands to their country of service and the fragility of the supply lines could also cause problems.75 As slaves usually came from remote regions, enemy forces could easily block access to them. Abbasid dependence on the Tahirids to send them slave children reduced Abbasid control in northern Iran and added to the Tahirids' strength. On the other hand, why the Ottomans did not cut off the supply of recruits from the Black Sea and the Caucasus areas to the Mamluk kingdom, once those two powers had become antagonistic, continues to baffle historians.

The expense and the distance over which military slaves traveled presented two drawbacks peculiar to slave soldiers, but only in times of decline; these problems were not envisioned


when a ruler founded a military slave corps in the second generation or so of the dynasty.

Control

Newly recruited soldiers from marginal areas entered as total aliens and outsiders, without affiliation either to the ruling powers or to the members of the polity. How could their master bind them to himself and his dynasty? Mercenaries or allies retained their own loyalties, culture, and methods of warfare, but slaves were subjected to reorientation; the government could secure their loyalty, impose cultural changes, and fit their military skills to the needs of the army.

Mercenaries and allies imposed their fickle loyalties on the ruler. They could always desert and they constantly threatened to mutiny: "an ally was always a potential threat to independence" and a mercenary even more so. Since these troops often constituted the most powerful force in the kingdom, little could prevent them from becoming an unmanageable and destructive element, indifferent to any allegiance that blocked the way to booty. If dissatisfied with their plunder from warfare, they readily attacked their own employer or ally. Military slavery provided a means by which to control marginal area soldiers. Unlike mercenaries and allies, slaves could be compelled to undergo changes in identity; these changes were effected through the complementary processes of deracination, isolation, and indoctrination. Deracination exposed slaves to loneliness and new relationships; isolation furthered their susceptibility; and indoctrination transformed their personalities.

Unlike mercenaries and allies, who usually arrived in tribal units and stayed in them, retaining their old loyalties, slaves came as individuals and had to build new attachments. Deprived of their own people, these soldiers had to accept the new affiliations offered them. The military slave corps developed into a substitute tribe and replaced the true kinship group in many places.

76. Smail, p. 70.
instances. The adoption of a master's *nisba* (kinship name) reflected the need for a new, albeit spurious filiation.\textsuperscript{77}

The master also isolated his slaves. He took them from their homelands to a strange country and cut them off from the rest of the society. They had no choice but to accept the ties provided them and to become loyal to him. They developed close relations with their comrades, all of whom shared the same predicament. Geographic isolation also reduced the possibility that a marginal area soldier would ever have to fight his own people by taking him far away from them. Combat against conationalists strained the loyalty even of a military slave, though many examples of their loyalty to their masters in such situations can be found.\textsuperscript{78}

Military slavery made indoctrination possible. Whereas mercenaries and allies arrived fully developed and resisted changes in their personalities and loyalties, military slaves came as children, uniformed and susceptible to reorientation. Years of careful schooling imbued them with lifelong attachments to the Islamic religion, their master, his dynasty, and their comrades-in-arms. The master exerted continuous pressure on the slave recruits to relinquish their prior allegiances in favor of himself. Enslavement made possible the extended period of gestation which changed identities. Ibn Khaldūn explains: "When a people with group feeling train a people of another descent or enslave slaves and mawlas, they enter into close contact with them. . . . These mawlas and trained persons share in [their patrons'] group feeling and take it on as if it were their own.\textsuperscript{79}

Mercenaries and allies invariably had concerns outside of their military service. They had family, kinsmen, herds, farms, and so forth, to which they devoted attention and from which they were loath to be long separated. These interests required time and conflicted with their service to the ruler. Slaves, on the contrary, could be made to live in isolation from the rest of society. Not


\textsuperscript{78} *CHI*, 4:162; P. Wittek, "Türkentum und Islam, 1," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 59 (1928): 517; and see the many examples in chapter 6.

\textsuperscript{79} Muq, 1:276 (my translation from the Arabic, 1:245).
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only could they be prevented from earning outside income, but they could also be kept unmarried; surely the ruler could not compel anyone but his own slave not to marry. In return for receiving their entire income in salary from the ruler, the slaves served him all year round as a standing army.

Military slaves fell far more completely under the cultural influence of the polity than their free rivals. In training they learned the customs, religion, culture, and language of the dynasty; this proved to be of great importance, for unless they were made to feel part of the dynasty, they could always turn against it. Military slaves never did this; they had become assimilated to the dynasty itself. They were part of the ruling elite, not its lackeys. When they revolted, they did not attack the polity as such but the individuals in charge; if successful, they usurped the government from within. This acculturation did not prevent them, however, from preying on the populace of the polity; they engaged in this pursuit, as did all members of the ruling elite. But acculturation made them part of the government, so they could not attack the polity itself, though its populace remained their victims.

The training process was the linchpin in the whole institution of military slavery. It established a slave's character by instilling military skills, discipline, and an understanding of command structures. The years of training distinguished the military slave and determined his future career. He entered training a young and isolated boy and emerged a highly skilled, disciplined, and well-connected soldier. The mercenary or ally, not compelled to undergo training, usually lacked these important qualities.

Military slaves received training first in the martial arts. Whereas mercenaries and allies showed impatience with the introduction of new techniques, slaves would learn new methods of fighting. They servile status and their youth combined to force them to accept these changes. Marginal area soldiers often arrived in the polity brimming with independent spirit and unfamiliar with chains of command, yet governments could not

80. For some details on this, see H. Rabie, "The Training of the Mamlûk Fâris."
tolerate the chaotic nature of tribal warfare, so they forced their slaves to learn discipline.

Through military training, the natural courage and hardiness of marginal area soldiers was combined with the organization, techniques, and discipline of government armies. The slaves emerged superbly accomplished in the martial arts and fully integrated into an organized army. The main drawback of the training program lay in the time it required; while mercenaries and allies came fully prepared for battle, military slaves had to be acquired and trained far in advance of their employment. They could be properly used only in the context of long-range planning.81

Besides bringing military power to the dynasty as a whole, military slaves provided the ruler with political henchmen. While serving the army against external enemies, they also supported the ruler against internal rivals. Although complementary, these two functions were not identical. As agents, they were totally beholden to the ruler, devoted to him, and lacking any trace of envy; no better agents could be found. Mercenaries and allies could not reliably provide this personal service.

Muslim leaders could choose to recruit alien marginal area soldiers in other ways, but these entailed more difficulties. For example, the Mughals did not have many military slaves; instead, they employed Hindus as palace guards, used lower-class men as infantry, and recruited cavalry from Iran and Central Asia by offering especially high salaries.82 However, the Mughals often had problems acquiring these troops and keeping their loyalty. Given the Muslims' need for alien marginal area soldiers, military slavery brought with it several advantages over other methods of organization; the slaves' numbers, quality, and youth assured the best material to work with; their isolation, training, and indoctrination assured fine and loyal soldiers.

Noting the advantages of military slaves, we should not find their military role in the millennium 820–1850 C.E. so puzzling.

The institution of military slavery was not an accident, a legalism, or a fluke, but a successful adaptation to the specific Islamicate need to acquire and control alien soldiers from marginal areas. However odd it may seem to our eyes, Muslim rulers reaped real military benefits from the enslavement of recruits.

**Nonmilitary Factors**

Besides providing Muslims with a mechanism for acquiring and controlling soldiers from outside marginal areas, military slavery had to fit into the general patterns of Islamicate life. Military slavery had a military rationale, but nonmilitary factors also contributed to its success and proliferation. These nonmilitary factors did not explain the purpose of the institution, but they did help to form an environment that was conducive to military slavery. Had the military needs been unchanged but other factors unsuitable, the system might never have come into being. Beyond fulfilling a function, military slavery also fitted into Islamicate society.

1. Slaves fought in battle from the first moments of Islam. They were already participating in Muḥammad’s battles in sizable numbers. This fact must have made their later use in warfare more acceptable, though no explicit mention of the Muhammadan precedent has come to my attention. Since every act of Muḥammad’s has attracted close scrutiny, it seems probable that the slaves who fought with him remained ever after in the Islamic consciousness. This may have given sanction to the use of slaves in warfare: “If the Prophet did so, we may too.” I cannot account for the striking absence of this justification from the sources, however.

2. Both Islamic law and the events of the early period combined to give slaves in Islamdom an exceptionally high status. The Qur’ān and subsequent Sharī‘a regulations guaranteed the human dignity of the slave, especially one who was a Muslim.

83. Details are in chapter 4.
Although inferior on this earth, his equal value in relation to God found frequent emphasis. Few slaves have enjoyed as high a legal and social status as those in Islamdom. The fact of being a slave in itself meant less among Muslims than among other peoples, for the slave’s potential was greater than elsewhere. This dignified treatment of slaves made it more likely that they would hold important positions.

In reality, too, the first experiences of slaves in Islam were extremely good. For a variety of reasons (to be discussed in chapter 6), they filled important positions from the first years of Islam and participated extensively in its early civilization. Where else have “slaves made important contributions and exerted strong influences in the realms of politics and public administration, warfare, religion, arts and crafts, music, poetry, grammar, and learning in general?” Slaves pervaded every area of activity, and their names ranked among the most celebrated of early Islamicate history and culture.

3. The Shari'a does not clearly permit or prohibit slaves from fighting. Al-Adawi, a 7th/13th-century author of a mirror for princes, points to universal agreement among the jurists that a soldier must meet four qualifications (he must be adult, Muslim, whole of body, and mentally sound) and disagreement on a fifth: whether or not he must also be free. Al-Adawi reports that Abü Ḫanifa requires him to be free and ash-Shāfi‘i does not. Ash-Shāfi‘i makes slave participation optional in offensive jihad warfare while requiring it in defensive warfare. Ash-Shaybānī asserts that a slave may not fight without his master’s permission except in an emergency; as-Sarakhsi adds that the master may not force the slave to fight except in an emergency. A consensus

84. Haas, p. i. Haas considers every mawla a slave, despite his disclaimer (p. 7, n. 1).
85. Al-Adawi, p. 156.
86. Umm, 6:85.
87. as-Sarakhsi, pp. 182–83, 199–200; Khadduri, pp. 84–87 lists seven major qualifications, one of which—economic dependence—excludes slaves; Thābit, pp. 93–99, lists freedom as one of the five prerequisites for soldiers but recognizes the controversy on this point. The argument over the validity of a slave’s amān (see note 52 to chap. 2) tacitly acknowledges the presence of slaves in the Islamicate armies.
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seems to exist against using slaves in normal circumstances but in favor of their assistance in times of trouble. It is noteworthy that there was no clear condemnation of slaves fighting in normal circumstances; further, the restraints on slaves fighting appear to reflect a concern with property value more than with honor, the discussions discourage slaves from exposing themselves to needless danger and thus jeopardizing their master's property.  

4. The strong and continuing relationship encouraged by the Shari‘a between a freed slave and his patron (the walâ‘ of manumission), created favorable conditions for military slavery. Slaves owned by a Muslim remained by their master long after emancipation, providing him with allegiance and service in return for protection and patronage. Few slaves returned to their countries of origin after becoming free; the majority stood by their patron. This continuing voluntary relationship increased the likelihood of men of slave origins serving their masters in important positions.

5. "Le Monde musulman est une civilisation esclavagiste." The Muslims never seem to have suffered from a shortage of slaves; through many centuries, over many areas, they owned them in abundant numbers. The Muslims imported slaves from all the surrounding areas—especially sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, Central Asia, and India—while hardly ever falling victim to slavery themselves. The presence of slaves was, of course, a fundamental precondition of military slavery; and their existence in massive numbers was conducive to the system, since owners sought useful ways in which to employ the slaves at hand. Certainly this appears to have been the case for those rul-

88. as-Sarakhsi, p. 908. This brings to mind a U.S. Civil War anecdote, when a master "told his slave to look after his property, and when some shot fell nearby, the Negro fled, and when the master reprimanded him he said, 'Massa, you told me to take good care of your property, and dis property (placing his hand on his breast), is worf $1500' " (CW, p. 278).

89. My "Mawlas" article discusses this at length.

90. For an exception, see KM, p. 203.


ers who received vast numbers of slaves as war captives (see p. 97).

6. An abundance of servile women in courts may have made rulers more predisposed to military slavery. A Muslim man could keep any number of concubines; this practice filled the rulers' palaces with legions of slavewomen. Many a Muslim ruler found himself surrounded by females of slave origins, including his mother and wives; why not, then, include male slaves in his entourage too?

7. Islam summons an unparalleled allegiance from its adherents. It has the power to change loyalties; it routinely transforms a person's whole orientation. This made it easier for Muslims than for other peoples to place outsiders in responsible positions. Islam shows astonishing power in capturing a person's primary identity; converts usually view themselves as Muslims first and as members of an ethnic group or region second. While many differences distinguished Muslims from each other, they felt their common bond more than those differences. So powerful was this affiliation that, for example, the Turks "submerged their identity in Islam" to the point where, in premodern times, they had almost no self-conception other than as Muslims. 93 Similarly, for Berbers in North Africa, "notions between tribal and Islamic were hazy and of doubtful social significance." 94

The power of the Islamic bond gave a master confidence that a slave who converted to Islam really did transfer his allegiance to the Muslims. When non-Muslims attempted to bring about comparable changes in identity, they did not meet with the same success; both the Byzantines and the Crusaders tried to effect a similar transformation in marginal area soldiers; 95 but Christianity does not bind its adherents as tightly as Islam does.

93. B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1965), p. 13; S. A. Zhenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), p. 8. Islam had the very special power (shared, perhaps, only by the United States) to change not only the identity of a new member of its community but also that of his ancestors.

94. Gellner, p. 15.

95. On Byzantium, see Vryonis, "Byzantine and Turkish Societies," pp. 125–52, comparing Byzantine and Islamicate attempts; also C. Cahen, "Djaysh" in *EF²*. On the Crusaders, see Smail, pp. 111–12, discussing the Turcopoles, the
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Besides the strength of the Islamic ties, the readiness of Muslims to accept new converts to Islam—even slaves—contributed to their enthusiasm for Islam. The manumitted slave became a full-fledged member of the community. A Muslim could not be a complete stranger to other Muslims; even if a foreigner or a slave, he shared a vital bond with them. Other societies generally showed less openness to outsiders and greater reluctance to allow them to hold sensitive positions.

8. The Shari‘a ruling that one-fifth of all booty (ghanīma) be given to the government derives from the Qur‘ān: “When you have taken booty, one-fifth belongs to God, the Prophet, his near of kin, to orphans, the poor, and wayfarers.”96 While the jurists disagreed about the details of this arrangement,97 they did concur that this one-fifth (Arabic: khums; Persian: penchik) of the booty belonged to the community as a whole as represented by its government and personified by its ruler. The fifth generally included all forms of wealth acquired by force of war, both property (movable and not) and persons—namely, slaves.98

Until now, no study has been made of the application of the khums regulation throughout Islamicate history; but wherever it held firm, it could supply the ruler with massive numbers of slaves.99 Extensive conquests could provide the Muslim ruler with thousands of slaves; in such instances, it made no sense for them all to serve him personally or work in his household. They could better labor in the fields or in industry, but the ruler might prefer to use them to support his regime by enrolling them into the army or the administration. The khums ruling probably made closest the Crusaders came to military slavery. The Crusaders had an acute shortage of military manpower (pp. 88–97); all the Muslim armies they faced relied on military slaves; yet despite the need and the availability of a model, the Western Christians appear never to have tried to imitate the Muslims.

The Ethiopians perhaps tried military slavery too (see n. 12 to chapter 1). 96. Qur‘ān, 8:41.
98. In the Ottoman case, for example, this factor is commonly ascribed considerable importance: Káldy-Nagy, pp. 164–65; S. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 1: Empire of the Gazis (Cambridge, 1976), s.v. penčik in the index.
the number of slaves available to a Muslim ruler greater than those available to other rulers, and their being at his disposal then encouraged their use in public life.

9. The Qurʾān prescribes the inheritance laws for Muslims and leaves little room for individual discretion. By assuring a fairly equal division of properties among members of a family, it prohibits the concentration of wealth for more than a generation or two. Muslims regularly applied these laws, despite widespread maneuvering around them and some outstanding long-lasting families. Polygamy exacerbated this diffusion of wealth, for rich men tended to have large families, and so the share of each individual heir was often quite small. No matter how rich the grandfather, two generations later his grandchildren usually received modest inheritances.

Unable to concentrate their resources, great families did not often gain a hold on important positions. Islamicate society knew no rigid social boundaries but was a constant flux of persons and families; as a result, there was always room for new blood. Only in religious officialdom, where special skills (not money) formed the basis of power, does one find consistent hereditary patterns. Because no hereditary aristocracy dominated military and political offices, they were open to social climbers—including slaves.

Beyond keeping the positions open, this fluidity in social rank cut down on birthrights. The daintiness of born aristocrats in Hindu India or feudal Europe derived in large part from their assured superiority. They never allowed their ranks to be filled by persons of slave origins; but in Islamicate society, social fortunes were too transient for a person's birth to play too much of a role in his career.

10. The Shariʿa allows few ties of subordination other than slavery, so Muslim leaders fully exploited the slave-master bond.

100. In Iran especially, the aristocracy exploited every loophole and even committed incest in order to preserve a fortune. For the description of an enduring aristocracy, see R. W. Bulliet, The Patricians of Nishapur (Cambridge, Mass., 1972).

101. For an entirely different approach leading to this conclusion, see Halpern, p. 70. Also Hodgson, 1:320, 2:117–18.
As a result, slaves attained diverse positions which elsewhere would have gone to persons with different statuses. Also, the disjointed nature of Islamicate society and its weak institutional ties meant that only a bond as strong as slavery insured durable relations. Ties with free men, be they relatives, kinsmen, mercenaries, allies, religious brethren, or notables, often did not hold.

11. A strict separation of the sexes may also have favored the use of military slaves. The exclusion of women from public life and the stringent sexual code between men and women encouraged widespread homosexuality among men and made it generally accepted in Islamicate society. In this context, military slavery benefited the leaders by supplying them with a pool of subservient men available for sexual relations. Better yet, the young recruits offered a choice of "beardless ones." Two practices reflected this homosexual element: the fact that eunuchs trained the recruits and the meteoric careers of male slaves—often military slaves—to whom the ruler or a high official took a liking. Presumably sexual bonds, not just good looks, accounted for this favor.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has suggested why military slavery existed and why it existed only in Islamdom. It provided a most effective way for governments to acquire and control marginal area soldiers; and Muslim rulers developed it because their own subjects withdrew from public life and would not fight for them.

Several distinctive Islamicate elements have emerged here: (1) the extent and seriousness of the gap between ideals and reality in public life; (2) the withdrawal of insiders from politics and

103. Ayāz, the slave and favorite of Maḥmūd of Ghazna, was probably the most renowned catamite in Islamicate history (P. Hardy, "Ayāz," in *EI²*); also Simā ad-Dimashqī, al-Muʿtasim’s favorite (Aghānī 18:93); and al-Khālidīyaynī, p. 49; Mez, p. 358. Even a eunuch gained fame as a sultan’s lover! (S. Digby, "Kāfūr, Mālik," in *EI²*).
warfare; (3) the reliance on outsiders to staff administrations and armies; (4) the development of an institution—military slavery—to bring in and control soldiers from the outside.

The truly unusual feature of military slavery has little to do with the enslavement of soldiers; it lies, rather, in the fact that a cultural rationale lies behind this phenomenon. The existence of military slavery has almost nothing to do with material circumstances (geographic, economic, social, political, technical, and so on), but follows from the needs inherent in Islamicate civilization. In contrast to other forms of military recruitment—tribal levies, mercenary enrollment, militia conscription, or universal service—this one existed in only one civilization and occurred there almost universally. To the best of my knowledge, no other method of military organization has comparable connections to a single civilization.

Herein lies the purpose of this analysis: to show that Islam, a religion, must be taken into account when assessing public affairs in premodern Islamdom. Some issues, no doubt, can be fully understood without reference to Islam; it would be foolish to claim that nothing significant took place in this period without Islam affecting it. But it would also be unwise to ignore Islam; for although it is a religion, it has affected many nonreligious aspects of life among Muslims, even in areas—military organization a case in point—which ostensibly have nothing to do with it. If the connection drawn here between military slavery and Islam is valid, then much else in the public life of Muslims occurred within an Islamicate matrix.

The reaction of the reader to this assertion may well be influenced by his own background. Of the three great monotheistic religions, Christianity differs from Judaism and Islam in this regard. To look at Islam from a Christian point of view can make it more difficult to understand how Islam permeated the lives of its adherents; whereas Christianity is a system of belief, Judaism and Islam are all-inclusive ways of life.

Above all, the Jew fulfills his religious obligations by maintaining an all-inclusive law, both the biblical and the expanded rabbinic Halakha. Although Jesus himself seems not to have rejected this law, Saint Paul did: “If righteousness comes by law,
then Christ died for nothing."\textsuperscript{104} Among other consequences, this belief had the effect of withdrawing religion from many aspects of life for Christians; the emphasis on faith made the many regulations which defined the everyday life of the practicing Jew unnecessary. While in time the Church built up a body of regulations, the Canon Law, which in some ways approached those of Judaism, these never touched on spheres of life to the extent that the \textit{Halakha} did, in respect both to quantity and to basic principles.

The Protestant Reformation included a passionate denunciation of the regulations which had proliferated in Catholicism; whatever their other differences, the Protestants agreed on reemphasizing the paramountcy of faith. Moreover, there arose among Lutherans a theory often alluded to as that of "two kingdoms," one of God and the other of the state. An indirect consequence of this theory was the shrinking of religion from being all-inclusive (as was the Jewish and Muslim view) into a limited domain of worship, personal piety, and the like. This reduction in the scope of religion has had a far-reaching impact, not only on Protestants, but also on Catholics, Orthodox, and even on Jews (since the late eighteenth century) and Muslims (since the late nineteenth century). The Protestant ethos has become the modern way; modern man restricts religion to belief and feeling; he is not familiar with the pervasiveness and absolute authority of religious injunctions.\textsuperscript{105} Thus, Catholics have come to view confession in terms of its psychological value; Jews point out the medical advantages of circumcision; and Muslims argue the social benefits of banning liquor. The modern person has nearly forgotten the original religious mandate that established these requirements; he is therefore psychologically distant from the notion that religion could both directly and indirectly affect nearly all aspects of life; he is unprepared for this because he looks at religion in a Protestant way.

\textsuperscript{104} Galatians 2:21.

\textsuperscript{105} Our alienation from comprehensive religion can be compared to our alienation from animals. The modern person no longer lives among them as his ancestors did, but encounters them only as pets, pests, clothing, and food.
Although in both Judaism and Islam faith is not ignored, both center around a code of law. The Muslim fulfills his religious obligations by maintaining the laws of the Sharī'a. Not only does it resemble the Halakha in general purpose; many of its specific points derive from Jewish prototypes. For example, Islamic requirements for slaughtering animals for food closely parallel Jewish ones. Other regulations reflect their Jewish origins by being the opposite; if Jews almost never speak the name of the Lord, Muslims do so incessantly. The important point is clear: Jews and Muslims in premodern times lived in societies molded by divinely inspired regulations in a way far different than did Christians.

Many modern persons, regardless of religion, are skeptical about the notion of Islamicate patterns permeating a society; traditional Jews and Muslims have little trouble understanding and accepting this fact. The dubious reader may inquire of himself if he does not look upon Islam in too modern a manner.

This excursus into comparative religions prompts a final remark: from a broader perspective, Islam extended many Jewish patterns and values. It took them to new geographical areas (sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia) and into new areas of life (warfare, politics) which the Jews, because of their smaller dispersal and numbers, hardly explored.
The second half of this study leaves the Islamicate level to concentrate on the first appearance of military slavery. Besides its evident importance for the history of the institution of military slavery, this topic sheds light on the early Islamic period and provides a means by which to test hypotheses presented in part I.

Above all, two questions must be answered: when did military slavery first occur (chapters 4 and 5) and how did it develop (chapter 6)? The primary sources bear reluctant witness to the origin of this institution; information must be squeezed from indirect and little-considered writings. Although no single indication conclusively answers either of these questions, several in combination add up to a forceful argument.

*Origins* has two possible meanings in a historical study, "genealogy" (tracing a thing's ancestry) or "breeding ground" (analyzing the environment in which it grew).* In this study, it has the latter meaning; pre-Islamic practices in Rome-Byzantium, Iran, and Arabia are of less concern than the circumstances under which military slavery developed.

Al-Muʿtaṣim’s name is universally associated with military slavery; but was he indeed the first Muslim ruler systematically to employ slaves as soldiers? The question contains two parts: (1) did slaves fight for the Muslims before al-Muʿtaṣim’s time? (2) if so, were any of them military slaves? This chapter answers the first question; chapter 5, the second.

The record of slaves fighting for the Muslims in the first two centuries contains some surprises, for they had a significant military role from the time of Muhammad’s first battle which continued through to al-Muʿtaṣim’s reign. (His ascension to the throne in 218/833 is assumed as an end date for the development of a military slave system, for reasons explained in the Introduction.) The frequency and importance of slaves in warfare in this period exceed previous notions. This chapter presents, with only a few comments, the historical record, gathering information about the many cases of slaves in warfare directly from the primary sources.

Before launching into the role of slaves in early Muslim warfare, a brief explanation of the mawla status and the word *unfree* in the chapter heading is necessary.

The following pages describe the military activities not just of persons called slaves but also those of mawlas.1 This vexing

1. The full version of this argument will appear in my “Mawlas: Freed Slaves and Converts in Early Islam.”
status played a major role in the early social history of the Muslim community. In Marwanid times, mawla referred to two distinct types of person, the slave mawla and the free mawla. The slave mawla (mawlā walāʾ) was a slave who was subsequently freed and who contracted a walāʾ (client) relationship with his old master in accordance with Islamic law. Most slaves who were freed had already converted to Islam. The free mawla (mawlā muwālāh) was a member of the conquered (that is, non-Arabian) populations who had converted to Islam. Upon converting, he too contracted a walāʾ relationship with his patron, an Arabian. The walāʾ of the freedman and that of the free man differed only in minor details, and their social standing was comparable.

The best efforts of twentieth-century researchers have not succeeded in distinguishing one type of mawla from the other. The historical sources call most persons merely “mawla,” without providing information about whether they were slave or free. For a study of slavery, the need to distinguish between the two kinds of mawla appears to be of paramount importance; but I argue elsewhere that nearly all mawlas who fought in the early Islamic period either had slave origins or experienced something very similar. The reasoning behind this is as follows.

For analyzing the mawla status, the early period of Islamic history divides into three eras, the Muḥammadan (1–13/622–34), Arabian (13–132/634–750), and first Abbasid (129–205/747–820). In the first, a count shows that five-sixths of identified mawlas were slave mawlas; in the third, the free mawla status disappeared, so the overwhelming majority of mawlas had slave origins. The second (Arabian) period is the most complex, for both slave and free mawlas appear to have existed in quantity. Close examination of mawlas in that period reveals that they shared many significant characteristics. On the basis of these common features, I conclude that all mawlas in the Arabian period had a single social status; in chapter 6, I argue that for mawlas who fought, their status was servile. Thus, in all three eras of mawla development, most of those engaged in warfare

2. Ibid.
experienced slavery or something closely akin to it. The term "unfree" thus refers both to slaves and to mawlas.

**Before 64/684**

Muḥammad and the Ridda Wars, 2–13/624–34

Slaves formed a disproportionately large part of the Muslim community in its very first years. According to an oft-quoted ḥadīth, five of the first eight converts had slave origins. Indeed, the second Muslim (after Muḥammad himself) may have been Muḥammad’s slave, Zayd b. Ḥarītha. The humble origins of the first Muslims provided Meccan scoffers with much to laugh at. Naturally, when war came these Muslims played a major role.

Slaves and other weak persons (mustaḍfaḥūn) found a welcome place in the nascent Islamicate armies for both religious and military reasons. Islam stressed the social egalitarianism of all Muslims; what better way to confirm this than by letting slaves take an active role in defending the faith? Beyond ideology, the slaves provided valuable manpower to the small community of Muslims and its allies. They made up a good part of the umma for some years, and it would have been folly to disregard them when every man was needed. Accordingly, the Prophet and the first caliph fully utilized the slaves at their disposal. This combination of sentiment and exigency led to the heavy use of slaves during the ten years from Badr to the end of the Ridda Wars (2–13/624–34).

Unfree soldiers fought for Islam from the first battle; indeed, the first Muslim killed in battle was Mīḥja, a black mawla. The biography of the Prophet, Ibn Hishām’s as-Sīra an-Nabawiyya, lists the combatants, slayers, and casualties at the Battle of Badr in 2/624, as well as the casualties at the Battle of Uhud in 3/625. A tally of these lists shows the following participation by mawlas:

3. *UG*, 4:44.
5. *AA*, 1:156.
### Table: Mawlas, Total Muslims, and Percentage of Mawlas

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<tr>
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<th>Mawlas</th>
<th>Total Muslims</th>
<th>Percentage of Mawlas</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combatants: Badr</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slayers: Badr</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties: Badr</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to these, *Usd al-Ghāba* mentions two more mawlas who fought at Badr. A compilation of Ṣaḥāba mawlas shows that about five-sixths of them were slave mawlas; thus, some twenty-four slave mawlas fought at Badr.

These figures are only for mawlas, not slaves still in servitude at the time of battle. Generally, slaves who had not been manumitted do not warrant separate mention, since they were considered the property of their masters; therefore we tend to hear of their exploits only if they were later manumitted, when it might be noted that they had fought while still slaves. At the Battle of Badr three such slaves of Muḥammad’s fought, three or five belonging to other masters, and three slaves of the Banu Affān. Adding these slaves to the slave mawlas, the unfree made up about 34 out of 324 combatants at Badr, about 10 percent of the Muslim force. This figure must be seen as a minimum, for undoubtedly more slaves fought alongside their masters without their participation being recorded.

Looking beyond Badr to all the battles the Muslims fought during Muḥammad’s lifetime and the Ridda Wars, a sizable proportion of mawlas fought. A collation of the biographies shows the following:  

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### The Unfree in Muslim Warfare, 2–205/624–820

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mawlas in Battle</th>
<th>Total Mawlas</th>
<th>Percentage of Mawlas in Battle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Walā' to Muḥammad</em></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Walā' to others</em></td>
<td>45</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Roughly one-third of all mawlas in the Ṣaḥāba fought with certainty; how many more have been omitted or forgotten we cannot even guess. The biographical source *Usd al-Ghāba* contains a confession of its incompleteness: “many of the Ṣaḥāba had mawlas and not all of them knew the Prophet.”

Beyond raw manpower, the unfree brought special skills which significantly aided the Muslims. A Persian slave, Salmān al-Fārisī, introduced the Iranian practice of digging a ditch around a city, and his innovation is credited with saving Medina from a siege by Quraysh. The Ethiopian spearmen, however, had the most military importance, as the career of Waḥṣī illustrates. Waḥṣī, a black Ethiopian, was expert at throwing the Ethiopian spear, a spear unlike the Arabian variety, though we do not know exactly how. He first entered the chronicles when his Qurashi master, Jūbayr, offered to free him in return for killing the Prophet’s uncle, Ḥamza, at the forthcoming battle at Uḥud. (Another account names as targets either Ḥamza, Muḥammad himself, or ʿĀlī b. Abī Ṭālib.) When Waḥṣī fought at Uḥud, he was one of only two ghulāms on the Qurashi

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15. IH, 2:61; T 1:1385.
Haszha side. He killed Ḥamza and received his freedom as promised. After the battle, he sped to Mecca and announced there the Qurashī victory at Uhud. A few years later, at the Battle of Khandaq, he fought again with Quraysh, this time killing the Muslim at-Ṭufayl b. an-Nuʿmān. When the Muslims took control of Mecca Muḥammad ordered his death, so Waḥshi fled the city and escaped to at-Ṭāʾif, where he joined a group of at-Ṭāʾif residents who submitted to Islam. On converting, he recounted to the Prophet the manner in which he had killed Ḥamza; upon hearing this tale, Muḥammad banished Waḥshi from his presence. Waḥshi subsequently became a less than exemplary Muslim; it is said that he was the first Muslim in Syria to drink wine excessively and to wear polished red clothes. However, in 11/632 he again proved himself as a soldier, this time for the Muslims. At the Battle of Yamām, he killed Musaylama, the enemy commander and the chief "false prophet" of the Ridda Wars. Musaylama's death marked a turning point for the Muslim fortunes. Waḥshi was thereafter remembered as the slave who killed both the uncle of the Prophet and one of early Islam's greatest enemies. In Waḥshi's own words: "I killed the best of men after the Prophet and then later the worst of them."

As Waḥshi's career indicates, slaves provided more than cannon fodder for the first Islamicate armies. Waḥshi "was certainly a soldier, trained in the handling of arms." He and Salmān al-

17. Ibid., p. 230.
18. Ibid., pp. 286, 300; AA, 1:322, 328; T, 1:1405; IA, 2:156; KM, 60; FB, p. 52; IH 2:69-73, 122, 156; IS, 2:1.29; TYaʿ, 2:47; Khalīfa, p. 32.
23. IH, 2:71; AA, 1:322; UG, 5:83; IA, 2:251; cUmar struck him off the diwān on account of his drinking (IH, 2:73); he eventually died from wine drinking (UG, 5:84).
25. IH, 2:73; FB, p. 89; Khalīfa, p. 89; UG, 5:83.
Fārisī made significant military contributions; though they are the best known of the first Muslim slave soldiers, others too must have had important military roles.

Usâma b. Zayd b. Hāritha, a son of Muḥammad's favorite slave mawla, commanded the left wing at the Battle of Yamāma; then, in 11/632, just before his death, Muḥammad ordered an expedition to Syria under Usāma's command. The Arabian warriors assigned to this campaign resisted the selection of a mawla leader, so when Abī Bakr insisted on carrying through the Prophet's last wishes, some of them complained to ʿUmar. Despite their protests, Usâma led the campaign and executed it successfully, returning home with booty.27 Thus a mawla led the very first sortie of Muslims out of Arabia.

Despite the profusion of slaves and mawlas fighting with the Muslims before 13/634, there can be no question of military slavery here; the Muslim forces constituted raiding parties more than a true army, and their need for the unfree in warfare was immediate and short-term. No system existed; rather, need for and availability of the unfree happily coincided.

Arabian Armipotence, 13–64/634–84

The Arabian conquests began in earnest after the subjection of the Arabian tribes took place under the caliph Abī Bakr (r. 11–13/632–34). Amazingly, the conquests were made in two short periods, with only finishing operations occurring at other times. The first wave of conquests were carried out during the reign of ʿUmar I, 13–23/634–44 and the next couple of years. After this burst of expansion, the Muslims did continue to push their boundaries back, but far more slowly. Then, a second round of conquests took place from 78/697 to 96/715.

At the close of the Ridda Wars, most Arabians united behind Muslim leadership and enrolled as Muslims. Suddenly, Islam had a profusion of warriors, Arabians no longer needed their slaves to fight, and the slaves' military role dropped precipitously. It then remained minor for two generations. Unfree

soldiers who fought before 13/634 stayed on, but few new ones were recruited. Accordingly, slaves had a less significant military role in the era 13–64/634–84 than at any other time in pre-modern Islamicate history. Setting a pattern which held through at least the next two centuries, unfree soldiers more often fought against Muslims than against non-Muslims. This was so even though most warfare in the period 13–64/634–684 was directed against non-Muslims.

When rebels attacked Caliph ʿUthmān (r. 23–35/644–56) in his own house in 35/656, unfree soldiers fought on both sides. Mughīra b. Shuʿba advised ʿUthmān to arm his mawlas, and he did so; 28 several of them, including a black slave, fell defending him. 29 A Jewish slave fought bravely for ʿUthmān and received his freedom as a reward. 30 On the other side, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib called on a cousin to collect mawlas, and presumably they joined the offensive forces. 31 A year later, at the Battle of the Camel, the slaves of ʿAlḥa's soldiers followed the troops into battle, a mawla carried his flag, and, in the midst of battle, one of ʿAz-Zubayr's mawlas emitted a war cry. 32

The Battle of Sīfīn between ʿAlī and Muʿāwiya in 37/657 marked the high point for unfree soldier participation before 64/684. Most significantly, ʿAlī had the support of 8,000 or 16,000 slave and mawla troops out of a total force of 68,000, an impressive number, even allowing for exaggeration. 33 Both he and Muʿāwiya gave high command to unfree leaders, Qanbar the ghulām and Wardān the slave mawla respectively. 34 Under the leadership of these men, a mawla on Muʿāwiya's side killed a

29. AA, 5:92, 98.
31. AA, 5:78.
32. Followed the troops: T, 1:3161; carried flag: T, 1:3175, 3203; war cry: T, 1:3190.
34. T, 1:3257. Wardān must have been a slave mawla because he was captured at Isfahan by the Muslims (Khalīfa, p. 168).
The Unfree in Muslim Warfare, 2-205/624-820

mawla on 'Ali's side.35 A Daylami mawla who had converted at
the hands of the Prophet fought for 'Ali, and another mawla
helped defend a gilded shield on Mu'awiya's behalf.36 Instead of
fighting on his own, Mu'awiya had a mawla impersonate him
in duels.37 In another duel, an ostensible Arabian fighting for
Mu'awiya was killed and turned out to be an Ethiopian slave.38

In 43/663, a mawla (Abū 'Ali mawla of Banī al-Ḥārith b. Ka'b)
led a Khārijī rebellion of mawlas; according to al-Ya'qūbi, "this
was the first campaign which the mawlas undertook."39 Unfor-
nately, he does not make it clear whether it was their first cam-
paign altogether or their first as Khārijīs. The leader of that ex-
pedition was probably the same person as Abū Miryam, mawla
of Banī al-Ḥārith b. Ka'b, a Khārijī leader of 200 or 400 mostly
mawla soldiers disparagingly called slaves by their enemies; Abū
Miryam was also the first to take women into battle.40 Unfree
soldiers accompanied al-Ḥusayn b. 'Ali b. Abī Ṭālib on his fateful
march to Iraq in 60/680 and were killed with him at Kar-
balā'.41 Three years later, a Shi'ī leader called for help from the
Bukhārīya and the mawlas in Basra.42

The sources mention unfree soldiers fighting on a few occa-
sions in the first wars of conquest. A ghulām (slave?) killed the
Persian commander at al-Buwayb in 13/634.43 Unfree soldiers
also fought at al-Qādisīya in 14/625, the conquest of Jerusalem
in 15/636, the conquest of Syria, Shuhriyāj, in eastern Iran,
Transoxiana, Egypt, and probably in Tabaristan.44 More re-

38. Ibn Muzāhīm, p. 276 = T, 1:3307. For a mawla killed in 41/661, see
Khalīfa, p. 235.
39. T, 2:221.
41. T, 2:323, 358, 388, 710; IS, 6:238.
42. T, 2:464. On the Bukhārīya, see Wellhausen, p. 403 n. 3; Forand, "Devel-
opment," pp. 6–9; Töllner, p. 13; Fries, p. 25; Gibb, p. 19; de Goeje, Glossaries
to Ibn al-Faqqīh, p. xvi, and to at-Ṭabarī, 14:xxvii.
43. T, 1:2192–93.
Shām, p. 22. Shuhriyāj: FB, p. 394; this passage is translated and discussed on pp.
markably, they also led forces on occasion. A ghulām led 60 or 80 free men against the Persians at al-Qādisiya; other unfree commanders, two of them, led troops in Khurasan, and also against Carthage in 59/679.\(^4\) On an expedition to the east, an Arabian commander “had three brave slaves with him, one of whom he retained to bear his arms, and the other two he appointed as officers in the army, each being made the leader of 500 men.”\(^4^6\)

A striking but puzzling pattern concerns the “slaves of the people of Kufa”; every mention of large numbers of servile soldiers during this period involves these Kufan slaves. After the campaign against Tabaristan in 30/651, Caliph "Uthmān distributed money to the mamlūks of Kufa, apparently for military purposes, without reducing the pay of their masters.\(^4^7\) The 8,000 or 16,000 slaves and mawlas who fought with "Ali at Šiffin came from Kufa.\(^4^8\) The Khārijī leader of the first mawla sortie mentioned above also came from Kufa.\(^4^9\) Kufa had indeed been known for its high proportion of non-Arabians ever since its founding—a recent estimate puts the number of mawlas at half the population—so this may explain the conspicuous role of its slaves and mawlas in warfare.

A special group of unfree soldiers has been omitted from mention here, the slaves and mawlas who had converted to Islam before the occupation of Mecca. Their early conversions made them part of the Muslim aristocracy and largely obscured their humble backgrounds (though not immediately: recall the case of Usāma). Men of servile origins such as "Ammār b. Yāsir, Salmān al-Fārisī, and Şuhayb b. Sīmān acquired important military positions on the basis of their high standing in the nascent Islamic community.

46. al-Kūfī, p. 60.
47. T, 1:2845.
48. See note 33 above.
49. TYa ᵃ, 2:221.
50. az-Zabidi, p. 76. On their numbers, see Din, pp. 288, 293.
The Marwanids, 64–132/684–750

Mu'āwiya II's death and the advent of civil war in 64/684 marked the first large-scale and consistent entry of unfree soldiers into Muslim armies. They continued to fight often and in large numbers through the Marwanid period, until the Abbasid takeover in 132/750. In this era, unfree soldiers fought against both Muslims and non-Muslims; and when Muslims fought each other, they supported both the central government and the rebels. Most modern accounts stress their support only for the rebels: "The feelings which stirred in the mawlas' souls led them to revolt against the Umayyad caliphate and to join every faction and every rebel opposing the Umayyads." Mazlmas did join rebellions, but they also fought as much—and perhaps more—for the Marwanids against the rebels! The following pages document this important fact and an explanation for it follows in chapter 6.

Although not discontinuous, warfare in the Marwanid period can be divided into three distinct periods, two with warfare predominantly between Muslims and one mostly against non-Muslims.

64–74/684–693 Intra-Muslim Civil war
74–119/693–737 Non-Muslim Second conquests
119–132/737–750 Intra-Muslim Marwanid decline

Civil War, 64–74/684–93

With Rebels. Two of the protagonists in the second civil war, al-Mukhtar and Ibn az-Zubayr, depended so heavily on unfree soldiers that they deserve separate consideration.

1. Al-Mukhtar has been portrayed as the first Muslim leader "to understand and to try to remedy the existing distinctions in social, economic and political rights between 'Arabs and mawāli." Already before his revolt, he claimed to defend the weak (ad-du'afā')—that is, slaves and mawlas. His first military

52. Dixon, p. 36.
53. Ibid. I have been unable to locate several of Dixon's references concerning al-Mukhtar.
action saw him in the company of mawlas.\textsuperscript{54} He sent a mawla on the important mission of avenging al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī’s death.\textsuperscript{55} Subsequently, unfree soldiers fought for him in large numbers: 500, 1,000, 2,300, possibly 4,000, and “most of an army.”\textsuperscript{56} Al-Mukhtār’s troops included so many unfree soldiers that they were called “the slaves”;\textsuperscript{57} at one point Ibn az-Zubayr’s soldiers complained to al-Mukhtār of being attacked by their own slaves (or their slaves and mawlas).\textsuperscript{58} The unfree provided al-Mukhtār with officers as well as troops; in 66/686 they led 100 horsemen on one occasion and 4,000 soldiers (including at least 1,000 mawlas) on another.\textsuperscript{59} Further, al-Mukhtār sent a black ghulām cavalryman on an important mission;\textsuperscript{60} and a mawla was such a close companion of his that when the enemy captured the mawla, he was singled out for special insults and punishment.\textsuperscript{61}

Of al-Mukhtār’s mawlas, Abū ʿAmra Kaysān is by far the best known.\textsuperscript{62} He served al-Mukhtār as the leader of his mawla bodyguard (the shurta or ĥaras).\textsuperscript{63} At the Battle of Madhār, where al-Mukhtār lost his life in 67/687, Abū ʿAmra Kaysān led a separate corps of mawlas.\textsuperscript{64} His exploits apparently caught the imagination of some Shiʿīs, for a sect called the Kaysāniya came into existence about the time of al-Mukhtār’s revolt, most probably named after this man.\textsuperscript{65}

After al-Mukhtār’s death in 67/687, his supporters lost a battle

\textsuperscript{54.} Ibid., p. 29.
\textsuperscript{55.} KM, p. 126.
\textsuperscript{57.} T, 2:623.
\textsuperscript{58.} Slaves: T, 2:718; Ibn ʿAtham, 6:147. Slaves and mawlas: Ibn ʿAtham, 6:146.
\textsuperscript{59.} 100 horsemen: Din, p. 301. 4,000 soldiers: Din, p. 298 and AA, 5:253; T, 2:721.
\textsuperscript{60.} Ibn ʿAtham, 6:155.
\textsuperscript{61.} Ibid., p. 108.
\textsuperscript{62.} A. A. Dixon, “Kaysān, Abū ʿAmra,” in EI.
\textsuperscript{63.} T, 2:634, 671. T, 2:634 implies that mawlas constituted the whole shurta.
\textsuperscript{64.} T, 2:721; AA, 5:253.
\textsuperscript{65.} W. Madelung, “Kaysāniyya” in EI; Dixon, pp. 77–78.
to Muṣʿab b. az-Zubayr, the brother of Ibn az-Zubayr. Muṣʿab at first intended to kill all of al-Mukhtār’s mawla soldiers while sparing the Arabians, but when his companions decried this as un-Islamic, he executed them all.66 Besides showing a strong antimawla feeling, this indicates the importance of mawlas in al-Mukhtār’s forces.

Al-Mukhtār’s use of mawlas has attracted much attention; historians consider his reliance on unfree soldiers unprecedented.67 While he depended on them heavily, a glance at other armies in the second civil war shows that all parties employed them to an unprecedented extent. The notion that al-Mukhtār received mawla support in return for championing their claims to equality does not stand up to the evidence, especially to the fact that many unfree soldiers fought against al-Mukhtār. Indeed, al-Mukhtār himself may have been killed by a mawla fighting on Ibn az-Zubayr’s behalf.68 Had there been an ideological commitment to the mawlas on al-Mukhtār’s part, he would scarcely have been killed by one of them.

2. Ibn az-Zubayr, almost simultaneously with al-Mukhtār’s rebellion (and also goaded into action by al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī’s death at Karbalā’ in 61/680), declared himself caliph in Mecca in 61/681. Unfree soldiers fought in his early battles against the Umayyads—though the sources are not entirely clear as to whose side they fought on.69 In particular, a mawla, Yazīd b. Hurmuz led a corps of mawlas at al-Ḥarrā in 63/683,70 where “they were entrusted with the defense of [a] section of the ditch. . . . Their force was divided into squadrons (karādās) positioned behind each other. They were assaulted by a unit of the [Umayyad] army and called upon to surrender; the commander,

68. AA, 5:262.
70. AA, 4b:35; IS, 5:209, 7:1.160.
Yazīd b. Hurmuz, refused and decided to continue to fight.”71 Another mawla unit did not fight so valiantly.72 The mawla who may have killed al-Mukhtār fought for Ibn az-Zubayr.73 Some of Ibn az-Zubayr’s own mawlas also participated; one went on campaign to Basra, and at Ibn az-Zubayr’s death, a slave or mawla of his declared that “a slave protects his master and is protected by him.”74

Even among soldiers of the same nationality, allegiances followed interests, not a common position. While Ethiopian allies who specialized in spear fighting fought on Ibn az-Zubayr’s side, Ibn az-Zubayr himself killed an Ethiopian ghulām who was fighting for the Umayyads.75

3. As for mawlas helping other rebels, Ibn Khāzīm’s insurrection in Khurasan during 65/685 included a slave mawla who fought so well that he caused his opponent, a tribal leader on the Umayyad side, acute embarrassment.76

*With the Umayyads against Muslims.* 1. Against al-Mukhtār. The unfree only rarely fought for the central government against al-Mukhtār; al-Mukhtār once killed two slaves in the Umayyad army, one a Black and the other possibly Greek.77 On another occasion, an Umayyad leader (who later deserted to al-Mukhtār) fought him with 1,000 Qays Arabians and their mawlas.78

2. Against Ibn az-Zubayr. Unfree soldiers played a greater role in fighting against Ibn az-Zubayr for the Umayyads. At the beginning of the revolt, the Umayyad governor in Medina sent mawlas among thirty or eighty cavalry soldiers against him; an Umayyad mawla later entrenched himself in At-Ṭā’fic with fifty men until Ibn az-Zubayr forced them to surrender and executed them.79 At the Battle of al-Ḥarra in 63/683, Caliph Marwān b.

71. Kister, p. 45, based on the manuscript of Abū'īl-'Arab.
72. Kister, p. 47.
73. *AA*, 5:262.
al-Ḥakam received material assistance from two of his generals; one offered funds, the other provided arms for all the mawlas of Banū Umayya (on the condition that Marwān collected them). This second offer indicates that the Umayyads' own mawlas fought only in emergencies, and not in standing armies. Also at al-Ḥarrā, one of Marwān's mawlas was killed in battle. A year later, at Marj Rāḥīt, Ziyād b. Abīhi's son ʿAbbād led 2,000 soldiers, mawlas and others. The sources do not state on whose side he fought, but since his brother ʿUbayd fought with the Umayyads, perhaps ʿAbbād did as well.

Toward the end of his rebellion, Ibn az-Zubayr faced Umayyad troops commanded by the mawlas of preceding caliphs; one of ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān's mawlas led 5,000 troops, beat Ibn az-Zubayr's forces at the Battle of Shabaka in 72/691, and went on to capture Medina; a mawla of Muʿāwiya's in the Umayyad forces against Mecca was killed by Ibn az-Zubayr. Significantly, mawlas fighting for the Umayyads were involved in killing Ibn az-Zubayr's principal commanders, his brother Muṣʿab and the general Ibrāhīm b. al-Ashtar, in addition to Ibn az-Zubayr himself. Recalling the report that a mawla killed al-Mukhtār, this means that all the rebel leaders may have been killed by mawlas. So much for the idea that mawlas only supported rebels! Rather, they seem to have fought with their patrons regardless of the cause, but with some noteworthy exceptions.

3. Against other rebels, Mawlas also more often fought against the Khārijī forces than for them. Al-Hajjāj sent at least six mawla generals into the field against them commanding thousands of soldiers, many of them separate corps of mawlas. An individual mawla also fought the Khārijīs. Of six Umayyad

82. AA, 5:136.  
soldiers who claimed to have killed the Khārijī leader Qatīrī b. al-Fujāca in 77/696, two were mawlas.\(^88\) At the Battle of Dayr Jamājim, al-Hajjāj’s slaves and mawlas helped to secure a crucial road head; at the same time, al-Hajjāj had ghulāms impersonate him.\(^89\) During ʿAbd al-Malik’s reign, his son al-Walid led the Caliph’s mawlas on a military expedition against ʿAmr b. Saʿīd’s brother Yaḥyā.\(^90\)

The Second Conquests

This long middle period of the Arabian era saw the Muslims once again on the offensive against non-Muslims. Unlike in the first conquests, when unfree soldiers played almost no role, in the second wave they participated often and in substantial numbers.

With Rebels. In 77/695 the Azāriqā sect of the Khārijīs split when 8,000 mawlas left the main body under their own leader, the mawla ʿAbd Rabbih as-Saghīr; presumably they also fought together.\(^91\) That same year, another Khārijī group sent 200 men under a mawla to fight al-Hajjāj’s forces.\(^92\) About this same time, a Khārijī mawla led fifty men into battle, and a mawla from Fars who was known for his ability to throw two spears (?) at once died fighting for the Khārijīs.\(^93\) Finally, Muṭarrīf, a quasi-Khārijī rebel, had a mawla in charge of his ḥaras (bodyguard); this man also served as a military commander when Muṭarrīf revolted in 77/696.\(^94\)

Ibn al-Asḥath, a former Umayyad military commander, rebelled in 80–83/699–702 using large numbers of unfree soldiers. At-Ṭabarī reports that mawlas numbered as many as the paid Arabian warriors (muqātil) at the Battle of Dayr Jamājim in

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\(^{88}\) T, 2:1019.  
\(^{89}\) T, 2:958.  
\(^{90}\) MDh, 3:111.  
\(^{91}\) Dixon, p. 180.  
\(^{92}\) T, 2:966.  
\(^{94}\) T, 2:983.
83/702\textsuperscript{95}—but it is hard to believe that they numbered 100,000. Some mawlas fought for Ibn al-Ash'ath, but another declined to lead the Ahl al-Qurrah on the grounds that, as a mawla, he was unsuited to command them, and instead he urged an Arabian for the position.\textsuperscript{96} In 116/734 one of Mūsā b. Nuṣayr's mawlas led Ibāḍī troops.\textsuperscript{97} A year later the allies of al-Ḥārith b. Surayj in Amūl had a mawla leader.\textsuperscript{98}

\textit{With the Umayyads against Muslims.} During this period of over forty years, unfree soldiers fought rebels only twice, and both of those cases are unclear. In 102/720 a mawla was killed in war, probably fighting Yazid b. al-Muhallab, and a few years later, in 109/727, a mawla led troops to Ifriqiya to quell a local disturbance, probably one caused by Muslims.\textsuperscript{99}

\textit{With the Umayyads against Non-Muslims.} After the civil wars ended internal Muslim dissension, the Umayyads undertook a second round of conquests, in my opinion even more impressive than the first. To have conquered Egypt, the Fertile Crescent, and Iran in a dozen years (13–25/634–46) was no mean feat; but to resume the wars of expansion two generations later was extraordinary. Indeed, probably the only other premodern example of such a second surge was that of the Mongols. During the years 78–96/697–715, the Muslims expanded to the far west and far east, to North Africa and Spain, western Central Asia and northwest India. Although they have been little noted as a distinct event, the second round of Arabian conquests did much to secure Islam as an established and widespread religion. Unfree soldiers played a far greater role in this wave of conquests than in the first one. Indeed, their role was so important that one might say they made the second wave possible.

\textsuperscript{95} T, 2:1072.
\textsuperscript{97} Khalīfa, p. 511.
\textsuperscript{98} T, 2:1582.
\textsuperscript{99} Khalīfa, p. 496.
While most of the warfare of this period took place in the far western and eastern regions, the Muslims also occasionally fought desultory campaigns against Byzantium. In 75/695 a mawla of Caliph cAbd al-Malik served as governor of Qinnasrin and led Umayyad troops to victory at the battles of cAmq Marc'ash and Jisr Yaghra; also during cAbd al-Malik's reign, a slave of Greek origins became a major commander of Muslim troops against the Byzantines.100 Mawlas defended Egypt from Byzantine attack in about 102/721.101

Little is known about unfree soldiers in the conquest of North Africa; in northwest India, they led 200 horsemen as an advance guard.102 In contrast, their outstanding role in the wars to control Spain and Central Asia is well documented.

Spain. Mūsā b. Nuṣayr was the key figure for the exceptional importance of slaves and mawlas in the conquest of Spain; he directed the campaign and is remembered for his connection to unfree soldiers. Mūsā's own origins are a matter of debate; he may have been an Arabian of either the Bakr b. Wā'il, Lakhm, or Arāsha tribes; a captive from cAyn at-Tamr; a wasīf manumitted by cAbd al-cAziz b. Marwān (the father of Caliph cUmar II); a mawla of the Banū Dabba, Banū Umayya, Banū Lakhm; and so forth.103 Whether himself of slave origins or not, Mūsā was one of the foremost employers of mawlas during the Arabian period, acquiring them from among the huge numbers of captives taken in the course of his conquests; the sources mention figures of 30,000, 50,000, 60,000, 100,000, and 300,000 and allude to even greater numbers.104 One contemporary of Mūsā's

100. FB, pp. 188–89, 160–61. For a translation and discussion, see p. 189.
101. al-Kindī, p. 70.
103. NT, 1:141, 156; T, 1:2064; Khalīfa, p. 102; FB, p. 247; al-Kindī, p. 52.
notes that “captives such as Mūsā b. Nuṣayr’s were previously unheard of in Islam.” In a conversation in 98/717 with Yazīd b. al-Muhallab, Mūsā boasted of his mawlas. Yazīd asked him:

“How many are your mawlas and the people of your house?”

“Many.”

“A thousand?”

“Yes, thousands and thousands, so many that one could count until it tired the soul. I have left behind [mawlas] such as no one else has left behind.”

Although most of Mūsā’s “thousands” of mawlas must have been Berbers who converted to Islam and joined his armies, the leading mawlas identified by name also had Rumi and Persian origins. This perhaps indicates that Mūsā b. Nuṣayr made efforts to collect mawlas from various regions. The scale and intensity of his use of mawlas recalls military slavery to mind.

Besides their large numbers, Mūsā’s mawlas also occupied positions of high authority. This emerges not only from their predominant role in the conquest of Spain (details to follow), but also their importance after Mūsā’s death in 98/717. In 101/720 the governor of Ifriqiya, Yazīd b. Abī Muslim (himself a mawla convert), took Berber mawlas previously affiliated to Mūsā b. Nuṣayr, tattooed the word harasī (bodyguard) on their hands, and made them his bodyguard and retinue. This action so upset the mawlas that they conspired against Yazīd b. Abī Muslim and killed him while he was praying. Some years later a Rumi mawla of Mūsā b. Nuṣayr was placed in charge of Tangiers, and another led Ibdī rebel troops in 116/734.

Mūsā’s mawlas played an extraordinary role in the conquest of Spain. All four of the Muslim leaders in the attack on Spain between 90/709 and 94/713 were probable mawlas: Tarīf, Tāriq,
Mughīth, and Mūsā himself. Ṭarīf, a Berber mawla of Mūsā’s, began the conquest in 90/709 by leading 400 or 1,000 soldiers to an island off Spain, capturing it. One hundred of those troops were on horseback.\footnote{A Berber mawla of Mūsā’s: NT, 1:141, 159. Conquest: AM, p. 6; NT, 1:159.}

Ṭāriq b. Ziyād was the great Muslim hero of the conquest of Spain. He is variously said to have been a Berber, to have come from Ṣadaf, a village near Qayrawan, or to have had an Iranian background.\footnote{AM, p. 6; NT, 1:148, 159.} All the sources agree on his being a mawla of Mūsā b. Nuṣayr. He crossed over into Spain at the head of 7,000 soldiers and then received 5,000 more.\footnote{AM, p. 7; BM, 2:6; NT, 1:142.} His troops “were mostly Berbers and mawlas, with only a few Arabians.”\footnote{AM, p. 6; NT, 1:142, 159.} One account specifies twenty-seven Arabians in his troops and adds that they went along “to teach the Berbers about the Qur’ān.”\footnote{ar-Raqīq, pp. 69-70, 74.} After many victories over the Goths, Ṭāriq is reputed to have told his patron, Mūsā: “This is your conquest for I am your mawla.”\footnote{Rūmī: FM, pp. 207, 210. Arabian: NT, 2:6. Mawla: BM, 2:9; AM, p. 10; ar-Risāla, p. 204; NT, 2:8. Sulaymān: NT, 2:8.}

Mughīth was not the mawla of Mūsā b. Nuṣayr but rather of the caliph; his patron is variously named as ēAbd al-Malik, al-Walīd I, and Sulaymān.\footnote{ ēAbd al-Malik: BM, 2:9. al-Walīd I: FM, p. 207; AM, p. 10; ar-Risāla, p. 204; NT, 2:8. Sulaymān: NT, 2:8.} Mughīth is called a Rūmī ghulām, a Rūmī captive of Arabian origins and a mawla.\footnote{ar-Raqīq, p. 78; FM, p. 207.} Ṭāriq sent him at the head of 700 horsemen and no infantry to attack Cordova, which he captured and looted with great success.\footnote{AM, p. 10.}

Finally Mūsā b. Nuṣayr himself joined the attack, bringing with him his Arabian and mawla commanders and troops.\footnote{FM, p. 207; NT, 1:144; Imāma, 2:87.} Envious of Ṭāriq, Mūsā jailed him. Ṭāriq asked Mughīth to tell Caliph al-Walīd I of his plight, offering Mughīth one hundred
slaves as a reward. Mughith accepted, had al-Walid compel Müsä to release Tāriq, and duly received his reward.\textsuperscript{121}

\textit{Western Central Asia.} While the greatest conquests in Central Asia took place in the period 86–96/705–15 under Qutayba b. Muslim, unfree soldiers had more importance in the following twenty years, 98–119/717–37.

The mawla Ḥāyyān an-Nabaṭī was the predominant unfree leader during this period. His origins are in dispute; some say his name signaled an imperfect command of Arabic, others that he was Khuradani or Daylami.\textsuperscript{122} Internal textual evidence implies that his origins lay in the Daylami mountains.\textsuperscript{123} He first appeared in 90/709 when negotiating the peace treaty (\textit{suhl}) between Qutayba b. Muslim and Ṭarkhūn, the ruler of Soghdia.\textsuperscript{124} Three years later, after Qutayba punished Ḥāyyān without good reason, Ḥāyyān turned against Qutayba and in 96/715 played a major part in the revolt against him.\textsuperscript{125} Qutayba plotted to kill Ḥāyyān, but Ḥāyyān's \textit{khādīms} warned him of the danger in time and saved him.\textsuperscript{126} At this point, Ḥāyyān commanded 7,000 mawla troops; he was a major military leader in his own right.\textsuperscript{127} In 98/117 he concluded a peace treaty for Yazid b. al-Muḥallab with the Ḣispābbadh, the ruler of Tabaristan.\textsuperscript{128} In 102/721 he advocated an attack on Soghdia, and this led to his death shortly thereafter.\textsuperscript{129} As the leader of a large corps of


\textsuperscript{123} Namely, his conversation with the ruler of Tabaristan in which he identified himself as a Tabaristani (T, 2:1329; Ibn ʿAṭham, 7:292).

\textsuperscript{124} T, 2:1204; Narshakhī, pp. 46, 58.


\textsuperscript{126} T, 2:1290.

\textsuperscript{127} T, 2:1291.


\textsuperscript{129} T, 2:1430–32. Shaban, \textit{ʿAbbāsid Revolution}, p. 100, suggests an interpretation of these events.
mawlas in Khurasan and Transoxiana, Ḥāyŷān an-Nabatī acted as one of the power-brokers of his time; he apparently did not have an Arabian patron to whom he owed service anymore.

Mawlas also fought the pagans in Central Asia in lesser capacities. They served as archers in the capture of Samarqand in 93/712.130 Mamlūks and mawlas fought with Yazīd b. al-Muhallab against Tabaristan in 98/717.131 Mawlas complained to Caliph Umar II (r. 99–101/717–720) that 20,000 of them were fighting without pay in Khurasan in 100/719;132 however exaggerated, this figure tells us something of their numbers. A mawla military commander led troops against Soghdia for the governor of Khurasan and became governor of Kīsī in 194/722.133 Two years later a mawla led a body (qawm) of mawlas and ʻarīfs (captains) against the Turks.134 The mawlas of Samarqand followed them in the rearguard.135 A Khārījī mawla participated in the siege of Kamarja in 110/728.136

Slaves made a crucial contribution at the Battle of the Pass in 112/730; the Muslims' surprise at the effectiveness of their slaves in warfare (which has already been noted),137 clearly implies that slaves normally did not fight. These were ordinary slaves who, unlike many of the mawlas, only went to war under exceptional circumstances. Also at the Battle of the Pass, other slaves of the Muslims were slain as they left the battlefield; presumably they too participated in the fighting.138

Ghulāms fought the Turks twice in 119/737. In the first encounter, they left the Umayyad military camp with saddles and staves and beat back the Turks, forcing them to flee.139 Soon

130. T, 2:1244.
131. T, 2:1318.
133. T, 2:1447.
134. T, 2:1478.
136. T, 2:1525.
139. T, 2:1598.
after, the Umayyad governor of Khurasan sent his bodyguard (ḥaras, shurṭa) and ghulāms into the Battle of Kharistān.\textsuperscript{140}

Umayyad Decline, 119–32/737–50

Extensive warfare between Muslims and virtually none against non-Muslims marked the final years of the Arabian period.

\textit{With Rebels.} During these years the unfree fought significantly less with rebels than they did with the Umayyads. In about 120/738 a manumitted ghulām of the Khārijī leader Siwār b. al-Asfar became a leader of Khārijī troops in his own right.\textsuperscript{141} When Zayd b. ʿAlī's rebellion collapsed in 122/740, a ghulām was one of the last two soldiers to persevere with him in battle.\textsuperscript{142}

The very last years of Umayyad rule saw a flurry of rebel activities.\textsuperscript{143} A mawla led the riff-raff (ghawghā') on behalf of ʿAbdallāh b. Muʿāwiya in 127/745.\textsuperscript{144} When Sulaymān b. Hishām, the son of Caliph Hishām, joined the Khārijī rebels, his mawla Badr adh-Dhakwānī, a distinguished military leader and probable founder of the Dhakwānīya corps of mawlas,\textsuperscript{145} changed sides with him along with 3,000 ahl al-bayt (retainers) and mawlas.\textsuperscript{146} Badr adh-Dhakwānī led his own and other Khārijī troops in 128/746.\textsuperscript{147} Al-Kirmānī, one of several dissident leaders in Khurasan at the time of the first stirrings of the Abbasids there, had the support of two mawla leaders commanding 2,000 and 5,000 soldiers, respectively, in 129/747.\textsuperscript{148} Finally, as the Umayyad regime collapsed, Marwān b. Muḥammad fled to Egypt, where he faced a corps of mawlas led by a mawla, and beat them.\textsuperscript{149}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{140} T, 2:1609.
\item \textsuperscript{141} UH, 3:108.
\item \textsuperscript{142} T, 2:1709.
\item \textsuperscript{143} The Abbasids will be treated in the next section.
\item \textsuperscript{144} T, 2:1883.
\item \textsuperscript{145} Dhakwānīya corps: T, 2:1892, 1939. Wellhausen, p. 372, thinks this unit was named after Muslim b. Dhakwān (on whom, see below, n. 154).
\item \textsuperscript{146} T, 2:1913, 1941.
\item \textsuperscript{147} T, 2:1939.
\item \textsuperscript{148} Khalīfa, p. 588.
\item \textsuperscript{149} al-Kindī, p. 96.
\end{itemize}
With the Umayyads against Muslims. In 119/737 both the rock-throwing slaves of Kufa and the mawlas in Khālid al-Qasrī's army fought against the Khārijīs.\textsuperscript{150} Balj b. Bishr led an expeditionary force to suppress Berber discontent in 123/740; his troops included 8,000 Arabians and 1,000 mawlas.\textsuperscript{151} Tammām b. ʿAlqama, the subsequent conqueror of Toledo and ruler of Washqa, Turtusha, and Tarsuna, was one of those mawlas.\textsuperscript{152}

The heaviest use of unfree soldiers in the Umayyad army against Muslims came in the final seven years of the Arabian period, 125–32/742–750, when they engaged every enemy—Khārijī and Shiʿī rebels and the rising Abbasids. In 125/742 a mawla archer of note fought against Yahyā b. Zayd b. ʿAlī in Khurasan.\textsuperscript{153} A year later, the mawla Muslim b. Dhakwān commanded 5,000 men in Syria.\textsuperscript{154} When rebel troops surrounded al-Walid II that same year, the caliph promised his army a reward for each enemy head they brought to him; one mawla brought him several and then complained when al-Walid delayed payment.\textsuperscript{155} Also in the same year, the governor of Egypt enrolled as soldiers 30,000 mawlas and the maqāmīsa at the order of Yazīd III.\textsuperscript{156}

In 127/745 the slaves of the people of Kufa attacked the Shiʿī leader Muḥāwiya b. ʿAbdallāh and mawlas from Egypt fought with Marwān II against a rival faction of Umayyads.\textsuperscript{157} When Marwān II fought the Khārijī leader al-Khaybarī, the slaves in Marwān's camp saw that al-Khaybarī's protection was weak and entered the battle to club him to death with staves.\textsuperscript{158} A different version of this same story is told about the war against another Khārijī, aṭ-Ḍabhāḥ. One of Marwān's commanders, a Berber


\textsuperscript{151} Ibn al-Qūṭīya, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{152} Ibn al-Abbār, 1:143.

\textsuperscript{153} T, 2:1773–74.

\textsuperscript{154} T, 2:1833. T, 2:1852–53 indicates that Muslim b. Dhakwān was a mawla and contains an important discussion about slave mawlas and free mawlas.

\textsuperscript{155} T, 2:1809.

\textsuperscript{156} al-Kindī, p. 84. On the maqāmīsa, see the possible explanation in Shaban, Islamic History, 1:157–58.


\textsuperscript{158} T, 2:1941.
mawla in charge of either his or his son’s bodyguard (haras), offered three or four thousand slaves on Marwân’s side their freedom if they would follow him into battle. They did, found ad-Ḍahhâk’s weak spot, and killed him with staves.\textsuperscript{159} This same body of Umayyad slaves then met a large number of mawlas and ahl al-bayt fighting for the Khârijîs.\textsuperscript{160} Also in that same year, a mawla of Naṣr b. Sayyâr’s grabbed a flag and died carrying it in battle against al-Kirmânî.\textsuperscript{161}

Although the Kufans joined Ābdallâh b. Muʿāwiya b. Ābdallâh’s revolt in 129/747, their slaves fought against him and lost.\textsuperscript{162} One of Caliph Marwân II’s commanders against this Shī‘î rebel received more than one hundred outfitted ghulâms, possibly for military purposes.\textsuperscript{163} At the Battle of Qudayd a year later, 1,500 to 1,700 of the 4,000 Medinan troops who fought the Khârijîs were mawlas, and Medinan slaves fought the Khârijîs at the Battle of Wâdil-Qurrâ later that same year.\textsuperscript{164} Were these possibly the same troops? When the Abbasids beat Marwân II, he fled to Egypt with 3,000 domestic slaves and mawlas.\textsuperscript{165} In 132/750 the Umayyad general Hawthara dispatched a contingent of mawla horsemen against the Abbasids.\textsuperscript{166} Shortly thereafter the Umayyad regime fell.

**The First Abbasids, 129–205/747–820**

The Rise to Power, 129–32/747–50

Unfree soldiers first fought for the Abbasids in 129/747 when they were still in Khurasan, before they took over the caliphate. In two long and revealing passages, Abû Muslim is shown to

\textsuperscript{159} Khalifà, pp. 574–75; TMaw, p. 72.
\textsuperscript{160} T, 2:1941.
\textsuperscript{161} T, 2:1926.
\textsuperscript{162} T, 2:1976.
\textsuperscript{163} T, 2:1980.
\textsuperscript{164} Mawlas: UH, 3:169; one of them is mentioned in TMaw, p. 109. Slaves: UH, 3:173.
\textsuperscript{166} T, 3:19.
have encouraged his enemies' slaves to desert their masters and to fight for the Abbasids in a separate corps. They fought in a separate trench, too, to avoid oppression by Arabians.

Abū Muslim himself, of course, was the outstanding mawla figure in the Abbasid movement; as the military and political tactician of their rise to power, he more than any other figure was responsible for the Abbasid success. Abū Salama, another mawla, also played a vital role; details about both these men have been collected by others and need not be repeated here.

Abū Jahm, the mawla founder of the Jahmiya sect, led 700 troops in 131/749. What appears to be a single mawla with various forms of his name led Abbasid troops to Sarkhus in 130/748, to Iraq against the Umayyads in 132/750, and commanded Qahtaba's advance guard also in 132/750. Finally, in 134/752, he rebelled against the Abbasids and was defeated. Al-Jāḥiẓ states that the Khurāsāniya, the Abbasid troops from Khurasan, were mawlas.

*With Rebels, 132–205/750–820.* By the time the Abbasids took over the caliphate, the eras of great conquests had ended; henceforth Muslims fought against fellow believers more often than non-Muslims. Unfree soldiers, consequently, also participated mostly in warfare between Muslims. It is commonly thought that mawlas favored the Abbasids, their alleged benefactors, just as they had earlier struggled against the Umayyads; but just as the Umayyad argument is wrong, so too is the Abbasid one. Mawlas fought as much for their rivals as for the Abbasids.

When the city of Mosul rose against the Abbasids in 133/751, a

169. On them, see Sourdel, *E/I²,* and the references in note 129 of Pipes, "Mawlas."
large army suppressed the revolt by killing "18,000 persons: pure Arabians, their slaves, their mawlas, and even unknown persons."\textsuperscript{174} Apparently, slaves and mawlas in Mosul fought along with Arabians. Mawlas fought against the Abbasids in North Africa on several occasions during al-Manṣūr’s reign: one mawla led (Berber?) forces against the Abbasids to stop the Abbasid expansion and another led Ibāḍī forces in 142/760.\textsuperscript{175}

Based in Medina, the Shi‘ī Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh revolted in 145/762; a mawla fighting for him sent out a general challenge to duel, but when he saw the soldier who accepted his offer, he ran away!\textsuperscript{176} Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh’s ally, ʿĪsā b. Zayd, dispatched a mawla in command of ten armed soldiers.\textsuperscript{177} Muhammad’s brother Ibrāhīm b. ʿAbdallāh also rebelled against the Abbasids in 145/762 with mawla help; according to Farouk Omar, vestiges of the Umayyad forces “and their Mawālī probably helped Ibrāhīm.”\textsuperscript{178}

After the revolts of Muḥammad and Ibrāhīm b. ʿAbdallāh had failed, the Abbasids sent troops to occupy Medina, but these met with opposition from an unexpected quarter, the black slaves. When an occupying soldier refused to pay for some meat, the butchers called on “the Blacks in the army,” who then killed several Abbasid soldiers with staves. Then the Blacks’ special trumpet sounded, and they all dropped what they were doing and ran to form military units. They forced the Abbasid governor to abandon Medina and flee to a nearby town, Nakhl; they then attacked Nakhl, beat the governor’s troops, forced him to flee again, and plundered his food. They continued to kill Abbasid soldiers with their staves, arousing the wonder of the Medinese: “These Blacks are either bewitched or devils!”

Once they had established their authority in Medina, the Blacks freed from jail a ʿAlid sympathizer, Ibn Abī Ṣabra, and made him their leader. Meanwhile, Caliph al-Manṣūr heard of

\textsuperscript{174} TYa, 2:357.
\textsuperscript{175} Stop Abbasid expansion: FB, pp. 232–33. Ibāḍī: Khalīfa, p. 644. For more mawla rebels, see ar-Raqiq, p. 138.
\textsuperscript{176} T, 3:238.
\textsuperscript{177} T, 3:235.
\textsuperscript{178} Omar, ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, p. 243.
the revolt, so Ibn Abi Ṣabra consulted with the notables of Medina about plans for future actions. He feared al-Manṣūr’s reaction—namely, that he would have everyone killed, and especially the slaves. The notables showed pride in what the Blacks had done but tried to modify their antagonism to the Abbasid forces. To maintain their position, the Blacks barricaded themselves in the marketplace. Ibn Abi Ṣabra then called a council to which four representatives came from each tribe and four from the mawlas (i.e. the Blacks). Ibn Abi Ṣabra called for obedience to al-Manṣūr; finally his will prevailed and the Abbasid governor returned. Retribution was relatively mild; the hands of four black leaders were cut off (the punishment for stealing). Thus ended a most remarkable rebellion by slaves on their masters’ behalf. According to Omar, “the outburst seems to have been motivated by economic and social factors as well as the sense of passion and loyalty felt by the slaves for their indignant masters.”

The Abbasids suppressed a revolt in al-Yamama and al-Bahrayn in 152/769 and took both Arabian and mawla captives (ṣābīs). Some years later a mawla of the Banū Ḥamīdīn lived in Bukhara led a rebellion in Khurasan. When the Shiʿī rebel al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz advanced to Mecca in 169/785, his 300 followers included mawlas; among them a waṣīf led 70 horsemen. When al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz needed more manpower, he sent out the usual offer to slaves: “The slave who joins us is free.” Some slaves left their masters and fought for the rebels, but when an irate slaveowner asked al-Ḥusayn how he could manumit and employ slaves he did not possess, al-Ḥusayn meekly returned to this man his own and a neighbor’s two slaves.

A mawla led a four-year rebellion in Khurasan from 183/799 to 186/802. Urmia in Azerbaidzhan fell to Abbasid troops

181. T, 3:556.
182. T, 3:470; T, 3:563 also identifies him as a mawla.
184. T, 3:556.
led by a mawla who then rebelled against the caliph. Another mawla rebel led Khārijī in Khurasan for almost thirty years, 175/791 to 213/828.

When Ālī b. ūsā, a leading Abbasid figure, rebelled against al-Ma’mūn in 195/811, a mawla of al-Mahdī’s joined him and fought a duel on his behalf. Ābū’s-Sarāyā, a former commander for both al-Amīn and al-Ma’mūn, led a major revolt against al-Ma’mūn in 199–200/815–16. One account states that Ābū’s-Sarāyā had been the slave of Harthama b. āyān, the Abbasid general. Was he in fact a freed slave? Our sources do not provide an unambiguous answer. Al-Mahdī’s son Ibrāhīm rebelled shortly after al-Ma’mūn came to power, and one of his leaders had mawlas fighting for him in 202/818.

With the Abbasids against Rebels, 132–205/750–820. After coming to power, the Abbasids first used mawlas in 134/752 in two remote regions, Oman and Sind. Seven hundred highly trusted troops, including mawlas, fought the Khārijīs in Oman and 4,000 soldiers, again including mawlas, suppressed the uprising of the Abbasid governor of Sind, Manṣūr b. Jamḥūr. Al-Manṣūr appointed a mawla as leader of 2,000 elite troops in 137/755 sent to fight the Khārijī rebel, Mulabbad b. Ḥarmala ash-Shaybānī; also a mawla commanded the Abbasid left wing on this expedition.

Unfree soldiers held important positions in the struggle against the Shi‘ī rebels, Muḥammad b. ābdallāh and his brother Ibrāhīm. A mawla led the attack on Muḥammad b. ābdallāh in 144/761 and the caliph’s mawlas participated. The

186. FB, pp. 331, 330.
188. T, 3:801.
190. Ba‘almī, 4:499.
193. 2,000 elite troops: T, 3:120. left wing: T, 3:123.
next year mawlas again took part as troops, and one led a regiment of a thousand soldiers. A mawlā amūr al-mu’mīnīn commanded so many troops against Ibrāhīm b. Ābdallāh that he established his own military camp. Another military camp included Blacks, though it is not clear that they fought or that they were slaves. The Bāhili Arabians and their mawlas also fought for the Abbasids against Ibrāhīm.

Shortly after the building of Baghdad in 148/765, the governor in al-Qinnasrīn controlled so many mawlas that Caliph al-Mansūr feared his strength. An Abbasid general returned from fighting Khārijis in 151/768 accompanied by an enormous escort of tribal kinsmen and his uncle’s mawlas; presumably the mawlas had fought with him. Two of the three leaders who joined Īsā b. Mūsā’s expedition to Khurasan in 153/1770 were mawlas. Two years later a mawlā amūr al-mu’mīnīn led an Abbasid expedition against rebels in Farghana. When faced with unrest in 158/775, al-Mansūr had, among others, mawlas prepare for action. Mawlas led troops against as-Ṣā‘īfa in 157/774; against a rebel in Khurasan in 161/778; and against rebels in Gurgan a year later. Two of the generals commanding Abbasid troops against a Khārijī revolt in 168/785 were mawlas; one of them, Harthama b. Aṭīyan, went on to become the outstanding Abbasid general. He led important campaigns until his death at al-Ma‘mūn’s hands in 200/816; his military activities and governmental positions over this thirty-year period were too numerous to mention here. His unusually long-lasting career

196. FB, p. 294.
197. T, 3:305.
198. Ibid.
199. Tya, 2:383.
203. T, 2:429.
205. TMaw, p. 252.
The Unfree in Muslim Warfare, 2-205/624-820

deserves study, particularly since he seems to have come from lowly origins.

The rebellion of the 'Alid leader al-Ḥusayn b. 'Alī marked a high point in the use of unfree soldiers; besides his heavy reliance on them (previously described), the Abbasids sent many against him. Four mawlas commanded troops, and one of them headed the vanguard of twenty horsemen. 207 Ḥammād at-Turki, an important figure in al-Manṣūr's court, 208 fought against al-Ḥusayn b. 'Alī, and one report says he killed al-Ḥusayn. 209 Another Turk, Mubārak at-Turki, was punished by the caliph for not pursuing the rebels vigorously enough. 210

In 178/794 the governor of Khurasan employed a total of half a million 'Ajam and called them the 'Abbāsiya; their walā' went to the governor, so they were in some sense his mawlas. Twenty thousand of them were sent to Baghdad where they were called the Karanbiya. 211 The governor of Ifriqiya sent his mawla against a rebel in 183/799 and the mawla won. 212

After succeeding al-Hādī on the throne, Hārūn ar-Rashīd made every effort to insure that forces supporting al-Hādī's infant son would not dislodge him; Hārūn sent Kházim with 5,000 armed mawlas against the infant. 213 When Hārūn died in 193/809, a mawla of his was counted among the major commanders. 214 After his death, an inventory of his possessions listed 50,000 swords of the Shākirīs and ghulāms. 215 As

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207. T, 3:558, 562.
208. He helped to build Baghdad (T, 3:276–80), led the caliph's bodyguard (T, 3:392; IA, 6:24), served as ḥājib (MDh, 3:309; T, 3:280), controlled taxation in the Sawad (Jah, p. 134), and personally waited on Caliph al-Manṣūr (MDh, 3:309; T, 3:429). Ath-Tha‘ālibī, p. 20, notes his special importance.
211. T, 3:631.
214. T, 3:772.
with the figure of half a million above, I little understand this huge number.

Both al-Amīn and al-Ma'mūn employed mawlas during the civil war between them. When one of al-Amīn's generals found himself in a desperate situation in 196/812, he suggested that his mawlas leave him, but they refused indignantly, averring their eternal gratitude to him for raising them out of poverty. Consequently they died by his side in battle.216 On the other side, the great mawla general, Harthama b. A'yan, fought for al-Ma'mūn that same year.217

The Abbasids sent several unfree commanders against the rebel Abū's-Sarāyā. A khādīm led 200 horsemen on the pilgrimage to Mecca in 199/815 and fought Abū's-Sarāyā's forces with them; the Abbasid governor of Mecca collected for war the mawlas of Banū ʿAbbās and the slaves of their houses (?); in the following year, the Abbasids' agent in Mecca, a mawla, collected the slaves of the Abbasids in Mecca, led them against Abū's-Sarāyā, and won.218 There are also further incidental references to mawlas fighting Abū's-Sarāyā.219

When al-Ma'mūn was looking for several soldiers of low rank to arrange the assassination of his vizier al-Fadl b. Sahl in 203/819, he chose a Black, a Greek, a Daylami, and a Ṣaqlabī (Slav); according to Baḥāmī, the Greek and the Ṣaqlabī were mawlas.220

With the Abbasids against Non-Muslims, 132–205/750–820. Unfree soldiers hardly fought any non-Muslims during the first sixty years of the Abbasid caliphate. Except for one campaign against an apostate in Khurasan in 141/758,221 they fought only against the Byzantines, the first time in 140/757, over Malatya.222 Al-Ḥasan al-Waṣīf or al-Ḥasan b. Waṣīf led the mawlas in the ad-

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222. FB, p. 188.
vance guard against Ankara in 159/776. Rabīʿ b. Yūnis, a mawla and one of the most renowned figures of the first Abbasid period, accompanied Hārūn ar-Rashīd on an expedition against Byzantium in 165/782. About that same time, the prominent Abbasid leader ʿĪsā b. ʿAlī led a corps of his mawlas to Marāsh where they joined the local populace in fighting the Byzantines; eight of the mawlas lost their lives in battle. Then nearly twenty-five years passed before mawlas again fought the Byzantines; in 189/805 a mawla led 30,000 murtaziqa (paid troops) and a year later Masrūr al-Khādīm also led troops.

The unfree fought often and performed important duties before al-Muṭṭaṣim’s reign; is this reason to believe that military slavery existed before his time? The next chapter takes up this question.

223. T, 3:459; ITB, 2:34.
225. FB, p. 189.
Slaves and mawlas fought right from the birth of Islam through to 205/820; yet the many examples given in chapter 2 make it clear that the mere fact so many unfree persons participated in battle does not mean that an institution of military slavery existed. When during the first two Islamic centuries did the military slave system originate? When did the unfree make the transition from ordinary slaves to military slaves? To place military slavery, it is necessary to look for its attributes: systematic acquisition, organized training, and professional employment. When these characteristics existed simultaneously and slaves did commonly fight, military slavery had presumably developed. Of these three requirements, the most information exists for acquisition of slaves in early Islam.

**Systematic Acquisition**

The Arabian Period

As the Muslims won great victories from 2/624 to 132/750, they acquired vast numbers of slaves—so many that no special efforts were needed to acquire them. The Prophet himself had about 70 slaves,¹ a very large holding in Arabia. Subsequent Muslim leaders amassed far greater numbers of slaves, however. Caliph

¹. This figure derives from a tally from *Usd al-Ghāba* and other sources.
Uthmān owned 1,000 mamlūks, and on one occasion he manumitted 80 in a single day; the father of Ibn az-Zubayr owned 1,000 male and 1,000 female slaves. Even a eunuch had “great wealth in slaves.” When ʿAbd al-Malik arrested his cousin ʿAmr b. Saʿīd in 69/689, the latter ordered 12,000 of his slaves and mawlas to surround the caliph’s palace. ʿAmr b. Saʿīd also had 1,000 slaves in Mecca and 1,000 in At-Ṭāʾif. When Ibn az-Zubayr died in 73/692, he left behind 1,000 skilled (sāniʿ) mamlūks. One of Ibn az-Zubayr’s commanders in Basra, apparently an Isfahani, owned 400 mamlūks.

The fabulous slave holdings of Mūsā b. Nuṣayr have already been discussed. Mūsā’s lieutenant, Ṭāriq b. Ziyād, a mawla, was able to offer 100 slaves to save his life. In 120/738, the kharāj collector in Iraq gave away 2,000 waṣīfs and 1,000 freedmen (ʿatīqṣ). At some unspecified time, the first Arabian ransomed himself for the price of 2,000 camels and 1,000 slaves.

Throughout the Arabian period, the caliphs received large numbers of captives sent by victorious commanders as khums, the one-fifth of the spoils due to the ruler. Although the military leaders probably dispatched khums after nearly every victory, the chronicles only occasionally mention it. We have specific references for the Ridda Wars, ʿAyn at-Tamr in 12/633, the capture of Jerusalem the same year, the Battle of al-Qadisiya in 14/635, the battles of al-Madāʾin and Jalūlā’ two years later, and some may have been sent from the siege of Ahwaz in 23/643.

2. One thousand mamlūks: ad-Damirī, 1:49; 80 manumitted: ar-Rashīd, p. 204; 1,000 male and 1,000 female slaves: Amīn, p. 105, quoting al-Mashūdī (without a reference).
3. al-Maqriẓī, al-Mawāʾiz, 2:137.
4. Jah, p. 112.
5. Balṭamī, 4:102–03. For more on ʿAmr b. Saʿīd’s mawlas, see Kister, p. 46.
6. ar-Rashīd, p. 203.
Khums often came from North Africa. Mūsā b. Nuṣayr sent 60,000 captives to ābād al-Malik, 30,000 or 40,000 to al-Walīd I in 95/714, and 100,000 to Sulaymān. When ā'umar II did not receive khums from Spain, he sent his mawla Jābir to collect it. Khārijī captives taken by an expedition in 122/740 ended up in the caliph’s possession.

The caliphs collected captives not just when their forces won battles and conquered territories; arrangements were made for the continuous delivery of slaves by the subject peoples. Even some areas that lay fully under Muslim rule were compelled to send slaves to the central authority as tribute or tax. In this manner, the Muslim rulers assured themselves of a steady supply of new slaves even after the conquests had stopped. As early as 20/641 the Muslim commander āmūr b. al-āṣ required that the Luwāta Berbers of Barqa pay some of their poll tax (jīzāya) in slaves drawn from their own people. Treaties made in āthmān’s time with Merv, Zaranj, Kirman, and an unknown ruler in Transoxiana all included the dispatch of slaves. In 46/666, Uqba b. Nafīr, the Muslim conqueror of North Africa, arranged for the Fezzan region to pay 360 slaves per annum. Similarly, al-Hajjāj made a treaty with Rutbil, the ruler of Sijistan, in which the latter agreed to supply slaves and other goods. In 114/732 Hishām received from his governor in Ifriqiya 20,000 slaves, 700 slavewomen, and 700 eunuchs, probably as a freely given gift.

When Marwān b. Muhammad (later Marwan II) invaded Armenia in the early 120/740s, he signed many treaties with separate local rulers; in Futūh al-Buldān, al-Baladhurī mentions nine in all. In three of them the conquered people agreed to supply slaves and wheat every year; in two they agreed to deliver a number of slaves just once and henceforth to pay wheat yearly; and in the other four they had no slaves to deliver. This small selection seems typical of the treaties which Muslims signed everywhere; most of them entailed the delivery of some slaves. On one occasion, when he received a single black ghulām, Marwan II is supposed to have sent back a scornful reply: “If you had found a color worse than black and a number less than one, you would have sent that!”

The baqt, a treaty between the Muslims and the Nubians made in 31/652, was the most confused and the most remarked upon agreement for the delivery of slaves to the Muslims. It remained in effect for over six centuries, until 674/1276; during this long period its terms were changed, but these alterations were never clearly distinguished, so the historian has many strata to separate. Y. F. Ḥasan’s analysis concludes that the original agreement stipulated annual Nubian delivery of slaves in exchange for provisions.

Of all the reported deliveries of slaves, only one explicitly indicates that the slaves had a military purpose; in either 125/743 or 128/746, the Umayyad governor of Iraq requested from the governor of Khurasan, Naṣr b. Sayyār, 1,000 armed and mounted

23. On the baqt, besides the references in Y. F. Ḥasan, The Arabs and the Sudan (Khartoum, 1973), pp. 219–21, see also Khalīfa, p. 138; Ibn al-Faqrīh, p. 76; Ibn Khurdadhbih, p. 83; Michael, 3:90–94, 360; and Hill, Termination, pp. 43–44.
24. F. Loekkegaard, “Baqt,” in EI ² gives this end date. Proof that this, unlike most other accords, remained in effect after the fall of the Umayyads comes from the fact that both the caliphs al-Mahdī and al-Muṭṣasim adjusted its terms (Ḥasan, The Arabs, pp. 25–26).
26. Ibid., pp. 20, 25.
mamlūks. Naṣr bought them (presumably in Khurasan) and had them dispatched, as requested. It is hard to assess the importance of this isolated but striking fact.

Armies in the Marwanid period, those of both the Umayyads and their rivals, found new sources of marginal area soldiers readily at hand: the vast numbers of slaves and mawlas who lived among the Muslims provided them with fresh manpower. Without having to exert themselves, military leaders had access to large numbers of unfree Arabians.

The Abbasids before al-Maʿmūn

The Abbasids did not inherit the Umayyad arrangements for slaves (with exceptions such as the baqt) and they themselves made hardly any conquests of their own. As a consequence, they nearly always had to pay for their slaves. In contrast to the Umayyads, who purchased almost no slaves (and those only during the final years), the Abbasids purchased nearly all theirs. Only on rare occasions did the Abbasids not have to buy the slaves they needed; in Hārūn ar-Rashīd’s time, 100 and 1,000 slaves came as khārīj (general tax or land tax) from Gilan, as well as 1,000 and possibly 4,000 Turks from Khurasan. Khums in the first Abbasid period was apparently figurative, a kind of tribute, and on no occasion did it include slaves.

Al-Manṣūr made unprecedented efforts to purchase slaves and mawlas:


28. I have not been able to confirm Ameer Ali’s statement that “Moāwiyyah was the first Mussulman sovereign who introduced into the Muhammedan world the practice of acquiring slaves by purchase” (quoted in R. Roberts, The Social Laws of the Qurān [London, 1925], p. 54, n. 3).


30. KB, p. 308 and al-Maqdisī, 6:101 give this impression because they refer not to specific battles but to continuous processes.
al-Manṣūr was the first caliph to acquire Turks. He acquired Ḥammād and then Caliph al-Mahdī acquired Mubārak. Subsequent caliphs and everyone else followed them in this practice.\(^{31}\)

A district [of Baghdad] is known as the “House of Slaves” (Dār ar-Raqīq) because it contained the slaves of al-Manṣūr who were brought from distant places.\(^{32}\)

Al-Manṣūr claimed in his testament to his son al-Mahdī: “I have collected for you mawlas such as no caliph before me has acquired.”\(^{33}\) One early source puts their number at 40,000.\(^{34}\)

The caliphs who ruled between al-Manṣūr and al-Ma’mūn—that is, between 158/775 and 198/813—must also have collected slaves, but the sources say almost nothing about this. Hārūn ar-Rashīd, as mentioned above, received substantial numbers of slaves as kharāj; an inventory of his legacy includes 50,000 swords belonging to his Shākirīs and ghulāms in an arsenal.\(^{35}\) Shortly after becoming caliph in 193/809, al-Āmin searched for eunuchs and bought them [i.e. they were slaves]. He set great store by them and made them his intimates through night and day. They provided him with food and drink and exercised absolute authority [over him]. He entered them in the Military Register as a corps called the Jirādiya and a corps of Ethiopians called the Ghurābiya.\(^{36}\)

Al-Āmin also had another corps of eunuchs called the Siyāfa.\(^{37}\) Al-Āmin had so many slaves that by the end of his reign, when he found himself in jail, he could not even recognize one of his slave mawlas by sight.\(^{38}\)

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31. ath-Tha‘alibi, p. 20.
32. KB, p. 248.
33. T, 3:448.
34. ar-Rashīd, p. 213.
35. Ibid., p. 217; on the Shākirīs, see note 215 to chapter 4.
37. T, 3:954; see also ITB, 2:160.
38. MDh, 3:421.
Al-Ma’mūn and Al-Mu’taṣīm, 198–227/813–42

These two caliphs and brothers undertook to acquire slaves in a systematic and large-scale manner unrelated to anything that preceded them. While al-Mu’taṣīm’s name is far more commonly associated with the recruitment and employment of slaves for military purposes, the sources do not clearly distinguish between his and al-Ma’mūn’s efforts to acquire slaves. The exact roles each of them played in the introduction of military slavery will be more fully discussed later; which of them did what is less important than the fact that together they began systematically to acquire Turkish and other slaves for use in the army. The contrast between these and earlier efforts to produce slaves cannot be too sharply drawn; for the first time in Islamicate history, a government made concentrated efforts and spent large sums to purchase slaves.

The majority of slaves came from Central Asia, though some also came from Egypt (5, 42, 44; these numbers refer to the sources cited in Appendix 5). Samarqand, a renowned slave-trading center (al-Muqaddasi, p. 278), served as al-Mu’taṣīm’s main source of Turkish slaves (4, 25, 26, 44). Through that city came slaves identified as coming from Farghana (5, 25, 26, 41, 43, 44), Khurasan (5, 41), Shash (41), Soghdia (26, 41), Transoxiana (41, 44), and Usrushana (5, 41, 44), as well as Turks of the Tuguz Guzz confederation (36).

A variety of agents acquired the slaves for the caliphs. Al-Ma’mūn requested al-Mu’taṣīm to procure Turks (2) and al-Mu’taṣīm turned to others: he sent buyers to Samarqand (4, 25), including his own mawlas (5), and he made requests to the governor of Khurasan, ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāhir (gov. 213–30/828–45), who in turn sent his request on to the governor in Transoxiana, Nūḥ b. Asad (gov. 202–27/818–42) (8, 9). Nūḥ b. Asad also sent slaves directly to al-Ma’mūn (36–39); and judging by the praise heaped on his efforts by al-Ma’mūn, Yahyā b. Aktham, a qādī and high official, contributed significantly to the acquisition of slaves (33). Not all slaves had to be sought in the hinterlands; al-Mu’taṣīm bought some of his most important Central Asians in the Baghdad market (4).
Prices are generally unknown; only the highest ones have been recorded. The sources note with awe that al-Ma'mūn's and al-Mu'taṣim's purchases pushed the cost of a single slave up to 100,000 (6, 20) or even 200,000 dirhams (6, 20, 23). On occasion, this money was transferred to Samarqand (26), sometimes in silver (32).

Not all Central Asian slaves were purchased: some appear to have been abducted (8, 9), some joined voluntarily (41), and others were captured—al-Ma'mūn directly received 2,000 Ghuzz Turks as captives from Kabul in 211–12/826–27 (Ibn Khurdadhbih, p. 37)—but in general the caliphs relied on their governors to send captives. Ṭalḥa b. Ṭāhir, the governor of Khurasan 207–13/822–28, had enough slaves of his own to give away 80 mamlūks at once (Tayfūr, p. 172); presumably these were captives, for al-Ma'mūn no doubt prohibited Ṭalḥa from spending revenues to buy slaves of his own. ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāhir sent a yearly tribute to the caliph of 44 million dirhams and either 1,012 raqīqs (al-Muqaddasī, p. 340) or 2,000 Ghuzz Turks captured in Khurasan (Ibn Khurdadhbih, p. 39). Tūlūn, father of the soldier who founded the Tulunid dynasty in Egypt, was a slave who had been captured.40

Al-Ma'mūn and al-Mu'taṣim first acquired Central Asian slaves while living in Khurasan, at the close of the al-Amīn–al-Ma'mūn civil war. Al-Mu'taṣim purchased Ītāk in 199/815 (T, 3:1383); al-Ma'mūn received slaves from his governor in Khurasan as tribute as early as 200/816 (36–38). Al-Mu'taṣim had acquired many of his principal slave aides before ascending to the throne in 217/833 (7); indeed, while al-Ma'mūn was still caliph, al-Mu'taṣim had gathered some 3,000 (4) or 4,000 (al-Kindi, pp. 188–189 = ITB, 2:208–09) slaves. After becoming caliph, he continued to send for more (26: referring to 220/835), until he was finally satisfied (13).

Estimated numbers of slaves differ widely in the sources and are open to doubt. Still, they indicate the magnitude of the ac-

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39. At this time, a dirham was worth about three grams of silver (G. C. Miles, "Dirhām," in EJ).
quisition effort; two anecdotes mention 400 slaves in connection with al-Ma'mûn (30, 33). Besides the numbers of slaves he possessed before becoming caliph (noted above), the following numbers of slaves are ascribed to al-Mu'taşim:

- 4,000: 5
- 8,000: 25, ITB, 2:251, 35
- 18,000: 25, 26
- ca. 20,000: 21
- 38,000: 32
- 50,000: 13
- 70,000: 14, 18, 19, 31, 33

While these figures are too variable to pin down, they clearly confirm that al-Ma'mûn and al-Mu'taşim instituted a new policy of gathering Central Asian slaves. In the Arabian period, slaves had been so available that the Muslim rulers rarely made special efforts to acquire them; also the presence of non-Arabian converts, mawlas, in vulnerable positions gave them ample unfree resources; the Abbasid rulers before al-Ma'mûn and al-Mu'taşim had only a moderate need for slaves and procured them sporadically. In striking contrast, al-Ma'mûn and al-Mu'taşim went to great lengths to collect slaves. This policy of acquisition constitutes the first of three necessary attributes for military slavery.

Organized Training

The training process, so central to military slavery, did not exist during the first two Islamic centuries. While unfree soldiers lacked formal military training, it was sometimes possible for them to have had military experience before entering Islamicate society.\(^{41}\) The skills they brought with them sometimes sufficed to make slaves or mawlas recognized military authorities.\(^{42}\)

The evidence for a system of military training for slaves in 205/820 is tentative. Curiously, the only individual biography of

42. T, 2:1544, 1599.
a military slave from about this period, that of Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn (born in 220/835),\textsuperscript{43} emphasizes not military training but religious instruction! "His upbringing was unlike that of a non-Arabian,"\textsuperscript{44} meaning that he learnt the Islamic sciences. As a consequence, although Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn was a Turk, he "despised the Turks and their sons who rode in the caliph's service."\textsuperscript{45} Despite this religious emphasis, it is quite certain that Ahmad also had a military education.\textsuperscript{46}

Use of the word ʾistanaʾa provides that most definite indication that slaves underwent a new, more systematic training around 205/820. Although the word was used occasionally before this time,\textsuperscript{47} it appears with greater frequency in descriptions of al-Muʿtaṣım's Turks, as well as others of that time. With Forand, I understand this verb to mean "to train, educate, discipline, rear or foster (someone) for a particular purpose."\textsuperscript{48} I have found four references to the ʾistināʾ\textsuperscript{c} of groups (1, 5, 11, 44) and three to individuals (24, T, 3:1316, MDh, 4:61).\textsuperscript{49} The proliferation of this term may signal the existence of a new procedure for training slaves. This impression is confirmed by the report that it was mostly youths who underwent training (44).

**Professional Employment**

In earlier times, no Muslims, not even Arabians, fought as professional soldiers, so the unfree could hardly have been more professional than their patrons. The slave or mawla was typically a personal retainer to his patron and fought in that capacity. Only when the free soldiers became professional in the first Abbasid period could the unfree follow suit. One may view the

\textsuperscript{43} al-Balawi, p. 38, calls him the ghulām of Caliph al-Mustafīn (r. 248–52/862–66), but clearly he was the slave of earlier caliphs too, his father having been the slave of al-Maʿmūn (39).

\textsuperscript{44} al-Balawi, p. 34.

\textsuperscript{45} ITB, 3:4.


\textsuperscript{47} T, 2:1920, 3:118; AM, p. 88.

\textsuperscript{48} Forand, "Development," p. 70.

\textsuperscript{49} Note also: al-Qalqashandi, 3:504; az-Zubayr, p. 567.
professionalism of military slaves as part of a general transition from tribal to professional warfare, from warriors to soldiers.

Evidence for professional employment beginning circa 205/820 is strong; from then, slaves served full-time, received regular wages, wore distinctive clothing, and lived in separate quarters. They must have served all year round, otherwise slaves could not have become al-Mu'taṣim’s commanders, retinue, elite guard, palace police force (8, 9), governors (14), and bodyguard (30: also al-Ma’mūn’s); and much less could they have become the “support of the dynasty and the mainstay of his movement” (10) or dominated his army (13, 15). Their military importance can be gauged by the prominent role they played in the warfare of al-Mu'taṣim’s reign (on this, more below). Repeated reference to Turks in the service (khidma) of al-Ma’mūn and al-Mu’taṣim (6, 7, 14, 20) emphasizes their long-term duties to the caliphs.

These two caliphs dropped Arabians from the Military Register (Dīwān al Jund; 29) and simultaneously entered Turks onto it for the first time (24, 26). Al-Maqrīzī draws an explicit connection between these two events; the Arabians were removed to make way for the Turks (23). Female slaves acquired for the Turks were also placed on the register (KB, p. 259); they, like the men, received fixed salaries (rizq), though how much is not stated. The 70,000 mawlas who made up the regularly paid force (murtaziqa) during al-Mu’taṣim’s caliphate (31) were undoubtedly these same slaves.50 In contrast, a Central Asian leader who was not a slave received a land-grant, not a salary (43).

Al-Mu'taṣim dressed his Turks very finely: gold and silk brocade, gold and silk belts, gold collars, and other ornaments (5, 25, 26, T, 3:1169) not only made them a handsome sight but also served to distinguish them from other troops. Under these adornments, they wore a government uniform (al-mulabbis wa’z-zayy as-sultāniya; 8, 9). Clearly, these must have been highly prized professional soldiers.

The segregation of Turks from other troops in Samarra provides a final indication that they were military slaves. The

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50. The number 70,000 is several times associated with al-Mu’taṣim’s slaves: 14, 18, 19, 33.
The First Military Slave System

Turks had a habit of galloping on their horses through Baghdad, disturbing the peace, thus inciting the inhabitants to pull down some of the soldiers and kill them in revenge.\(^{51}\) To put an end to this problem, and also to move himself away from the hostile populace of Baghdad which resented his rule, al-Mu'tašim founded a new capital at Samarra in 221/836.\(^{52}\) In this new town he had a free hand to arrange his troops as he wished; the Turks ended up isolated from the rest of the population, divided from it by walls, far from the marketplace and crowds. To complete their isolation, al-Mu'tašim built them mosques, baths, and a small market; he even acquired slavewomen for them, provided the women with pay, and forbade them divorce. These quarters were off limits to the rest of the population.\(^{53}\) D. Ayalon, who has analyzed this information,\(^{54}\) shows parallels between al-Mu'tašim's segregation of military slaves and a similar one in Mamluk Egypt, implying that it is a common feature of military slave systems and providing another indication that military slavery existed by the time of al-Mu'tašim's reign.

Whereas unfree soldiers in early Islam had fought spontaneously, as availability and need coincided, regular patterns of acquisition, training, and employment that began around 205/820 led to large numbers of well-trained professional corps of military slaves.

Information on the First Military Slave System

Which Caliph Developed Military Slavery?

Modern scholarship has inextricably tied al-Mu'tašim's name to the introduction of Turks into the army and the development of

\(^{51}\) Nearly all the sources which mention al-Mu'tašim's slaves also discuss these incidents; the many accounts could probably be comparatively studied with profit. Ayalon understands the antagonism in part as that of a free populace toward a slave soldiery ("Reforms," p. 4).


\(^{53}\) KB, pp. 258–59.

\(^{54}\) "Muslim City," pp. 315–19.
military slavery. He is made responsible for relying on the new
type of soldier too heavily, thus paving the way for a military
takeover shortly after his death. Was al-Mu'tasim in fact the first
to use Turks and military slaves?

Turks fought for the Muslims as early as 54/674, although
they remained few in number until the time of Caliph al-Mansur
(r. 136–58/754–75).55 Al-Mansur was the first Muslim ruler in-
tentionally to acquire Turks (12, 17). His successors continued to
rely on Turks in their armies, courts, and governments, though
not in large numbers (12, 17). So great was the increase in their
role in al-Ma'mun's time that the prior use of Turks was often
forgotten.

Many accounts note that al-Ma'mun acquired Turkish slaves
(2, 20, 23, 33, 36–38, 40), and others refer to his owning them
(30, 39). More important, some make an explicit connection
between practices that al-Ma'mun initiated and al-Mu'tasim's
imitation of him. Al-Mu'tasim followed his example in buying
Turks at high prices (23; implied in 6), in systematically training
some men to serve as his counselors (28), and in attracting free
Central Asians to convert and join the Muslim army (41). Fur-
ther, al-Mu'tasim bought Turkish slaves originally at al-
Ma'mun's behest (2). Recognizing al-Ma'mun's principal role,
one account credits him with first taking Turks into service (20).

Although al-Ma'mun appears to have initiated these practices,
al-Mu'tasim became more closely identified with them. He
began collecting Turkish slaves soon after al-Ma'mun's victory in
the civil war (T, 3:1383) and never looked back. As noted previ-
ously, he already had considerable numbers of Turkish slaves
before ascending to the throne; and as ruler he gathered many
more. He favored them over others (5) and was especially eager
to replace the unreliable Arabian soldiers with them (10, 23, 29).
He was the first to enter Turks onto the Military Register (24,
26). As a result, Turkish slaves made up most of his army (13)
and dominated it (15). One source states that al-Mu'tasim was
the first to use Turks (7), while two others state that he only in-
creased their numbers (16, 34), implying that they had already
existed before his reign.

55. This summarizes information in my “Turks,” pp. 87–88.
The debate over who first used Turks need not detain us further; whether it was al-Manṣūr, al-Maʿmūn, or al-Muʿtaṣim depends on one's definition: al-Manṣūr was the first to acquire them intentionally, al-Maʿmūn the first to use them in large numbers, and al-Muʿtaṣim the first to depend on them heavily.

More important for our purposes is the question: who first used the Turks and others as military slaves? Who should receive the credit or ignominy for this novel institution? The information analyzed here points unequivocally to al-Maʿmūn. He initiated this use of slaves, then his younger brother adopted the usage so enthusiastically that the institution came to be identified with him. As with the Turks, al-Maʿmūn first recruited military slaves, while al-Muʿtaṣim came to rely heavily on them.

Turkish Military Slaves in al-Muʿtaṣim's Service

Turks predominated as military slaves thanks to their superior martial qualities. "No people in the world [are] braver, more numerous, or more steadfast," al-Muʿtaṣim is supposed to have said about them (3); their abilities with weapons were famous (17); Central Asians were known for their courage and daring (43); and al-Jāḥiẓ in Manāqib al-ʿĀtrāk, discusses their military virtues at length. As a result of these, "the Turks formed the Abbasids' armies thanks to their superiority over all other armies" (8, 9).

Al-Muʿtaṣim undertook two major military campaigns during his caliphate, the attack on Amorium (a town in Anatolia) and the suppression of the Persian rebel Bābāk. In both of these, Turkish military slaves played a major role; the sources tell us far more about a handful of leaders, however, than about the masses of soldiers. In fact, by al-Muʿtaṣim's reign, military slaves did most of the fighting for the caliphs. As early as 202/818, when fighting a Khārījī rebel, he had a bodyguard of Turkish slaves, one of whom saved his life.56 When he went to Egypt in 213/818, 4,000 Turks accompanied him, and they left with him two years later.57

On coming to power in 218/833, al-Muʿtaṣim delegated much

57. al-Kindī, pp. 188–89; ITB, 2:208–09.
of his power to several Central Asians. The annals of his reign echo with their names: Ashnās, Itākh, Bughā al-Kabīr, Waṣīf, and al-Afshin.\footnote{Al-Mu’tasim himself considered these men (naming them all except Bughā al-Kabīr) his most important agents (T, 3:1327).} It was Ashnās\footnote{Ashnās called a Turk: T, 3:1017, 1306, 1338; MDh, 4:55, 60; KB, p. 259; TYa, 2:475, 479, 481; BaFami, 4:524; ITB, 2:243, 245, 255–56, 274; Miskawayh, p. 438; Ibn Khalikān, 3:89; TMAw, p. 352; Ibn al-Adīm, 1:69. Ghulām: all the references in note 56 above. Mamlūk: KB, p. 256. Mawlā: Yaqūt, 3:16. Mawlā amīr al-mu’minin (on this term, see my “Mawlas”): Balog, pp. 240–43 (five examples).} who defended al-Mu’tasim in the incident mentioned above; he saved the future caliph from an assailant’s knife.\footnote{See the references in note 56 above.} Ashnās undertook two expeditions for al-Ma’mūn; in 215/830 he led Abbasid troops against the Byzantines and two years later led them in Egypt.\footnote{Al-Kindi, p. 194; ITB, 2:229; TMAw, p. 416.} When al-Mu’tasim came to power, he appointed Ashnās governor of Egypt.\footnote{Al-Kindi, p. 194; ITB, 2:229; TMAw, p. 416.} Ashnās retained this title for some years without actually living in or presiding over Egypt. Indeed, the chroniclers ignore him almost completely when recounting the history of Egypt during his tenure. It appears that al-Mu’tasim wished to honor Ashnās with the governorship without losing his presence at the court. In 223/838 Ashnās led a variety of units both on the way to the battle of Amorium in Anatolia and on the return.\footnote{To Amorium: (vanguard) T, 3:1236; TYa, 2:475; (cavalry) T, 3:1241; (infantry) UH, p. 393; (left wing) T, 3:1244. From Amorium: (right wing) T, 3:1260; (rearguard) T, 3:1261–62.} Again honoring Ashnās, al-Mu’tasim allowed him to sit on a throne (kursi) in 225/840.\footnote{T, 3:1302; UH, p. 404.} A year later Ashnās went on the pilgrimage to Mecca and al-Mu’tasim paid him a yet greater honor by giving him control of every region through which he passed between Samarra and Mecca.\footnote{T, 3:1318.} Accordingly, he is sometimes known as the governor of Syria, al-Jazira, and Egypt,\footnote{Ibn al-Adīm, 1:69.} though he never ruled those provinces. Ashnās died in 230/845.\footnote{T, 3:1338.}
Itākh,\textsuperscript{68} originally a cook, came to al-Muṣṭaṣim in 199/815.\textsuperscript{69} In 222/837 he joined the long campaign (220–23/835–38) against the Persian rebel Bābāk.\textsuperscript{70} A year later he led the right wing to Amorium and then the Turks and Farghanians at the battle there.\textsuperscript{71} In 225/840 he became governor of the Yemen, but that same year we also have a report that he stood guard at al-Muṣṭaṣim’s doorway,\textsuperscript{72} so this too was probably an honorary appointment. Two years later he fought a rebel near Mosul.\textsuperscript{73} Soon after al-Muṣṭaṣim’s death he acquired the important position of governor of Khurasan;\textsuperscript{74} al-Mutawakkil had him executed in 234/849.\textsuperscript{75}

First mention of Bughā al-Kabīr\textsuperscript{76} comes in 210/825 when he took possession of someone else’s lands.\textsuperscript{77} He brought relief to the Abbasid troops fighting Bābāk in 220/835 and a year later led troops on his own.\textsuperscript{78} He led the rearguard both to and from Amorium;\textsuperscript{79} and he served al-Muṣṭaṣim as chamberlain (ḥājib).\textsuperscript{80} After al-Muṣṭaṣim’s reign, Bughā al-Kabīr filled several important positions. He died in 248/862.\textsuperscript{81} One account says that he loved warfare and died at over ninety (lunar) years;\textsuperscript{82} if this is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{68} Ītākh called a Turk: T, 3:1306, 1327; MDh, 4:60; TYa, 2:479, 481, 485; BalCami, 4:524; ITB, 2:243, 255, 265, 274.
\item On his career, see H. D. Yıldız, “Abbasiler devrinde Türk kumandanları,” \textit{İstanbul Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi} 2 (1974): 51–58. This is part 2 of the article.
\item \textsuperscript{69} T, 3:1234, 1383; TMaw, p. 424.
\item \textsuperscript{70} T, 3:1195.
\item \textsuperscript{71} T, 3:1236, 1250.
\item \textsuperscript{72} T, 3:1303, 1307, 1327.
\item \textsuperscript{73} T, 3:1322.
\item \textsuperscript{74} TYa, 2:479.
\item \textsuperscript{75} T, 3:1383–87; ITB, 2:276.
\item \textsuperscript{76} Bughā al-Kabīr called a Turk: T, 3:1313; TYa, 2:478; ITB, 2:218, 327.
\item \textsuperscript{77} T, 3:1085.
\item \textsuperscript{78} T, 3:1174, 1186–93.
\item \textsuperscript{79} TMaw, p. 427; T, 3:1261.
\item \textsuperscript{80} Tanbih, p. 356; Eutychius, 2:61 (but not on p. 284).
\item \textsuperscript{81} T, 3:1506; ITB, 2:327.
\item \textsuperscript{82} ITB, 2:327.
\end{itemize}
true, then Bughā al-Kabīr was already an adult when he was acquired by al-Mu'taṣīm.

Waṣīf[83] had a role at Amorium and served al-Mu'taṣīm as chamberlain;[84] however, like Bughā al-Kabīr, his most important positions came after al-Mu'taṣīm's death. Waṣīf died in 253/867.[85]

Al-Afshīn,[86] who was al-Mu'taṣīm's most prominent general, already led military campaigns for al-Ma'mūn.[87] Under al-Mu'taṣīm he directed the battle against Bābāk and fought in the conquest of Amorium.[88] I shall not dwell on his important career and fascinating downfall, however, for although two sources call him a Turk,[89] he came from Farghana, an Iranian cultural region, and was not usually considered Turkish.[90]

Several other lesser-known Turks also had leading positions: Simā ad-Dimashqī, Simā ash-Sharābī, and Muḥammad b. Ḥa:mmād b. Danfashi all served al-Mu'taṣīm as chamberlains;[91] Bashīr at-Turkī led Farghanian troops in an ambush against Bābāk in 222/837.[92]

Anonymous Turks filled a variety of military roles: some became bodyguards, either for the caliph or for others;[93] Turks guarded Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī in 210/825 and fought at


85. TYa, 2:502; ITB, 2:338, 340.


87. T, 3:1105, 1106.


89. See note 86 above.

90. Al-Afshīn's trial (T, 3:1303–18) is permeated with the fact of his Iranian culture; note especially vol. 3, pp. 1312 and 1315.

91. TYa, 2:478; ‘Iqd, 5:121. Muḥammad b. Ḥa:mmād b. Danfashi's name seems to indicate that his father was already a Muslim.

92. T, 3:1215–16.

93. T, 3:1076, 1289.
The First Military Slave System

Amorium. They played a major part in the conspiracy against al-Mu'tasim of al-Ma'mūn's son al-ʿAbbās. For example, Ashnās was to be assassinated by a fellow Turk, his drinking companion. When the conspiracy failed, it was again Turks who executed one of its leaders in 223/838. Al-Afšān sent a Turkish mawla to kill one of Bābāk's men in 222/837.

Turks provided personal services for al-Muṭṣāsim. On one occasion, he called for Ṣūkh to bring him dates; a Turkish slave eunuch swatted flies from around al-Muṭṣāsim's head. Turks also served other persons in nonmilitary ways.

Perhaps most indicative of the favor bestowed on the Turks was the fact that al-Muṭṣāsim reared one of them, al-Faṭḥ b. Khāqān, along with his own son Jaʿfar, the future Caliph al-Mutawakkil. The close relationship between these two lasted for decades, and al-Faṭḥ played a vital role in al-Mutawakkil's reign.

But Turks could not do everything. When al-Muṭṣāsim's forces fought the Zuṭṭ of the Persian Gulf, a waterborne people, the only Abbasid troops that could reach them were some Egyptian captives who "were accustomed to water and swam like fish." Al-Muṭṣāsim was so impressed by their military skills that he "took a number of them into his service" (37). Presumably, then, they too became slave soldiers alongside the Turks.

Assessments

Although the Muslim sources all agree about the military prowess of Turkish military slaves, they disagree on the effects of

94. T, 3:1076, 1250; UH, p. 394.
95. T, 3:1267; Miskawayh, pp. 501–02.
96. T, 3:1257, 1266.
97. T, 3:1265.
98. T, 3:1194.
100. MDḥ, 4:50.
102. ITB, 2:325.
introducing them into the Islamicate polity. On the positive side, al-Qazwīnī quotes Yahyā b. Aktham’s statement to the mamlūks, “If not for you we would not be believers,” meaning that the slaves had kept the Muslims safe. Apparently this view convinced al-Ma’mūn to take mamlūks into his personal service (33). Also on the positive side, Diyāb al-Iklīdī reports that al-Mu’taṣīm was known as the second founder of the Abbasid Kingdom because the servile Turks rejuvenated the army (27).

A majority of writers regard the Turks negatively. At-Ṭabarī records an antislave point of view. Al-Mu’taṣīm asked one of his top counselors, a free man placed in a high position by al-Ma’mūn, why al-Ma’mūn succeeded in finding first-rate aides while al-Mu’taṣīm failed at this. The counselor answers elliptically that al-Ma’mūn made use of socially respectable men (he “considered the roots . . . and the branches flourished”), while al-Mu’taṣīm did not (he “used branches which did not flourish because they had no roots”—28). The bias of this reply becomes apparent when one realizes that the men who are claimed to have failed al-Mu’taṣīm in fact served him superbly over decades.

Ibn Badrūn explains the decline of the Abbasid dynasty as a result of the power of ‘abāds, the Turkish military slaves (17). Ibn Khaldūn similarly explains the rift between the dignity of the caliphate and the power of non-Arabian military commanders by the introduction of the Turkish mawlas (18). Al-Maqrīzī, who lived under a dynasty of Turkish and other military slave-rulers, ruefully notes that after al-Mu’taṣīm’s time, “Turks (against whom the Prophet called us to fight) became the rulers of the [Muslim] kingdoms” (23). Indeed, as long as al-Mu’taṣīm and his son al-Wāthīq ruled, the slaves obeyed; subsequently, they took over the rule themselves (17, 22).

The findings of this chapter generally confirm the established notion that al-Mu’taṣīm began using military slaves for the first time, though I ascribe the initiative to his brother al-Ma’mūn. Having located and described the first military slave institution, it remains now to provide an explanation how it developed when and where it did.
Chapter Six
How Military Slavery First Occurred

Defining the universal characteristics of a military slave system (systematic acquisition, organized training, professional employment) made it possible to date and identify its first appearance in 198–205/814–20; similarly, establishing the general rationale for military slavery—that it served as a means to acquire and control marginal area soldiers—helps us to understand how it first developed. This concluding chapter interprets the first two centuries of Islamicate history in the light of the theories presented in chapter 3; here I shall show the need that existed for marginal area soldiers and propose that the enslavement of soldiers followed from the earlier practice of employing them as mawlas. First, however, I shall note the ideas of other historians on this topic and then the possible influence of prior civilizations on the development of military slavery.

Only a few historians have ventured an opinion on the first development of military slavery, and none of them explains how, for the first time in human history, a major dynasty came to enslave its soldiers in a systematic manner. It is not unfair to say that no scholar has seriously considered this question. Ayalon attributes military slavery to a growing manpower shortage, which he traces all the way back to the time of 'Umar I. Lapidus points to this and to the usefulness of slaves in help-

ing the caliphs to centralize their power. Bosworth offers two explanations: the economic and commercial expansion of the first Abbasid period; and the decline of Arabian soldiers through decay and anarchy, which forced the Abbasid rulers to seek out more reliable troops. Cahen suggests that slaves were able to provide more faithful and skilled service. Hamdi stresses al-Ma'mūm's favorable experiences with Turkish soldiers in Khurasan, whereas Töllner and Ismail point to al-Mu'tāsim's experiences with them in Egypt and Iraq. Ismail also notes that these two countries did not provide the Abbasid armies with sufficient numbers of soldiers. Hrbek explains the phenomenon in terms of class conflict. Crone sees military slavery as an Islamicate institution but does not develop this line of reasoning; she ascribes it only to "the failure of the Abbasids to structure a Muslim empire." Hodgson, as ever, goes beyond all these explanations: military slavery emerged among the Abbasids because "no strata of the population were ready to give effective support to the government." Yet even he does not tie this fact into the major facts of Islamicate public life.

In a confusing passage, Ibn Khaldūn appears to telescope the Umayyad and Abbasid declines into one and then to explain the Abbasid reliance on outsiders by the unreliability of the original Arabian troops:

When the Arabians conquered nations and cities, their desert barbarism and the simplicity of their caliphs was transformed into the pride of rulership and the softness of civilization . . . Spread throughout the world, new generations of Arabians grew up in ease; they preferred the tranquil plains, enjoyed the soft life, and

2. Lapidus, p. 37.
slept long in the shadows of peace and plenty. Eventually they grew accustomed to civilization and lost the desert legacy as well as those qualities which had made them rulers. . . .

The ruler refused to share his glory or his lineage with anyone. He suppressed the pride of rebels, tribes, and tribal chiefs who challenged him. To quell their stubborn ambition, he replaced them with mawlas, non-Arabians, and creatures of the dynasty. These grew in number until they took precedence over Arabians, the founders of the dynasty, supporters of the faith, and maintainers of the caliphate. . . .

Arabians lost the power to bind and untie, to contract and repudiate; mawlas and other creatures of the dynasty won it and resolved to renounce the caliph and acquire the kingship themselves. They seated themselves on the throne and acquired dictatorial powers. 10

Pre-Islamic Antecedents

It is never simple to unravel the influences of earlier civilizations on a later one, and this process is especially difficult for Islam. Yet, of the many ancient cultures that contributed to the sudden, new, and original Islamicate synthesis, only three had influence on Islam’s military institutions: Rome-Byzantium, Iran, and Arabia.

Rome-Byzantium

The late republic and the early empire employed many slaves in their armies; the frequent and important functions of these slaves have been extensively collected and studied, so there is no reason to recount them here. 11 Historians agree that these were ordinary slaves. “The employment of slaves for military purposes is limited to emergencies; it was never undertaken as a normal part of the recruitment of soldiers. . . . It is a crisis which explains and legitimizes the use of slaves for military pur-

10. Ibar, 6:2–3.
11. The main study is Rouland’s Les Esclaves romains en temps de guerre. See also Barrow, Duff, Kühne, and Treggiari.
The Roman influence on Islamicate civilization is both the most obscure and the most disputed. In my view, the Roman Empire had negligible direct influence on Islam but a fair indirect impact through Byzantium. The Byzantines, however, employed slaves for military purposes far less often than the Romans had. One major instance dates from the time of Tiberius (r. 578–82): “Tiberius began cautiously to lay the foundation of a new system, by adding to his household troops a corps of fifteen thousand heathen slaves, whom he purchased and disciplined.” The author of this account, George Finlay, explicitly compares those troops to the Janissaries and the emperor’s circumstances to those of the Abbasid caliphs who first introduced military slavery. In later Byzantium, there were no indications of slaves serving as soldiers, though a servile class of youths performed auxiliary services and did occasionally fight. Overall, it appears that the Byzantines used slaves in warfare far less often than the Romans and in this respect did not contribute much to the Islamicate institution.

Iran

Iran may have provided the Muslims with a model for training slaves, though definite information on this topic is scant. We shall discuss here only the Soghdian and Sasanian cases, for although similar training may have existed elsewhere, those cases are even more obscure.

It appears that the Soghdians gathered children to train as

15. Ibid., 1:301, n. 1.
18. I have been unable to verify the casual mention of large slave armies in Achaemenid times (e.g. H. Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire [London, 1973], p. 77). Richard Frye believes that the Sasanian rélak (page) “may have been a slave and may have been trained for war” (conversation of 30 July 1975).
slaves for military purposes. Soghdia maintained an extensive trading network throughout Inner Asia, and a large part of its population engaged in commercial pursuits which took them far from Soghdia. Indeed, the Soghdians engaged so heavily in trading that they lacked adequate manpower to defend their caravans and their country. To protect both of these they needed outside sources of military manpower; these they found in the children of the Inner Asian nomads. The merchants procured the children while traveling, brought them back to Soghdia, and trained them as soldiers. It seems that the nomad children proved themselves highly capable and loyal soldiers—even in combat against their own peoples. Since the Soghdians always needed these children and the nomads could continue to supply them, this arrangement went on for a long time.

Besides the vague indications for this Soghdian system, there is more specific evidence on slaves fighting for the Sasanians. Rulers even before the time of Khosroes I (r. 531–78) brought captives into their armies, but

what distinguishes the transplantations of peoples effected by Khosroes from earlier ones is ... the systematic use of those [later] colonizers for military purposes. The [captured] barbarians were endowed with a physical vigor superior to the degenerate Iranian peasants, and so were preferred for [colonizing] the regions exposed to the attacks of enemy peoples. They were set up there in return for lending military service to the empire. In this manner, Khosroes I’s permanent army included Iranian cavalry and colonized barbarians. The latter quickly assimilated to their new environment without losing their military qualities.20

The Sasanian use of the Sayābija, Zuṭū, and Andaghār confirmed this practice. According to al-Balfidhfiri, all these peoples “were in the army of the Persians. They were people of Sind who had been taken captive and then enrolled [in the army which had captured them].”21

19. The following information derives from discussions with Richard Frye and Omeljian Pritsak on 30 July 1975; see also Bosworth, in CHI, 4:162.
When a Sasanian expedition to the Yemen fought the Ethiopians, a ghulām took an arrow from his master’s quiver. At the Battle of al-Qadisiya in 14/635, at-Ṭabarī reports that the Sasanian army fielded 120,000 soldiers and as many followers (atbāʾ) who served them, many of whom must have been slaves; at the same battle, a ghulām encouraged the shah to send a certain general to battle; when this general lost, the ghulām tried to conceal the bad news. Finally, back in Central Asia, when the Khātūn of Bukhara broke a treaty she had made with the Muslims, a slave of some of the members of her coalition was present but then withdrew with his supporters.

C. E. Bosworth, a foremost authority on Iranian military practices, concludes that although slaves served in the armies of pre-Islamic Iran, “more than anything else, this institution [of military slavery] marks off the armies of Muslim Persian dynasties from those of pre-Islamic Persia.”

Jahili Mecca

Information on slaves fighting in pre-Islamic Arabia derives almost entirely from Mecca in the years preceding Muslim control, 2–8/624–30. Mecca consistently used slaves in warfare, though the notion that the Meccans depended on Ethiopian slaves for the bulk of their military strength has been thoroughly discredited.

22. UA, 1:149.
26. Lammens proposed this idea in “Aḥābīš.” He suggested that the word Aḥābīš derived from Ḥabashi, Arabic for “Ethiopian.” His article on this subject is a tour de force in its own way: a massive display of erudition based on totally unfounded and unsupportable conjecture. There is not a shred of evidence in the sources to sustain Lammens’s argument; all explanations of this term indicate that the Aḥābīš were Arabs (notably al-Fāsī, 2:97–98). See KM, p. 302 for two etymologies of the word. Modern scholarship unanimously rejects Lammens’s idea, choosing instead to understand Aḥābīš as the plural form of uḥbāš, “any company, or body, of men,” according to E. W. Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon (London, 1863–93), 1:501. For arguments, see: W. M. Watt, Muhammad at Mecca (Oxford, 1953), pp. 154–57; M. Hamidullah, “Les ‘Aḥābīš’ de la Mecque,” Studi
At the two main battles between Quraysh and the Muslims, those of Badr and Uḥud (2–3/624–25), mawlas made up the following percentages of the total number of Qurashi casualties:\(^{27}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mawlas</th>
<th>Total Quraysh</th>
<th>Percentage of mawlas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Badr</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uḥud</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These percentages are about half the corresponding Muslim ones for the same battles (see chapter 4). At Badr, Qurashi slaves went off in search of water.\(^{28}\) At Uḥud, “when battle was joined, the first to meet the enemy was Abū ʿĀmir with the Aḥabish and the slaves of the people of Mecca.”\(^{29}\) This passage hints at the slaves forming their own corps. Šuʿāb, a *ghulām*, carried the Qurashi banner at Uḥud until he met his death. Hassān b. Thābit, the Muslim poet, made this event the butt of a satirical verse:

You boasted of your flag;  
The worst (ground for) boasting  
Is a flag handed over to Šuʿāb.  
You have made a slave your boast,  
The most miserable creature that stalks the earth.\(^{30}\)

The remarkable career of Waḥshi has already been discussed (see chapter 4); suffice it to say here that he killed the uncle of the Prophet at Uḥud and another Muslim at the Battle of al-Khandaq. According to the account of the slave Nistās, Šuʿāb and Waḥshi were the only slaves who fought with Quraysh at Uḥud; other Qurashi slaves were near the battle and apparently ready to participate, however: “Abū Sufyān [the leader of

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28. IH, 1:616.
29. IH, 2:67.
30. IH, 2:78/379 (slightly adapted from Guillaume’s translation).
Quraysh] said: 'Look Quraysh, you have left your ghulâms with your possessions—they will be the ones who take over your camel saddles.' So we [the slaves] grouped together, hobbled the camels, and took off in battle formation to the left and right wings.\textsuperscript{31}

Later, Nistāš executed a Muslim captive under orders from his master.\textsuperscript{32} After the peace of al-Hudaybiya in 6/628, a Qurashī soldier who had been taken captive by the Muslims wished to stay in Medina as a Muslim, but the Meccans sent out a Qurashī with a mawla to bring him back.\textsuperscript{33} At the Battle of al-Ḥunayn in 8/630, a Christian slave fought for Thaqīf and met his death in battle.\textsuperscript{34} Just before the Muslim takeover of Mecca, Quraysh sent its mawlas to help its allies, the Kināna tribe.\textsuperscript{35}

It appears likely that the Meccans, who were city dwellers, used slaves in war more often than did their desert brethren. The view of the latter can be readily appreciated in the statement, "A slave does not understand how to fight; his work is to milk the camels and bind their udders."\textsuperscript{36} Still, at the most important battle of the Ridda Wars, at Yamāma in 11/632, the "false prophet" Musaylama suffered so many losses fighting the Muslims that his leaders sent out a call to arm the villagers and slaves.\textsuperscript{37}

As in the Roman-Byzantine and Iranian cases, Arabia provides examples of slaves fighting, but none of them appears to have much to do with military slavery.

\textbf{The Need for Marginal Area Soldiers}

Tracing Muslim military needs from the birth of Islam until 205/820 shows that Muslims twice sought what military slavery

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{31} al-Wāqidī, p. 230.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} IH, 2:172 = al-Wāqidī, p. 362.
  \item \textsuperscript{33} IH, 2:323.
  \item \textsuperscript{34} IH, 2:450.
  \item \textsuperscript{35} TYa\textsuperscript{e}, 2:58.
  \item \textsuperscript{36} Sīrat 'Antar, quoted in R. A. Nicholson, \textit{A Literary History of the Arabs} (London, 1907), p. 115.
  \item \textsuperscript{37} T, 1:1953–54; al-Balansi, p. 104, writes "women, children, and slaves."
\end{itemize}
How Military Slavery First Occurred

could provide: readily obtainable marginal area soldiers under firm control. The first time they acquired these as mawlas, the second time, as slaves.

The Initial Need, 64–74/684–93: Mawlas

A Tribally Organized Army. The Arabian conquerors of the 1st/7–8th centuries were among the very few empire builders of history organized by kinship group. Usually, an army cannot venture far with large forces unless its soldiers are organized along nontribal lines (for example, a decimal system); it needs a unifying purpose and a hierarchy of command greater than the one that kinship can provide. In the Arabian case, Islam provided both of these without detribalizing the army. Although the Islamic umma developed as a supratribal community, kinship ties remained vital; in the army, Arabians predominantly fought in tribal contingents. This allowed the tribal structure to persist; herein lies a most distinctive and important fact of Islamic history, the key to understanding the society and politics of the early Muslims.

Because the victorious Arabians had kept tribal affiliations paramount throughout the conquests, tribal leadership emerged from the first years of Islam with unmatched power. Although it was the great generals (like Khalid b. al-Walid) who had led the Arabian armies to victory, chiefs had direct control over the soldiers. This arrangement brought many benefits to both the chiefs and the tribesmen, for it allowed them to remain autonomous and gave them special privileges vis-à-vis the rest of the population. How did Arabian tribesmen preserve the tribal organization of Muslim armies for over a century?

Scanty evidence points to a key role for the Military Register (Dīwān al-Jund), the principal mechanism by which Arabian tribesmen received their pay. Knowing that soldiers follow the person, tribe, city, or government that pays them, Arabian tribal chiefs insisted that military salaries be distributed to tribes, not individuals. Arabian warriors (al-muqātīla) remained loyal to the

38. Others include the Germanic tribes that invaded Europe and the Seljuks.
tribe that paid them. The central government disbursed funds to the tribal leaders, who in turn distributed them to members of the tribe; with few exceptions, mainly the descendants of eminent Ṣahāba, Arabians (even widows and children) received money through their tribe. Until 132/750, the Military Register provided a mainstay of tribal power and privilege against outside control, and it allowed the tribesmen to preserve their cohesive independence from other elements of the population. When the government tried to replace these tribal corps with other troops whose leaders, allegiances, and interests more nearly matched its own, the Arabian tribesmen resisted it with almost total success.

Viewed altogether, the tribal organization of the armies that carried out the great conquests and its preservation through the Military Register meant that the central government did not control its army. This led to unusual developments when the time came to recruit new soldiers.

**Arabian Troop Unreliability after 64/684.** As marginal area soldiers par excellence, Arabians rapidly became unreliable. Precisely according to the pattern sketched in chapter 3, in the 60/680s, about two generations after the conquests began, they deteriorated, grew unruly, and no longer supplied the Umayyads with sufficient troops. Some settled down in towns or on agricultural lands, while others remained soldiers in the pay of the government but provided ever less loyal and dependable service. This division had a geographical aspect; many Arabians settled in Iraq and Khurasan to acquire new occupations and interests, while those living in Syria and Jazira generally remained soldiers.

In Iraq and Khurasan the Arabians degenerated militarily despite strenuous governmental efforts. Measures designed to
How Military Slavery First Occurred

isolate the Arabians in garrisons (miṣrs) failed because cities grew up around the military encampments; the prohibition on their owning land collapsed in the face of their eagerness to acquire property. As the Arabians took up commercial or agricultural pursuits, they developed new concerns; eventually they fell from the ruling elite into the subject population. Indicative of this change was their loss of interest in genealogy, the pride of Arabian nomads. As a result, the soldiery diminished in size; this was a serious matter in an army that from the first had been numerically small.

Arabians in Syria and Jazira for the most part remained armed, but many of them became unruly; they feuded incessantly with the central Umayyad government as they pursued their own political interests. By 64/684, only the army of (the Arabians in) Syria remained even moderately faithful to the Umayyads. Consequently, that army "was gradually transformed from a regional militia, concerned only with its region's frontiers, into an imperial force to control the whole empire." Arabian soldiers from other regions supported the Umayyad government, but not in large numbers or reliably; more often, they either ignored the central government or acted in defiance of it.

As Arabians settled and became disunited, all the factions, the Umayyads and the defiant tribesmen, felt the need for more manpower. Where could it come from? Either from Arabia, the conquered territories, or from outside the empire altogether. Arabia itself was perhaps the most likely source of new soldiers, but its resources had been depleted. The conquerors stayed in the lands they had won and rarely returned to Arabia; later, large numbers of Arabians emigrated from the peninsula.

42. Ashtor, p. 37.
43. Hodgson, 1:245.
44. 'Iqd, 3:312; Muq, 1:266.
45. On those interests, see Crone, chap. 1 and Shaban, Islamic History, vol. 1, chap. 6.
46. Shaban, Islamic History, 1:114.
47. Ibid., p. 115.
Perhaps more than any other conquerors in history, Arabians deserted their homeland to settle in vanquished territories. So Arabia did not provide a reservoir of fresh marginal area soldiers, soldiers neither softened by civilization nor embroiled in internecine strife. The Muslim leaders had no choice but to replenish their armies with non-Arabians.

Enrollment of Non-Arabians as Mawlas. When the time came to enroll non-Arabians in Muslim armies, the central government (and also rebel leaders) lacked the power either to compel the introduction of new soldiers or to establish new corps. Instead, it allowed individual Arabian tribesmen to recruit non-Arabians on their own. Clearly, the latter lacked affiliation to an Arabian tribe; therefore they could not enroll directly in the Military Register and were precluded from joining the army independently (though in some cases they fought in separate units which had no apparent Arabian patron). In order to join, they had to attach themselves to a tribal member, an Arabian patron.

Non-Arabian clientage profited both Arabian tribal leaders and tribesmen. Leaders extended their powers by acquiring larger forces; individual tribesmen became patrons to non-Arabians who served them as retainers. Just as the tribal chief controlled his warriors' pay, so the tribesman controlled that of his clients. The government (or rebel leader) which funded them had as little control over the new soldiers as over the old. This remarkable situation, again, grew from the origins of Muslim power in conquests by tribally organized armies.

Non-Arabian clients in the army were mostly Muslim. Non-Muslims joined too and fought in large numbers at the far corners of the empire (especially in North Africa and Central Asia), but most new soldiers were converts from the subject populations: mawlas.

Mawlas who became soldiers shared many characteristics, regardless of their origins, slave or free. All were non-Arabian

49. Donner, pp. 192–93 explains this as a result of the central government urging Arabians to move into areas in which they could be more easily controlled by the government.
50. P. 190.
51. For details, see my “Mawlas,” section c.
Muslims outside the tribal network who occupied positions of low social status; all experienced dislocation and relied heavily on their patrons for access to the good things in life. Despite legal differences, fighting mawlas of both types had a disjointed and vulnerable standing; they had given up ties to the subject population without acquiring firm new ones to the ruling circles. Lacking an independent power base, mawlas depended heavily on their warrior patrons; the best way to win favor was through faithful service in war.

That a slave mawla lost his ties to his own people and had none to the Arabians except through his patron requires no explanation, since this almost always happens in slavery. But why was it also the case for free mawlas? Because they voluntarily gave up their independence in return for specified social and economic benefits. Free mawlas were usually persons from the most humble social origins who had nothing to lose when they went over to Islam. They found that mere conversion in itself brought them little; in order to gain from this act, mawlas had to enter military service. By attaching themselves to the society of the rulers, indeed, they had much to gain. However low their position within that society, becoming mawla to an Arabian soldier offered the only route of escape from the subject population.

Free mawlas gained the following by entering the cliental relations with an Arabian: in return for giving up community, religion, and independence of action, they made the enormous leap from subject and taxpayer to soldier and tax-recipient. However fraught with risks, military service offered the only path for a non-Arabian to share in any way the benefits enjoyed by the ruling elite. Though they normally received less pay than Arabians and had almost no independent voice in establishing policy, mawlas still gained by joining the army.

The free mawla entered service voluntarily, but once in, his commitment became irreversible; after casting his lot with an Arabian, he could not go back on his conversion nor abandon his

52. Bulliet, p. 41.
54. For some references on this, see Dixon, p. 48 n. 115; al-ʿAli, at-Tanzimat, p. 66 n. 2; Abū ʿUbayd, pp. 311, 314.
patron. True, free mawlas had a legal right to change patrons or even to have no patron, but if they abandoned one, they were cut off from Arabian society altogether. The transfer of wala was anathema; mawlas who changed allegiance were never trusted again. In 142/759 the mawlas of the last Umayyad governor of Spain, Yusuf al-Fihri, turned on him, killed him, and then applied for reward to his victorious rival, Abd ar-Rahman I, the new independent Umayyad ruler of Spain. But instead of taking the mawlas into his own service as they wished, Abd ar-Rahman executed them, saying, “You did not protect your patron, so how will you protect or obey me?” Mawlas had to remain loyal to their master, otherwise they lost all claim to favor; generally, indeed, they were very loyal. In Dhamm Akhlq al-Kuttâb, al-Jahiz makes this point in reference to mawlas serving their masters as secretaries (another common occupation for them): “The slave at least has the right to complain to his master or, if he desires, to demand a change in masters; but the secretary (katib) cannot demand his wages if they are in arrears nor can he leave his patron (shib). His position is that of a slave, like one of the stupidest among them.”

Fighting mawlas were entirely in the hands of an Arabian patron. Their position came to depend entirely on his favor; they subsumed themselves to him and their interests to his. To fall into disfavor meant the abrupt end of a career; all hopes of advancement and well-being lay in the patron’s good will. By converting and joining the army, non-Arabians voluntarily placed themselves under the control of Arabs.

Slaves and mawlas acquired military significance in the Marwanid era by providing needed extra manpower to the armies of

55. Mawlas in military service resembled a voluntary devshirme (the periodic Ottoman levy of children for the military slave corps). It may also be compared to joining the Communist party; in return for a chance at privilege and power, the member gives up much of his personal freedom.
57. BM, 2:50.
58. Examples of outstanding loyalty may be found in chapter 6, pp. 185–88.
59. Dhamm Akhlq al-Kuttâb, p. 191. For the important role of mawlas as katibs, see Biddle, pp. 154–60.
How Military Slavery First Occurred

The time. Although only humble auxiliaries, they fought often and in large numbers. The fact that even free non-Arabians fought as mawlas did much to perpetuate Arabian supremacy, for as mawlas they provided services on highly favorable terms. When free non-Arabian Muslims accepted subservient, even servile, positions, they forfeited a chance to gain power on their own. Had they held out for better terms, the Arabians would have faced severe shortages of soldiers and might well have made concessions to gain their assistance. By accepting employment on inferior terms, the free mawlas contributed to the maintenance of Arabian rule and privilege. The transition from Arabian armipotence (13-64/634-84) to Arabian hegemony (64-132/684-750) indicated Arabian, not mawla, strength.

In view of the Islamicate pattern suggested in chapter 3, enrollment of mawlas in the period after 64/684 has two irregular features. First, individual soldiers and their tribal leaders, not the central government, recruited these new soldiers; this was not a matter of preference, but was due to the fact that the central government lacked the authority to bring in soldiers on its own. Second, the new soldiers were Muslims and subjects, not aliens from beyond the empire's boundaries. Even if they did not enjoy the privileges of the Arabians, mawlas were Muslims participating in the army, and this anomaly requires explanation. Perhaps the special conditions of early Muslim society explain it; at this time, most warfare was still jihad, so that Muslims had reason to join the armed forces. Also, in Marwanid times, Muslims constituted only a tiny portion of the population ruled by the Umayyads; according to a statistical analysis of names by Richard W. Bulliet, in 64/684 Muslims made up 3 to 4 percent of the population in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.60 Such a small minority could not possibly feel secure enough to withdraw from public affairs. Even though Muslims wielded enormous power, their hold was too shaky for them to relinquish it to others.

The first time Muslim rulers needed to replace unreliable marginal area soldiers, they turned to their outsider subjects and

60. Bulliet, pp. 97, 109, 83, 44.
recruited them as mawlas. The second time this need arose, the authorities established the pattern which was to be followed for a millennium: they went beyond their domains and recruited marginal area soldiers as slaves.


A Detribalized Army. The Abbasid army could not have been more different from its Umayyad precursor. The Umayyad army had remained tribal because the central government had been unable to assume direct control over it. As conquerors, the soldiers had the strength to retain the tribal structure which served them so well, first against the central authority and then as a means to control the non-Arabian converts who joined the army. The Abbasid dynasty, on the contrary, began as a quasi-religious movement; it had no truck with tribal etiquette and it owed the tribesmen no privileges. From 129/747, the Abbasids made efforts to control their army and to insure the equal participation of all their supporters. For both these reasons, they detribalized the army. By organizing new corps of their own which had no other leaders or allegiances, the Abbasids acquired a direct control over the army which their predecessors always lacked. Also, as conspirators and then rebels, they needed a loyal army and did not worry about its constitution. The old dichotomy between tribesmen and others would have impeded the Abbasid search for loyal soldiers; they had to open the ranks to all their partisans: Arabians and others, tribesmen and others. Eliminating the tribal element made it easier for the Abbasids to control the army and to recruit into it loyal supporters of all background.

The Abbasids engineered this military reorganization by changing the Military Register. In the Arabian period, the Military Register had played a vital role in distinguishing Arabian tribesmen from other Muslims. Tribal membership brought enfranchisement, for military pay and political power both came through the tribes. This insured Arabian control over Islamicate public life in general and over the non-Arabians in military service in particular.

Shortly after Abū Muslim arrived in Khurasan in 129/747, he founded the first nontribal corps of Muslim soldiers. He did this
by instituting a new Military Register to parallel the old one. Rather than listing soldiers by their tribal affiliation (nasab), the new register listed "the names of the soldiers, their fathers' names, and their villages." By thus eliminating any reference to tribal genealogy, Abū Muslim made it possible for nontribesmen to join the army as full-fledged soldiers without needing an Arabian patron. The transition from tribal to geographic Military Register may have taken place gradually. The Abbasids did not list everyone in the new register but for some years maintained two registers, one tribal and another geographic; the first listed tribal Arabians and the second, all nontribal persons. When the Abbasids came to power they stopped adding names to the tribal register, allowing it to dwindle in size through natural attrition.

Direct enrollment of non-Arabians into the army gave them a new political and social status. As full-fledged soldiers, they could for the first time participate in Islamicate society on their own terms, without an Arabian patron. Thus, an apparently minor change in the Military Register affected Islamicate society in a very fundamental way:

By altering the key for the registration in the army roll, Abū Muslim enabled non-Arabs to enlist in the army on the same status as Arabs. This was a revolutionary act, which later bore decisive and far-reaching historical consequences.

Military Support for the Abbasid Movement. It used to be thought that the Abbasids represented an Iranian revolt against Arabian rule. This view has been discredited, however, and a more
subtle understanding has replaced it. Arabians participated heavily in the Abbasid movement, providing it with both military support and its ruling family. Earlier scholars were misled by the fact that Abbasid support came from Khurasan into thinking that Iranians gave all the support; closer examination shows that most of the Khurasanis were Arabians who had settled there and become detribalized, and others were Arabian tribesmen employed in the armies stationed there. 66

The Abbasid da'wa (movement) appealed directly to non-tribesmen, to all Muslims who had been excluded by the tribal organization of society, and particularly to non-Arabians everywhere and detribalized Arabians in Khurasan. 67 Despite this antitribal Abbasid ideology, Abū Muslim, through masterful maneuvering, managed to gain the support of Arabian tribesmen in Khurasan as well. In order to accomplish this,

he had to identify the da'wa with the ‘asabiyya of the southerners [an Arabian tribal faction] and this is what he succeeded in doing.

. . . By adjusting the da'wa to the existing political circumstances. Abū Muslim was able to attract to his cause, en bloc, thousands of excellent fighters. . . . In its final stage [the Abbasids] acquired an army which was mainly Arab in its constitution. 68

The armies which carried the Abbasids to victory had three Khurasani elements: Arabian tribesmen, Arabian nontribesmen, and Iranian nontribesmen. The Abbasid army thus had the same composition as every previous Islamicate army, Arabian warriors and non-Arabian auxiliaries; the major difference lay in the organization and status of the non-Arabians.

Earlier interpretations of the Abbasid takeover mistook the Abbasids' antitribal policy for an anti-Arabian one. The two can indeed be easily confused, since it was the Arabians who belonged to tribes, but they were very different. The Abbasids did not rebel against Arabians but against the tribal organization which profited Arabians so greatly at the expense of other Muslims.

The factors which had made unfree soldiers so important in

67. Ibid., pp. XXXIII–XXXIV.
68. Ibid., p. XXXIV.
Marwanid times changed when the Abbasids seized power; supply and demand both diminished. The easy availability of unfree soldiers during the Arabian period came to an end. No significant conquests had taken place since 119/737, so the Abbasids found that the supply of captives had dried up. Even more importantly, they had enfranchised free mawlas, so these no longer provided a source of unfree soldiers. The need for unfree soldiers had also declined; the Abbasids came to power with an army of fresh marginal area soldiers that would not have to be replaced until two generations later. During the first sixty years of Abbasid rule (132–95/747–811), the government did not have unreliable soldiers. Slaves and mawlas had a not incon siderable military role during the first two generations after the Abbasid takeover, but it was not so great as earlier. Nothing indicates that the army at this time had a need for military slavery.

*Abbasid Weakness.* The Umayyads never mobilized their own forces but had to reach an agreement with the tribal leaders; still, they did usually arrive at a consensus and preserved their rule over all Dār al-Islām. The Umayyad regime had its share of rebels, but it vanquished them all (until the Abbasids), maintained some control over all the lands ruled by Muslims, and continued to wage wars of expansion.

The Abbasid record was far less impressive; their takeover in 132/750 marked the end of Muslim expansion and unity. The last significant military advance occurred in Inner Asia, culminating in the Battle of Talas and the occupation of Tashkent in 133/751.69 Raids against Canton in 141/758, the Abbasid-T'ang alliance against Tibet in 182/798, and intermittent warfare against Byzantium did nothing to expand the Muslims' frontiers.70 The Abbasids could not resume the earlier conquests.71 Worse, they failed even to hold together the empire

71. Muslim expansion did not end in 132/750, but henceforth other dynasties, such as the Aghlabids, Samanids, and Tahirids, carried it on.
they had inherited from the Ummayads. Very quickly after the Abbasid takeover, Muslims broke away from the caliph's control, beginning a process which continued for over two centuries; the Abbasids steadily lost territories until the time when they fell under Buyid control in 334/945. Between 132/750 and 205/820 a region broke away from Abbasid control approximately every five years:72

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<tr>
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<td>Sayfawa</td>
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<td>172/789</td>
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<td>184/800</td>
<td>Aghlabids</td>
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<tr>
<td>204/819</td>
<td>Samanids</td>
<td>Khurasan &amp; Transoxiana</td>
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<td>204/820</td>
<td>Ziyadids</td>
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<td>210/825</td>
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Why were the Abbasids unable to maintain Muslim expansion and unity? They had undermined the tribal ties and failed to replace them with new bonds; also, they insisted too strenuously on submission, repulsing many who could have tolerated more lenient arrangements.74 When the Abbasids detribalized military pay, they opened the way to a more devoted army, but in the long run they lost a hold over the tribal Arabians. The Abbasids did not find a way to bind those tribesmen to themselves after

72. Information on most of these dynasties comes from E. de Zambaur, Manuel de Genealogie et de Chronologie pour l'histoire de l'Islam (Hanover, Germany, 1927). This extraordinarily valuable book deserves to be better known and far more widely consulted.

73. To appreciate how totally the above dynasties are ignored, note this statement: "It is usual to begin the list of independent dynasties with the Tahirids" (Grunebaum, Classical Islam, p. 106).

74. Bulliet, p. 86, offers another explanation: "Whenever Islam's survival came to be taken for granted, the caliph's underlying source of authority evaporated." See also ibid., p. 129.
they discarded the tribal connection. Detribalization unmoored loyalties and left most of the Arabian warriors floundering, unable or unwilling to fit into the new system of corps organized by the Abbasid regime. More important still, as the fervent support of the Abbasid movement cooled, the Abbasids found no bonds to fall back on; they were left “with an empire possessing neither tribal nor factional ties to hold it together.”

The Abbasid insistence on direct control alienated many, and again, especially the Arabian tribesmen. Severe political divisions followed, with the leaders in several regions breaking away from the caliphate. This process of segmentation further increased Abbasid concern with loyalty and direct control. As rebellions multiplied and regions broke away, the rulers made ever more desperate efforts to find loyal supporters.

*Crisis in Military Manpower, 195–98/811–14.* Two generations after gaining the caliphate, the Abbasids could no longer rely on the descendants of the marginal area soldiers who had brought them to power. The Khurasanis, both Arabian and Iranian, settled down or became unruly. The civil war of 195–98/811–14 between the brothers al-Amīn and al-Maʾmūn made this fact clear, just as the earlier war of 64–74/684–93 had.

Al-Amīn relied mostly on the descendants of the troops who had won in 132/750, known as the *Abnāʾ*, the “core and nucleus” of the *ahl Baghdaḏ* (People of Baghdad) who “bore the brunt of the struggle” against al-Maʾmūn. The *Abnāʾ* “were the mainstay of Amin throughout the whole struggle, from the first clash up to his very death.” Arabians did not play a large role in the civil war, but insofar as they fought, they aided al-Amīn. They did not cooperate well with the *Abnāʾ*, nor did they take advantage of this last opportunity to salvage something of their earlier power. Al-Amīn’s troops exemplified what happens to the off-
spring of marginal area soldiers who both settle and become unruly.

In contrast, al-Ma’mūn relied on new troops. Disposed to be anti-Arabian,\(^{81}\) he acquired soldiers during the civil war from Khurasan, Transoxiana, and “perhaps even beyond.”\(^{82}\) By the terms of the Meccan accords worked out in 186/802 (at the behest of their father Hārūn ar-Rashīd), al-Amin agreed to let al-Ma’mūn rule the eastern half of the Abbasid empire. It appears that al-Ma’mūn actually took control of his territories five years later, in 191/807, when he was twenty years old. Henceforth, almost all his support came from the eastern regions and from Khurasan in particular. Al-Ma’mūn did not control his army directly; rather, he took into his service a number of strong local figures (for example, Ṭāhir b. Ṭālḥa and Harthama b. Aṣyān) who could call upon the loyalties of the Khurasani and Central Asian soldiers.\(^{83}\)

**Recruitment of Military Slaves, 198–205/814–20.** At the close of the civil war, al-Ma’mūn found himself in the following circumstances: despite his conquest of western Iran, the strong animosity of the populace of Baghdad and its region toward al-Ma’mūn induced him to stay in the east. He remained in Khurasan for another six years, until 204/819, during which time Merv served as effective capital of the Abbasid empire.

After his victory in the civil war, al-Ma’mūn had even less direct control over his army than previously. The top generals he had employed during the war received substantial rewards for their services and gained in power. Once again, as under the Umayyads, the central government did not directly control its decentralized army. If al-Ma’mūn were to solidify his rule, he had to build up corps loyal to himself and diminish his dependence on the Khurasani generals.

Al-Ma’mūn saw the descendants of earlier marginal area soldiers collapse when fighting for al-Amin. Whatever other reasons he might have had for seeking out new troops, the experience of the civil war confirmed this undertaking. For the second time in Islamic history, a Muslim ruler needed fresh marginal

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83. FB, p. 431.
area soldiers. Having just beaten the old soldiers in a civil war, al-Ma'mūn was well placed to recruit whomever he chose; and living in Khurasan, he had easy access to large numbers of the finest marginal area soldiers.

Although the mawla status in 198/214 had only a shadow of its former importance, al-Ma'mūn no doubt had some idea of the role it had played in supplying marginal area soldiers to Marwanid era armies. In servility lay the kernel of a method of recruitment with which al-Ma'mūn surmounted the hostility of the Baghdad populace, the power of his generals, and the weakness of his old soldiery: enslavement of soldiers enabled al-Ma'mūn to restructure his army. His needs, his location, and the mawla precedent induced him to turn to Central Asia to enslave marginal area soldiers in the manner documented in chapter 5.

First, unlike Marwanid era use of mawlas, Abbasid recruitment of military slaves does fit the general Islamicate pattern; done by the central government (individual soldiers recruited the mawlas), it brought aliens into the army (mawlas were Muslim subjects). The Abbasid army was not tribally organized and thus lacked the remarkable autonomy of Arabian period forces; it could resist neither the recruitment of new soldiers nor the establishment of new corps. Second, whereas only 3 to 4 percent of the population of Dār al-Islām in 64/684 was Muslim, half the population in Iran had converted to Islam by 205/820, and elsewhere up to a quarter had done so. The withdrawal from power and public affairs, which characterized Muslim populations henceforth, began in Iran at this time: the increase in the proportion of Muslims meant that they no longer felt so threatened by the non-Muslims living among them, and disappointment in public affairs became acute as rival leaders increasingly split the umma, the caliphate lost its luster (especially among Shiās), and the jihād wars of expansion had ended, to be replaced by internecine fighting. The Abbasids had carried high hopes, but after some decades they disillusioned many groups, including the army, the pious, and the remoter provincials. These turned inward, and in doing so initiated a long-standing pattern.

How Fighting Mawlas Foreshadowed Military Slaves

Military slavery did not appear ex nihilo in al-Ma’mūn’s time; two centuries of slaves fighting made the notion of military slavery accessible. But this was not enough, for slaves have often fought without its leading to the development of a military slave system; something more was necessary. What beyond the mere presence of slaves in warfare made military slavery possible? Mawlas. The mawlas who fought for the early Muslims shared with military slaves several crucial features—features not usually found among the unfree in warfare: ease of acquisition, certainty of control, and the formation of separate corps. This discussion concentrates on mawlas rather than slaves, for they played a larger and more consequential military role in early Muslim armies.

Acquisition

Like military slaves, most unfree soldiers came from marginal areas. Although the sources identify the ethnic origins of only a few of them, a distinct pattern emerges when one tallies the distinct times an ethnic affiliation of unfree soldiers is mentioned.

85. Ayalon makes this point, too: “The rise of the Mawālī and the eunuchs in the ‘Abbāsid court . . . paved the way to the introduction of the Mamluks as a major military force” (“Reforms,” p. 25). He does not, however, provide evidence for this assertion.

86. The mawla status had importance in other ways, too: (a) the Abbasids called their agents “mawlas,” and (b) the confusion between slave and free mawlas opened doors to the former (Vloten, p. 13, also notes this).


Berber: NT, 1:141 = 159; Ibn al-Qūṭiyā, p. 31; FM, p. 214; TMaw, p. 72; TYa', 2:413; Tanbih, p. 189; and probably Ṭāriq b. Ziyād (see note 112 to chapter 4).

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<td>Khazar</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khurasani</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabatean</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slav (Saqlabi)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemeni</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>96</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures are admittedly small, but they do confirm a clear preference for soldiers from marginal areas, especially Blacks and Turks (who together constituted nearly two-thirds of the entire sample, 62 out of 96), but also Berbers and Slavs. Free non-Arabian soldiers fighting for the Muslims similarly came predominantly from marginal areas.

Egyptian: al-Kindi, p. 87.
Greek: KM, p. 255; T, 2:530; FB, pp. 160–61 (on this, see p. 189); FM, p. 207; BaFami, 4:516.
Khazar: T, 3:1383.
Khurasani: T, 3:75.
Nabatean: Ḥayyân an-Nabātî (on him, see nn. 122 and 123 to chap. 4).
Turk: T, 2:268, 698, 1719, 1805, 3:562, 775, 799, 891, 1076, 1194, 1215–16, 1237, 1250, 1267, 1289; Denys, 4:72; Abûl-Faraj, Maqâsit al-Tâlîbiyân, p. 451; Jah, p. 151; Khalîfa, p. 701; Ḥqd, 2:203; al-Jâhiz, Manâqib, p. 37; al-Kindi, pp. 188–89, 192; BaFami, 4:209; and the main military leaders under al-Muṭṭasîm (Ashnâs, İtâkh, Bughâ al-Kâbîr), discussed in chapter 5. For more information on this topic, see my “Turks in Early Muslim Service.”
Control

The Arabian control of mawlas in military service bore a striking resemblance to the subsequent control of military slaves. Some of the similarities included:

1. Identification with the patron. The Arabians discovered a method to induce diverse non-Arabians to relinquish their prior allegiances, through slavery or conversion or both. Mawlas in military service, like military slaves, subordinated their own interests, lost them, or were chosen so that they had none. They could be slaves or not; more important than that, the Arabians exercised control over the most vital decisions in their lives. Although they could become powerful figures, mawlas did not control their own lives for some years after joining Muslim society.

2. Low social standing. Mawlas occupied the lowest social category and had the opportunity to rise to positions of importance and responsibility. Their low social standing served to eliminate competing allegiances. Even free mawlas, who were not of slave origins, found themselves at the bottom of Muslim society. Since contemporaries often could not distinguish between mawlas of slave and of free origins, they viewed all mawlas as freed slaves, even when that was not the case. The low social standing of mawlas also made them more malleable. Without a position of their own, they associated themselves wholeheartedly with their patron, who did have a position and who alone could provide them with the possibility of advancement. They could achieve nothing on their own, so they committed themselves totally to serving their patron. Their humble station made this identification of interests often complete.

3. Isolation. The mawla in military service found himself living in a foreign culture and having to make his way among alien conquerors. Until 132/750 the gap between Arabians and their subjects was that between two different cultures. Conversion to Islam cut the mawla off from his own people without binding him to the society of Arabians; it left him at the mercy of his patron. Conversion was irreversible too; apostasy from Islam is punishable by death, so once committed the mawla had no escape. His isolation furthered the control the patron exercised.
4. Insecure privilege. Like a military slave, the mawla advanced because of the weakness of his own position; he too could be displaced at the patron's merest whim.

The effectiveness of Arabian control over mawlas in military service can best be judged by results; time and again mawlas showed exceptional devotion to their patron, to the point even of sacrificing their own lives or fighting against their own peoples on his behalf.

Outstanding Loyalty

Notable examples of slave and mawla loyalty in warfare appeared consistently throughout early Islam. The first example may have come at the death of Caliph 'Uthmān in 35/656, when ghulāms almost singlehandedly defended him. When 'Uthmān's house was overrun, they died along with him; subsequently they shared his fate of having their corpses left unwashed; and surviving ghulāms were the only mourners at his funeral.  

The Umayyad leaders discovered the loyalty of unfree persons raised to positions of responsibility even before 64/684, as the following conversation between Marwān b. al-Ḥakam (the future Caliph Marwān I) and his ghulām Jurayḥ makes clear:

Marwān had a ghulām called Jurayḥ on his lands at Dhū Khushub. One day he asked Jurayḥ:

"Have any of the crops ripened?"

"They will ripen soon, while you are here."

As Marwān rode on his lands, he saw some crops being shipped. On asking, "Where are these crops from?" he received the reply, "From your estate at Dhū Khushub, where the lands are in harvest."

On hearing this, Marwān accused Jurayḥ: "I think you are a traitor to me." Jurayḥ answered:

"As for me, my Lord, I think you are weak in the head. When you bought me, I was in a coarse wool jerkin and today I am prosperous. I have taken on [responsibilities] and have constructed buildings. I am no more likely to deceive you than you would deceive the caliph or he would deceive God—may God damn all three of these evils."  

88. T, 1:3018, 3046, 3049–50; Ḥimma, 1:44.
89. AA, 5:130.
Although Jurayḥ had financial not military duties, his loyalty sprang from the same source as that of the soldiers; he owed everything to his master. For this reason, Ziyād b. Abihi recommended mawlas to Muʿāwiyah as “more helpful, more forgiving, and more grateful” than others. 90

At the Battle of al-Ḥarrā in 63/683, a mawla unit fighting with the rebels fought in “a steadfast and courageous manner,” while some of their free allies treacherously let the Umayyads in. 91

The loyalty of mawlas may have been shown at al-Mukhtār’s death in 67/687: according to Dixon, “the ḤArabs deserted al-Mukhtār and took refuge with their tribes, while the mawālī remained with him until he was killed.” 92 During the wars against the Turkish ḥāqān in 110/728, a mawla gave advice to the Umayyad leaders; when one person doubted his word, saying, “Verify what he says, for he came to weaken you,” others answered, “We will not, for he is our mawla and we know him for his advice.” 93 Zayd b. ʿAlī’s rebellion failed in 122/740; only two soldiers stayed with him to the bitter end, one of them a ghulām. 94 Similarly, four years later, at the assassination of al-Walid II, both his khādīms and mawlas stood loyally by the caliph until his death. 95

In the late 120/740s, as the Abbasid danger grew in Khurasan, the Umayyad governor there, Naṣr b. Sayyār, sent his mawla Yazīd to negotiate with Abū Muslim. Abū Muslim proposed to Yazīd that he join the Abbasids, but Yazīd returned to the Umayyad camp despite the favorable impression the Abbasid movement had made on him. On reporting about his mission to Naṣr b. Sayyār, Yazīd revealed that he would have preferred to stay with the Abbasids and added: “Were you not my patron, the man who manumitted me out of slavery, I would not have come

90. AA, 4a:23.
91. Kister, p. 45.
92. Dixon, p. 74 (this assertion does not appear to follow from the references Dixon cites).
93. T, 2:1517.
94. T, 2:1709.
back to you, but would have stayed with them." The power of the bond of manumission cannot be more clearly stated.

"Marwân II, when all hope was lost, advised ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, his secretary [and a mawla], to join the Abbasids who would value his skill and in whose service he might do something for Marwân. The secretary refused to leave his master," losing his life as a consequence.

In an interesting parallel, two great adventurers escaped persecution in the Muslim East by fleeing to the West and establishing an independent dynasty there: ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān b. Muʿāwiya founded the Umayyad dynasty of Spain and Idrīs b. Abdallāh founded the Idrisids. Both of them received vital assistance from a slave retainer who faithfully accompanied them through every tribulation; as reward, they both acquired great power. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān fled the destruction of the Umayyad family in 132/750 and made his way to Spain, often in disguise, with the help of his mawla Badr. When ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān rose to power in Spain, Badr became an important official. In a very similar manner, when Idrīs fled defeat at the Battle of Fakhkh in 169/786, he fled to Morocco with his mawla Rāshid. Idrīs died in 177/786 and Rāshid served as regent for his posthumous son, ruling Morocco until his own death in 186/802. (It might be noted that the first regent in Islamicate history was thus a man of slave origins.) In both of these cases, the ex-

97. That he was a mawla: T, 2:839; UH, 3:205; Ibn Khallikān, 3:228–32; Jah, p. 72.
100. BM, 2:53; AM, pp. 102, 103, 107.
103. It is worth noting that much earlier, in 6/627, Muḥammad left for a raid on al-Muraysī and placed the mawla Zayd b. Ḥarītha in charge of Medina during his absence (IS, 3:1.31).
traordinary loyalty of a mawla made the patron's spectacular escape possible and was rewarded with responsibilities and power.

When cAbd ar-Rahmân b. MuCãwiya reached Spain, he had to win control of the region from the last Umayyad governor there, Yûsuf al-Fihrî; although in one account Yûsuf fell at the hands of his own mawlas, another version portrays them as standing by him loyally to the end.

In Abbasid times too, unfree soldiers continued to show the same strong loyalty to their masters. A defeat of al-Amin's forces by al-Ma'mûn's in 196/812 provided khâdîms and mawlas with an opportunity to stand by their defeated leader. Later that same year al-Amin's general in Ahwaz fell into a desperate situation, so he offered his mawlas the chance to escape; but they indignantly refused, saying:

By God, if we do so, we would cause you great injustice. You have manumitted us from slavery and elevated us from humble positions, raising us from poverty to riches. And after all that, how could we abandon you and leave you in this state? No! Instead, we shall advance in front of you and lie under your steed. May God curse this world and life altogether after your death.

True to their word, the mawlas fought until every one of them died in battle. In 206/822, al-Ma'mûn's governor in Egypt fought rebels with mixed troops; when all but his mawlas and his kinsmen deserted, the governor continued to fight on with those remaining loyal forces. Finally, Bbâk fled a defeat in 222/837 with an armed slave; though less successful than cAbd ar-Rahmân b. MuCãwiya or Idrîs b. cAbdallâh, his slave helped to provision him and kept him out of sight for a while.

Fighting Conationalists

Another severe test of the loyalty of unfree soldiers arose when they had to fight their own peoples. Although not commonly

104. BM, 2:50.
105. AM, p. 100.
106. T, 3:850.
108. TYa#, 2:457.
forced to do so, when they had to, slaves and mawlas usually did not desert their patrons. The examples from early Islam involve Byzantium and northern Iran.

A dramatic story dating from the beginning of ēAbd al-Malik’s reign (about 65/685) deserves note. It began when a rebellion took place in the Lebanon region involving many runaway slaves. After great difficulties, the Umayyads suppressed the revolt, dispersed the rebels, and returned the slaves to their masters. One of the slaves caught the attention of the caliph and subsequently was employed by him as a commander against the Byzantines.

Maymūn al-Jurjumānī, a Greek (Rūmī) slave,110 belonged to the Banū Umm al-Ḥakam (she was the sister of Caliph Muʿāwiya), a tribe of Ṭhaqīf. . . . Caliph ēAbd al-Malik heard of his courage and asked his masters to manumit him, which they did. ēAbd al-Malik put him in command of a body of troops and stationed him in Antioch. He joined the caliph’s son Maslama in an attack on at-Tuwāna, leading 1,000 soldiers from Antioch. He was martyred after showing valiant courage and a memorable defense. ēAbd al-Malik felt his loss so deeply that he sent a great army against Byzantium to avenge him.111

Such an extraordinary transferral of loyalty must have been unusual even for the Muslims. In a similar spirit, when al-Muṭaṣsim’s troops attacked Amorium in 223/838, a ghulām of Byzantine origins spoke to the Byzantine leader on behalf of the Muslims.112

In northern Iran, the king of Samarqand said to Qutayba b. Muslim, the Muslim commander (in 93/712), “You are battling me with my own brethren,” meaning the people of Bukhara and Khorezm.113 There is, however, no indication that they were slaves or mawlas. More explicitly, when the mawla Ḥayyān an-

110. Maymūn is identified as both a Jurjumānī and a Rūmī (Greek); although the Jurjumānīs were frequently independent of Byzantine power (see M. Canard, “Djaradjima” in EI2), as a Rūmī, Maymūn appears here to be fighting his own co-nationals.
113. T, 2:1244.
Nabatî negotiated with the ruler of Tabaristan for a peace treaty in 98/717, he told the ruler: "I am a man from among you, even if religion has divided us."\textsuperscript{114} In just a few words, this statement conveys the tremendous break which conversion to Islam caused between the convert and his own people. Much later, in 224/839, when a non-Muslim relative of al-Afshin's rebelled in Azerbaijan, al-Afshin directed the campaign against him.\textsuperscript{115}

Separate Corps

In contrast to most ordinary slaves but similar to military slaves, the unfree soldiers in early Islam often fought in separate corps under their own commanders.

A mawla first led mawlas in 43/663 on behalf of the Khārijīs; the second occurrence was in 63/683 at the Battle of al-Ḥarrārā where they fought under their own banner.\textsuperscript{116} Al-Mukhtar’s chief of bodyguard, Abū ʿAmra Kaysān, a mawla, led the mawlas at the Battle of Madhār in 67/687.\textsuperscript{117} The mawla who killed Ibn az-Zubayr in 72/691 commanded mawlas in the Umayyad army sent to the Hijaz.\textsuperscript{118} Four years later al-Hajjaj sent four commanders and 6,000 soldiers to fight a Khārijī rebellion; of these, two commanders and at least 1,000 and maybe 2,000 soldiers were mawlas.\textsuperscript{119} At the Battle of Dayr Jamājim in 83/702, a mawla commander and 200 of his mawla troops fell fighting for the rebel Ibn al-Ash’ath.\textsuperscript{120} Ḥayyān an-Nabatî, a mawla, commanded 7,000 mawlas in Khurasan in 96/715; in his case, we know that he really controlled them, because they provided him with a political base from which he influenced current affairs.\textsuperscript{121} Again in Central Asia, the governor of Khurasan in 106/724 sent a mawla against the Turks with a body (qaωm) of mawlas and

\textsuperscript{114} T, 2:1329; Ibn ʿAtham, 7:292. Note also T, 2:1184.
\textsuperscript{115} T, 3:1301; ʿYAϵ, 2:474.
\textsuperscript{116} Khārijīs: ʿYAϵ, 2:221. Al-Ḥarrārā: AA, 4b:35; IS, 5:209, 7:1.160. For the banner and more details, see Kister, pp. 44–45.
\textsuperscript{117} T, 2:721; AA, 5:253.
\textsuperscript{118} al-Kindī, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{119} T, 2:919.
\textsuperscript{120} Khalifa, p. 370.
\textsuperscript{121} T, 2:1291.
"arīf's (captains). Yet again in Central Asia, the governor sent an expedition against Khuttal in 119/737, and a mawla led the mawlas. Just before his final defeat, Marwān II in 132/750 beat a rebel force opposing him in Egypt, apparently an independent mawla corps led by a mawla. As āb dār-Rahmān b. Muʿāwiya fled to Spain in 136/754, his mawla Badr led a corps of āb dār-Rahmān's mawlas on campaign. Some mawla corps even had names. āb dāl-Malik's mawla Wadādā led the Waḍḍāhiya; subsequently Waḍḍā's son led it. The Dhakwāniya had both a mawla leader and mawla troops.

Examples of separate corps of unfree troops are much less common in the first Abbasid period. A1-Mansūr's father had a corps called the Sharawīya which consisted of mawla troops. A commander who may have been a waṣīf led mawlas on an expedition to Ankara in 159/776. Finally, in 200/816, an Abbasid mawla led Abbasid slaves in Mecca against the rebel Abū's-Sarāyā.

Slaves and mawlas who fought before 198/813 shared several important qualities with military slaves: they came mostly from marginal areas, demonstrated outstanding loyalty, and fought separately from other soldiers. In these same ways, they differed from the usual pattern of ordinary slaves in warfare (outlined in chapters 1 and 2). Thus they provided the vital prototype for military slavery. But they were clearly not military slaves, for they were not systematically acquired, trained for military purposes, or professionally employed. Fighting mawlas of the

122. T, 2:1478.
123. 2:1630. That the leader (Salma b. Abī ābdallāh) was a mawla comes from T, 2:1934.
124. al-Kindi, p. 96.
125. BM, 2:41.
126. Wadādā a mawla: this is stated in the Cairo edition of at-Ṭabari (10:449) but I have not been able to confirm it. Wadādā's son led the Waḍḍāhiya: T, 2:1893. There is nothing to indicate that the soldiers of this corps were mawlas.
127. On the Dhakwāniya, see n. 145 to chap. 4.
128. KB, p. 243.
129. T, 3:459; ITB, 2:34.
130. T, 3:992.
131. This is indicated in chapter 5.
Marwanid period had particular importance as a precedent and transition; for the first time, Muslim leaders looked to unfree outsiders from marginal areas to replenish their armies. This key act then influenced countless other Islamicate dynasties over several continents and many centuries. Can it be demonstrated that fighting mawlas provided the crucial step to military slavery? Confirmation may come from the Umayyads of Spain.

The Spanish Umayyads

This dynasty came to power only six years after the Abbasids and was largely isolated from the Abbasid government. During its first two generations, 138–80/756–96, conquering marginal area soldiers and their descendants dominated and the unfree had only a small military role. Major changes took place during the reign of al-Ḥakam b. Hishām (r. 180–206/796–822), who introduced large numbers of slaves into the army: “He was the first . . . to increase the number of kḥādīms . . . and the first to acquire mamlūks. He called the mamlūks “the Mutes” (khurs), on account of their not speaking Arabic. The number of mamlūks reached 5,000, of which 3,000 were cavalry and 2,000 infantry.”

It is unclear whether al-Ḥakam b. Hishām founded the mamlūk corps or merely increased the size of an existing body of troops: “Many say he was the first to assemble mamlūks.” “He increased the number of mamlūks.” We lack enough detailed in-

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132. The first Umayyad ruler of Spain, ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān (r. 138–72/756–88), used unfree soldiers on occasion. He had a mawla corps before even becoming ruler (BM, 2:41, 42, 44; AM, p. 67); his mawlas later formed a cavalry corps (Ibn al-Qūṭiya, p. 31); mawlas helped besiege Carmona (Ibn al-Qūṭiya, p. 33; BM, 2:51; NT, 1:211); they fought a rebel (BM, 2:53), led an assault on Toledo (AM, p. 103), and ruled Washqa, Tartusha, and Tarsuna (Ibn al-Abbār, 1:143).

133. NT, 1:220.

134. This sentence is combined from Ibn Saʿīd, 1:39, ʿIbar, 4:127, and NT, 1:220. ʿIqd, 4:492, mentions 1,000 cavalry on guard at al-Ḥakam’s palace without indicating that they were slaves; they may well have been, for slaves often performed this function. See also UH, 3:363.

135. NT, 1:220.

136. NT, 1:219; ʿIbar, 4:125.
formation to decide on the significance of al-Ḥakam b. Hishām's measures and to judge whether or not they constituted a system of military slavery. If so, his may have the honor of preceding the one established by al-Ma'mūn and al-Mu'tašīm.\textsuperscript{137}

Was it mere coincidence that this heavy reliance on slaves in Spain occurred simultaneously with the Abbasids' development of military slavery? Can it be accidental that a system unprecedented in human history occurred in two places at the same moment? I think not. The Spanish Umayyads and the Abbasids shared two legacies: the Islamicate need (for marginal area soldiers) and the Marwanid answer (using marginal area soldiers in an unfree way, as mawlas). In combination, these elements prompted both dynasties to recruit marginal area soldiers as slaves.\textsuperscript{138} The simultaneity of developments in Spain and Iran-Iraq can hardly be coincidental; together, Islamicate need and Marwanid precedent account for the initial development of military slavery.

Conclusion

This explanation for the origins of military slavery confirms the argument for its Islamicate rationale proposed in chapter 3. Briefly, that rationale maintains: (1) that the impossibility of attaining Islamic public ideals caused Muslim subjects to relinquish their military role; (2) that marginal area soldiers filled this power vacuum; (3) that they became rapidly unreliable, creating the need for fresh marginal area soldiers and a way to bind them; (4) that military slavery supplied a way both to acquire and to control new marginal area soldiers.

In the first development of military slavery, the following se-

\textsuperscript{137} Papoulia, p. 13, notes this possibility too. Another discussion of al-Ḥakam's corps: Lévi-Provençal, p. 130.

\textsuperscript{138} Most of the slave recruits were Saqāliba; Ayalon has announced a detailed study on this term ("Aspects," p. 224), so I refer the reader to his research for an explanation of this elusive ethnic identification (it is more ambiguous in the Spanish context than elsewhere). Slaves also came from North Africa, both Berbers and Blacks (S. M. Imamuddin, Some Aspects of the Socio-Economic and Cultural History of Muslim Spain [Leiden, 1965], p. 61).
quence occurred. (1) Muslim subjects in the Fertile Crescent and Iran had withdrawn from public affairs by the end of the 2d/8th century, a consequence of their disappointment with Abbasid rule (and possibly because Muslims had become a large portion of the population). (2) Some or many of the Abbasid military supporters from Khurasan were marginal area soldiers. (3) The descendants of these soldiers had grown unreliable by the 190/810s, as is shown by the poor show they made in fighting for al-Amīn against al-Maʿmūn. Al-Maʿmūn needed new sources of marginal area soldiers and a way to control them. (4) Military slavery fulfilled both these needs.

Once the institution of military slavery had been established, it acquired a momentum of its own and became available to rulers and dynasties with diverse needs. Mainly it spread because Muslim rulers, under the restriction of unattainable Islamic ideals, needed some way to acquire and control outsider soldiers from marginal areas. Military slavery developed early and remained a basic institution of premodern Islamicate public life. It did not arise as a result of accidental features of Abbasid history; much less was it the result of al-Maʿmūn’s personal decision. Rather, it came into existence and took hold in response to fundamental facts of Islamicate life. Military slavery was an institution implicit in the Islamicate order; the Abbasids (and probably the Spanish Umayyads as well), with the Marwanid model before them, resorted to it naturally.
APPENDIX 1: SLAVE TERMINOLOGY

Arabic has an extraordinarily rich vocabulary for slaves: the *ma'dhīn* possesses some legal rights for commercial purposes, the *abiq* is a runaway, the *jalib* is an imported slave, and the *buqāʾan* is one brought from Ethiopia. Yet these colorful specialized terms rarely find their way into the historical literature of early Islam. Instead, seven other general terms most frequently occur. Of these, all but one, *raqīq*, had meanings other than “slave”:

- *ʿabd*: human being (“servitor of God”)
- *ghulām*: personal servant, apprentice, youth
- *khādim*: servant, eunuch
- *mamlūk*: any possession (such as land or cattle)
- *mawlā*: see pp. 107–08
- *waṣīf*: servant

Historians have noted that these terms acquired some specialized meanings; the best known and most important distinction was the one drawn between the *ʿabd* and the *mamlūk*, the black and the white slave, respectively. While this distinction undoubtedly had validity in later times, and particularly in the Mamluk Kingdom of Egypt, it did not exist in the early period of Islam. During the first two centuries (and perhaps the first four), all general terms had the same meaning. The sources used these words interchangeably, so modern attempts to distinguish between them are specious.

An individual slave can be called by a wide variety of terms. For example, Wahshī is called a *ʿabd, ghulām, mamlūk*, and

mawla;\textsuperscript{5} nothing in all these terms indicates that he was a black Ethiopian.\textsuperscript{6} In telling the story of the slave who ended hostilities at Shahriyaj (quoted on pp. 34–35), FB, p. 390, calls him a \textit{abd mamluk}; Ab\textup{u} \textit{Ubayd, pp. 242–43, both \textit{abd} and \textit{mamluk}; at-Tabari, 1:2568, just \textit{abd}; and Khalifa, p. 133, just \textit{mamluk}.

Al-Mu\textsuperscript{ta}s\textsuperscript{'im's Turks are referred to by the following terms in the sources (the italic numbers refer to the quotes in Appendix 5; parentheses mean that Turks are implied):

\textit{abd}: 17, (32); Tanbih, p. 356.

\textit{bande}: 14

\textit{ghulam}: 4, 5, 7, 11, 13, 14, 16, 26, (30); T, 3:1017, 1180; TMaw, p. 352; Miskawayh, p. 438

\textit{mamluk}: 4, 8, 18, 19, 23, 25, (33–35), 38–40

\textit{mawla}: 22, (31), 40; ITB, 3:4; (Ibn al-Faqih, p. 280); (al-Maqrizi, al-Maw\textsuperscript{a}riz, 1:94). Also Ibn al-\textsuperscript{i}ibr\textup{i}, p. 146

\textit{raqiq}: (36), 38

Proof of the interchangeability of these words lies in the description of the same person by more than one term; the following lists provide some of these equations, in alphabetical order:

\textit{abd} = \textit{ghulam}: T, 3:366, 556, 1294; UA, 1:149; ADA, pp. 263, 280; UG, 4:341, 5:126; al-W\textsuperscript{a}qidi, p. 105; Ibn A\textsuperscript{tham}, 1:39

= \textit{kh\textsuperscript{a}dim}: Diyab, p. 173

= \textit{mamluk}: T, 2:650, 3:566; ITB, 2:251; Ab\textup{u} \textit{Ubayd, pp. 242–43, 556–60

\textit{5. \textit{Abd}: T, 1:1944, 1949; al-Balansi, p. 95; TYa\textsuperscript{e}, 2:47; al-W\textsuperscript{a}qidi, 285–86; IH, 2:73; UG, 5:84; Khalifa, 89; Ibn A\textsuperscript{tham}, 1:39.}

\textit{ghulam}: T, 1:1385, 1405; IH, 2:61, 71, 91, 122; UG, 5:84; Khalifa, p. 32; Ibn A\textsuperscript{tham}, 1:38–39.

\textit{mamluk}: al-W\textsuperscript{a}qidi, 230.

\textit{mawla}: T, 1:1943; IH, 2:70; UG, 5:83; IA, 2:364.


\textit{Ethiopian}: T, 1:1385; IH, 2:61; al-W\textsuperscript{a}qidi, 287; AA, 1:322, 328; al-Balansi, p. 95.
Appendix 1


freedman: $AA$, 1:189, $UG$, 4:341

$^cabd$ mamlük = mamlük: $UG$, 4:139

= mawlā: T, 2:368 = Din, p. 259

din = mawlā: $ADA$, p. 191

$ghulām = khādim$: T, 3:439, 968, 1:3257 and ITB, 2:285, ITB, 2:318; Diyāb, p. 88

= khāṣī: T, 3:393 and Ṭayfūr, p. 133

= mamlük: T, 3:556; $AA$, 1:478, 484; $KB$, p. 256; al-Wāqīdī, p. 230; Ibn Ṭiqlaqa, p. 231


= waṣīf: $AM$, p. 100; T, 3:393

$khādim = mawlā$: T, 3:558, 712 and 764, 773; $AA$, 4a:49; $MDh$, 3:355; Jah, p. 277; $KB$, p. 252 (two); Combe, 1:113

eunuch: T, 3:392, 439, 1243; $UH$, 3:288; IA, 6:24, 29; Diyāb, p. 40

non-eunuch: Ibn al-Faqīh, p. 100

$khāṣī = mawlā$: ITB, 2:40

mamlük = mawlā: T, 2:650, 1886; al-Wāqīdī, p. 230

mawlā = mukātib: Ibn Ḥabīb, pp. 340–47; $KM$ 162, 240, 253

= ṣaḥī: the many captives from $^cAyn$ at-Tamr

= waṣīf: $KB$, p. 252; $AM$, p. 3

Note also the following interesting combinations of words:


$^cabd$ Habāši: $UG$, 3:2; al-Wāqīdī, p. 287; al-Balansī, p. 95; ITB, 2:39
Although the sources refer both to black *ʿabds* and *mamlūks*, the preponderance of the former is clear and perhaps explains the common idea that *ʿabds* were always from Africa, even though this was not the case.
Muslims were apparently very little aware of the institution of military slavery, for it is mentioned rarely in the great bulk of premodern literature written by them. Slave soldiers keep appearing, but not the system which molds them, except for their military training, described in detail in the many furūsīya treatises. As far as I am aware, premodern Muslim literature contains only two discussions of military slavery as an institution, one written by the renowned vizier Niẓām al-Mulk, a Seljuk official, the other by the even more celebrated historian, Ibn Khaldūn. It is interesting that the two discussions come from the pens of such eminent authors. Might this imply that whereas the culture as a whole did not notice military slavery, the most acute minds did?

The following pages present the most important sections of Niẓām al-Mulk and Ibn Khaldūn dealing with military slavery.

Niẓām al-Mulk

On keeping Turkmans in service like pages [ghulāms]

Although the Turkmans have given rise to a certain amount of vexation, and they are very numerous, still they have a long-standing claim upon this dynasty, because at its inception they served well and suffered much, and also they are attached by ties of kinship. So it is fitting that about a thousand of their sons should be enrolled and maintained in the same way as pages of the palace. When they are in continuous employment they will learn the use of arms and become trained in service. Then they will settle down with other people and with growing devotion serve as pages, and cease to feel that aversion [to settled life] with which they are naturally imbued; and whenever the need arises, 5,000 or 10,000 of them, organized and equipped like pages, will mount to perform the task for which they are detailed. In this way the empire will not leave them portionless, the king will acquire glory, and they will be contented.
On organizing the work of slaves and not letting them crowd together while serving

Slaves who stand in attendance are apt to crowd together, so that it is constantly necessary to hurl abuse at them; and when they promptly disperse [to perform a task], they just as promptly come back [in a crowd]. But when orders are given in decisive terms and they are told once or twice how they are to behave, then they will act accordingly and there will be no need for this inconvenience. Alternatively, [pages should be employed and] clear orders should be given how many water-bearers, arms-bearers, wine-bearers, robe-bearers and the like should report for duty every day, and how many of those pages who have reached the rank of amir-chamberlain and great amir should attend; then every day they will come for service from each tent by turns in the required numbers; likewise with the private [servants of the king], so that there is no crowding. Moreover in all former times, from the day they were bought until their advancement in years and promotion [to high office] pages have been efficiently organized as to their education and grading, but in these days irregularities have come into the system. Your humble servant will mention a little of what is needed to fulfil the purpose of the book, in the hope that it meets with the approval of The Sublime Intellect.

Concerning the training of pages of the palace. This is the system which was still in force in the time of the Samanids. Pages were given gradual advancement in rank according to their length of service and general merit. Thus after a page was bought, for one year he was commanded to serve on foot at a rider's stirrup, wearing a Zandaniji cloak and boots; and this page was not allowed during his first year to ride a horse in private or in public, and if it was found out [that he had ridden] he was punished. When he had done one year's service with boots, the tent-leader spoke to the chamberlain and he informed the king; then they gave him a small Turkish horse, with a saddle covered in untanned leather and a bridle of plain leather strap. After serving for a year with a horse and whip, in his third year he was given a belt to gird on his waist. In the fourth year they gave him a
Appendix 2

quiver and bow-case which he fastened on when he mounted. In his fifth year he got a better saddle and a bridle with stars on it, together with a cloak and a club which he hung on the club-ring. In the sixth year he was made a cup-bearer or water-bearer and he hung a goblet from his waist. In the seventh year he was a robe-bearer. In the eighth year they gave him a single-apex, sixteen-peg tent and put three newly bought pages in his troop; they gave him the title of tent-leader and dressed him in a black felt hat decorated with silver wire and a cloak made at Ganja. Every year they improved his uniform and embellishments and increased his rank and responsibility until he became a troop-leader, and so on until he became a chamberlain. When his suitability, skill and bravery became generally recognized and when he had performed some outstanding actions and been found to be considerate to his fellows and loyal to his master, then and only then, when he was thirty-five or forty years of age, did they make him an amir and appoint him to a province.


Ibn Khaldūn:

Ibn Khaldūn (808/1406) says that after the ‘Abbāsid Empire had decayed and become effeminate, as a result of the indulgence of its rulers in luxury and pleasure, and after the infidel Tartars had abolished the throne of the Caliphate and Islam had been overpowered by heathendom, “it was by the grace of God, glory be to Him, that He came to the rescue of the true faith, by reviving its last breath and restoring in Egypt the unity of the Muslims, guarding His Order and defending His ramparts. This He did by sending to them (the Muslims), out of this Turkish people and out of its mighty and numerous tribes, guardian amirs and devoted defenders who are imported as slaves from the lands of heathendom to the lands of Islam. This status of slavery is indeed a blessing . . . from Divine Providence. They embrace Islam with the determination of true believers, while retaining their nomadic virtues which are undefiled by vile nature, unmixed with the filth of lustful pleasures, unmarred by
the habits of civilisation, with their youthful strength unshattered by excess of luxury. The slave merchants bring them to Egypt in batch after batch, like sand grouse flocking to watering places. The rulers have them paraded and bid against one another to pay the highest prices for them. The purpose of their purchase is not to enslave them but to intensify their zeal and solidarity and strengthen their prowess.

"Then the rulers lodge them in the royal chambers, and give them a careful upbringing, including the study of the Koran and other subjects of instruction, until they become proficient in these things. Then they train them in the use of the bow and sword, in riding in the hippodromes, in fighting with the lance, until they become tough and seasoned soldiers and these things become second nature to them. When the rulers are convinced that they are prepared to defend them and to die for them, they multiply their pay and augment their fiefs and impose upon them the duties of perfecting themselves in the use of the weapons and in horsemanship, as well as of increasing the number of men of their own races (in the rulers’ service) for the same purpose. Then they appoint them to high offices of state, and even sultans are chosen from them who direct the affairs of the Muslims, as had been ordained by the Providence of Almighty God and out of His benevolence to His creatures. Thus one group (of Mamelukes) follows another, and generation succeeds generation and Islam rejoices in the wealth which it acquires (by means of them) and the boughs of the kingdom are luxuriant with the freshness and verdure of youth."

## APPENDIX 3: THE EARLY CALIPHS

### Arabian Period

**Rāshidūn**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Caliph</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/632</td>
<td>Abū Bakr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/634</td>
<td>ʿUmar [I] b. al-Khaṭṭāb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/644</td>
<td>ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35/656</td>
<td>ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib</td>
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**Umayyads**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Caliph</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40/660</td>
<td>Muʿāwiya [I] b. Abī Sufyān</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60/680</td>
<td>Yazīd I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64/683</td>
<td>Muʿāwiya II</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Marwanids)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Caliph</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>64/684</td>
<td>Marwān [I] b. al-Ḥakam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65/685</td>
<td>ʿAbd al-Malik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86/705</td>
<td>al-Walid I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96/715</td>
<td>Sulaymān</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99/717</td>
<td>ʿUmar [II] b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101/720</td>
<td>Yazīd II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105/724</td>
<td>Hishām</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125/743</td>
<td>al-Walid II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126/744</td>
<td>Yazīd III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126/744</td>
<td>Ibrāhīm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127/744</td>
<td>Marwān [II] b. Muḥammad</td>
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<tr>
<td>132/750</td>
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</table>

### The First Abbasids

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Caliph</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>132/749</td>
<td>Abū ʿālāʾ Abūl-ʿAbbās as-Ṣaffāḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136/754</td>
<td>Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣūr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158/775</td>
<td>al-Mahdī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>169/785</td>
<td>al-Hādī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170/786</td>
<td>Hārūn ar-Rashīd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>193/809</td>
<td>al-Amīn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>198/813</td>
<td>al-Maʿmūn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>218/833</td>
<td>al-Muʿtaṣim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>227/842</td>
<td>al-Wāthiq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232/847</td>
<td>al-Mutawakkil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 4: MAJOR MILITARY DATES

Muḥammad and the Ridda Wars, 2–13/624–34

2/624       Battle of Badr
11–12/632–33  Ridda Wars

Arabian Armipotence, 13–64/634–84

13–25/634–46  First conquests
25–64/646–84  Two generations

Marwanid Period, 64–132/684–750

64–74/684–93  Civil war
74–119/693–737  Second conquests
119–132/737–50  Umayyad decline

First Abbasids, 132–205/750–820

132–93/750–809  Two generations
193–218/809–33  Civil war and new recruitment
APPENDIX 5: SOURCES ON THE FIRST MILITARY SLAVE SYSTEM

A full listing of the Arabic and Persian sources dealing with the first use of military slaves by the Abbasids follows. These quotes provide the reader with the material from which to draw his own conclusions. They are listed in chronological order under four separate headings. "He" without further description refers to al-Mu'tašām.

I. Turkish slaves

1. Al-Jāḥīz (255/868): "al-Mu'tašām knew the Turks well when he collected and trained (ištana'a) them" (Manāqib, p. 37).
2. Ibn Qutayba (276/889): al-Ma'mūn "ordered his brother Abū Ishāq [al-Mu'tašām] to acquire Turks, and he imported them [as slaves]" (KM [Cairo, 1969], p. 391).
3. Tayfūr (280/893): al-Mu'tašām said the following about Turks in an argument: "There is no people in the world braver, more numerous, or more steadfast against the enemy than the Turks. While they can attack their enemies, none of their enemies can attack them" (Kitāb Baghdad, p. 143).
4. Al-Ya'qūbī (285/897): "I heard this from Ja'far al-Khushshakī:
   "'Al-Mu'tašām sent me during the reign of al-Ma'mūn to Samarqand, to Nūh b. Asad [Samanid governor, 202–27/818–42] for the purchase of Turks. I presented him each year with a number of them, so that already in al-Ma'mūn's reign he had collected some 3,000 ghulāms.'"

1. Most of the following sources deal with the inception of military slavery. No contemporary chronicles survive from the early Islamic period; and the dozens of sources from later times deal with its events in different ways. It is indeed remarkable how seldom versions from many centuries later repeat each other; historiographically this may be unique. Do the late accounts reflect a first recording of oral traditions or a copying of written documents since lost? I think they were oral traditions, for the chronicles we do possess so rarely repeat each other's accounts.
2. Wüstenfeld's edition lacks this important quotation.
"When the caliphate fell to [al-Mu'tasim], he persevered in demanding them. He purchased slaves in Baghdad who belonged to the people (an-nās); in this way, he bought a large number of slaves, including:

1. Ashnās, the mamālik of Nuṣaym b. Khāzim, the father of Hārūn b. Nuṣaym;
2. Īṭākh, the mamālik of Sallām b. al-Abrash;
3. Waṣīf, an armorer, the mamālik of the an-Nuṣmān family; and
4. Simā ad-Dimashqī, the mamālik of Dhūr-Riʿāsatayn al-Faḍl b. Sahl" (KB, pp. 255-56).

5. Al-Masʿūdī (334/953): "al-Mu'tasim liked to gather Turks; buying them from his maulūs, he gathered 4,000. He dressed them in gold brocade, belts, and ornaments, distinguishing them by their uniform from the rest of his soldiers.

"He trained (istiṣāna) a group from the Hawf of Egypt, the Hawf of Yemen, and the Hawf of Qays and called them the Maghāriba. He prepared men of Khurasan, Faraghanians, and others from Ushrusana, enlarging his army."

"Al-Mu'tasim favored the Turkish ghulāms he had introduced over his old companions and his father's advisers" (MDh, 4:53; Tanbih, p. 354).

6. Muḥāhir al-Maqdisī (wrote 355/966): "Abū Isḥāq ordered the acquisition of Turks for service. He purchased each of them for 100,000 or 200,000 [dirhams]" (al-Bad', 6:112).

7. Bal'amī (363/974): "Mu'tasim, who liked the Turks, had [in his army] many Turkish ghulāms. He was the first Abbasid caliph to take Turks into his service and he accumulated a large number under his banners. He placed at their head some of those who had already been with him before he ascended to the throne, such as Ashnās, Bughā al-Kabīr, and Īṭākh. These soldiers went every day, morning and evening, outside town to practice archery, and they galloped on their horses through the market and the streets of Baghdad" (Tarjama, 4:524).

8,9. al-ʾIṣṭākhrī (mid-4th/10th century) and Ibn Ḥawqal

3. A eunuch: Tayfūr, p. 133.
4. On the definition of al-Ḥawf, see Yāqūt, s.v.
Appendix 5

(wrote 366/977): “al-Mu'tasim asked 'Abdallâh b. Thâhir [r. 213–30/828–45] (or wrote to him asking) what there was to be envied in Khurasan and Transoxiana. 'Abdallâh b. Thâhir dispatched the letter to Nûh b. Asad b. Sâmân, who wrote back to al-Mu'tasim:

“Khurasan and Transoxiana have 300,000 villages. If one horseman and one infantryman were taken from each, the population would not notice a loss.”

Khurasanis and Transoxianians “are most submissive to their notables and most careful to please their rulers. These qualities encouraged the Abbasid caliphs to bring recruits from Transoxiana. The Turks formed their armies thanks to their superiority over all other armies. The dihqâns served as their officers. [The Turks] distinguished themselves from all other soldiers by their great courage, temerity, and fortitude; this pushed them ahead of the others.

“On account of their agreeable service, eager obedience, and fine bearing in government uniform, the dihqâns of Transoxiana become commanders, the retinue, and the elite guard of khâdîms. They became the retinue of the caliphate and its trusted agents.

“The leaders of the camps, such as the Faraghanians and the Turks, provided the police force for the caliph’s palace.

“Turks who took control of the caliphate (on account of their courage and daring) included: al-Afshin; the family of Abû’s-Sâj from Ushrusana; the Ikhshid from Samarqand; al-Marzubân b. Taraksafti; 'Ujayf b. 'Anbasa from Soghdia; the Bukhârâkho-dhâh; and other leading amirs, commanders, and soldiers” (al-Masâlik, pp. 291–92, and Şûrat al-Ârḍ., pp. 467–68).

10. Al-Balawi (late 4th/10th century): “When al-Mu'tasim bi-llâh singled out the Turks and humbled the Arabians, he made the Turks the support (ar) of his dynasty and the mainstay of his movement (a'lâm da'wati)” (Sîrat Aḥmad b. Țûlûn, p. 32).

11. Miskawayh (421/1030): “al-Mu'tasim's Turkish ghulâms were non-Arabians ('Ajâm) whom he had trained (iştana'a). He saw excellent qualities in them.” (Tajârib al-Uman, p. 478).

12. ath-Thâ'alîbî (429/1038): “Al-Manṣûr was the first caliph to acquire Turks. . . . Subsequent caliphs and everyone else fol-
lowed [him and his successor al-Mahdî] in this practice” (Laṭā'if al-Maṣā'īrīf, p. 20).

13. Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (463/1071): “When al-Mu'taṣīm had completed his acquisitions and had some tens of thousands of Turkish ghulūms—50,000 nosebags hung from horses, nags, and mules—they humbled the enemy in every direction. Al-Mu'taṣīm's desires were suddenly satisfied.”

A monk said to al-Mu'taṣīm: “A king whose soldiers are mostly the sons of fornication will enter Amorium.”

Al-Mu'taṣīm replied: “By God, I am that king, for most of my army are the sons of fornication—they are Turks and non-Arabians (Aʿājīm)” (Taʾrikh Baghdad, 3:346, 344-45).

14. Niẓām al-Mulk (485/1092): “Of the Abbasid caliphs, none had such authority, such dignity, such a profusion of wealth as Mu'taṣim; nor did any own as many Turkish bandes as he. They say he had 70,000 Turkish ghulūms; many of his ghulūms he appointed to governorships. He always used to say that there was none like the Turk for service” (Sīyāṣetnāmeh, p. 57/50).

15. Ibn al-Imrānī (580/1175): a variant reply by al-Mu'taṣim to the same monk as in al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī's version: “By God, my whole army is dominated by Turks and all Turks are the sons of fornication. They have no law or politics (lāyṣa baynahum shariʿa walā siyāsa)” (al-Anb', p. 106).

16. Al-ʿUyūn wa'l-Hadāʾiq (6th/12th century) and Ibn al-Athīr (630/1233): “He increased the number of Turkish ghulūms” (3:381 IA, 6:452).

17. Ibn Badrūn’s (608/1211) commentary on Ibn ʿAbdūn’s (529/1134) poem:

Poem: “The Abbasid dynasty fell.”

Commentary: “This refers to the domination by the Turkish ʿabds. It got so that the ʿabds could kill Abbasids at will and could enthrone or depose them.”

Poem: “As a result of the hypocrisy of brown and white.”

Commentary: “The Abbasids were overpowered by the number of their ʿabds and the ʿabds' abilities with weapons. . . . This occurred at the death of al-Wāṭhīq b. al-Mu'taṣīm in 232/847. ʿJaʿfar al-Manṣūr was the first to acquire them. He acquired a
Turk named Ḥammād; al-Mahdī had another, named Mubāräk. Henceforth the Turks continued to increase in numbers, and eventually they overpowered the Abbasids, as we have mentioned. Obeisance [to their masters] kept them from taking over the rule earlier. They took over at the death of al-Wāthiq on [the strength of their] increased size in al-Muṭṭasim's and his reigns (Sharḥ Qaṣīdat, p. 285).

18. Yaqūt (626/1229): “The armies of al-Muṭṭasim increased until his Turkish mamlūks reached 70,000 in number” (Muʿjam al-Buldān, 3:16).

19. Ibn Dihyā (634/1237): “His possessions expanded greatly until he had 70,000 mamlūks and as many free [soldiers]” (an-Nibrūs, p. 65).

20. An-Nuwayrī (731/1332): al-Maʾmūn “was the first to take Turks in his service. He raised their price, paying for one of them 100,000 or 200,000 dirhams.”

21. Ibn Kathīr (774/1373): “al-Muṭṭasim employed a large body of Turks, nearly 20,000 of them. He owned war materiel and mounts such as no one else had” (al-Bidya, 10:296).

22. Ibn Khaldūn (808/1406): “Mawlawās of dynasties . . . acquire nobility by being firmly rooted in their walāʾ relationship, by their service to a particular dynasty, and by having a large number of ancestors who had been under the protection of (that dynasty). For example, the Turkish mawlawās of the Abbasids . . . thus achieved ‘house’ and nobility and created glory and importance for themselves by being firmly rooted in their relationship to the (Abbasid) dynasty.”

“The group feeling (ʿasabīya) of the Arabians had been destroyed by the time of the reigns of al-Muṭṭasim and his son al-Wāthiq. The Abbasids tried to maintain a hold over the government with the help of Persian, Turkish, Daylamī, Saljūq, and other mawlawās.

“The Abbasids after al-Muṭṭasim . . . remained caliphs in name because Arabian group feeling continued to exist . . . Caliphate and royal authority [initially] existed in the same person; then,
with the disappearance of Arabian group feeling, the annihilation of the (Arabian) people, and complete destruction of (Arabian ethnic pride), the caliphate lost its identity (and power)."6 (Muq, 1:246/277, 280/314–15, 375–76/427).

23. Al-Maqrizi (845/1442): al-Ma'mūn "bought numerous Turks and increased the prices for them, paying sometimes as much as 200,000 dirhams for one mamlūk. His brother Abū Ishāq al-Mu'taṣīm followed his example. . . . He ousted the Arabians . . . from the Military Register and stopped their pay. Ever since, they have not received pay [from the Military Register].

“He introduced the Turks in their stead. He shed Arabian clothes and put on those of the non-Arabians (¢Ajam) . . . Arabian rule ceased to exist with him and because of him. Since his time, the Turks (against whom the Prophet called us to fight) have become the rulers of the [Muslim] kingdoms.”7 (an-Nizāc, p. 63).

24. Al-Maqrizi and as-Suyūṭi (911/1505): "al-Mu'taṣīm was the first to enter the Turks onto the Military Register" (as-Sulūk, 1:16 = Ta'īrkh 24).

25. Ibn Taghri Birdi (874/1470): "In this year [220/835], al-Mu'taṣīm concerned himself with procuring Turks. He sent [buyers] to Samarqand, Farghana, and their districts to purchase them. He spent money freely on them, dressed them in various silk brocades and belts of gold. He continued purchasing them until their number reached 8,000 mamlūks. Or 18,000, the better known number" (an-Nujām, 2:233).

26. An-Nahrawānī (990/1582): "He was the first to enter Turks onto the Military Registers. He imitated the Persian (A'jam) kings. His Turkish ghulāms reached 18,000 in number. He sent money to Samarqand and Farghana to purchase Turks. He dressed them in gold collars and brocade" (al-A'lam, p. 123).

27. Diyāb al-Iklīdī (wrote 1100/1688): “He was known as as-Ṣaffāḥ the Second because he renewed the Abbasid kingdom by establishing the Turks as his servile creatures” (A'lam an-Nās, p. 256).

6. Adopted from Rosenthal’s translation.
II. Slaves, No Turks Mentioned

28. Al-Ṭabarî (310/923): al-Muṭṭasim notes that his brother al-Maʿmūn ‹trained (istanaa) four men who turned out excellently and I also trained four men, but not one of them amounts to anything.’
   ‘Who are those your brother trained?’ I asked, and he answered:
   ‘Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn—you saw and heard of him! And ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāhir—a man whose like you will not see. And you [Abūʾl-Ḥusayn Ḥishāq b. Ibrāhīm]—you are, by God, a man for whom the government could never be compensated. And then your brother, Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm—where is there his like?
   ‘But I trained al-Afshīn, and you have seen what came of him! And Ashnās, what a coward. And Ḥīk, who is of no account. And Waṣīf, who is unreliable.’
   ‘I said, ‘O Commander of the Faithful . . . your brother considered the roots and made use of them and their branches flourished. But the Commander of the Faithful used branches which did not flourish because they had no roots.’” (Taʾrikh 3:1327)

29. Al-Kindī (349/961) and al-Maqrīzī (845/1442): “He ordered Kaydūr [the governor in Egypt] to pay him homage, to drop any Arabians who were on the Military Register of Egypt, and to cut off their military pay. Kaydūr did so” (al-Wulāh, p. 193 = al-Mawāriz, 1:94).

30. Gardīzī (ca. 442/1050): “Muṭṭasim was angry with ʿAbdallāh [b. Ṭāhir]. This was because one day when ʿAbdallāh was serving as Maʾmūn’s chamberlain (hājib), Muṭṭasim came to Maʾmūn’s door with a group of his own ghulāms at an inopportune time.
   ‘ʿAbdallāh said: ‘You are unwelcome here with so many ghulāms.’
   ‘Muṭṭasim replied: ‘But you may be sitting with 400 ghulāms. It is not suitable for me to sit down with this [small] quantity of men.’

“Abdallāh answered: ‘Even if I were sitting with 1,000 ghulāms, I would not want you to be with four ghulāms’” (Zayn, p. 7).


32. Michael (1199) and Bar Hebraeus (1286): “He freed at his death 8,000 abds who had been purchased with silver. And he left 40,000 horses for the cavalry, 20,000 baggage mules, and 30,000 abds for the stables” (3:104 = 1:140).

33. Al-Qazwīnī (682/1283): “It is said that [Yahyā b. Aktham, a high official under al-Ma’mūn] made efforts to collect handsome youths to serve as mamlūks of the caliph [al-Ma’mūn]. He said to them: ‘If not for you we would not be believers.’

‘Al-Ma’mūn heard of this and ordered that 400 handsome mamlūks go every day to his door; when he went out, they rode in his service to the Caliph’s palace.”

“His armies increased in size until his mamlūks numbered 70,000” (Athār al-Bilād, pp. 318, 385).

34. Ibn Ṭiqqāqā (709/1309): “al-Muṭaṣim increased the numbers of mamlūks” (al-Fakhīrī, p. 231).

35. Ibn Shākir al-Kutubi (764/1363) and ad-Damiri (808/1405): “He had 8,000 mamlūks” (Fawāt al-Wafāyat, 2:533 = Ḥayāh, 1:75).

III. Ṭūlūn

36. Al-Balawi (late 4th/10th century) and Ibn Saʿīd al-Maghribī (685/1286): “Ṭūlūn was of the Tughuz Ghuzz. He was taken to al-Ma’mūn by Nūḥ b. Asad, the governor of Bukhara and Khurasan, when Nūḥ b. Asad was in charge of the money, raqāqs, workhorses, etc., every year. This happened in the year 200/816” (Sīrat, p. 33 = [Vollers ed., Weimar, 1895] p. 4).


38. Ibn Khallikân (681/1282): Ibn Ţūlûn's “father was a mamlûk given to al-Ma'mûn by Nûh b. Asad the Samanid, the governor of Bukhara. Ţūlûn was one of a group of raqûqs taken to al-Ma'mûn in 200/816. Ţūlûn died in 240/854” (Wafâyât al-Á'ŷân, 1:173).

39. Ibn al-Ībrî (1286): “Ţūlûn was a Turkish mamlûk of al-Ma'mûn” (al-Mukhtâṣar, p. 147).

40. Ibn Taghri Birdî (874/1469): Ibn Ţūlûn’s “father was Ţūlûn, the mawlû of Nûh b. Asad b. Sâmân the Samanid, the governor of Bukhara and Khurasan. Nûh gave him, in a group of mamlûks, to al-Ma'mûn b. ar-Rashid, who raised him until Ţūlûn became one of the amirs” (an-Nujûm, 3:1).

IV. No Slavery Mentioned

41. Al-Balâdhûrî (279/892): “Al-Ma'mûn used to write to his governors of Khurasan to raid those peoples of Transoxiana who had not submitted to Islam. He also used to send envoys [there] to enroll those who were willing [to convert] onto the Military Register [i.e. they became soldiers for the caliph when they became Muslims]. He wanted to enroll both the people and the princes of these parts, so he treated them well; when they came to him, he honored and favored them.

“When al-Mu'tasîm became caliph, he did the same to the point that most of his military leaders came from Transoxiana: Soghdians, Farghanians, Ushrusanians, peoples of Shash, and others. [Even] their kings came to him. Islam spread among those who lived there, so they began raiding the Turks who lived beyond them” (FB, p. 341).

42. Michael (1199): “He set troops to combat the Zuṭṭ who lived on the lakes into which the Euphrates and Tigris spill; these people were ever in revolt and molested the king. . . . But the government troops could do nothing against them, since they fought in boats. So the king [al-Mu'tasîm] sent against them Egyptian captives that he had brought from Egypt. They were used to water and swam like fish. [The Egyptians subsequently beat the Zuṭṭ.] When the king saw the Egyptians' brilliant feats of arms in combat against the Zuṭṭ, he liked them and took a num-
ber of them in his service, to work in his gardens and parks, to weave linen cloth with the Egyptian style of embroidery; he permitted the rest of them to return to their country" (3:84).

43. Ibn Khallikān (681/1282): “Al-Mu’tasîm had many Farghanians brought to him. They used to describe the courage and daring of Juff and others in battle. Al-Mu’tasîm sent someone to bring them to him. When they arrived, he honored them greatly and assigned them military land-grants in Samarra [in return for their military service]. (The land-grants of Juff are known until now [mid-7th/13th century] and are still inhabited.) Juff had children and died in Baghdad . . . on 3 Shawwāl 247/10 December 861” (Wafayāt al-Aṣyān, 5:56).

44. Ibn Khaldūn (808/1406): “al-Mu’tasîm trained (ištanaṣ’a) a group of people of al-Hawf in Egypt and called them al-Muṭāriba; also a group from Samarqand, Ushrūsana, and Farghana, whom he called al-Farghāna. Most of them are youths” (Ibar, 3:257).

10. In the original: al-Ḥarf.
11. In the original: Ushrūsana.
GLOSSARY

'abd: Slave (see Appendix 1)

Arabian: A person living in Arabia or who traces his ancestry to there

Arabian period: The era during which the Arabians dominated Islam,
from Muḥammad to 132/750

Dār al-Ḥarb: Regions not under the control of Muslims

Dār al-Islām: Regions under the control of Muslims

dhimmi: A believer in one of the scriptuary religions recognized by Islam
who lives in a region under the control of Muslims. He has a pre-
scribed position in Islamic law.

Diwān (al-Jund): The Military Register

early Islam: The germinative period of Islamicate history, from
Muḥammad to al-Maʾmūn (d. 218/833)

free: Never having experienced slavery; not of slave origins

free mawla: A mawla who has not experienced slavery, who is not of
slave origins, i.e. a mawla-ally, mawla-convert, or mawla-agent

freed slave: A slave who has been manumitted

former master: The master of a former slave; one who has no real con-
trol over the slave

former slave: A slave who has become independent, whether man-
umitted or not; opposite of a true slave

gulām: Slave (see Appendix 1)

government area: an area which in premodern times could support
concentrated populations and in which highly structured political
organizations—governments—developed

government slave: A slave who holds political power and who emerged
from the ruler's or a high official's household

ḥadīth: A report of a saying or an action of the Prophet Muḥammad; or
such reports collectively

insider: A member of the ethnic, social, religious, and economic pre-
dominant group of a settled region

ipsismission: The process by which slaves with military power become
independent by seizing power on their own

Islamlām: "The society in which the Muslims and their faith are recog-
nized as prevalent and socially dominant . . . not . . . an area as such
but a complex of social relations" (Hodgson, 1:58. Emphasis in the origi-
nal)

Islamic: Pertaining only to the religion (not the civilization) of Islam

Islamicate: Pertaining to the civilization (not just the religion) of Islam

Jahili: The period immediately preceding Islam in Arabia
Jahiliya: The society of Arabia just before Islam

*jihād*: Religious war by Muslims against non-Muslims

*khādim*: Slave, eunuch (see Appendix 1).

*khums*: The one-fifth part of captured booty and prisoners which the Qurʾān declares the property of “God, the Prophet, his near of kin, orphans, the poor, and wayfarers” (8:42). In practice, it was collected by the central government.

*mamlūk*: Slave (see pp. 5-6 and Appendix 1)

*marginal area*: An area which in premodern times did not support concentrated populations in cities or dense agriculture; specifically, the steppes, deserts, mountains, and forests

*marginal area soldier*: A soldier coming from a marginal area and his descendents

*Marwanid period*: The era 64-132/684-750 (For a justification of this term, see Hodgson, 1:221, n. 7.)

*mawla*: Here, the *mawla*-*l-asfal* (lower mawla); in early Islam this included several distinct types of person: the slave and free mawlas concern us most

*military slave*: A person of slave origins who has been acquired in a systematic manner, trained for military purposes, and spends most of his career as a professional soldier

*military slavery*: The system for acquiring, training, and employing slaves as soldiers

*Muslim (adj.)*: Pertaining to those who believe in Islam (cf. Islamic and Islamicate)

*ordinary slave*: A slave not in the army or government

*outsider*: Either a foreigner or a member of a disadvantaged indigenous group

*patron*: The *mawla*-*min fawq* (upper mawla), the person to whom a mawla is affiliated

*premodern*: The eras before Europe transformed the life of a non-European people

*raqiq*: Slave (see Appendix 1)

*Ṣaḥāba*: The companions of Muḥammad, those who knew him

*Sharīʿa*: The sacred law of Islam

*slave*: A person who had at some point been enslaved, even if he was later manumitted or ipsimitted; of slave origins

*slave mawla*: In practice, any freedman of a Muslim patron

*slave soldier*: Same as a military slave

*true slave*: A person who fits the standard English meaning of *slave*: “one who is the property of, and entirely subject to, another person”
(The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary); a person who is actually and legally servile

`ulamā': Muslim religious scholars and authorities (comparable to Jewish rabbis)

`umma': The community of Muslims

unfree: Slaves and mawlas in early Islam

`wāla': The bond between a mawla and a patron

`wasīf': Slave (see Appendix 1)
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The dates following the authors of primary sources, unless otherwise indicated, refer to the year of death: if the author was Muslim, both Hijra and common (Christian) years are given; if Christian, only the common date. Included among the primary sources are three modern compilations by Balog, Combe, and Grohmann.

An asterisk (*) indicates that I have relied on a translation; a slash (/) between two page references in a note separates a text reference from the translation of the same work. A dagger (†) indicates books that I have not seen. I saw P. Crone’s Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of the Islamic Polity (Cambridge, 1980) too late to consider its ideas in this study.

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